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Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to present and motivate the relative modality view,
whereby at least the non-logical alethic kinds of modality are mere relative
forms of logical modality. The first chapter is devoted to presenting the
relative modality view in general, providing a correct formulation, and con-
sidering some arguments for and against. The next chapter considers the
particular challenges raised for the view by some essentialists. The third
chapter turns to look at logical modality, the bedrock of the relative modal-
ity view, and presents an example of an account of logical necessity which
suits it well. I argue that logical necessity is that necessity implicated in a
deductively valid argument, and hence that its source is to be found in an
account of the laws of logic. I argue that the laws of logic are constitutive-
normative laws of thought. The fourth chapter takes a more historical turn.
Here I argue that Kant can be understood as advocating a relative modality
view, in particular for what he calls “real modality”. In the fifth and final
chapter I will draw on the conclusions of the preceding chapters to present a
Kantian relative account of metaphysical necessity. Metaphysical necessity
is that which follows, as a matter of logical necessity, from conditions on our
having any experience of an objective world. I argue why this Kant-inspired
kind of relative necessity is well-suited to play the role of metaphysical ne-
cessity, and consider how the view accommodates contemporary views about
features of metaphysical necessity and its typical cases.
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Introduction
There is a surfeit of questions to be asked about possibility and necessity.
One family of questions concerns different kinds of modality, including ques-
tions such as: How many different kinds of modality are there? Are some
of those kinds of modality definable in terms of/reducible to other kinds?
Is one kind of necessity absolute, i.e. at least as strong as every other kind
of necessity? Are some kinds of modality simply incommensurable? In the
following, I hope to begin addressing some of these questions. I plan to
motivate and develop an account of modality according to which at least
the standard alethic modalities (metaphysical, mathematical, natural, etc.),
if not further kinds of modality (epistemic, deontic), are relative forms of
logical modality.
A different kind of question concerns the very nature of possibility and
necessity. Such issues will have an important role to play in a fully-developed
account of relative modality. If an account can be given of the (non-logical)
alethic modalities in terms of logical modality, then an investigation into the
source and nature of logical modality should potentially provide an account
of the source and nature of all alethic modalities. If the relative modality
account can be extended further to other, non-alethic modalities, then such
an investigation would have the potential to get to the heart of modality tout
court. My discussion of relative modality will be set against a background
agenda to potentially provide an alternative to certain popular accounts of
the nature of modality.
For one, my aim is to try to give an account of modality which does not
make use of the notion of a possible world. To properly argue against any
possible worlds account of the nature of modality would be a hefty project
in itself, so I will limit myself to a few remarks. First, without having to
explicitly argue against a possible worlds view, it is an interesting exercise to
see how far an alternative account can get without appeal to worlds. If such
an account seems plausible and well-motivated, then possible worlds might
begin to look like a gratuitous addition to a metaphysics of modality. Sec-
ondly, the current project is to explore relativizing other kinds of modality
to logical modality. The standard Lewisian pluriverse of possible worlds, and
its variants, is typically taken to be a pluriverse of metaphysically possible
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worlds.1 Expanding the pluriverse to include logically possible worlds would
take the account further and further from standard views. If one is going to
reject a standard account anyway, why retain the structure of a pluriverse of
worlds? In short, the account to be developed is intended as an alternative
to the standard possible worlds accounts of modality. If successful, then the
existence of an alternative account at all should begin to cast doubt on the
standard worlds view.
Another increasingly popular account of the nature of modality is a
certain brand of essentialism. This view takes metaphysical modality to
have its source in the nature of all things, and logical modality to be a sub-
species of metaphysical modality.2 Again, the view I present is intended to
provide an alternative. Not only do my account and essentialism differ with
respect to the nature of modality, but they also clash when it comes to the
structure of the views. E.g., the relative modality view does not accept the
essentialist claim that metaphysical necessity is absolute. As a consequence,
there will be more discussion of essentialism as a rival to my proposed view
than of possible worlds views.
And so to relative modality. When considering the topic of relative
modality there are at least three different issues, arising from different dis-
ciplines. First, there has been extensive work in linguistics and philosophy
of language to argue that modal terms in our language are univocal, al-
beit relative to some parameters, fixed by context. This view has been put
forward most famously by Kratzer (1977) and in other works, where she
argues, amongst other things, that different “must”s share a core meaning,
relativized to contextually defined sets of worlds and orderings of worlds.
Other proponents of versions of this view regarding modal language include
Lycan (1994), White (1975), Wertheimer (1972) and Lewis (1979).
The second issue has a formal character, related to the discipline of logic.
This concerns whether it is possible to define all modal operators in terms
of just one, privileged, modal operator. Instead of having different modal
operators to express, e.g., physical necessity, deontic necessity and logical
necessity, one might seek to define the former two in terms of the latter.
This is one way to interpret the contribution of Smiley (1963), and is the
kind of project for which Humberstone (1981b) and van Fraassen (1977)
raise considerable formal challenges. The motivation for taking on such a
project may be more philosophical than formal, and the lessons taken may
be that, e.g., the logically strongest kind of necessity is in some significant
sense absolute,3 but these discussions focus on what can be done (or not)
formally.
Finally, there are issues in metaphysics, regarding what we should say
1E.g. Lewis (1986).
2See, e.g., Fine (1994, 2005); Hale (2002b).
3See section 2.1 for further explication.
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about modality in the world, modality as regards things rather than words.
What does that mean? The discussions in linguistics and philosophy of
language focus on modal sentences and modal terms. The metaphysics of
modality might be framed in terms of what modal sentences and terms
are about, or what, if anything, determines whether they are true or false.
What exactly this amounts to can depend upon the kind of metaphysical
background one already has. E.g., advocates of truthmaker theory hold
that in at least some cases, if something is true, then there is something
else which makes it true: a truthmaker. One can then ask: What are the
truthmakers for modal truths (assuming there are such truths)? If one
generally takes truthmakers to be facts, e.g., then one will want to know
whether modal truths are made true by modal facts or non-modal facts.
If the latter, one might conclude that modality is not a genuine feature of
reality; if the former, one will then want to investigate the nature of modal
facts. What makes them modal? Do they have a special property? Do
they contain a special kind of constituent? Do modal features of reality
depend for their existence on something else (e.g. human conventions) or
are they ontologically independent? It is clear that these are questions in
metaphysics, and not philosophy of language. It is metaphysical issues that
I will be at pains to address in the following. However, considerations of
language and logic can and will be brought to bear.
The relevant metaphysical questions for a theory of relative modality
assume to begin with that there is modality in the world, one way or another,
and asks how many different species there are, and how they are related. A
relative view of modality will claim that most kinds of modality in the world
are in fact merely relative forms of one other, privileged kind of modality. I
take these questions to be, at least initially, orthogonal to another important
set of metaphysical questions about the nature of modality, such as whether
the modal facts, features and so on, which provide truth-conditions for our
modal statements, are mind-independent features of reality, or whether they
are somehow mind-dependent. Even so, arising out the the relative modality
view will be consequences for our study of the nature of modality. E.g., the
question of the source of the modal “oomph” of merely relative modalities
may be reduced to the question of the source of the modal “oomph” of the
fundamental modality of which the relative modalities are forms.
I should add that one version of a relative modality view would be to
claim that there is more than one kind of fundamental modality, and that all
other kinds are definable in terms of one or other of these fundamental kinds.
This kind of view is perhaps in the spirit of the work of Fine, especially Fine
(2005), where he claims that metaphysical, natural and normative necessity
are all fundamental, and that other kinds of necessity can be defined in terms
of these fundamental necessities. Perhaps one might wish to be a pluralist
about modality as well as a relativist, but, as we shall see, this may turn out
to undermine some of the arguments for holding a relative view of modality
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to begin with.
The aim of this thesis is to present and motivate the relative modality
view, whereby at least the non-logical alethic kinds of modality are mere
relative forms of logical modality. The first chapter will be devoted to pre-
senting the view, determining its correct formulation, and considering some
arguments for and against. The next chapter will consider the particular
challenges raised for the view by some essentialists. The third chapter will
turn to look at logical modality, the bedrock of the relative modality view,
and present an example of an account of logical necessity which suits it well.
The fourth chapter will take a more historical turn. Here I will argue that
Kant can be understood as advocating a relative modality view, in particular
for what he calls “real modality”. In the fifth and final chapter I will draw
on the conclusions of the preceding chapters to present a Kantian relative
account of metaphysical necessity.
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Chapter 1
Relative Modality
1.1 Formulating Relative Modality
1.1.1 Consequence and Conditionals
It seems quite natural to make statements like the following: physical neces-
sity is a matter of following from the laws of physics, and physical possibility
is a matter of being compatible with the laws of physics. It seems natural
to explicate certain kinds of modality in terms of consequence and compat-
ibility relations to sets of propositions, such as the laws of physics. How
should we formulate a relative modality view more precisely? There are two
closely related ways to go. First, such views are often framed in terms of
logical consequence from or logical compatibility with a set of propositions.
So if some kind of modality, R-modality, is relative to some set of proposi-
tions Φ, the R-necessities will be characterized as those propositions which
follow logically from Φ, and the R-possibilities will be characterized as those
propositions which are logically compatible with Φ (those propositions which
when added to Φ do not entail a contradiction).1
〈p〉 is R-necessary: Φ  〈p〉
〈p〉 is R-possible: Φ ∪ {〈p〉} 2 ⊥
E.g., in the case of physical modality, one might take Φ to be the set of
propositions expressing the laws of physics, and the physical necessities to
be those propositions which follow logically from the laws of physics.2
1I will be putting things in terms of propositions. I want to remain uncommitted
regarding what exactly are the things which are related by consequence. These might be
sentences, thoughts, senses of sentences (Fregean thoughts), facts, Russellian propositions,
states of affairs, etc. In the following “proposition” should be taken to be as neutral a
term as possible.
2A note on notation: I shall use “R-modality” as a place-holder for different kinds of
relative modality, e.g. physical-modality. I shall use small Greek letters for propositional
variables and Greek capital letters for names of sets. The expression “〈p〉” is the name of
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A second formulation of the view is in terms of a necessitated conditional.
Here, if R-modality is relative to some fundamental modality, expressed by
a necessity operator “”, then the R-necessities are characterized as those
propositions p which are the consequents of true conditionals of the form
(ϕ → p), where ϕ details the conditions to which this kind of modality
is relative (it is the conjunction of the members of Φ). To take the case
of physical necessity again, here ϕ would amount to the conjunction of the
laws of physics, and the physical necessities would be those propositions p
for which it is true that it is -ly necessary that, if ϕ, then p. R-possibility
would accordingly capture the idea that ϕ does not rule some things out,
i.e. if 〈p〉 is Rly-possible, then ¬(ϕ→ ¬p).3
It is R-necessary that p: (ϕ→ p)
It is R-possible that p: ¬(ϕ→ ¬p)
This second formulation initially leaves open whether -modality, the fun-
damental kind of modality, is logical modality or something else entirely.4
In the following I will favour the operator-conditional formulation. At
least prima facie, this formulation is easier to deal with than the other. I
want to allow for nested modalities and quantifying into modal contexts—
even if, e.g., one doesn’t agree that there are genuinely iterated modali-
ties, one should at least be able to express the view with which one dis-
agrees. On the operator-conditional approach, most people take iteration
and quantifying-in to be unproblematic, whereas it is not so clear that this
is unproblematic on the predicate approach. Ultimately, it may turn out
that the two different ways of formulating relative necessity are logically
equivalent, so that nothing hangs on my choice here.
Another way to formulate relative necessity is in terms of possible worlds,
either tinkering with the accessibility relation between worlds, or taking
subsets of (the set of all) worlds, which amount to about the same thing.
Necessity as “truth in all worlds” is restricted in the case of R-necessity to
“truth in all R-accessible worlds” and possibility as “truth in some world”
is restricted to “truth in some R-accessible world”, where the relevant sub-
set of worlds is that picked out by an R-accessibility relation, and an R-
a proposition, to be read as “the proposition that p”.
3The formulation here now changes from “〈p〉 is R-necessary” to “it is R-necessary that
p”. This is to honour the fact that the relation of logical consequence is represented by
a predicate, “”, relating two names (of a set and of a proposition), whereas the boxed
conditional consists of an operator “” applied to a (conditional) proposition. Hence in
the first case I use the predicate “is R-necessary”, and in the second case the operator “It
is R-necessary that”. This is also why 〈p〉 following “” needs something to distinguish it
as the name of a proposition, in this case some brackets.
4See, e.g., the formalization at the end of Humberstone (1981), where the absolute
necessity to which other necessities are relative, represented by “”, does not behave as
one would expect logical necessity to behave, e.g. the S4 axiom is not generally valid.
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accessibility relation picks out a set of worlds. E.g., it will be physically
possible that p if and only if there is a physically possible world in which p
is true, where the physically possible worlds are a subset of possible worlds
picked out by a certain accessibility relation. In the following I will leave
aside this kind of view. As stressed above, part of my agenda is to give an
account of the metaphysics of modality without introducing an ontology of
possible worlds.
In short, it is best to take the operator-conditional formulation as our
first candidate for the canonical formulation of a relative modality view.
Given that it appears to be closely related (perhaps equivalent to) an in-
tuitive formulation in terms of logical consequence, I may at some points
put things in terms of logical consequence, although when it comes to being
more precise it will be better to adhere to the canonical formulation. How
exactly the operator-conditional formulation will look finally has not yet
been determined, due to some logical problems below.
1.1.2 Derivative Modality
An important consideration for a theory of relative necessity is that a princi-
pled line has to be drawn between the relative and the more basic modalities
of which others are relativized forms. “Relative” is typically contrasted with
“absolute”. Another related contrast can be made between “fundamental”
and “derivative”. Fine (2005) suggests that a kind of modality can be a
derivative form of another kind in two ways: relativization and restriction.
Depending upon which notion of necessity one starts with, there
are two main strategies for defining the other notions of necessity.
Suppose one starts with the narrow notion of logical necessity
(or with some other suitably narrow notion). The main problem
will then be to define the broader notions of necessity; and the
obvious way to do this is by relativization. . . . Suppose, on the
other hand, that one starts with the broad metaphysical notion of
necessity (or with some other suitably broad notion). The main
problem will then be to define the narrower notions of necessity;
and the obvious way to do this is by restriction. (Fine, 2005, pp.
236–7)
I will focus on the prospects for the first kind of derivative treatment of
modalities. Although fundamental modality is thus properly contrasted with
derivative modality in general, I may sometimes talk of relative as opposed
to fundamental necessities to avoid confusions arising from the notion of an
absolute modality. One can define absolute necessity as a kind of necessity
which is at least as strong as any other kind of necessity, which means that
if it is logically necessary that p, then it will be necessary in any other sense
(setting aside epistemic modalities, see section 2.1). From this alone, the
12
metaphysical point that the weaker necessities are nothing over and above
relative forms of the absolute necessity does not immediately follow. It might
be that there are interesting logical relations between different necessities
which, metaphysically speaking, are not mere forms of other necessities at
all.
Terminology aside, if one holds the view that one kind of modality is
fundamental, and all other kinds are mere relative versions of it, then one
might be obliged to tell a convincing story about why this, and not some
other, kind of modality is fundamental. There will be a similar story about
why the other kinds of modality are not fundamental. The simplest account
is perhaps just that the relative modalities are definable in terms of the
fundamental modality, however, it seems to me that this gets the order of
explanation the wrong way around. Surely, if, e.g., we can define natural
necessity in terms of a relativization of logical necessity, this is because
natural necessity is a relative form of logical necessity. In the same way, a
mathematician might be loathe to admit that numbers are really sets just
because she can define numbers in terms of sets. It doesn’t seem to follow
from the fact that we can define one kind of thing in terms of another kind
of thing that the former is in fact a kind of the latter thing. Rather, one
explanation of the fact that we can provide such a definition is that one
kind of thing is really another kind of thing (although there may be other
explanations available). So, the challenge to provide an explanation of the
difference between relative and fundamental modality stands.
Bound up with the distinction between fundamental and relative modal-
ity is the requirement that fundamental modality be given a different ac-
count. Suppose one holds that if 〈p〉 is R-necessary, then this is to be
explained in terms of it being -necessary that if ϕ, then p. We cannot give
an account of what it is to be -necessary in terms of a -necessary con-
ditional, on pain of (vicious) circularity. Hence, work will have to be done
to flesh out an account of this fundamental necessity. In the case where
-necessity is logical necessity, this amounts to the requirement to give an
independent account of the nature of logical necessity.
The current project is focused on the prospects for treating as much
modality as possible as relative. But what about the other kind of derivative
modality, restricted modality? First, I must take care to make sure that my
arguments for relative modality are not, in fact, arguments merely for most
modalities being derivative, i.e. either relative or restrictive. Second, even
if it is granted that many kinds of modality can be treated as relative, when
it comes to particular kinds of modality, there may still be an open question
regarding whether they are best treated as relative or restricted forms of
(what may be a relative form of) modality. E.g., even if an account of
metaphysical necessity as mere relative logical necessity is successful, it may
be that the best way to define some other kinds of necessity is in terms of a
restriction on metaphysical necessity.
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1.1.3 Logical Problems
The logical study of relative modality has uncovered some problems. First,
Humberstone (1981b, 2004) raises a problem for relative modalities for which
the T-axiom is valid, i.e. modalities for which it is true that, if it is R-
necessary that p, then it is true that p. This is an axiom that we will want
to be valid for a number of kinds of modality which I also want to treat as
relative, such as metaphysical and physical necessity, so this problem is of
great importance.
Consider a (relative) modal operator O1 such that O1A is defined as
(C1 → A), for some necessity operator , and some conditions C1.
O1A =df (C1 → A)
Suppose that the T-axiom is valid for O1, i.e.
` O1A→ A
This is translated as
` (C1 → A)→ A.
Now consider the case where the proposition A is C1. Nothing so far rules
this out.
` (C1 → C1)→ C1.
The antecedent of the conditional is provable so we can detach the conse-
quent (using modus ponens), which is therefore provable, and by necessita-
tion we get that conditions C1 are logically necessary.
(1) ` (C1 → C1)→ C1 instance of T
(2) ` (C1 → C1) tautology
(3) ` (C1 → C1) necessitation rule, 2
(4) ` C1 modus ponens, 1, 3
(5) ` C1 necessitation rule, 4
This leads to the unenviable result that our relative necessity operator, O1A,
collapses into our necessity operator . If conditions C1 are -necessary,
then whatever follows from them will also be -necessary, in particular
proposition A. So if a proposition A is R-necessary, thus formulated, it
follows that A is  necessary, i.e.
` O1A ⊃ A
The opposite direction is simply an instance of the following which is valid
in system K
` A ⊃ (B ⊃ A)
i.e.
` A ⊃ (C1 ⊃ A).
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So R-necessity is just equivalent to -necessity.
` A↔ (C1 ⊃ A)
` A↔ O1A
So we can’t define relative necessities in this way.
By taking A as C1, then even assuming only the logical properties
conferred on  by K, the smallest normal modal logic, we have a
conditional whose antecedent is provable and whose consequent
is therefore detachable, so that C1 is provable, and hence by
necessitation, our logic contains (5.6) and accordingly also (5.7)
for all formulas A:
(5.6) C1
(5.7) (C1 → A)↔ A
(2004, p. 50)
The problem is compounded if we consider that we may wish to include
two or more relative modalities satisfying the T-axiom. In the case of a
second operator O2, things go much the same, such that, as soon as we
also have the result that (C2 → A) ↔ A, we can infer from there that
(C1 → A)↔ (C2 → A), and that O1A↔ O2A, contradicting the initial
assumption thatO1 andO2 were distinct modal operators expressing distinct
modalities.
A second problem comes from assuming that our basic modal operator
 satisfies the S4 axiom: A→ A. Logical necessity, e.g., is commonly
assumed to satisfy this principle. Humberstone (1981b) shows that if S4 is
valid for , not only does this make any relative necessity operators also
satisfy S4, but that the additional necessity operator in the consequent of
the axiom could be any necessity operator, and not necessarily the same as
in the antecedent.
Giving the S4 axiom to “” has the unfortunate consequence of
making all the operators translated S4-ish, because
(C → A) → (C → (C → A)) is an instance of a theorem
of S4. . . . Things are even worse, because the second occurrence
of C here could be replaced by anything and we should still
have a theorem of K4, and so once we accept A → A we
are lumbered with proofs of the translations of formulae like
O1A→ O2O1A for any (however unrelated) O1 and O2 we choose
to deal with in the manner indicated. (1981b, p. 35)
A third problematic example involves two operators, O1 and O2, where
the T-axiom is valid for O2, and the T-axiom is not valid for O1 but axioms
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(i) and (ii) are:
(i) A→ O1¬O1¬A B
(ii) O1A→ ¬O1¬A D
Translated respectively as5
(i) A→ (C1 → ♦(C1 & A))
(**) C1
From these assumptions it can be derived in K that T is valid for O1 af-
ter all.6 At the very least, this drastically restricts the kinds of necessity
operators one is able to define in the proposed way.
Humberstone proposes a solution to the problem using two-dimensional
modal semantics. At the heart of the problem, he says, is the fact that the
relevant conditions to which necessity is relative are not properly expressed
as a proposition, picking out a set of worlds in which it is true. Rather,
the relevant factor is an accessibility relation between worlds. When we
formulate the view in terms of a proposition, rather than a relation, of
course trouble ensues.
If we are trying to encode information about modal operators
with their own accessibility relations, in terms of sets of worlds—
the sets at which the constants Ci are true—then we are bound
to lose information. (Humberstone, 2004, p. 51)
Humberstone thus replaces “Ci” with “Ri”. “Ri” is a constant standing
for a relation between worlds. A given such R is valid with respect to two
worlds x and y just when y is accessible from x. E.g.
If we have in mind a formalization of physical necessity, we might
read “xy R” as “the laws of x are true in y”. (1981b, p. 38)
Humberstone calls these strange creatures Ri “dipropositions”, in order to
emphasise their relationality. The first problem, arising from taking the T-
axiom to be valid, occurs because we can freely substitute any proposition
for A, including Ci. This kind of substitution is blocked by Humberstone’s
strategy, because only propositions can be substituted into A’s position, and
R stands for a diproposition.
The propositional variables really do range over propositions, but
the sentential constants Ri cannot be substituted for them be-
cause the latter are not propositional constants. In the terminol-
ogy of [Humberstone (1981)], they are semantically interpreted
5(**) is not a direct translation, but introduced by Humberstone for simplicity as it is
inter-deducible in K with what is the direct translation: (C1 → A) → ¬(C1 → ¬A).
See Humberstone (1981b, p. 35)
6See Humberstone (1981b, pp. 35–6)
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not as propositions but as dipropositions—sets of (ordered) pairs
of worlds. (Humberstone, 2004, p. 53)
One strategy to solve the logical problems with the formulation of a relative
modality view is to use “dipropositions” in the role of the conditions to
which modalities are relative.
There is at least one pressing problem with Humberstone’s strategy. In
the current project, it is not clear how one could make sense of a dipropo-
sition. This is easy enough to understand in terms of possible worlds—they
express relations between worlds, or denote sets of ordered pairs of worlds.
But if we are interested in an application to the metaphysics of modality, and
not just the logical issues, this would require us to take seriously an ontology
of worlds. I.e. relative modality would be relative to sets of ordered pairs of
worlds. If one wishes to avoid this kind of ontology when giving an account
of modality, then an alternative interpretation of Humberstone’s diproposi-
tion is required. Note that by this I do not mean some kind of anti-realist
account of possible worlds, but an interpretation that does not require us
to bring in worlds at all. Note also that this is not a criticism of using a
notion of possible world to give a semantics for modal languages in general:
the problem arises because the project is to give a metaphysical account of
different kinds of modality, so this strategy would require dipropositions to
appear in the metaphysics of modality, not just a semantics.
Thankfully, alternative solutions are available. I will discuss two broad
strategies, the first involving the addition of a conjunct or disjunct to the
formulation, the second involving the application of a quantifier.
1.1.4 Adding a conjunct(disjunct)
This strategy involves drawing a line between those relative modalities which
are intended to validate the T-axiom and those which are not. We might call
the former “veridical” or “factive” modalities, given that according to them
necessity implies truth, and the others “non-veridical” (“non-factive”).7
We can then define relative modalities for each group as follows.
7This relates to a distinction made by Wertheimer (1972) between Systems to which
modalities are relative, namely Systems of Actuality and Systems of Ideality. His view
provides an example of how a motivation can be given for making a principled distinction
between the two types of modality, beyond theoretical utility.
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Veridical Modality
It is R-necessary that p: (ϕ→ p) & ϕ
It is R-possible that p: ¬(ϕ→ ¬p) ∨ ¬ϕ
Non-veridical Modality
It is R-necessary that p: (ϕ→ p)
It is R-possible that p: ¬(ϕ→ ¬p)
First, for veridical modalities, if  validates the T-axiom, then this for-
mulation validates the T-axiom without falling foul of the collapse problem.
T is valid because, from the necessary conditional from ϕ to 〈p〉, together
with ϕ, we can infer 〈p〉. However, the proof for the collapse breaks down.
T is now translated as
((ϕ→ p) & ϕ)→ p.
Substituting ‘ϕ’ for ‘p’, we get the following
((ϕ→ ϕ) & ϕ)→ ϕ.
Even detaching the provable element (ϕ→ ϕ) we are still left with ϕ→ ϕ
which, although true, does not allow us to infer to ϕ, and hence by ne-
cessitation to ϕ. The problem does not arise in the case of non-veridical
modalities because we do not require the T-axiom to be valid for them.
Therefore, the extra conjunct in the formulation is omitted.
Unfortunately, this strategy breaks down when it comes to the second
problem. Recall, the problem was that
(C → A)→ (C → (C → A))
is a theorem of S4, thus forcing all operators OiA defined as (Ci → A) to
validate S4. The equivalent formulation of S4 for operators defined according
to the conjunct-formulation is
((C → A) & C)→ ((C → ((C → A) & C)) & C).
This is certainly a different formula, but it is also a theorem of S4. Proof:
(1) (C → A) & C Assumption
(2) (C → A) 1, propositional logic
(3) C 1, propositional logic
(4) (C → A)→ (C → (C → A)) Theorem of S4
(5) (C → (C → A)) 2, 4, MPP
(6) (C → C) Theorem of K (and so of S4)
(7) (C → ((C → A) & C)) 5, 6, rule valid in K
(8) (C → ((C → A) & C)) & C 3, 7, propositional logic
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This gives us a proof of (8), on the assumption that (1). Hence, we have a
proof of (1)→(8) without assumption. Therefore,
((C → A) & C)→ ((C → ((C → A) & C)) & C).
is a theorem of S4.8
One way to save the formulation is to reconsider part of Humberstone’s
diagnosis, that the problem comes from overly permissive substitutions. In
his new system, all the key axioms, such as his S4*
(R → A)→ (R → (R → A)) where A is R-free
come along with this proviso that A be R-free. With the extra condition,
the axiom is not a theorem of S4, and so is independent of the S4-ishness
(or not) of .9 Humberstone’s two-dimensional system allows him to show
that these axioms are valid only for R-free substitutions. If we are not to
adopt the two-dimensional account of the conditions to which modalities are
relative, then we may still learn the lesson that we need to make a principled
restriction on the substitutions allowed into consequent position. What kind
of rationale is available for such a restriction? One option would be to build a
restriction into an account of the conditions to which modalities are relative.
One would need to argue that there is something about being selected to play
the role of conditions for R-modality which makes a proposition unsuited to
itself be assessed for R-possibility and R-necessity. E.g., one might argue
as follows: if a certain class of deontic necessities are those propositions
which follow logically from a given moral code, what should we say about
the modal status of this code? Surely it follows logically from itself, and is
therefore also deontically necessary? But there was something special about
the code before we went through the motions of showing it to be deontically
necessary. Assessing the moral code for deontic possibility and necessity
(relative to itself) misses the point of choosing that moral code in the first
place, without having taken into account deontic modality at all.
This kind of argument is not convincing. Even if one accepts that a
special status is conferred on conditions for a relative modality, why does
that make it illegitimate to assess it for R-modality, rather than just unin-
teresting? Without filling out the details, such a restriction hardly seems as
promising as Humberstone’s use of dipropositions. In order for the restric-
tion to work at a logical level, what needs to be argued is that for any q,
and any p, if q occurs thus in the formula (q → p) & q, then q cannot be
substituted into the position of p in virtue of the fact that q already occurs
thus. It is hard to see how this could be motivated in purely logical terms.
8Proof by Fabrice Correia.
9Actually, it turns out that S4, A→ A, will now not be valid for  for arbitrary
A, but only for R-free A.
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One might offer some different motivation—e.g. it is wrong-headed to as-
sess moral principles against themselves—but this will not serve to block
the logical problem.
A final problem with this formulation is epistemological. Suppose I want
to assert that a proposition p is R-necessary. It seems that in order to be in a
position to assert this, i.e. that 〈p〉 follows logically from ϕ (and ϕ), I need to
know the content of ϕ (or at least believe that I know it). E.g., in the case of
physical necessity, it’s not that I assert merely that p follows from “the laws
of physics” (and “the laws of physics” are true). I don’t just describe the
laws of physics, I really need to state them: ϕ stands in for a (conjunctive)
proposition, it does not stand in for a description. So it seems that I need
to know what the laws of physics are (or at least believe that I know what
they are) to put myself in a position to legitimately make assertions about
physical modality. However, it seems that we do understand what physical
necessity and possibilty are, and can make assertions about them, without
knowing the laws of physics.
One response to this problem is to reiterate that the aim of the project
is not to analyse the meaning of modal phrases such as “It is physically
necessary that...”, or the conditions under which we understand them, but
rather to give an account of what it is for something to be physically neces-
sary. That said, if what it is for something to be physically necessary is for
it to follow logically from a conjunction ϕ, which states the laws of physics,
it would seem that we won’t be able to say anything about the nature of
physical necessity, or to state that something is physically necessary, without
being able to state the laws of physics.
1.1.5 Quantifiers
Another strategy for resolving Humberstone’s problems is to introduce a
quantifier into the formulation.10 This can be motivated as follows. In the
background of the account is an assumption, namely that there is a suitable
set of premises or conjunction of propositions to which the conclusion or
consequent is relatively necessary, possible or impossible. E.g., in the case of
physical modality, there is a background assumption that there are some laws
of physics. In general, there is an assumption that if it is relatively necessary
that p, then there is some (conjunctive) proposition with respect to which it
is necessary that p. The current strategy brings such assumptions into the
limelight, making them explicit in the form of an existential quantification.
The simplest formulation is as follows:
It is relatively necessary that p: ∃ϕ(ϕ→ p)
It is relatively possible that p: ¬∃ϕ(ϕ→ ¬p)
[∀ϕ¬(ϕ→ ¬p)]
10Suggested by Bob Hale.
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I.e. it is relatively necessary that p just when there is a conjunction ϕ such
that 〈p〉 is a logical consequence of ϕ. It is relatively possible that p just
when it is not the case that there is a conjunction ϕ such that the negation
of 〈p〉 is a logical consequence of ϕ (alternatively, for any conjunction ϕ,
it is not the case that the negation of 〈p〉 is a logical consequence of ϕ).
I have framed this formulation as purporting to define relative modality,
rather than a particular kind of R-modality. This is because we haven’t said
anything about ϕ. All that has been said is that there is some ϕ from which
〈p〉 follows. We can only advance to the claim that it is necessary that p
in some particular sense, e.g. physically necessary or doxastically necessary,
once we specify that the propositions to which 〈p〉 is relatively necessary
are, e.g., laws of physics or things believed by the Queen.11
This first formulation is, however, too simple. It immediately entails that
every proposition is relatively necessary, and that no proposition is relatively
possible! First, since it is true that ∀p(p → p), then quantifying-in, it is
also true that ∀p∃ϕ(ϕ→ p), i.e. every proposition p is relatively necessary.
It is trivial that every proposition p is relatively necessary (to itself), but
we need a way to express the view that certain interesting kinds of necessity
are relative.
Second, it is supposed to be relatively possible that p just when there is
no ϕ such that the negation of 〈p〉 follows logically from ϕ. Again, there are
no restrictions on the variable ϕ, on which propositions it may range over,
e.g., whether they are laws of physics or moral statements or what. So the
formulation of relative possibility states simply that it is relatively possible
that p if no proposition or conjunction of propositions entails ¬p. However,
for any proposition p, and its negation 〈¬p〉, it is the case that (¬p→ ¬p),
hence it is true that, for any proposition p, there is some proposition such
that it strictly implies 〈¬p〉. So nothing is relatively possible. It is hardly
attractive to define a notion out of existence in this way. The notion that we
do seem to want to express with relative possibility seems to be something
different, namely, that there is some ϕ which does not rule out 〈p〉:
It is relatively possible that p: ∃ϕ¬(ϕ→ ¬p)
This looks better, but it is no longer the dual of relative necessity. (If one
has a good reason for denying that necessity and possibility are duals,12 one
will not be troubled by this, but that’s quite a big if.)
Something seems to have been lost in the change from names of proposi-
tions to propositional variables. Before, the name specified the proposition.
11Note, this is at best an informal rendering of “∃ϕ(ϕ→ p)”. Strictly speaking, “∃ϕ”
is a sentential quantifier, binding a variable which can be substituted by a sentence, rather
than a nominal quantifier which can be substituted by a name (e.g. of a proposition). So
talk of propositions here should not be taken seriously.
12See e.g. Prior (1957, pp.41-54)
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This meant that, e.g., in the case of physical necessity we could give an ac-
count in terms of “ϕ”, confident that “ϕ” named a conjunction of physical
laws. The variable ϕ, however, merely ranges over propositions, containing
no further information about features of these propositions. What seems to
be required is a condition on the variable, telling us what kind of propo-
sitions we are interested in for a given relative modality. (Note that this
moves us from a name of a proposition to a description of a proposition.)
We can now introduce a more complex quantifier formulation which adds
a condition on ϕ.13
It is R-necessary that p: ∃ϕ(Ψϕ & (ϕ→ p))
It is R-possible that p: ¬∃ϕ(Ψϕ & (ϕ→ ¬p))
Take “Ψϕ” to state something like “〈ϕ〉 is a conjunction of Ψ-propositions”.
These formulations then state that it is R-necessary that p just when there
is a ϕ such that ϕ is a conjunction of Ψ-propositions and 〈p〉 is a logical
consequence of ϕ. It is R-possible that p just when it is not the case that
there is a ϕ such that ϕ is a conjunction of Ψ-propositions and the negation
of 〈p〉 is a logical consequence of ϕ (alternatively, ∀ϕ¬(Ψϕ & (ϕ → ¬p)),
i.e., for any ϕ, it is not the case that ϕ is a conjunction of Ψ-propositions
and the negation of 〈p〉 is a logical consequence of ϕ).14
Note now that there are two different ways to be R-possible: it’s not be-
ing the case that the negation of 〈p〉 is a logical consequence of ϕ or ϕ’s failing
to be a conjunction of Ψ-propositions (i.e. there are no Ψ-propositions). To
illustrate, suppose it is physically possible that p just when it is not the case
that there is a ϕ such that ϕ is a conjunction of laws of physics and 〈¬p〉 is
a logical consequence of ϕ. So 〈p〉 can be physically possible when 〈¬p〉 does
not follow logically from laws of physics or when there is no conjunction of
laws of physics (perhaps the physical world is not law-like).
Furthermore, this avoids the problems above: relative possibility for 〈p〉
does not require there to be no proposition from which 〈¬p〉 follows, but
only that there be no proposition with the specified property Ψ from which
〈¬p〉 follows. Likewise, in order for it to be relatively necessary that p, there
must be a proposition satisfying Ψ from which 〈p〉 follows.
The solution to Humberstone’s problems is based on the illegitimacy
of introducing a variable into a quantified context where that variable is
already bound. I.e. the move from
∃ϕ(Ψϕ & (ϕ→ p))
to
∃ϕ(Ψϕ & (ϕ→ ϕ))
13This is the particular formulation suggested by Bob Hale.
14See footnote 11.
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is illegitimate.
This blocks Humberstone’s first problem by blocking the troublesome
substitution into an instance of the T-axiom, i.e.
∃ϕ(Ψϕ & (ϕ→ ϕ))→ ϕ
In order to prove that ϕ was a logical necessity in a similar way, one would
need a derivation such as
(1) ∃ψ(Ψψ & (ψ → ϕ)) ϕ is R-necessary
(2) ` ∃ψ(Ψψ & (ψ → ϕ))→ ϕ instance of T-axiom
(3) ` ϕ modus ponens, 1, 2
(4) ` ϕ necessitation rule, 3
However, such a derivation is unavailable. The rule of necessitation depends
upon a proposition being provable, i.e. we can only get ϕ from ` ϕ. In
order to get this result, the premises must also be provable. Although the
second premise may be valid as an instance of the T-axiom, the first is
not. We can only bring it in as an assumption. The following derivation is
correct, but it only tells us that ϕ follows from the premises, not that it is
logically true.
(1) ∃ψ(Ψψ & (ψ → ϕ)) ϕ is R-necessary
(2) ` ∃ψ(Ψψ & (ψ → ϕ))→ ϕ instance of T-axiom
(3) ϕ modus ponens, 1, 2
So Humberstone’s first problem can be dispatched (and without requiring a
distinction between veridical and non-veridical modalities).
Humberstone’s second problem is prima facie solvable for the same
reasons. The formula which expresses S4 for a relative modality on this
quantifier-formulation is.
∃ϕ(Ψϕ & (ϕ→ p))→ ∃ψ(Ψψ & (ψ → ∃ϕ(Ψϕ & (ϕ→ p))))
The question at hand is whether this is a theorem of an S4 system to which
suitable quantificational apparatus has been added.15 Here is an example of
how one might go about showing this. First, suppose the antecedent of the
formula.
∃ϕ(Ψϕ & (ϕ→ p))
Then, assuming a plausible ∃-elimination rule, we can infer an instance
Ψϕ0 & (ϕ0 → p)
15It can’t be a straightforward theorem of S4 because S4 is a propositional modal system
without quantifiers.
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From the second conjunct, in S4, we can infer that
(ϕ0 → (ϕ0 → p))
Assuming a plausible ∃-introduction rule, it seems reasonable to infer
(ϕ0 → ∃ϕ(ϕ→ p))
Bringing back the first conjunct we then have
Ψϕ0 & (ϕ0 → ∃ϕ(ϕ→ p))
And by existential generalization
∃ψ(Ψψ & (ψ → ∃ϕ(ϕ→ p)))
This potentially gives a proof, without assumption, of the following
∃ϕ(Ψϕ & (ϕ→ p))→ ∃ψ(Ψψ & (ψ → ∃ϕ(ϕ→ p)))
Note that this is close to our target formula, but crucially omits the em-
boldened part shown below.
∃ϕ(Ψϕ & (ϕ→ p))→ ∃ψ(Ψψ & (ψ → ∃ϕ(Ψϕ & (ϕ→ p))))
So this attempt at deriving the target formula in S4 fails.16 I leave the onus
on my opponent to show how one might succeed here differently.
I will not go into the details of Humberstone’s third problem. His deriva-
tions again rely upon a substitution that is rendered illegitimate by the
addition of a quantifier. Again, I will leave the onus on the opponent of rel-
ative modality to come up with proofs similar to Humberstone’s challenges
against the more complex formulations.
In summary, we have seen that adding a conjunct (disjunct) solves the
first logical problem only for veridical modalities, and falters on the second,
S4 problem. We have also seen that adding a quantifier (plus condition)
solves the problems. The best formulation of the view is therefore the fol-
lowing.
It is R-necessary that p: ∃ϕ(Ψϕ & (ϕ→ p))
It is R-possible that p: ¬∃ϕ(Ψϕ & (ϕ→ ¬p))
Having settled on a rather complex formulation, I may lapse in the fol-
lowing and put things in terms of a proposition following from a conjunction
or a set of premises, as in the first attempts at a formulation. I will allow
such lapses to enable ease of discussion, taking it as read that this implies
16Proof suggestion by Fabrice Correia.
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that there is such a conjunction, and that some salient predicate applies to
the conjunction.
The quantifier formulation I favour deals more naturally with the main,
important kinds of relative modality, in the clause “Ψϕ”, than with more
gerrymandered kinds. In order to generalize out to include, e.g., the kind of
necessity relativized to the conjunction of truths about the items in my desk
drawer and the proposition that 5+7 = 12, more complicated operators will
be required. At the most random limit, the operator will read something like
“ϕ is a conjunction of p, q, r”, listing the propositions conjoined in ϕ rather
than describing them via shared features. This quantifier formulation also
solves the epistemological problem mentioned above. One no longer needs to
know what the Ψ-propositions are. The formulation now says simply “There
is a conjunction of Ψ-propositions”, describing the conjunction, rather than
stating it.
A further detail is that this formulation can be presented either using
interpreted operators, or as a schema. In the first case, a different operator
is used for each kind of modality, i.e.
It is physically necessary that p: ∃ϕ(Pϕ & (ϕ→ p))
where Pϕ means ‘ϕ is a conjunction of laws of physics’.
It is desk-drawer necessary that p: ∃ϕ(Dϕ & (ϕ→ p))
where Dϕ means ‘ϕ is a conjunction of 2 + 2 = 4 and truths
about the items in my desk drawer’.
In the second case, different kinds of necessity are expressed using the same
schema, where the operator Ψ is interpreted differently for each different
kind.
It is physically necessary that p: ∃ϕ(Ψϕ & (ϕ→ p))
where Ψϕ is interpreted as Pϕ.
One challenge for this formulation will arise when attempting to flesh
out suitable predicates for familiar kinds of modality that we want to treat
as relative. E.g., how should we give a fuller account of the predicate “is a
conjunction of laws of physics”: what should we say about laws of physics?.
One thing is clear: we cannot give an account of these laws in terms of
physical necessity, such that to be a law of physics just is to be a physical
necessity. More generally, we cannot give an account of Ψ-propositions,
understood as a conjunction of some kind of laws, in terms of an R-necessity
defined in terms of Ψ. Of course, we may still allow that, e.g., a law of physics
is physically necessary, but this cannot be the defining feature of a law. This
is an issue that will need to be addressed (see section 1.3.5).
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1.2 The Scope of an Account of Relative Modality
1.2.1 Epistemic Modality
How far can the relative modality view be extended? It turns out that ex-
tending it to notions connected to propositional attitudes, such as epistemic,
doxastic and boulomaic (desire-based) modalities is problematic. Similar
problems also arise for deontic modalities.
The notions of epistemic necessity and possibility concern the “must”s
and “might”s in sentences such as:
(Given all the evidence) Joe must be the killer.
(For all I know) Jane might be at home.
These modalities are typically linked to sets of known propositions, or sets
of evidential propositions. It is thus tempting to extend an account of rel-
ative modality to the case where ϕ is a conjunction of known truths, or a
conjunction of propositions about the available evidence. E.g., epistemic
necessity would be defined as following from known truths.
epip ⇔ ∃ϕ(Kϕ & (ϕ→ p))
where “Kϕ” means something like “ϕ is a conjunction of known truths”.
Likewise, epistemic possibility would b e defined as compatibility with known
truths.
♦epip ⇔ ¬∃ϕ(Kϕ & (ϕ→ ¬p))
However, a problem arises when we consider logical truths. Logical
truths are strictly implied by any proposition whatsoever, and so all log-
ical truths will come out as epistemically necessary. They must be true, in
the epistemic sense of “must”. However, it seems that we also want to leave
room for the epistemic possibility of logical falsehoods. There are certain
propositions of logic for which we do not yet know if they are true or false.
So, we would intuitively describe both the proposition p and its negation ¬p
as being epistemically possible (i.e. “It might be that p, but then again, it
might be that ¬p”). However, according to the formulation above, only one
of the propositions will be epistemically possible, indeed, it will be epistem-
ically necessary, the other being epistemically impossible. Logic has already
decided although, epistemically speaking, the matter should be left open.
What to do? Perhaps we want to take into account those propositions
which follow only from ϕ.
epip ⇔ ∃ϕ(Kϕ & (ϕ→ p) & ∀ψ((Kψ & (ψ → p))→ ψ ≡ ϕ))
But this would be too strong. Surely most epistemic necessities are neces-
sary relative to a subset of one’s known truths. E.g., it may follow from all
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the truths I know about geography that Torquay is in Devon. I know other
truths. Call the conjunction of all the truths I know p, and call the conjunc-
tion of all the truths I know about geography q. The formula states that if
any proposition follows from a conjunction of my known truths, then that
proposition follows only from one unique conjunction of my known truths.
But that Torquay is in Devon follows both from p and from q, and ¬(p ≡ q).
In any case, the logical truths follow just as much from one conjunction
as from another. One might therefore try to explicitly rule them out, but
this would fare no better, e.g.
epip ⇔ ∃ϕ(Kϕ & (ϕ→ p)) & ¬p
This rules out any logical truth from being epistemically necessary, which is
an unwelcome result. Note, this doesn’t rule out logical truths from being
known: a logical truth l may be a conjunct of ϕ, and hence be strictly implied
by ϕ, but the second clause here rules out 〈l〉 from being epistemically
necessary on that basis. What is ruled out is, e.g., a logician being able to
make the true claim after going through a rigorous proof:
“Aha! Now I see, it must be that l.”
This is surely not something a good account of epistemic modality should
immediately rule out. Of course, his being able to make such a true claim
may be ruled out for other reasons, e.g., if there is no knowledge, and hence
no known truths from which 〈p〉 follows. The point is that the truth of the
claim shouldn’t be ruled out just from saying what epistemic necessity is,
whether or not there is any.
Such problems are not restricted to the case of logical truth, where the
relevant propositions follow from any set whatsoever. The set of Peano ax-
ioms is a set of arguably non-logical truths, jointly known by many people.
Whatever follows from these propositions ought therefore to be epistemi-
cally necessary, given the defintion above. However, certain propositions
about numbers such as Goldbach’s conjecture are not yet known to be true
(or false) by anyone. Granted that either Goldbach’s conjecture or its nega-
tion follows from the Peano axioms, it should be epistemically necessary or
epistemically impossible, yet we want to count both the conjecture and its
negation as being epistemically possible, given that the matter is still open.
I shall not address how to give an account of epistemic modality here,
but I will briefly run through some different ways one might respond to these
problems. First, Edgington (2004) draws a distinction between relative and
absolute epistemic modality. Relative epistemic modality depends upon
what is known by a subject at a time, i.e. it is relative to the state of
information of a subject at a time. Absolute epistemic modality, by contrast,
concerns what can be known whatever the state of information, subject, or
time. Edgington connects this absolute notion with the a priori.
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Relative epistemic possibilities are also constrained by two kinds
of thing, one peculiar to the subject—what she already takes
as known, the other not—what combinations of things can be
recognised as impossible whatever state of information the sub-
ject is in. Call these things absolutely epistemically impossible,
or a priori impossible. I leave unanswered the question of the
source of a priori knowledge. But I do capture the core of the
traditional notion: a priori knowledge is independent of the state
of information of the subject. We are all, at all times, capable
of ruling out that a thing be both round and square, and so on.
(Edgington, 2004, p. 6)
The suggestion one can take from Edgington’s notion of absolute epistemic
modality is that we should bite the bullet and accept that, for a given
unknown logical truth, yes, it is (absolutely) epistemically necessary, and its
negation is (absolutely) epistemically impossible. These kinds of truths can
be known in any state of information.
Edgington has provided us with an interesting option for accommodat-
ing epistemic modality in the relative modality view: allow the prima facie
unintuitive consequences regarding logical truths, but use them to delinate
the a priori. However, there is still a distinct notion of a kind of modality
importantly connected to what is known, and what can be known or ruled
out on that basis. This is the notion I described above, whereby an unknown
logical truth and its negation are both rendered possible. If that is not prop-
erly called “epistemic” modality, so be it. But there remains a question how
to accommodate this notion, call it “epistemish” modality, in the relative
modality framework. Another example of a nearby kind of modality is that
which is relative to a subject s’s true beliefs, rather than their knowledge
(for all s truly believes. . . ). The same problem arises: if s has no true belief
that p and no true belief that ¬p, for some logical truth p, then it doesn’t
seem right that 〈p〉 will nevertheless come out to be necessary or impossible
relative to s’s true beliefs. In order to apply Edgington’s strategy, one would
need a notion of an a priori true belief, but a prioricity is a notion attaching
to knowledge.
A further worry for this option is that it may have unwelcome conse-
quences when it comes to unknowable logical truths. Suppose it has been
proven that a given logical proposition, u, is undecidable, i.e. it has been
proven that there is no proof that u and no proof that ¬u. Suppose also that
〈u〉 is a very complicated proposition, such that our only chance for getting
to know whether it (or its negation) is true would be through a proof (i.e.
it would take too long to test every case, and it is too complex to be able to
just “see” its truth, and so on). Suppose, also, that we are non-deviant and
hold to the law of the excluded middle, so that either 〈u〉 or 〈¬u〉 is true.
Whichever is true, it will be a logical truth. Suppose that in fact 〈¬u〉 is the
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logical truth. On the proposed Edgington-inspired strategy, it will turn out
that 〈¬u〉 is knowable a priori : it can be known in any state of information
whatsoever. But it seems that one will be able to make a pretty good case
for 〈¬u〉 not being knowable at all. If it is knowable, then an explanation is
owed regarding how it could be known, given that the usual suspects (proof,
empirical testing, rational intuition) are ruled out.
Second, one promising way to try to capture the idea that we want to
know the logical consequences of ϕ in particular, not necessarily including
the logical consequences which follow from any propositions, would be to
make use of a Relevant Logic.17 This family of logics tries to avoid the
paradoxes of material and strict implication by trying to capture formally
the idea that in a valid inference the premises must be somehow “relevant” to
the conclusion. Given a conjunction of known propositions ϕ, not including
logical truths, the conclusion that p ⊃ p would not be said to follow logically
from ϕ in a Relevant Logic, even though in Classical Logic 〈p ⊃ p〉 is a
consequence of any premises whatsoever. So one would not be forced to
conclude that such a logical truth is epistemically necessary, if, intuitively
speaking, for all one knows it could be either true or false. I will discuss
this option in more detail in section 1.2.4.
Third, one could restrict an account of relative modality to alethic modal-
ities. This is what I will do in the remainder of this thesis. It would be nice if
the account could be extended such that most, perhaps all, kinds of modality
could be reduced to relative forms of logical modality, leaving only logical
modality requiring deeper explanation. Furthermore, such a general account
would help us to explain what diverse kinds of modality have in common
(see section 1.3.2). However, this scale of account is too ambitious for the
present.
1.2.2 Propositional Attitudes
Knowledge is often taken to be a propositional attitude. Problems besetting
epistemic modality appear to carry over to other kinds of modality based
on propositional attitudes, such as doxastic modality (belief) and boulomaic
modality (desire). E.g.
(Given everything Columbo believes) Joe must be the killer.
(Given my desires for music) I must have that album.
Suppose we define doxastic necessity as following logically from a set of
propositions believed by a subject, and doxastic possibility as compatibility
with those beliefs. As with epistemic modality, all logical truths will turn out
to be doxastically necessary. Yet, for a given logical truth p, I may believe
neither 〈p〉 nor 〈¬p〉, and my other beliefs may not rule out either. Surely 〈p〉
17A.K.A. Relevance Logic.
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and 〈¬p〉 both count intuitively as doxastically possible—for all I believe, p
and for all I believe, ¬p—and yet one of them must be doxastically impossi-
ble. The same goes for a notion of boulomaic modality, whereby boulomaic
necessity is a matter of following from a set of desires, and boulomaic possi-
bility a matter of compatibility with those desires. Again, logical truths will
be boulomaically necessary. I may have no interest in whether 〈p〉 or 〈¬p〉,
and yet one will be boulomaically necessary. There is also the unwelcome
consequence that logical falsehoods will be doxastically and boulomaically
impossible, i.e. unbelievable and undesirable. But a bad logician may be-
lieve a logical falsehood, and a long-suffering logician with an unwelcome
end to his proof may desire that this logical falsehood be true. (And this is
all without considering that we often have contradictory desires and beliefs.)
Related problems arise for deontic modality. If we define deontic neces-
sity as following from propositions comprising a moral code, say, then all
logical truths will also follow from the moral code, and hence be deontically
necessary. But it seems counter-intuitive to suppose that all logical truths
ought to be the case, or must be the case in the sense of some moral im-
perative. Indeed, one can imagine a strange moral code arising such that
it is morally obligatory that some contradictions be true.18 Then it should
follow from the moral code that some contradictions are true, but this has
already been ruled out.
A possible diagnosis of these problems is suggested by highlighting the
feature that these kinds of modalities, or at least doxastic, boulomaic and
arguably epistemic, are based on a propositional attitude. Given a set of
propositions to which an agent has a particular attitude, we can say how
this bears on other, related propositions. E.g., if I believe that Torquay is
in Devon, this has implications for the proposition that Torquay is not in
Devon, i.e. given what I believe, it can’t be true. A pertinent question to
ask here is: How far should modalities based upon our attitudes be expected
to extend? Can we expect our having attitudes towards certain propositions
to imply our having attitudes towards other propositions? If certain logi-
cal truths and logical falsehoods do not fall under the purview of a set of
propositions to which an attitude is held, nor propositions with a related
content, perhaps we should be wary of extending the consequences of those
attitudes to the unrelated propositions. It seems to me that this kind of
sketchy diagnosis of the problems provides additional motivation for using
a Relevant Logic. It seems to accord with the idea that having attitudes to-
wards a certain set of propositions shouldn’t be taken to have consequences
for our also taking attitudes to (relevantly) unrelated propositions.
The case of deontic modality is different, depending on one’s account of
a moral code. If one takes the notions of right and wrong to be importantly
connected to our attitudes, then all is well and good. If not, an alternative
18Unless you think that ought implies can.
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diagnosis may be required. However, even if one doesn’t agree that deontic
modalities have anything to do with propositional attitudes, one can still
motivate the use of Relevant Logic to help solve its particular problems.
Suppose we take a deontic modality to be based on some moral code, or
suchlike. One would not expect matters falling outside of what is mentioned
in that code to be bound by them. E.g., suppose I have a moral code
consisting solely of the two following propositions:
1. Thou shalt not kill.
2. Honour thy father and mother.
A notion of deontic necessity relativized to these two propositions would
render it impermissible (deontically impossible) for me to commit a murder.
It would also make showing respect to my mother obligatory for me (de-
ontically necessary). Deontic possibility, admittedly, could follow from the
absence of any prescriptions, e.g., as this code does not mention stealing, it
would appear to be permissible for me to steal something. What does seem
counter-intuitive is that something should be impermissible or obligatory
without it being explcitly related to something in the code. E.g., Classical
tautologies such as if grass is green, then if the sky is blue then grass is green
will be deontically necessary, but why must such a thing be so, in the sense
of moral obligation? Have I been good if it’s true? Again, it seems that a
neat way of out of this problem is to use a logic which requires premises to
be relevant to a conclusion.
1.2.3 Inconsistent Conditions
Another problem case arises where the set of propositions to which a kind of
modality is supposed to be relative is inconsistent. It seems appropriate to
include this kind of problem amongst problems associated with non-alethic
modalities, as I am assuming that contradictions can’t be true, so, e.g., I
would not expect necessities following from a contradiction to themselves
imply truth (just as I would not expect doxastic necessities following from
a set of false beliefs to imply truth). It seems that intuitively plausible
kinds of modality will be susceptible to this kind of problem, e.g. it does
not seem unlikely that someone might hold inconsistent beliefs (affecting
doxastic modality), or that they might hold inconsistent desires (affecting
boulomaic modality), or that an overly demanding and complex moral code
might make inconsistent prescriptions (affecting deontic modality), or that
a complicated legal system built up over many centuries might contain in-
consistent laws (affecting legal necessity), and so on.
If the set of propositions Φ to which a given R-modality is relative is
inconsistent, then every proposition will turn out to be R-necessary on a
logical consequence relation which conforms to the explosion rule of inference
ex falso quodlibet (everything follows from a contradiction). Recall,
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It is R-necessary that p: ∃ϕ(Ψϕ & (ϕ→ p))
We can now see that if ϕ is a conjunction of inconsistent propositions (falling
under condition Ψ), then any p will come out as R-necessary.
Conversely, it would seem that nothing would be R-possible. Put in
terms of logical consequence: if Φ already entails ⊥, then so will Φ∪{p} for
any p, so there is no p such that Φ∪{p} 2 ⊥, so no proposition p is such that
it is R-possible that p. Put in terms of the quantified formulation: recall
It is R-possible that p: ¬∃ϕ(Ψϕ & (ϕ→ ¬p))
[∀ϕ(Ψϕ ⊃ ¬(ϕ→ ¬p))]
Suppose that there is a ϕ which satisfies condition Ψ but which is inconsis-
tent.
(1) ∃ϕ(Ψϕ & INCϕ) assumption
(2) Ψq & INCq existential elim, 1
(3) Ψq & elim, 2
(4) INCq & elim, 2
(5) ∀ϕ(Ψϕ ⊃ ¬(ϕ→ ¬p)) R-possibility
(6) Ψq ⊃ ¬(q → ¬p) universal elim, 5
(7) ¬(q → ¬p) modus ponens, 3, 6
(8) ♦(q & p) modal logic, 7
(9) ♦q modal logic, 8
(10) ♦q & INCq conjunction introduction, 4, 9
(11) ¬∃ϕ(Ψϕ & INCϕ) reductio, 1
There is a contradiction in an inconsistent proposition being (logically) pos-
sible, so the initial assumption has to be rejected. So nothing can be possible
relative to inconsistent ϕ.
Note that the operator in this formulation makes the problem slightly
more narrow: it will only apply to kinds of modality where the defining
condition Ψ can be true of an inconsistent proposition. As long as it is
agreed that there are no inconsistent conjunctions of laws of physics, and so
on, this would appear to add weight to the assumption that the inconsistency
problem will not affect standard alethic modalities.
However we put the point, inconsistent sets of propositions are clearly
A Bad Thing for non-veridical modalities. A simple response would be to
deny that the account applies to inconsistent sets of propositions. A less ad
hoc proposal is made by Kratzer (1977), which employs consistent subsets
of Φ.
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It is R-necessary that p: if ∆ is the set of all consistent subsets of Φ,
then there is for every set in ∆ a superset
in ∆ from which 〈p〉 follows logically.
It is R-possible that p: if ∆ is the set of all consistent subsets of
Φ, then there is a set in ∆ such that 〈p〉 is
logically compatible with all its supersets
in ∆.
In the case of an inconsistent set {p, q,¬q}, call it A, Kratzer’s solution
allows that 〈p〉 be necessary: for every consistent subset there is a superset
from which 〈p〉 follows. The consistent subsets of A are {p, q}, {p,¬q}, {p},
{q}, {¬q}, ∅. Call this set of consistent subsets X. For each of those sets,
there is a superset of it in X such that 〈p〉 follows from that superset, e.g.,
{p, q} is a superset of {q}, is a member of X, and entails that p. However,
it is not the case that any arbitrary proposition can be necessary. E.g., take
〈¬p〉. There are no sets in X from which 〈¬p〉 follows, particularly no sets
in X which are supersets of other members of X.
This response looks rather complicated, but for good reason. If necessity
were a matter of following from every consistent subset, then 〈p〉 wouldn’t
come out necessary. This would be too strong, hence Kratzer introduces
supersets. If necessity were a matter of following from just some consistent
subset, then both 〈q〉 and 〈¬q〉 would be necessary. Assuming that we want
to rule out necessary contradictions, this seems too weak. Kratzer’s solution
is just right.
Another way to address this kind of problem would be to reject ex falso
quodlibet. This rejection is precisely one of the features of a Relevant Logic.
1.2.4 Relevant Logic
One prospect for extending a relative modality treatment beyond alethic
modalities is to use a Relevant, rather than a Classical logic. I will close
this discussion regarding the scope of the relative modality view by running
through this option and some of its benefits and drawbacks.
What is Relevant Logic? Broadly speaking, we might describe differ-
ent logical systems—Classical, Intuitionist, Dialethic, Relevant, etc.—to be
based on taking different views about what it is for an argument from
premises to conclusion to be valid.
The purpose of logical theory is to provide an explanation of the
validity and invalidity of argument. The goal is to describe the
relation which must hold between premises and conclusion for it
to be correct to say that the premises entail the conclusion, that
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the conclusion follows from the premises, or that the inference
from premises to conclusion is valid. (Read, 1988, p. 19)
The development of Relevant Logic can be understood as a reaction to the
Classical validity of certain arguments which intuitively seem invalid, and
the associated paradoxes of material and strict implication. These results
are achieved by various means. E.g., Read (1988) changes the rules for some
of his connectives (most importantly “and” and “if. . . then”), which in turn
allows him to give an alternative definition of validity.
In Relevant Logic, Read presents some compelling examples of classically
valid but intuitively invalid arguments.
Let us suppose that Roy Dyckhoff has claimed that John Slaney
was in Edinburgh on a certain day, and that Crispin Wright
has denied it. Consider the following three propositions as they
describe this situation.
(1) If John was in Edinburgh, Roy was right.
This is clearly true: that’s what Roy claimed.
(2) If Crispin was right, so was Roy.
That is equally obviously false, given the logic of denial.
(3) If John was in Edinburgh, Crispin was right.
That too is false, for Crispin denied it. Let us use these proposi-
tions to construct an argument, taking as premises (1) together
with the denial of (2), and as conclusion (3):
If John was in Edinburgh, then Roy was right.
It’s not the case that if Crispin was right, so was Roy.
Hence, if John was in Edinburgh, Crispin was right.
Since (1) is true and (2) and (3) false, this argument, which takes
the denial of (2) as its second premise, has true premises and a
false conclusion. Hence it is invalid.
Classically, however, the argument is valid. For the sequent
P ⊃ Q,∼ (R ⊃ Q) ` P ⊃ R
which formalizes the argument classically, using ‘⊃’, representing
material implication, to capture ‘if’, is (classically) valid.
(Read, 1988, pp. 23–4)
Such examples do seem to indicate that something fishy is going on with the
Classical view of validity, and the view that ‘if. . . then’ is to be captured by
the material conditional (defined as: (p ⊃ q)⇔ ¬(p & ¬q)).
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I do not wish to digress too far by dwelling on the details of Relevant
Logic. For present purposes, one important point is that this kind of logic
avoids (indeed has been developed in order to avoid) the paradoxes of strict
implication.19 These paradoxes include:
• (p & ¬p) q
• p (q q)
• p (q ∨ ¬q)
where “p q” here is short for “(p ⊃ q)”.20
These paradoxes are exactly the kind of results that are problematic
for the relative modality treatment of the kinds of modality I have been
discussing. Take the following candidate definition of epistemic necessity:
epip ⇔ ∃ϕ(Kϕ & (ϕ→ p))
where “K” means “is a conjunction of known truths”, reading “→” as the
material conditional. Whenever 〈p〉 is a logical truth, the right-hand-side
will be satisfied, and so 〈p〉 will be epistemically necessary, granted that
there is a conjunction of known truths. Note that this includes cases where
the second conjunct of the right-hand-side, (ϕ → p), a strict implication,
is of the form (ϕ → (q  q)), (where p is (q  q)), or of the form
(ϕ → (q ∨ ¬q)), (where p is (q ∨ ¬q)), the paradoxes mentioned above.
If the background logic for the definition ruled out its being trivially true
that (ϕ → p) for any logically true p, then we would avoid the problem
of logical truths always being epistemically necessary. The right-hand-side
of the definition would no longer be immediately satisfied whenever 〈p〉 is
a logical truth, so logical truths are not rendered immediately epistemically
necessary in this way.
Take as a second example the following candidate definition of a legal
necessity:
legalp ⇔ ∃ϕ(Lϕ & (ϕ→ p))
where the operator “L” can be read as “is a conjunction of UK laws”.
Suppose that, due to inattention in legislation, this conjunction of laws is in
fact contradictory—it contains, for some q, both 〈q〉 and 〈¬q〉. According
to Classical Logic, anything follows from a contradiction, and so the right-
hand-side of the definition will be satisfied. So 〈p〉 will be legally necessary,
for any p. In a Relevant Logic, the rule of inference that anything follows
from a contradiction is eliminated from the system, so according to such a
19See Mares (2009)
20My own notation. I haved tried to leave the precise interpretation of implication
and consequence open elsewhere, i.e. regarding whether “→” is to be read as material
implication, or some other kind of implication, and whether “” is to be understood in
terms of Classical logical consequence or some other notion of logical consequence.
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logic, the right-hand-side of the definition is not guaranteed to be true for
any p. Hence the problem of inconsistent conditions for modality can be
avoided.
In general, then, the employment of a relevant logic addresses the various
problems raised for extending a relative treatment of modality to kinds of
modality such as epistemic, doxastic and deontic modalities, by respecting
our intuitions that the conjunction of conditions to which the modality is
relative should be relevant to the resulting possibilities and necessities. It
does this by blocking certain rules for conditionals, such as rules which allow
that you can build a necessarily true conditional out of any antecedent and
a tautologous consequent. This kind of logic also rejects the rule of inference
ex falso quodlibet, providing a solution to problems arising from inconsistent
conditions to which a kind of modality is relative.
One drawback to this strategy is that it does not seem appropriate to
use Relevant Logic across the board, i.e. to also use it for alethic modalities.
E.g., although a given logical truth doesn’t seem to be directly relevant to
the laws of physics, we still would not want to say that the negation of a
logical truth is therefore physically possible. Physics doesn’t allow for logical
impossibility, although our propositional attitudes might. One response here
might be to draw a distinction between kinds of modality, between those best
treated with a Classical as opposed to a Relevant logic. Given the kinds of
modalities for which a Classical logic is problematic, this begins to resemble
the distinction made above between veridical and non-veridical modalities.
Modalities such as doxastic and deontic are not so much concerned with
truth, as they are with specifically what follows from certain propositions.
It doesn’t matter if a logical truth is true—it is simply not relevant to this
kind of modality. Kinds of necessity which concern ways of being true,
alethic necessities, are different. By including some propositions to which
necessity is relative, the range of resulting necessities is broadened, but that
there should be some logical truths included does not seem problematic.
They are still true, and alethic modalities are not in the business of ruling
out truth. Epistemic necessity may also imply truth, but it is not so much a
way of being true as connected to a propositional attitude which is factive:
being known is not a way to be true, but something that might happen to
a truth incidentally.
I do not wish to settle the question of how far the relative modality view
can or should be extended here. In general, I will focus primarily on alethic
modalities, especially logical and metaphysical modality. However, I submit
that if the account is to be extended to kinds of modality such as epistemic,
deontic and doxastic modalities, then it seems that a promising option for
accommodating them requires that we employ a deep distinction between
these and other, alethic kinds of modality. This in turn would appear to have
consequences for the account given of the modality to which other kinds of
modality are relative. Rather than simply logical modality, we would have
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both Classical logical modality and Relevant logical modality.21 It remains
to be seen whether the two could be reconciled, or whether this reflects a
deep and fundamental division between two families of modality.
1.3 Some Arguments For and Against
Having looked at how best to formulate the view that some kinds of modality
(at least non-logical alethic kinds) are relative kinds of one fundamental kind
(logical modality), the pressing issue is now to consider what reasons there
are in favour of endorsing such a view.
1.3.1 The Argument from Linguistics
Most arguments in the literature in favour of relative modality of some form
are to be found in linguistics and philosophy of language, regarding the
nature of modal terms. The main argument comes from the plethora of
different modals of the same force, i.e. different “must”s and “can”s. There
is such a great variety of modals to be found in the linguistic data, that it is
implausible to think they are different words with different meanings (such
that words like “must” are ambiguous in a similar way to the ambiguity of
“bank”). Furthermore, all these different “must”s and “can”s do seem to
share some significant portion of meaning. It makes better sense to assume
that, rather than ambiguous words with many meanings, we have univocal
words with one meaning along with something like parameters to be de-
termined by context. Lycan (1994) motivates the view by considering the
many different and subtle changes in modals in everyday use, concluding
My purpose is only to indicate that everyday English is shot
through with restricted alethic modalities whose restrictions are
almost capriciously diverse, rarely aligned with any easily specifi-
able modal concept known to logicians, and irreparably vague—
yet calculated on the spot by ordinary human speakers/hearers
with hardly a conscious thought. (1994, p. 176)
Having considered this kind of data, Kratzer (1977) argues
All this leaves us with many different ‘must’s and ‘can’s. What
can we do with them? We could give them different names.
Numbers have been proposed. Let’s have
‘must1’, ‘must2’, ‘must3’,. . .
‘can1’, ‘can2’, ‘can3’,. . .
But we might not have enough numbers. How many bits of
knowledge are there, to which we can refer? How often does the
21This might result in a kind of Modal Pluralism. However, this might undermine the
Argument from Similarity, see section 1.3.2.
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Queen change her mind? . . . How many kinds of duties can we
take into consideration? And even if we had enough numbers,
it would not be very sensible to use them here. In everyday
conversation we do not use subscripts when we use the words
‘must’ and ‘can’. Somehow we do without them. And even
quite easily. There must be another way by means of which we
make ourselves understood using these words. (Kratzer, 1977,
pp. 339-40)
For Kratzer, the explanation of this other way is a common core of mean-
ing—“must-in-view-of”, “can-in-view-of”—relativized to different parame-
ters. Lewis (1979) also appears to be convinced by this kind of argument.
The “can” and “must” of ordinary language . . . usually . . . ex-
press various relative modalities. . . . That suggests that “can”
and “must” are ambiguous. But on that hypothesis, as Kratzer
has convincingly argued, the alleged senses are altogether too
numerous. We do better to think of our modal verbs as unam-
biguous but relative. (Lewis, 1979, p. 354)
This may be a widely accepted view regarding modal terms, but these
are arguments concerning pieces of language, and the current project is
concerned with the metaphysics of modality. Conclusions regarding how
modal language works do not immediately tell us how reality is. However,
two arguments for a metaphysical thesis of relative modality—that most
kinds of modality are in fact merely relative forms of another, fundamental,
kind of modality—can be formulated on the basis of arguments concerning
modal language.
The first argument is an appeal to take the account of modal language
seriously as a guide to modal reality. If we speak about a plentiful variety of
kinds of modality, and we say something true, then we should be prepared
to accept that there are many such kinds of modality in the world. And, if
we take seriously the claim that our modal terms are univocal but relative,
this suggests that we ought to take seriously the idea that there is one core
type of modality, to which the others are relative.
One problem with this kind of argument, given my agenda, is that when
it comes to giving a semantics for modal terms, possible worlds are often
brought onto the scene. If one can be persuaded to take this semantics
seriously, then it looks like one will have to admit a possible worlds ontology.
This is what I don’t want to do. However, not all treatments of modal
language use possible worlds. E.g., the semantics that Kratzer offers is
situated firmly in a possible worlds framework (see Kratzer (1977, 2008)).
However, Wertheimer (1972) provides an example of a treatment of modal
language in other terms, namely, in terms of “Systems”, where a System is
‘a more or less well organized and integrated system of laws (and perhaps
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other propositions as well) concerning some more or less well-defined set
of objects’ (1972, p. 88), and “must” and “can” are analyzed in terms of
contraints imposed by these Systems. Without going into detail, suffice it to
say that although different linguists and philosophers disgree on the details
of the semantics, there does appear to be significant consensus regarding
the relativity of modals. This is the lesson we should take seriously. Where
linguists and philosophers of language have converged on the relativity of
modal terms, but not a specific semantics, we can take seriously the relativity
without having to take on board a specific semantic treatment. We can then
take this major point of agreement as a significant motivation for taking the
relativity of modal language to be a reflection of the relativity of modal
reality (assuming that modal language is somehow fact-stating).
Consider things from another direction. Suppose we agree that modal
terms are univocal but relative, and that modal language is in the business
of stating facts. If we also claim that in reality different kinds of modality
are not relative to one fundamental kind, but independent, then it seems
that we will have to say something like: for each (or most) relativization(s)
of a modal term in our language, there is a kind of modality in the world
corresponding to it, but which is not itself relative in the manner described.
This seems strange. Apart from anything, why would we use the same word,
with a constant meaning, to refer to so many different things? If, e.g., the
“must”s in ‘2 + 2 must equal 4’ and ‘Every effect must have a cause’ denote
genuinely distinct and unrelated modalities in the world, how can we explain
using the same word with the same core meaning? Indeed, what could that
core meaning be, if not a basic kind of modality?
One might object here that there is a significant disanalogy between the
linguistic case and the metaphysical case: the linguistic accounts claim that
there is a common core to all modal terms with a parameter to be fixed,
whereas the metaphysical account argues that there is a fundamental kind
of modality, to which other kinds of modality are relative. E.g., the core ele-
ment “must-in-view-of x” is supposed to be common to logical necessity and
physical necessity alike, in both cases being fleshed-out with a specification
of the conditions in view of which something is necessary. In contrast, the
metaphysical view takes, e.g., physical necessity to be a form of logical ne-
cessity, relative to some conditions. Doesn’t this disanalogy make it difficult
to use the linguistic considerations as an aid to the metaphysical view? No.
Consider, there must be some kind of limiting case for “must-in-view-of”,
where the set of conditions in view of which something is necessary is min-
imal, perhaps empty. What kind of modality might this express? Surely a
kind of necessity which is relative to no conditions is not properly described
as relative at all. It seems to me that this limiting case of necessity on the
linguistic view corresponds to the fundamental necessity on the metaphysical
view, to which other kinds of necessity are relative.
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1.3.2 Similarities and Differences
The second type of argument is more loosely inspired by linguistic considera-
tions. The idea is to note that all the different kinds of modality in the world
seem to have something important in common (just as all the “must”s and
“can”s have a shared core meaning). Metaphysical necessity and natural
necessity, say, are taken to be distinct kinds of necessity, subject to different
principles. Even so, they are fundamentally alike. They are both necessi-
ties for a start. That different necessities and possibilities have something
in common demands explanation. What is the core common to different
modalities? One plausible explanation is that there is only one fundamental
kind of modality in the world, and all other kinds are derivative forms of this
modality. The commonality or “shared core” between different derivative
modalities is then a matter of them all being derivative forms of the same
thing. The commonality between derivative modalities and the fundamental
modality is that the former is a derivative form of the latter. Perhaps there
is more than one fundamental kind, each with its own derivative modalities,
however, this will raise the challenge to explain the deep similarities between
them, and the derivative modalities relative to them.
Does this argument favour a relative modality view over a more gen-
eral derivate modality view, where derivative modality may be relative or
restricted. The relative modality view claims that different kinds of modal-
ity are similar because they are relative forms of a fundamental kind of
modality, logical modality. The derivative modality view would claim that
similarity is accounted for in at least some cases because the relevant kind
of modality is a restricted class of some other modality, i.e. the physical
possibilities might be a subset of the metaphysical possibilities. There are
two main considerations which make this approach less favourable than a
relative modality view.
First, in order to explain important similarities between different kinds
of necessity in terms of restriction, one will need a very wide notion of
necessity to restrict. E.g., it is standardly thought that the realm of physical
necessity is narrower than the realm of physiological necessity. So if one were
to apply a restrictive strategy here, the physical necessity would simply be
a subclass of the physiological necessities. In order to accommodate all the
different kinds, the widest kind of necessity is going to be something very
weak. Hardly an ideal paradigm from which to explain how it is that, e.g.,
physical necessities are necessary. In contrast, the relative modality view
does not need the fundamental kind of modality to somehow “contain” all
the others, so that they can be isolated by restriction. This allows us to
take a stronger and more intuitively robust kind of modality as the basis for
explanation. That said, there would be no analogous problem in explaining
different kinds of possibility in terms of restriction of a wide, weak form of
possibility.
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An additional consideration is that restrictive strategies often tend to
start with metaphysical modality. E.g., Fine takes metaphysical modality
to find its source in the essential nature of all things, and some kinds of
modality to find their source in the essential nature of a more restricted
class of things (e.g. conceptual necessity finds its source in the nature of
concepts, which are things), such that these other kinds turn out to be
restricted kinds of metaphysical modality. But metaphysical modality itself
is a rather mysterious notion. So all restricted kinds of modality would
likewise be mysterious.
In response to the call for an explanation of similarity between different
modalities, a modal pluralist might reply that a relative theory of modality
cannot account for important differences between the most significant kinds
of modality. This is indeed Fine’s complaint when he discusses treating
natural necessity as a relative kind of necessity. The problem arises from
the fact that the notion of relative modality can be applied to any set of
propositions, however, we seem to take necessities following from some sets
of propositions more seriously than others.
Any true proposition whatever can be seen as necessary under
the adoption of a suitable definition of relative necessity. Any
proposition that I truly believe, for example, will be necessary
relative to the conjunction of my true beliefs, and any proposition
concerning the future will be necessary relative to the conjunc-
tion of all future truths. The problem therefore is to explain why
the necessity that issues from the definition of natural necessity
is not of this cheap and trivial sort. (Fine, 2005, p. 247)
E.g., it might be necessary relative to the set of my true beliefs that 2+2 = 4,
but it is also necessary relative to a set of mathematical laws. The second
kind of necessity seems different in kind to the first. Let us call those kinds of
modality that seem unnatural and gerrymandered, contrived modalities, and
the more familiar kinds (such as metaphysical, mathematical, natural, and
normative necessity) non-contrived modalities. Fine marks the difference by
allowing at least three fundamental kinds of (non-contrived) necessity, which
are not to be understood in terms of any other kind: metaphysical, natural,
and normative necessity. Fine may face the challenge of explaining their
fundamental similarity, but he has a story to tell about their distinctness
from other, contrived kinds of modality.
A second, related, challenge is that these non-contrived modalities have
a distinctive “modal force” which is lost when they are treated as relative
modalities.
One might wish to press the objection further and claim that no
definition stated entirely in terms of metaphysical necessity could
capture the peculiarly modal force of truths that are naturally
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necessary yet metaphysically contingent. Just as it has been
supposed that there is a conceptual barrier between normative
and non-normative concepts, so one might think that there is
a conceptual barrier, not merely between modal and non-modal
concepts, but also between different ‘grades’ of modality. (Fine,
2005, pp. 247–8)
Fine seems to want to say that a naturally necessary truth, say, is necessary
in a peculiar way that cannot be captured in terms of a relativization of
another kind of necessity. He then goes further in suggesting that there
might be a conceptual barrier between different fundamental kinds of (non-
contrived) modality, making it impossible for us to be able to understand
one in terms of another.
We have two related challenges, then, to account for important differ-
ences between kinds of modality: the differences between contrived and
non-contrived modalities; and the differences between the peculiar modal
character or “modal force” of the most fundamental non-contrived kinds.
These are set in opposition to the challenge to explain important and fun-
damental similarities between different kinds of modality.
The first challenge, of drawing a distinction between contrived and non-
contrived modalities, I take to also apply to Fine’s own theory. Fine takes
metaphysical necessities to be de re necessities true in virtue of the natures
of things. Logical, conceptual and mathematical necessities are defined as
restrictions on metaphysical necessity. E.g., conceptual necessities are those
necessities true in virtue of the nature of concepts, where concepts are a
sub-class of all things. But, one might ask, why are some sub-classes, and
the necessities to which they correspond, more important, less trivial, than
some other classes? E.g., one might define red necessity as being true in
virtue of the nature of red things. Whilst it is metaphysically necessary
that something cannot be red all over and green all over, it might be argued
that it is also “redly necessary”.
One way Fine might respond to this challenge would be to appeal to some
notion of distinctive ontological categories.22 Concept and entity might both
count as ontologically distinctive categories of things, thus justifying Fine
in taking conceptual necessary and metaphysical necessity as important and
non-contrived. However, this kind of appeal may force Fine to include kinds
of necessity as non-contrived which he does not include in his system. E.g.,
the following seem to also be good candidates for distinctive ontological
categories: physical object, colour, event, abstracta, but kinds of modality
such as “event necessity”, “colour necessity” and “abstracta necessity” are
not the standard kinds which Fine wants to pick out as special. So it seems
that the challenge still stands.
22Thanks to Fabrice Correia for this suggestion
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A relative view could respond by giving an account of why the propo-
sitions to which a modality is relative constitute an important class, such
that the importance of the kind of modality is inherited from the base class.
Take the case of legal necessity as an example of non-contrived necessity.
All the UK laws form a fairly homogeneous class of propositions, sharing
key properties such as being on the statute book or being decided upon via
a particular process. That these propositions share these properties makes
the propositions which follow from and are compatible with them very im-
portant for anyone who is interested in UK law. By this strategy, one would
likewise hope to be able to tell a story about why the propositions from
which, e.g., metaphysical necessities, or natural necessities, follow are sig-
nificant classes, as opposed to more random classes giving rise to contrived
modalities. In arguing that a theory such as Fine’s also faces the challenge
to draw a distinction between contrived and non-contrived modality, I do
not deny that a relative modality view must also address it. It is not a
deciding factor between the two different kinds of views. Fine could also
avail himself of a similar move, e.g. by giving an account of why the class
of concepts is more natural and important than the class of red things. But
at least he is not any better or worse off than the relativist.
Regarding the second challenge, it is not clear what Fine has in mind.
What is this “modal force” that he claims is peculiar to each fundamental
kind of modality? One might understand this in terms of principles obeyed
by a kind of modality, e.g. we might explain the difference between meta-
physical and normative modal force in terms of the fact that the former kind
of necessity implies truth (is factive), the latter not. But this doesn’t help
with Fine’s distinction between the peculiar modal forces of metaphysical
and natural necessity. One assumes that they obey the same principles (e.g.
S5). It would appear that modal logical systems do not cut fine enough
to capture those kinds of modality which Fine wants to claim are pecu-
liarly different. Even if it turned out that the crucial kinds of modality
did differ logically in this way—e.g. perhaps metaphysical necessity obeys
an S5-system, where natural necessity obeys only an S4-system—the point
remains that a difference in logical strength does not immediately imply a
difference in kind. A necessity operator is still a necessity operator, whether
it be defined in an S4-system, an S5-system, or any other system. Yes, one
is able to “do more” with one than the other, but this does not show that
they are fundamentally or peculiarly different.
What about a difference in scope? Fine claims that metaphysical neces-
sity is de re, whereas natural necessity is de dicto. However, this is no good
as an indicator of peculiar modal force, as he also claims that normative ne-
cessity is both de dicto, and fundamentally distinct from natural necessity.
The combination of factivity (or not) and scope is more promising: for Fine,
natural necessity is de dicto factive, metaphysical necessity is de re factive,
and normative necessity is de dicto non-factive. But this still leaves Fine
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unable to distinguish between, e.g., logical, conceptual and metaphysical
necessities. Fine does take logical, conceptual and mathematical necessi-
ties to be restrictions of metaphysical necessity, so he would presumably
just take them to have the same peculiar “modal force”. However, it seems
strange to claim that natural necessity and metaphysical necessity have pe-
culiarly distinct kinds of modal force, to the extent that there may be some
kind of conceptual barrier between them, whilst taking what are prima fa-
cie notably different kinds of necessity—logical, conceptual, metaphysical,
mathematical—and allowing that they have precisely the same modal force.
This is a very wide gulf, which seems to me to be under-motivated.
Fine does try to explicate the idea of peculiar modal force further.
There appears to be an intuitive difference to the kind of neces-
sity attaching to metaphysical and natural necessities (granted
that some natural necessities are not metaphysical). The former
is somehow ‘harder’ or ‘stricter’ than the latter. If we were to
suppose that a God were capable of breaking necessary connec-
tions, then it would take more of a God to break a connection
that was metaphysically necessary than one that was naturally
necessary. (Fine, 2005, p. 259)
The idea is that metaphysically necessary connections are “harder to break”
than naturally necessary connections. I don’t see that this makes the notion
of modal force any less mysterious. First, the relation between strength and
modal force is not clear. Why not say that natural necessity is a kind of
necessity with the same kind of modal force as metaphysical necessity, but
with different strength? Second, this difference in strength can be explained
without appeal to the obscure notion of “modal force”. E.g., if metaphysical
necessity is relative to principles governing all things, but natural necessity
is relative to principles governing physical objects and processes, it might
seem natural to conclude that metaphysical necessity will be the stronger
kind given its wider subject matter, but not due to a different force.
Fine also attempts to explicate the idea in terms of a “conceptual barrier”
between natural and metaphysical necessity, analogous to the conceptual
barrier between the modal and non-modal. I suspect, however, that this
serves only to bring out a misrepresentation of a relative modality view.
Fine presses his objection against a definition of natural necessity ‘stated
entirely in terms of metaphysical necessity’. It seems unsurprising that if
we only have the concept of metaphysical necessity at our disposal, we will
be unable to talk about much more than metaphysical necessity. Likewise,
if we only have the concept of logical necessity at our disposal, we will be
unable to talk about anything else. Granted, if the definition were phrased
entirely in terms of another kind of necessity, this might pose a problem.
But this isn’t the case. The definitions proposed importantly include a
set of propositions to which a kind of necessity is relative, and a predicate
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describing important features of those propositions (e.g. that they are laws
of physics). The defintions are only partially in terms of logical necessity;
they are also in terms of a key set of propositions of a certain kind.
The simple answer to Fine’s challenge is thus that the “peculiarity” of
each kind of modality is parasitic upon them being related to different kinds
of propositions. Perhaps I have misunderstood Fine’s objection, and hence
have not succeeded in answering it, but given its obscurity the onus seems
to fall on Fine to provide a more precise formulation of the objection which
cannot be avoided by my proposal. Note also, if Fine persists with this kind
of challenge, then he will exacerbate the opposing challenge to explain what
the peculiar modal forces of, e.g., metaphysical and natural necessity have
in common.
With mechanisms in place to explain the differences between different
modalities, namely by considering the base classes of propositions to which
different modalities are relativized, one can respond to Fine’s objections,
and indeed turn them back against his own view. This leaves the third
challenge, of explaining the similarity between different modalities. The
relative modality view has an easy answer; they are all relative forms of one
kind of modality (logical modality).
Note that this kind of argument does not immediately respect a distinc-
tion between veridical and non-veridical modalities. The idea is that all
“must”s and “can”s share a common core. If it turns out that a principled
distinction has to be made between epistemic-style and alethic modalities,
this may weaken the argument, however, if e.g. one takes alethic modalities
to be relative forms of a Classical logic, but epistemic-style modalities to be
relative forms of a Relevant logic, perhaps there is still room to account for
the common core in terms of all modalities being relative forms of logical
necessity, albeit slightly different forms of logical necessity. Also, it may be
fair to say, given the considerations in section 1.2, that alethic modalities,
concerned with ways of being true, and other modalities which are impor-
tantly connected to our attitudes, are indeed sufficiently different to warrant
different treatment.
1.3.3 The Argument from Unreality
An additional argument for relative modality is rather obscure, and relies
on some significant background assumptions and preferences. However, I
will briefly run over the argument, in anticipation of some discussion that
appears later. In chapter 2 I will consider the view that some logical pos-
sibilities are “not real” or not “genuine” possibilities. Whereas a kind of
possibility such as metaphysical possibility provides a genuine guide to how
the world could be, the idea is that mere logical possibility falls short. E.g.,
it is a logical possibility that water not be H2O, but it is often assumed
that this is not a genuine way the world could be. Now, if there is a case
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to be made for logical modality being somehow “not real”, but if there is
nevertheless a good account of logical modality to be had, and if we take
other kinds of modality to be relative forms of logical modality, this may
allow one to say that modality is not a genuine, real feature of the world.
If one already has reasons for doubting the “reality” of modality, then one
might find this line of thought attractive.
The argument goes:
1. Some logical possibilities are “not real” (therefore, logical modality is
“not real”).
2. There is a good (non-relative) account of logical modality.
3. All other forms of modality (i.e. non-logical (alethic) modalities) are
relative forms of logical modality.
4. Therefore (alethic) modality is not a genuine, real feature of the world.
(3) is just the relative modality view. (2) is a condition on making the
relative modality view viable, as was mentioned above.
The view that some logical possibilities are not genuine possibilities, (1),
has become fairly common, based on the thought that overly restrictive ne-
cessities, such as narrow logical necessities, should be counted as necessities
“in name only”.
But those ‘possibilities’—such as the austerely logical possibility
that there are male vixens—are possibilities in name only, not
real or genuine possibilities at all. (Hale, 1996, p. 100)
The essentialist is simply at pains to maintain that any logical
possibilities outside the domain of the metaphysically possible
have no bearing on the ways the world might be. Such merely
logical possibilities are possibilities in name only. (Shalkowski,
1997, p. 49)
At first glance, it appears that logical necessity should remain unaffected:
one certainly still expects logical necessities to be true, and hence to give
a reliable guide to ways the world must be. However, one may begin to
doubt whether we can call logical necessity “real” if we allow that logical
possibility and necessity are interdefinable as duals, i.e. p ⇔ ¬♦¬p and
♦p ⇔ ¬¬p. If it is logically necessary that p just when it is not logically
possible that ¬p, and we have agreed that logical possibility is not a genuine
guide for ways for the world to be, why should we be confident that logical
necessity thus described is a “genuine” modality?
It is still not clear why logical modality’s failing to be “genuine” in this
way should render it impotent to inform accounts of other kinds of necessity.
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E.g., one might give an account of logical modality in terms of something
like the laws of thought: rules for correct thinking, or norms against which
one’s activity is subject to evaluation if it is to count as thinking at all.23
It is not clear why one would expect a kind of modality based on such a
general notion to provide a guide for ways the world could be. Thinking a
certain thing may be perfectly permissible according to these standards, but
something more seems to be required to ensure that such a thing could exist:
e.g. thinking about water which is not H2O avoids the vice of contradiction,
but whether or not there could be such a thing might also depend upon facts
about substances.
We can now see how this line of thought relates to (4). One might
be reluctant, for independent reasons, to take modality tout court to be a
genuine, objective, mind-independent, robustly real feature of the world.
Things such as modal properties, modal facts, possible objects and the like
certainly have an air of mystery. What is their nature? How can we gain
epistemic access to them? If I perceive that Tibbles is a cat, and Tibbles
is necessarily a cat, do I also perceive Tibbles’s necessary-cat-hood, or just
his cat-hood? One way to resolve these questions is to deny that there are
such modal things, and explain modality in a different way. Now, if one
endorses (1), that logical modality is “unreal” in some important sense, and
one holds a relative view, encompassing (2) and (3), then one will have a
strategy for reducing all (or at least all alethic) “real” kinds of modality
to mere logical, non-real modality. Something like, e.g., natural necessity
will still count as real insofar as the propositions which follow from laws
of nature, say, do have a bearing on ways the world can be, however, the
modality in this is not strictly a real phenomenon, but only borrowed from
logical modality which does not itself have such bearing on the world. One
could say that the common core shared by all kinds of modality is logical
modality, which cannot provide a genuine guide for ways for the world to
be alone, but which can be relativized to propositions about the world such
that their logical consequences and compatibilities are able to chart so-called
“real” possibilities.
Again, I must stress that this is clearly not a conclusive argument. How-
ever, given a certain agenda, and the assumption that logical modality is
not a genuine or real kind of modality, one should be motivated to explore
a relative theory of modality.
1.3.4 New Jersey Necessity
One challenge to the kind of relative modality view I want to endorse has
been raised by Rosen (2006), who complains that what I am calling contrived
necessities are not rightly called “necessities” at all.
23See chapter 3.
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The trouble is that most such ‘restricted necessity operators’
do not correspond to genuine species of necessity. Let NJ be
the complete intrinsic truth about the State of New Jersey, and
say that P is NJ-necessary just in case NJ strictly implies P.
It will then be NJ-necessary that Rosen is in Princeton, but
NJ-contingent that Blair is in London. But of course we know
full well that there is no sense whatsoever in which I have my
location of necessity while Blair has his only contingently. So
NJ-necessity is not a species of necessity.
The moral is that one cannot in general infer, from the fact
that a certain consequence (φ→ P ) holds of necessity, that there
is any sense in which the consequent (P ) holds of necessity. (If
there were then every proposition would be necessary in a sense,
even the contradictions.) (Rosen, 2006, p. 33)
Rosen argues that in the case of contrived necessities, there is no such sense
of necessity, so any account which allows for contrived necessities must be
wrong.
Rosen’s point is in conflict with the kind of arguments discussed earlier,
such as those in Kratzer (1977), which draw on the multiplicity of “must”s in
our language use. The point was that there are so many different meanings
we can give to words like “must” and “can” that we need to give the words
a relative semantics to accommodate such a profusion. In contrast, Rosen’s
argument is based on an assumption that we have only a few senses of
necessity, which do not stretch far enough to accommodate notions such as
NJ-necessity. Who is right? Can we imagine a plausible situation in which
someone would genuinely wish to assert something of the form, “In view of
the complete intrinsic truth about the State of New Jersey, it must be that
p” or “In view of the complete intrinsic truth about the State of New Jersey,
it can be that p”? Here are some suggestions:
• Suppose that the inhabitants of New Jersey happen to be rather tra-
ditional, and often have cold heads, resulting in the fact that everyone
in New Jersey wears a hat. So it would be NJ-necessary that everyone
wears a hat. One can imagine a newcomer to the state looking around
at first, and saying to himself, “I must wear a hat”. This depends only
on truths about New Jersey (e.g. it does not draw upon truths about
Ohio), and it does not obviously seem to be a wider kind of necessity
(it might be true in New Jersey that necessarily 2 + 2 = 4, but we
would not usually say that with NJ-necessity in mind).
• New Jersey is an entity which is not independent of human society, e.g.
its borders were determined by us, and the fact that it is a state also
depends upon us. This suggests that we can include the laws of New
Jersey in the complete intrinsic truth about New Jersey. If there is a
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law unique to New Jersey, then any modal statements drawing on that
law (“You must not. . . ”) could be described as invoking NJ-necessity.
• I am writing a play, partly set in New Jersey. In my play, I want to hold
true anything to do with the complete intrinsic truth of New Jersey,
but I don’t care about anything else being accurate. I don’t have any
particular plan for what kind of situations I want to have happen, as
long as I respect New Jersey facts. Whilst writing one scene I say
to myself, “Rosen must be in Princeton (given the complete intrinsic
truth about New Jersey), but in that other scene, Blair can be in
Paris”.
Even if one can describe strange circumstances in which rather contrived
senses of “must” can be found, what about the most arbitrary cases, where
we might define a kind of necessity as relative to three random propositions?
Surely there is no intuitive sense of necessity we can bring to bear here? This
forces one to look again at Rosen’s objection.
Rosen finds the conclusion that every proposition is necessary in some
sense to be unacceptable, and so concludes that a relative modality account
is wrong. However, it is open to the relative modality theorist to simply
agree that yes, most propositions are necessary in some sense, but perhaps
in a very uninteresting sense. Kinds of necessity such as necessity relative to
truths about my left shoe together with truths about velcro can be dismissed
as likely to be uninteresting, because the set of propositions to which they
are relative is not an interesting grouping. But this is still a kind of necessity.
As for every proposition being necessary, including contradictions, it is not
clear what Rosen has in mind. Presumably he has in mind the idea that
every proposition follows from itself, even contradictions. I have discussed
problems arising from inconsistent sets of propositions above: at least this
case should not occur for any alethic necessity.
The relative modality theorist might also diagnose Rosen’s worry as be-
ing, not about necessity, but about what makes a kind of necessity count as
non-contrived. Rosen is probably right to say that there is no non-contrived
sense of necessity in which he has his location of necessity while Blair has his
only contingently. But this is a claim about non-contrived necessities, and
there are two parts to this notion: necessity, and being non-contrived. On
the relative modality view, it seems that our familiar notions of necessity—
metaphysical, natural etc.—are in danger of losing some kind of special
status. A stark way to put (the widest version of) the view is that there is
only logical modality; any other purported kind of modality is merely logical
modality, relativized to some propositions. To raise our familiar notions out
of the mire, we can tell a story about why they, as opposed to other shadows
of logical modality, are more important. E.g., physical modality is special
because it is relative to physical laws, which constitute an important class
of propositions, or because it provides a reliable guide to how things can
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and must be in the physical world. On the relative modality view, relative
necessity becomes such a weak notion that the more important feature of
a kind of necessity is really the operator Ψ applying to ϕ (see section 1.1.5
p. 25). Rosen mistakes the lack of a good story to tell about the complete
intrinsic truth about New Jersey as the lack of any necessity.
It should be added that, after all, Rosen has not definitively shown that
there can be no good sense for even a kind of necessity which is relative to 3
randomly-selected propositions. He has just pointed out that it is difficult,
and so we tend to assume that there is none. Who is to say that one day
things won’t be such that NJ-necessity, or pqr-necessity, develops into an
important sense of necessity? The relative modality view at least has room
to accommodate this kind of eventuality. Such necessities may always be
available, but it is only when the defining predicate of the propositions to
which they are relative gains prominence that they will be brought to the
fore.
1.3.5 Finean Counterexamples
Another critic of the kind of relative modality view I wish to defend is Kit
Fine. I have already discussed his arguments that relativization leads to
trivialization and that such views fail to capture the distinctive modal force
of certain kinds of modality (cf. section 1.3.2). I will consider one final
challenge from Fine.
One of Fine’s targets is the view that a proposition is a naturally nec-
essary truth if and only if it is logically necessary relative to or conditional
upon the basic truths about the status and distribution of natural properties
and relations. From the perspective of the actual world, if another world
has alien kinds or properties, then it is not naturally possible. If something
that looks to be a familiar kind in fact behaves according to different laws
of nature, ‘in a nomically irregular way’, then it is an alien kind mistaken
for our familiar kind.
Note, Fine is considering a particular version of a relative view of natu-
ral necessity, namely, the base propositions are non-nomic facts about the
status and distribution of natural kinds, properties and relations in a world.
Fine says nothing about a view where the base propositions are nomic facts,
viz. a view upon which the natural necessities are logical necessities relative
to or conditional upon the laws of nature. I take it that Fine is assuming a
view whereby the distinctive feature of laws of nature just is to be naturally
necessary, thus preventing one from taking them as the relative basis for
natural necessity on pain of triviality. Hence the choice of non-nomic facts
instead. But if one had a different account of the distinctive feature of the
laws of nature, they might still be trivially naturally necessary (in virtue of
following from themselves), but they would not thereby be trivially laws of
nature. If Fine’s argument is successful, he will block one avenue for giving
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an account of the base propositions to which natural necessity is relative
(laws defined as necessities), but he leaves open the possibility of giving a
different account of the base propositions.
It can already be seen that the scope of Fine’s challenge here is lim-
ited. But is the challenge any good? Fine sets up two examples intended
to demonstrate circumstances according to which two possible worlds differ
merely as to what is a natural necessity, and not as to the status and distri-
bution of natural kinds, properties and relations. Therefore, the latter does
not adequately determine the natural necessities and possibilities.
The first example concerns worlds WN and WM . WN is a metaphysically
possible world that is subject to Newtonian laws of nature, containing mass.
WM is a metaphysically possible world that is subject to different laws of
nature, call them Schmewtonian laws (say, the inverse cube law), contain-
ing schmass. Neither set of natural laws demands that there be anything,
therefore there are two further metaphysically possible worlds, VN and VM ,
which are empty. VN is a natural possibility for WN , and so verifies the
natural necessities for WN . VM is a natural possibility for WM , and so ver-
ifies the natural necessities for WM . In terms of the status and distribution
of their natural kinds, properties and relations, VN and VM are completely
alike; they are both empty. However, they differ in terms of their natural
necessities, and hence also their natural possibilities. Therefore, worlds VN
and VM are an example of two worlds which differ merely as to what is a
natural necessity (see Fine (2005, pp. 244-5)).
I do not find this purported counterexample convincing. It requires that
there be two, distinct empty worlds. If the worlds are empty, what are the
grounds for claiming there are two? Why not say there is just one empty
world which is a natural possibility for both WN and WM? Call this world
V∗. Fine suggests that
A possible world is a natural possibility relative to a given world
if it contains only (or perhaps all and only) those natural kinds
that exist in the world. (Fine, 2005, p. 243)
Fine adds the caveat that, to avoid questions about when a kind can be
said to exist, one can put the definition in terms of instantiation of kinds.
In any case, it is true that V∗ instantiates only kinds instantiated in WN
and only kinds instantiated in WM , in virtue of instantiating no kinds at
all. Therefore, V∗ is a natural possibility relative to WN and it is a natural
possibility relative to WM . Fine would now claim that V∗ therefore verifies
the natural necessities for both WN and WM , but these are different. So it
looks like it will be true at V∗ that it is naturally necessary that bodies behave
according to the inverse cube law and that it is not naturally necessary that
bodies behave according to the inverse cube law.
Now, there was no prima facie reason to think that an empty world
such as V∗ could not exist, indeed, if VN and VM are acceptable, then surely
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V∗ should be too. And according to the definition of what it is to be a
natural possibility, V∗ counts as a possibility for both WN and WM . I think
the problem can be resolved by introducing a distinction between different
“natural necessities”. Suppose that there are some kinds of necessity which
are defined as relative to or dependent upon the status and distribution of
natural kinds, properties and relations at a world. For each distinct status
and distribution of natural kinds, there is an associated necessity. This
family of necessities, sharing as they do the feature that they depend upon
natural kinds and relations etc., might be called the natural necessities. But
the idea of one, unique kind of necessity which is “natural necessity” is set
to one side.
One consequence of this way of looking at things, is that a world W2
which is a “natural possibility” for a world W1 should not in general be
expected to have the same “natural necessities” as W1. W2 might be a
possibility for/be accessible to W1 relative to the natural kinds etc. at W1.
An imprecise way of recounting this is to say that W2 is a natural possibility
for W1. And there will be certain necessities relative to the natural kinds
etc. at W2, which might imprecisely be referred to as the natural necessities
for W2. But this talk of natural possibilities and natural necessities has
obscured the fact that we are talking about two different modalities here,
albeit modalities which are relative to similar things. Of course, W2 may
still verify naturalW1 necessity, but it will also have its own, distinct, natural
necessity, naturalW2 necessity.
With this distinction between different necessities of the “natural” family
in place, one can work through the example and see that there is no reason
to posit two empty worlds, rather than one. Consider again worlds WN and
WM . Neither set of natural laws demands that there be anything, therefore
let us posit an empty metaphysically possible world, V∗. V∗ is a naturalN
possibility for WN , and so verifies the naturalN necessities for WN . V∗ is
a naturalM possibility for WM , and so verifies the naturalM necessities for
WM . Suppose, for some p, that it is naturallyN necessary that p, but that
it is not naturallyM necessary that p. There is now no problem of clashing
necessities at V∗. We do not have a case where it is both naturally necessary
that p and not naturally necessary that p at a world, forcing us to posit
two separate worlds (VN and VM ) to avoid contradiction. We simply have
two different kinds of necessity. Our empty world verifies at least two kinds
of necessity from the “natural necessity family”, naturalN necessity and
naturalM necessity. It may, in addition, verify its own very minimal brand
of natural∗ necessity.
One diagnosis of the situation is that Fine has assumed that only one
kind of natural necessity can be verified at a world. However, I contend
that, if we take natural necessity to be a kind of necessity dependent upon
some status and distribution of natural kinds, properties and relations, then
there might be many such necessities verified at a world. However, we can
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allow that each world verifies a kind of necessity based upon the status and
distribution of its own properties and relations, which is a privileged natural
necessity at that world. There is only one privileged natural necessity in
each world, although there may be many more others verified as well. Fine
took naturalN necessity and naturalM necessity to be incompatible kinds of
necessity, but I have shown how the example can be understood such that
they can both be verified at world V∗, along with V∗’s own privileged natural
necessity. In short, the natural necessities for a world may be relative to
the status and distribution of natural properties and relations at that world.
But this does not rule out other natural necessities, which are relative to
the properties and relations at other worlds, being verified at that world.
They may not be the natural necessities for that world, but they may still
be legitimate necessities.
Does this all this turn on some worlds being empty? No. Fine introduces
his second counterexample to address this concern. This example concerns
worlds WD and WE . WD is a metaphysically possible world in which mind-
body dualism and epiphenomenalism are both true. WD contains mentalD
and physicalD events, which are ‘each subject to their own laws, but with
no nomological interaction between them’ (2005, p. 245). WE is also a
metaphysically possible world in which mind-body dualism and epiphenom-
enalism are both true. Its physical events are subject to the same laws as
WD, i.e. it contains physicalD events, but its mental events are subject to
different laws, call them mentalE events. Neither set of natural laws for the
two worlds demand that there exist any minds or mental events, therefore
there are two further metaphysically possible worlds, VD and VE , which are
mind-free, i.e. they contain no mental events. VD is a natural possibility for
WD, and so verifies the natural necessities for WD. VE is a natural possibil-
ity for WE , and so verifies the natural necessities for WE . In terms of the
status and distribution of their natural kinds, properties and relations, VD
and VE are completely alike; they contain only physicalD things. However,
they differ in terms of their natural necessities, and hence also their natural
possibilities. Therefore, worlds VD and VE are an example of two worlds
which differ merely as to what is a natural necessity.
By the same line of reasoning as before, VD and VE will dif-
fer on what is a natural possibility (for the mentalistic part of
the world), even though there is no difference in the ‘status’ or
distribution of their natural properties. (Fine, 2005, p. 245)
This second example assumes that, in a dualist, epiphenomenal world,
the laws governing mental events would be relevant to natural necessity.
Surely only the laws governing physical events are relevant? Dualist-style
immaterial minds do not strike one as being a part of the natural world, even
if they exist. This would undermine the counterexample, however, one can
rescue it by taking it to be about a wider kind of natural necessity where “the
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natural world” includes the realm of the mental. But then this just asks us to
consider worlds which are empty of a significant portion of natural kinds and
properties. A similar response to the first example can therefore be applied
here, mutatis mutandis. One need only suppose that there is a world V$
containing only physicalD events. V$ is a natural possibility relative to WD
and relative to WE . V$ has its own natural necessity, which supervenes on
the status and distribution of its own natural kinds, properties and relations.
In addition, V$ verifies naturalD necessity and naturalE necessity, given that
it is a natural possibility for worlds WD and WE .
If my response is successful, then the counterexamples fail. Each world
may have its own natural necessity, relative to the status and distribution
of natural kinds etc. at that world. In addition, a world may verify other
necessities, relative to the status and distribution of natural kinds etc. at
other worlds, but this does not imply a situation whereby the same status
and distribution of natural kinds may give rise to different necessities. There
is thus no threat to a relative modality view. But recall, even if Fine’s
counterexamples were successful, they would only bar one from a view where
natural necessity is relative to non-nomic facts.
One might worry about the following case. Suppose that it is naturallyM
necessary that p and naturallyN necessary that ¬p. On the assumption that
the empty world V∗ verifies both the naturalM necessities and the naturalN
necessities, and the factivity of natural necessities in general, both p and ¬p
will hold at V∗, which is impossible. This may look like a pretty decisive
problem for my proposal, however, it is not clear whether one can plausi-
bly expect the case where it is naturallyM necessary that p and naturallyN
necessary that ¬p to genuinely occur. Recall, these natural necessities are
intended to be defined in terms of the status and distribution of natural
kinds, properties and relations. If you have different kinds of things—e.g.
schmasses rather than masses—not only will you have different natural ne-
cessities, but your necessities will concern different things, e.g., naturalN
necessity tells us about the behaviour of mass, whereas naturalM necessity
tells us about the behaviour of schmass. So, e.g., even if it is naturallyN
necessary that mass is F , and naturallyM necessary that schmass is not F ,
in V∗ this will not lead to a case of p & ¬p (Fa & ¬Fa) but only to a case of
Fa & ¬Fb (or even Fa & ¬Gb if the same natural property also cannot carry
over). What we want is the two necessities to yield a flat-out contradiction.
The following might look like the right kind of case. It is plausible to
suppose that the relevant natural necessities and possibilities arising from
WN and WM include:
It is naturallyN necessary that there is no schmass.
It is naturallyN possible that there is mass.
It is naturallyM necessary that there is no mass.
It is naturallyM possible that there is schmass.
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All these will then be verified at V∗. But, again, although at first glance
this may not look right, there is no contradiction to be yielded. There is
no contradiction of the form p & ¬p: one can only infer instances of the
perfectly acceptable 1p & ¬2p. Given the factivity of natural necessity,
we can infer that in V∗ there is no mass and no schmass. But this is hardly
news: V∗ is empty.
What we really need is two worlds containing the same natural kinds
etc., but where they behave differently. But in such cases it will always be
debatable whether they really are the same things. I thus conclude that
we have no good reason to believe that there are genuine cases where it is
naturallyN necessary that p and naturallyM necessary that ¬p. My proposal
stands undamaged.
There is another worry one might raise, in terms of accessibility relations
between the worlds.24 Natural necessity is standardly taken to validate an
S4 system, and the accessibility relation for natural modality is accordingly
taken to be (reflexive and) transitive. V∗ is a natural possibility for WN ,
so V∗ is naturally-accessible from WN . V∗ is a natural possibility for WM ,
so V∗ is naturally-accessible from WM . We have been told that because V∗
is a natural possibility for WM , it therefore verifies the natural necessities
of WM , so from this it will follow that WM is a natural possibility for V∗,
and that WM is naturally-accessible from V∗. Taking “x ⇒ y” to signify
natural accessibility from x to y, we have WN ⇒ V∗ and V∗ ⇒ WM . If the
accessibility relation is transitive, it follows that WN ⇒WM , which is false.
The example was set up to ensure that they are worlds with different natural
necessities, possibilities, laws etc. One way out of this problem would be to
deny that the natural accessibility relation is transitive, and hence reject the
view that natural necessity validates S4. However, this challenge to my reply
to Fine is misguided, and hence does not need such a radical response. V∗ is
naturallyN -accessible from WN , and V∗ is naturallyM -accessible from WM .
The same line of reasoning can lead one to conclude that WM is naturallyM -
accessible from V∗, but it does not follow from this that WM is accessible
from WN , with respect to either of the kinds of natural necessity mentioned
(we only have WN ⇒N V∗ and V∗ ⇒M WM ). So there is no unwelcome
accessibility which should invite one to reject transitivity.
The foregoing has left open a number of important questions and issues
which need to be properly addressed if a viable and competitive account of
relative modality is to be defended. I will address at least some of these in
the remainder of the thesis. In the next chapter I will look more closely at
challenges raised for the relative modality view by essentialists and essen-
tialism in general.
24Thank you to the participants of the NIP/IP Graduate Conference 2010, and in
particular to So`nia Roca Royes, for drawing my attention to this.
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Chapter 2
Essentialism and Relative
Modality
The relative modality view (RM) disagrees in many respects with essential-
ism about modality. A significant point of disagreement is over absolute
necessity: RM takes logical necessity to be absolute and metaphysical ne-
cessity to be relative, where essentialism takes metaphysical necessity to
be absolute, and logical necessity to be absolute only insofar as it is a sub-
species of metaphysical necessity. My proposed view takes logical possibility
to be an important kind of modality, where essentialists often dismiss mere
logical possibility as not being genuine possibility, or possibility “in name
only”. There are also challenges raised when it comes to the kind of account
RM can accept of logical modality, such that RM is not undercut by an
account which places metaphysical necessity as prior to logical necessity. In
this chapter I will assess some of the particular objections raised against
the kind of view I want to defend, as well as some more general lessons
essentialism has for RM.
2.1 Absolute Necessities
A number of points arising from work by Shalkowski present challenges for
RM. These challenges are largely directed against the view that Shalkowski
takes Hale to have endorsed in his 1996 paper “Absolute Necessities”, so in
order to properly understand the criticisms, one must first look at the argu-
ments presented in that paper. It will turn out that Shalkowski’s criticisms
when directed against Hale are not entirely fair, but can be refocused to
present genuine challenges for RM.
Hale (1996) begins by introducing a notion of relative necessity, in terms
of there being some other sense of possibility available such that the negation
of a candidate φ-necessity is possible according to this other sense. It is not
absolutely impossible: there is a sense in which it is possible. As this is a
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different notion of relative necessity to that I have been discussing so far, I
will refer to Hale’s notion of relative necessity as “relativeH necessity”, and
use his expressions “φ-necessity” and “φ-possibility”, in contrast to my use
of “R-necessity” and “R-possibility”.
The relativity of φ-necessity consists in the fact that, whilst no φ-
necessary statement can be false, provided that all the members
of Φ are true, it is not excluded that there are other senses of
‘possible’ in which the members of Φ may be false; if so, φ-
necessity is a merely relative notion. (1996, p. 93)
Hale also introduces relations of relative strength between different kinds
of modality, such that one kind is stronger or weaker (or at least as strong
as/at least as weak as) another kind.
One kind of necessity, 1, may be said to be stronger than an-
other, 2, if ‘1p’ always entails ‘2p’ but not conversely. As-
suming the usual relations between necessity and possibility, this
relationship will obtain if and only if ♦1 is weaker than ♦2, i.e.
‘♦2p’ always entails ‘♦1p’ but not conversely. I shall also say that
1 is at least as strong as 2 if the first half of this condition is
met, i.e. ‘1p’ always entails ‘2p’. (1996, p. 94)
With this in place, Hale is now in a position to ask the question whether
for every kind of relativeH necessity, logical possibility is at least one sense
in which it is possible for the relativeH necessity to be false.
It is not, however, given by the assumption that φ-necessity is
merely relative that the falsehood of members of Φ is logically
possible. We have that ‘♦∗p’ does not always entail ‘♦φp’. We
could close the gap, if we could show that logical possibility
is at least as weak as any other kind of possibility (so that in
particular, ‘♦∗p’ entails ‘it is logically possible that p’). (1996,
p. 94)
If logical possibility can be shown to be the weakest notion of possibility,
and hence logical necessity be shown to be the strongest kind of necessity,
then this would appear to go against those who take a notion of metaphys-
ical necessity to be absolute, in the sense that ‘when it is metaphysically
necessary that p, there is no good sense of ‘possible’ (except, perhaps, an
epistemic one) in which it is possible that not-p’ and such that ‘metaphysical
necessities hold true at all possible worlds without qualification or exception’
(Hale, 1996, p. 95).1
1Hale immediately sets aside notions of epistemic possibility and necessity, because it
seems that epistemic possibility will not always entail logical possibility (see section 1.2).
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It is in this context that Hale introduces an argument inspired by McFet-
ridge, intended to show that logical necessity is at least as strong as every
other kind of (non-epistemic) necessity. In the argument, ‘ ’ represents the
logical necessity operator; ‘♦’ represents an arbitrary possibility operator;
and ‘→’ is to be understood as the material conditional. Five assumptions
are made about   and ♦:
1. If  (A→ B) then  (A & C → B)
2.  (A→ A)
3. If  (A→ B) and  (A→ C) then  (A→ B & C)
4. If ♦A and  (A→ B) then ♦B
5. ¬♦(A & ¬A)
(1996, p. 96)
The first assumption corresponds to the familiar rule of monotonicity or
weakening. The second assumption is a tautology. The third assumption
corresponds to another rule of standard propositional logic. Assumption 4
allows that an arbitrary kind of possibility can be transferred across logical
consequence. And assumption 5 says that in no sense of possibility can a
contradiction be true.
The argument then runs as follows:
1 1)  (A→ B) assumption
2 2) ♦(A & ¬B) assumption
1 3)  (A & ¬B → B) 1, by A1
4)  (¬B → ¬B) A2
5)  (A & ¬B → ¬B) 4, by A1
1 6)  (A & ¬B → B & ¬B) 3,5, by A3
1,2 7) ♦(B & ¬B) 2,6 by A4
8) ¬♦(B & ¬B) A5
1 9) ¬♦(A & ¬B) 2,7,8 reductio
(1996, pp. 96–7)
Hale calls the conclusion established “McFetridge’s Thesis”.
(McF) If the conditional corresponding to a valid inference is
logically necessary, then there is no sense in which it is possible
that its antecedent be true but its conclusion false.
(See 1996, p. 97.) The argument is finished with the aid of two lemmas (see
1996, pp. 97–98 for lemma proofs):
Lemma 1:   p iff   ((p→ p)→ p)
Lemma 2: ♦¬p iff ♦((p→ p) & ¬p)
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Now if  p, then by Lemma 1,  ((p → p) → p), whence by
McFetridge’s thesis, ¬♦((p → p) & ¬p) for any sense of ♦, so
that ¬♦¬p, by Lemma 2. Thus we have:
(Generalized McF): If  p then there is no sense in which ♦¬p
(1996, p. 98)
We have our conclusion that logical necessity is absolute: if it is logically
necessary that p, then there is no (non-epistemic) sense in which it is possible
that not-p.
It is worth asking whether this conclusion can be used in arguing for the
stronger thesis that, not only is logical necessity absolute in this sense, but all
other kinds of necessity—the merely relativeH necessities—are mere relative
(in my sense) versions of logical necessity, rather than being independent
kinds of necessity. I.e., what relevance does the conclusion that non-logical
(non-epistemic) necessities are as least as weak as logical necessity have
for the thesis that non-logical (non-epistemic) necessities are in fact mere
relative kinds of logical necessity? This goes beyond the remit of Hale’s
argument. His result may simply show that there are interesting logical
relations holding between distinct kinds of modality that are not forms of
any other kind.
One may, however, wish to use Hale’s result in the following way. RM en-
tails that logical necessity is absolute, at least as it applies to alethic modal-
ities. Recall, a proposition p is R-necessary just when ∃ϕ(Ψϕ & (ϕ→ p)).
Now, take any kind of R-necessity. This will involve a conjunction ϕ fulfill-
ing a condition Ψ. Logical necessities follow from any premises whatsoever.
In particular, the logical necessities will follow from the conjunction ϕ, re-
gardless of which kind of R-necessity we started out with. So for any kind of
relative R-necessity, if 〈p〉 is logically necessary, it follows that 〈p〉 will also
be R-necessary, so logical necessity is at least as strong as any R-necessity
(and R-necessities turn out to also be relativeH necessities). Discovering
that logical necessity is absolute does not show that the relative modality
account is true, but the account does provide an explanation of why logical
necessity is absolute, i.e. logical necessity is absolute because all other kinds
of necessity are mere relative versions of logical necessity.
This is just the beginning of Hale’s paper. After giving his argument for
the Generalized McFetridge Thesis, he considers the problem this poses for
someone who takes metaphysical necessity to be absolute. First, he presents
the friend of absolute metaphysical necessity with a dilemma. Granted, we
have established that if it is logically necessary that p, then there is no sense
in which 〈¬p〉 is possible, including metaphysical possibility. But nothing
has been said regarding the converse, whether if it is metaphysically neces-
sary that p, it can be logically possible that ¬p. The dilemma concerns these
two options. If the converse does not hold, then metaphysical necessity is
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not absolute. If the converse does hold, then both logical and metaphysical
necessity appear to be of equal and absolute strength. But, ‘neither alterna-
tive is—or seems—congenial to the friends of metaphysical necessity’ (Hale,
1996, p. 98). The first horn goes against the friend of metaphysical ne-
cessity’s contention that there are no metaphysically impossible worlds, e.g.
possible worlds in which water is not H2O. The second horn does not allow
the logical possibility of metaphysical impossibilities, and hence seemingly
non-logical, non-conceptual truths will be included in the logical necessities,
e.g., it is not logically possible for water to fail to be H2O.
Hale’s suggested way of out the dilemma is to “blunt its first horn” by
introducing a notion of “genuine” or “real” possibility, which he does via a
discussion of notions of possibility narrower than the broad notion of logical
possibility he has been working with thus far. Yes, some metaphysically
impossibilities are logical possibilities, but these nevertheless do not count
as real possibilities.
The moral of our discussion of austere logical possibility and its
kin is, in effect, that we should recognise a kind of necessity as
absolute iff there is no real possibility that a necessity of that
kind should be false. But then why should it not be maintained
that, just as certain austerely logical possibilities are not genuine
possibilities, and so should not be taken as showing that the asso-
ciated broadly logical necessities are not absolute, so not every
broadly logical possibility is a real possibility, fully apt to de-
stroy the claim to absoluteness of a corresponding metaphysical
necessity? (Hale, 1996, p. 101)
Hale thus introduces a rival picture of absolute necessity, which avoids the
dilemma:
Absolute necessity is the union of broadly logical and metaphys-
ical necessity, while real—or absolute—possibility is the inter-
section of broadly logical and metaphysical possibility. (1996, p.
101)
In order to be absolutely necessary, 〈p〉 must be either broadly logically or
metaphysically necessary, and in order to be really possible, 〈p〉 must be
both broadly logically and metaphysically possible. Such an account might
seem rather unnatural, rendering absolute necessity a merely disjunctive
notion. Hale thus devotes the final sections of the paper to exploring one
candidate unifying theory, ‘in the light of which it is intelligible how a truth
may qualify as absolutely necessary in either of these two ways’ (Hale, 1996,
p. 102). This candidate theory is an essentialist theory of modality, inspired
by the work of Kit Fine.
In brief, Fine’s theory is as follows. Essence is prior to modality. All
things have essences. The essence of a thing is what makes it what it is,
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without which it would cease to be, or lose its identity. Metaphysical modal-
ity finds its source in the essences of all things. Smaller sets of things give
rise to other kinds of modality, which are restricted kinds of metaphysical
modality. E.g., conceptual necessity finds its source in the essences of all
concepts, and logical necessity finds its source in the essences of all logical
concepts. Metaphysical necessity is de re, and applies to things. Fine’s
essentialist theory of modality applies most clearly to metaphysical neces-
sity and those kinds which it contains. Some other kinds of necessity are
not definable at all in terms of metaphysical necessity, namely, natural and
normative necessity. These kinds of necessity are de dicto, and find their
sources in the “natural order” and the “normative order” respectively. I will
discuss Fine’s view in more detail later, but this sketch should suffice for the
time being. (See Fine (1994, 2005).)
This kind of essentialism is supposed to explain how both metaphysical
and logical necessity can both be “absolute” as follows. Logical necessity
is a restricted kind of metaphysical necessity: it has its source in logical
concepts, some things, whereas metaphysical necessity has its source in all
things. This means that the Finean actually takes logical necessity to be
strictly stronger than metaphysical necessity: every logical necessity will be
a metaphysical necessity, because the former is just a special case of the
latter—truth in virtue of the nature of some, rather than all, things. There
are truths in virtue of the natures of things other than the logical concepts,
which means that there will be metaphysical necessities which are not logical
necessities. However, this is where the notion of “genuine” possibility comes
into play. Hale has argued that we need to be able to discount ‘possibilities
in name only’. E.g., it does not matter if it is possible* that ¬p although it
is absolutely necessary that p if some possibilities* are not genuine. So, the
notion of absoluteness we are really interested in is where a kind of necessity
is absolute just when there is no genuine sense of possibility such that, for
some p, it is necessary that p in the first sense of necessity but possible
that ¬p in the second sense of possibility. On this kind of essentialist view,
metaphysical necessity is absolute in this stronger sense. In particular, if is
it metaphysically necessary that p, then a logical possibility that ¬p will not
count as genuine. But note that, as a special case of metaphysical necessity,
logical necessity will also be absolute in this sense. So both metaphysical
and logical necessity are “absolute”, although logical necessity is, on Fine’s
view, strictly stronger.
To clarify, there are two notions of absoluteness in play.
1. 1 is absolute = there is no notion of possibility ♦2 such that
∃p(1p & ♦2¬p).
2. 1 is absolute = there is no notion of genuine possibility ♦2 such that
∃p(1p & ♦2¬p).
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Where it counts, I will refer to the first kind of absoluteness as strict abso-
luteness, and the second kind as rich absoluteness.
2.2 Shalkowski’s Critique
2.2.1 Against Hale
Shalkowski raises a barrage of criticisms against a view which takes logical
necessity to be absolute, and other kinds of necessity to be relative to it.
The developments of formal logic, especially model-theoretic se-
mantics, have paved the way for apparently clear accounts of the
relation of logical consequence and the correlated property of be-
ing a logical truth. With one or other of these in hand, logical
necessity is easily definable: A is logically necessary if and only
if A is a logical truth if and only if A is a logical consequence
of the axioms of logic. With logical necessity thus understood
in formally manageable terms, other metaphysically significant
necessities, such as physical necessity, can be defined as the logi-
cal consequences of some specified set of nonlogical axioms. The
physical necessities would be, in this framework, the logical con-
sequences of the fundamental laws of physics. . . . In what follows
I argue that this received view about modalities is seriously mis-
guided. (Shalkowski, 2004, p. 56)
His arguments are directed against this kind of view in general. They are
also directed against Hale’s particular arguments for the absoluteness of
logical necessity. Shalkowski takes Hale’s argument to be a challenge to his
favoured view, essentialism, which takes ‘the most general and fundamental
necessity’ to be de re metaphysical necessity, with its source in the natures
of things. Hence he calls proponents of his target view “anti-essentialists”.
It is worth noting already that, as we have seen, alongside Hale’s arguments
for the absoluteness of logical necessity are arguments in favour of exploring
just this kind of essentialism.
One can draw out several points from Shalkowski’s work. First, as di-
rected against Hale (1996):
1. Assumption 5 (A5) begs the question in favour of the absoluteness of
logical necessity.
2. Hale misses the essentialist target. The essentialist argues that some
logical possibilities are not genuine possibilities, not that some logical
impossibilities are metaphysically possible.
3. Hale has no dialectical advantage over the essentialist.
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And in general against the “anti-essentialist”:
4. One cannot give an account of metaphysical necessity in terms of log-
ical necessity, because in order to give a proper account of logical
necessity one must appeal to essentialist or metaphysically necessary
facts.
5. Anti-essentialism brings along with it substantial Humean metaphys-
ical commitments.
Let us consider them in turn.
First, A5 constitutes the assumption that, for any (non-epistemic) sense
of possibility, no contradiction is possible. Shalkowski argues that this im-
mediately rules out senses of logical possibility endorsed by proponents of
paraconsistent logics.
In some well-developed paraconsistent logics, the Law of Noncon-
tradiction fails and so, according to (logical) necessities specified
in accordance with the truths of these logics, it is possible that
there be true contradictions. Thus, (A5) is, strictly speaking,
false and will not be granted by all anti-essentialists. (2004, p.
59)
Hence, assuming A5 begs the question against those who take paraconsistent
logical necessity to be stronger than a less exotic brand of logical necessity.
For Shalkowski this problem is not pressing as he is interested in a debate
between the essentialist and the “anti-essentialist”. As the essentialist is
likely to agree with A5, this is not a point at which he can attack.
For traditionally minded essentialists, that Hale’s argument is in-
sufficiently general is somewhat cold comfort. It does not beg the
question against them after all, since they accept (A5). (2004,
p. 60)
In any case, it is not clear which “well-developed paraconsistent logics”
Shalkowski has in mind. One of the better known paraconsistent logics,
Priest’s Logic of Paradox (LP ) (Priest, 1979), does in fact validate the
Law of Non-contradiction. For suppose ¬(A & ¬A) was false for some A.
Then A & ¬A would be true. So both A and ¬A would be true. But
given the semantics for ¬, this is impossible: if A is true then ¬A is false.
So ¬(A & ¬A) must be true. Even if A and ¬A were true-and-false, as
is allowed in LP , this would only mean that A & ¬A and ¬(A & ¬A)
would both be true-and-false as well. Importantly, ¬(A & ¬A) would not
be plain false. With a principle of necessitation (which Priest accepts),
we have ¬(A & ¬A), and hence A5, ¬♦(A & ¬A). It is possible that
there be contradictions which are true-and-false, but there is no room for
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contradictions which are plain true. This is not to say that all paraconsistent
logics validate the Law of Non-contradiction, but given this reasoning, it is
hard to see how it could fail to hold. It seems that the onus is on Shalkowski
to give an example of a plausible, motivated logic which allows for true
contradictions.
This kind of criticism does, however, highlight the need for a principled
choice of logic to underlie logical necessity. Even if most logics agree on
A5, there will be other differences and disagreements. When it comes to
Hale’s proof, there are only a very few commitments to logical principles
(the Law of Non-contradiction, weakening (monotonicity), proof by reductio
etc.), which will be compatible with a number of different kinds of logical
system, and hence with different species of logical necessity being absolute.
Whatever “the right logic” turns out to be, it is likely that Hale’s proof
can be used to show that it is absolute. In terms of drawing additional
conclusions from the result, if we want to make a substantive metaphysical
claim to the effect that logical necessity is therefore privileged in some way,
this will be no good if we haven’t settled on a privileged logical system.2
Shalkowski’s next criticism is that, even if Hale’s argument works, it
misses the essentialist target. Hale’s argument purports to show that there
is no sense of possibility for which a logical impossibility is possible. But,
says Shalkowski, this is not a claim that the essentialist who takes meta-
physical necessity to be absolute wants to make. In taking metaphysical
necessity to be absolute, the essentialist does not wish to claim that there
is some sense of possibility, namely metaphysical possibility, for which a log-
ical impossibility is possible; he does not want to claim that some logical
impossibilities are metaphysically possible, or that some logical necessities
are metaphysically contingent. Rather, he wants to claim that those logi-
cal possibilities which are metaphysically impossible are not genuine or real
possibilities. Metaphysical necessity is the absolute genuine necessity (richly
absolute).
Metaphysical possibility is supposed by essentialists to be less
permissive, not more permissive, than logical possibility. Ac-
cordingly, essentialists hold that logical possibility, as given by
first-order quantificational logic with identity and perhaps any
relevant nonlogical meaning postulates, overgenerates admissi-
ble formulae and counts as possible things that are not really
possible. (Shalkowski, 2004, p. 61)
As a criticism of Hale (1996), this is completely misguided. Yes, it is
shown that there is no sense of possibility for which a logical impossibility
is possible. But Hale then immediately points out that nothing has been
said about the other direction, as to whether, specifically in the case of
2See section 3.5.5.
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metaphysical necessity, there can be metaphysical impossibilities which are
logically possible. There then procedes a discussion regarding how an essen-
tialist who endorses the absoluteness of metaphysical necessity can respond
to or accommodate the Generalized McFetridge Thesis. Hale certainly does
not yield his result as a weapon against the essentialist.
If we ignore this aspect of Shalkowski’s comments, an important point
does begin to emerge. First, one can take him to have presented an alter-
native option to the essentialist in the face of Hale’s argument, namely, to
make a principled distinction between genuine and non-genuine possibilities,
and take absolute necessity to be the dual of the weakest genuine kind of
possibility. Second, this point can be used as a challenge, not to Hale’s
views, but to RM, the kind of view Shalkowski originally lays out as his
target. In order to claim that metaphysical necessity is a merely relative
form of logical necessity, I will have to confront arguments for the claim
that some logical possibilities are not genuine possibilities, and hence that
logical possibility is not the weakest genuine kind of possibility and hence
not absolute in the rich sense.
In the end, Shalkowski concludes that Hale has no dialectical advan-
tage over the essentialist. He claims that both must draw a line between
what they take to be genuine possibilities, and kinds of possibility which
are too permissive to be metaphysically significant. The essentialist stops
at possibilities based in essentialist, metaphysical truths, and draws the line
to cut off conceptual and logical possibilities from reality. E.g., they count
“Socrates could be fat” as a genuine possibility, but not “Socrates could have
had different parents to those he actually had”. The anti-essentialist draws
the line further out, including broad logical possibilities, such as “Socrates
could have had different parents to those he actually had”, but ruling out
possibilities that break analytic or conceptual connections such as “Some
bachelors are married”. Both sides of the debate must justify their drawing
of this line.
While the essentialist must justify the verdict that some consis-
tent sentences which violate “metaphysical postulates” fail to ex-
press real possibilities, the conceptualist must justify the verdict
that some consistent sentences that violate meaning postulates
fail to express real possibilities. No advantage to the conceptual-
ist here. . . . Thus, Hale’s preferred position affords no dialectical
advantage over the essentialist. Each must stray from the ap-
parent security and innocence of austerely logical truth; each
must justify their respective chosen limit on genuine possibility;
each derives necessities largely from a priori investigation, with
perhaps the addition of merely uncontroversial empirical infor-
mation. Thus, Hale’s argument fails to establish the absoluteness
of logical necessity, traditionally understood. (Shalkowski, 2004,
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p. 63)
Again, whilst it may be true that “the anti-essentialist” draws such a line,
the point does not properly apply to Hale (1996). Hale suggests that to be
genuinely possible, 〈p〉 must be both broadly logically possible and meta-
physically possible, so, in effect, he draws the same line as the essentialist.
It may be true that this gives Hale no dialectical advantage over the essen-
tialist, but this is simply because he is arguing for an essentialist position
himself!
Again, although the criticism does not apply to Hale, it does seem to
apply to the (anti-essentialist) view I want to endorse. Whatever logical
necessity I take to be absolute, surely I can always restrict it a little further
(broad to austere, austere predicate logic to austere propositional logic. . . ).
So a principled line needs to be drawn between an acceptable notion of logical
necessity, and logical necessities which are too narrow. This is related to the
previous challenge: somehow, a suitable notion of logical necessity needs to
be isolated from other candidates, arising from other logical systems, and
from narrower systems. Furthermore, something needs to be said regarding
whether the logical possibilities associated with this notion can be relied
upon to be genuine possibilities. Note that it is not clear whether logical
possibilities need to be genuine: nothing so far appears to rule out agreeing
with the essentialist that a notion of logical necessity does not always yield
genuine, metaphysically significant possibilities, but nevertheless arguing
that it can be used as the modality to which all other kinds of modality are
relative (perhaps rendering all modality derivatively non-real, see section
1.3.3).
An important point to be clarified is what exactly it means for a kind of
modality to be “genuine”, “real” or “metaphysically significant”. It seems
that Shalkowski takes a metaphysically significant or genuine necessity to be
a kind of necessity which will rule out as false all non-genuine possibilities.
The fundmental dispute is surely over which, if either, of these
modalities correctly characterizes the necessary truths. It is a
dispute over whether everything not ruled out as false by the
relevant logical truths is a genuine possibility. (Shalkowski, 2004,
p. 61)
So the onus falls onto what it is for a possibility to be genuine. I take
Shalkowski’s notion of metaphysically significant possibilities to be that they
have implications for “how the world might be”.
The essentialist is simply at pains to maintain that any logical
possibilities outside the domain of the metaphysically possible
have no bearing on the ways the world might be. Such merely
logical possibilities are possibilities in name only. (Shalkowski,
1997, p. 49)
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This isn’t particularly illuminating, given the use of a modal term: does
“might” here express a genuine sense of possibility? But it at least indicates
that these possibilities have an important relation to the world.
Put this way, it is not clear why one would want logical possibility to be
significant in this way. If you take the view that the field of logical possibility
is wider than that of metaphysical possibility, one wouldn’t expect logical
possibility to be metaphysically significant. However, this does not mean
that logical possibility must immediately be dismissed as insignificant tout
court. Perhaps logical possibility has consequences for the limits of thought,
for instance, rather than the limits of how the world might be. A related
point is that, just because a notion of modality may fail to be metaphysically
significant, it does not immediately follow that it cannot be used to give an
account of kinds of modality which are taken to be significant in this way.
E.g., one might argue that an account of physical necessity in terms of the
logical consequences of the laws of nature will be significant precisely because
of the connection to laws of nature which are metaphysically significant, not
because logical necessity is or is not metaphysically significant.
2.2.2 Against the Anti-Essentialist
We can now move on to consider Shalkowski’s more general challenges
against the anti-essentialist. First, he presents a general problem for any
view which takes only logical necessity to be (richly) absolute or which
seeks to give an account of metaphysical necessity in terms of logical neces-
sity. Such a project requires one to provide an account of logical modality
and, it is argued, any successful such account will have to make reference
to metaphysical considerations, drawing on a prior notion of metaphysical
modality. Therefore, the account of metaphysical necessity will fall foul of
vicious circularity.
The problem starts with a standard model-theoretic understanding of
logical consequence and logical necessity. This requires making use of a do-
main or class of models. However, one needs to give an account of what
models there are. What counts as a genuine model? What makes some
candidate models admissible and some inadmissible? Shalkowski considers
several alternatives open to the anti-essentialist. First he considers Platon-
ism, by which models are abstract objects. However, it is difficult for the
Platonist to show why these actual abstract objects should have any bearing
on logical possibilities and necessities.
So far, all the Platonist has told us is that the actual world con-
tains some abstract objects in addition to the concrete objects
recognized by the nominalist. With respect to understanding
modality this is no more illuminating than being told that there
are extraterrestrial objects such as planets and comets in addi-
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tion to the terrestrial objects we all know and love. (2004, p.
67)
Two further assumptions are needed.
(i) every model represents a possibility. . .
(ii) all possibilities are represented by some model.
(2004, p. 68)
Shalkowski has a number of objections against “Modal Platonism”, but
the most important is that it cannot justify (i) and (ii) without making
problematic metaphysical commitments.
There is nothing, though, in standard model theory that can
count as justifying the two modal constraints that modal platon-
ism requires. It is not as though model theorists have exhaus-
tively examined objectively existing entities, catalogued their
structures and their representational capacities, compared the
results of this examination with considered judgments about the
modal facts, and then reported back to the rest of us. (2004, p.
70)
Why think that a certain class of abstract objects succeeds in representing
all and only possibilities? We cannot rely on logical principles to justify the
claim, as the question is precisely whether our logical principles yield the
right domain of models for modalizing. Rather
Some other necessity [other than logical] must be taken as basic
to provide for some appropriate constraints on the existence and
nature of the class of objects that are thought to underwrite
logical necessity, such as abstract models. (2004, p. 81)
Shalkowski of course makes the additional point that this justification
can be given using metaphysical considerations. We can frame the appropri-
ate constraints in terms of the metaphysical necessities and possibilities for,
arising from the essence of, logical objects. We can ensure that the models or
the truth-tables of logic are relevant for necessity and possibility by taking
them to encode essential truths about logical objects, such as propositions,
or logical constants, and so on.
What the anti-essentialist takes to be modally innocent seman-
tic facts involving models, the essentialist sees to be closet es-
sentialism about peculiar sorts of entities. . . . If the truths of
logic as specified by truth tables are to be useable in our rea-
soning about contrafactual situations, then the semantic infor-
mation contained in truth tables must represent not just the ac-
tual facts about propositions but also modal information about
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propositions (or some other favoured truth bearers). This modal
information, if it is to be useful in reasoning across the full range
of the possibilities, must be information about the essence of
propositions. Implicit in truth tables, then, is the thesis that
what the tables represent are all and only the relevant possibili-
ties for propositions. Conditions (i) and (ii) resurface as hidden
assumptions in all elementary logical semantics. (2004, p. 78)
Logical modality is a matter of the essences of a certain class of logical
objects, and associated metaphysical necessities and possibilities for those
objects. In order to fix on an account of logical modality, one must ad-
dress certain metaphysical issues concerning the natures of certain objects.
Therefore, one cannot give an account of metaphysical modality in terms of
logical modality, as this will lead to circularity; any successful account of
logical modality will have made prior recourse to metaphysical necessities
and possibilities for logical objects.
In response, one might ask why truth tables contain only some infor-
mation about the essence of propositions, and how the line is drawn be-
tween information which is and is not included. E.g., one might think
that propositions are essentially abstract entities, or essentially intentional
(about things), or essentially such that they can be the objects of certain
attitudes such as belief, or perhaps even essentially logical entities. But none
of this appears to be encoded in the truth tables of propositional logic. The
same point applies if one abandons the idea that these encode the essence
of propositions, in favour of taking them to encode the essence of the log-
ical constants, such as conjunction and negation. These will still arguably
have essential properties which fail to be encoded, such as being essentially
abstract. This is an instance of a general problem: the essentialist needs to
distinguish between what is true in virtue of the nature of logical entities,
and a proper sub-class which covers our standard notion of logical necessity.3
Shalkowski owes us an explanation of why only some essential truths about
logical entities are relevant for what models there are.
One might also accuse Shalkowski of assuming an essentialist account
of modality in his argument. He moves immediately from the thought that
models must represent ‘modal information about propositions’, to the claim
that this modal information ‘if it is to be useful in reasoning across the full
range of the possibilities, must be information about the essence of proposi-
tions’ (2004, p. 78). But this only follows given an antecedent commitment
to an essentialist account of this modal information. An alternative move
could take the modal information to arise from the limits of how we think
about propositions, or even from the behaviour of counterpart propositions
in other possible worlds.4 Note also, even if we need information about
3See e.g. Correia (forthcoming, §5).
4Unless you think propositions are sets of worlds.
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‘the full range of the possibilities’ it is not clear that information about
the essence of propositions will do that. Suppose you take essence to pro-
vide the source of metaphysical possibility, but that you nevertheless take
mere logical possibility to be a genuine kind of possibility. The essence of
propositions is only going to tell you what is metaphysically possible for
propositions, but surely, for the purposes of logic, we want to count what is
logically possible as well?
Two variants of this argument are presented by Vaidya (2006). He starts
with the fact that there are many different formalizations of logic to choose
from when giving an account of logical modality.
1. P is logically necessary only if P is either an axiom or deductive con-
sequence of the axioms of the correct logical system.
2. There are multiple formalizations of logic that are plausible. . . .
3. There are three plausible domains one can appeal to in order to deter-
mine which formal system correctly captures logic: logic, metaphysics,
or physical theory.
4. Appealing to different formalizations of logic to determine which for-
mal system is correct is circular. Moreover, one cannot appeal to facts
about a first-order classical system to argue that a paraconsistent sys-
tem is not adequate. The facts appealed to must be external to the
formalization.
5. Appealing to physical theory to determine which formal system is cor-
rect would commit the naturalistic fallacy.
6. Consequently, the domain one must appeal to in determining which
formalization of logic is correct is metaphysics.
7. Therefore, some metaphysical truths about the scope and nature of
logic determine whether P is logically necessary. (2006, pp. 179–180)
In short, in order to fix on a unique account of logical necessity, we need
to fix on a unique underlying logical system. The only way to settle on the
correct logic for logical necessity is to appeal to metaphysical considerations.
Therefore, metaphysical considerations in part determine whether a given
proposition is logically necessary.
This argument suffers from a circularity problem. Regardless of the
conclusion, one is using logical reasoning to come to the conclusion that
such-and-such is the correct logic.5 Even if we don’t endorse this particular
argument, it seems likely that in arguing that one logic is correct, we will
engage in logical reasoning, and thus presuppose some underlying logical
5This was pointed out by Bob Hale.
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principles. It looks like one will have to appeal to something non-logical to
get off the ground justifying one logic over another. But it also looks like
logic is always going to appear in the picture somewhere.
Vaidya’s second argument is more specific about what metaphysical con-
siderations he takes to be relevant to logical necessity, namely, the nature or
essence of logical constants. What propositions are logically true depends
upon which propositions are true under substitution of their non-logical con-
stituents. This, in turn, depends upon what the logical constituents are, i.e.
what the logical constants are. We need to be right about the distribution
of the fundamental kind property of being a logical constant in the world in
order to be right about the logical truths and logical necessity.
[L]ogical necessity is metaphysically determined by the logical
constants. . . . A proposition P is a logical truth just in case P
is true under every replacement of constituents of P that are
not logical constants. Consequently, the logical truths are deter-
mined by what the logical constants are. . . .
One distinctively metaphysical principle is the essentiality of
fundamental kind. In general, the fundamental kind of thing
x is, is a property x cannot fail to have. The properties that
individuate an entity at its most fundamental level are essential
to that entity. These properties speak to the issue of what kind
of thing x is. The suggestion here is that being a logical constant
is a fundamental kind property. . . . What things are taken to
be logical constants can vary across various formalizations of
logic. However, for a system L to be the correct logical system
is for it to capture the essential nature of the logical constants.
Consequently, there is a metaphysical foundation to logic. (2006,
pp. 180–181)
This argument rests upon the principle of the essentiality of fundamental
kind. So one can only accept Vaidya’s conclusion if one is also prepared to
accept the truth of this principle, and that it applies to entities such as logi-
cal constants. The argument also leaves open some important details of how
this principle is to be used. Vaidya appeals to the idea that being a logical
constant is an essential property, such that logical necessity stems from a
fixed class of logical constants. However, it also seems natural to expect that,
on this view, the nature of each logical constant would be relevant. E.g., one
might take one difference between Classical and Intuitionistic logic to be that
they attribute different properties to negation. One way to decide between
the logics might be to inquire into the nature of negation, e.g. if an essential
property of negation is that, for all p, ¬¬p iff p, then Intuitionistic logic is
wrong because it gets the properties of negation wrong. Vaidya might reply
that intuitionistic negation and classical negation are different entities, one
of which, say, is essentially of the kind logical constant, one of which is not.
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Suppose the logical constant is classical negation. What kind of thing is in-
tuitionistic negation then, if not a logical constant? Perhaps, then, classical
negation and intuitionistic negation are both logical constants, but different
kinds of logical constant. However, this would undermine Vaidya’s point.
He suggests that for a logical system to be “the correct logical system is for
it to capture the essential nature of the logical constants” (my emphasis).
But if both kinds of negation are logical constants, albeit different kinds
of logical constant, then a logical system must include both kinds. But it
can’t be that both ∀p(p ⇔ ¬¬p) and ¬∀p(p ⇔ ¬¬p). One could reply
that the correct logical system has to capture the essential nature of logical
constants of a particular kind. But then one will need to argue why one
kind, e.g. the classical constants, should be favoured over another, e.g. the
intuitionistic constants. But this returns us back to the debate over what
is the correct logical system—essentialist considerations have not helped us.
Alternatively, one could claim that a correct logical system has to capture
the essential nature of logical constants of a kind, but that there can be
many such correct systems. But this would be (a) to reject the assumption
behind Vaidya’s first premise, that there is such a thing as the correct logical
system, and (b) to engage again in debates concerning logical pluralism vs.
logical monism. Again, essentialism has not helped us avoid these debates.
The advantage of talking in terms of “capturing the essential nature of the
logical constants” has been lost. We are left with the same, familiar debates.
An additional matter concerns how we are supposed to discover what the
right logic is. It may be well and good to claim that logical necessity is deter-
mined by metaphysical necessities stemming from the essence of the logical
constants (or from the essentiality of being a logical constant), however, it
remains unclear how we may be able to discover these essences.
The final point of Shalkowski’s that I wish to highlight suggests where
the problematic metaphysical commitments of the anti-essentialist may lie.
The argument is, roughly, that logical modality, in allowing all and any com-
binations of properties, and in claiming to be metaphysically significant, is
committed to the Humean metaphysical position that there are no necessary
connections between distinct existences, i.e. no combinations of primitive
properties are ruled out by the relations between them.
If logical necessity is supposed to be a metaphysically significant
necessity in the sense explained, that is, that the T-axiom holds
for logical necessity, then one adopting classical logic as encom-
passing all and only the fundamental necessary truths must face
the fact that defending this commitment requires defending a
substantial Humean metaphysical view. If the only necessities
are austere logical truths expressed in primitive predicate nota-
tion, then whatever is not ruled out by those truths is possible;
whatever is not contradictory is possibly true. This is simply
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a way of expressing in terms of grammatical form the meta-
physical thesis that all logically possible combinations of basic
properties are genuinely possible; there are no necessary connec-
tions between primitive properties. The problem here is not that
the anti-essentialist will find this Humean metaphysics unattrac-
tive, but rather that the modal doctrine, the anti-essentialism,
is hostage to a particular metaphysical program. This conflicts
with the common perception that logic and its correlated modal-
ity are free of metaphysical commitment in a way that essential-
ism is not. (Shalkowski, 2004, pp. 73–4)
Note that the passage ends with a point about the dialectic between essen-
tialists and anti-essentialists. Both bear significant metaphysical commit-
ments. The problem for anti-essentialists, however, is that it seems that their
account of modality requires that there be no such metaphysical commit-
ments. Essentialists have no such constraint, and thus gain the advantage
here.
This argument rests on the idea that the anti-essentialist takes logical
modality to be genuine, and thereby takes it to be metaphysically significant.
But this just seems wrong. The point of having a notion of logical possibil-
ity wider than metaphysical possibility is clearly completely undermined if
one also claims that all logical possibilities are “metaphysically significant”,
where “metaphysically significant” would appear to mean “metaphysically
possible”. In taking a certain stance on what it takes for a possibility to be
genuine or real, and dismissing all weaker kinds of possibility as no good,
Shalkowski is clearly favouring his essentialist view. Of course mere logical
possibilities are not metaphysically possible, but the relative modality the-
orist does not want to claim that they are. They want to be able to say
both that some logical possibilities are not metaphysical possibilities and
that mere logical possibility is still genuine possibility. Shalkowski’s argu-
ment that taking logical modality to be “genuine” commits one to Humean
metaphysics, depends crucially on understanding “genuine” to mean some-
thing like “metaphysically significant”. But someone who takes the realm
of logical possibility to be wider than the realm of metaphysical possibility
would precisely not take logical possibility to be metaphysically significant,
although they may have another way to cash out the idea that logical pos-
sibilities are not mere possibilities “in name only”.
2.3 A Problem for Logical Necessity
There is a general point to take from these arguments, which poses a chal-
lenge for RM, concerning the consequences of taking a certain view of logical
necessity as based on the behaviour of some logical entities. Some philoso-
phers take it to be pretty straightforward to take talk about models, propo-
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sitions, logical constants and so on to usher in some things which really
exist, such as models, propositions, and logical constants. So, e.g., a truth
about propositions such as “Not every proposition is true”, will depend for
its truth upon the behaviour of some abstract objects, propositions. And in
saying, “My favourite truth-function is conjunction,” I say something true
if, of all the abstract objects which are truth-functions, conjunction is the
one I like best. Defining logical truth in terms of such entities looks to have
worrying consequences for the current project. E.g., if you think that logical
truth is truth in all models, then to be assured that the models capture all
and only the possibilities, one will need to say something about the nature
and existence of models (understood as abstract objects). Or, if models are
supposed to correctly represent the behaviour of truth-bearers, then one will
need to say something about the essential nature of truth-bearers (typically,
propositions).
Likewise, if you think that logical truth is a matter of truth under sub-
stitution of non-logical constituents, then one will need to say something
about the nature and existence of the logical constituents, i.e. the logical
constants. One will need to be assured of what the logical constants are, and
that they couldn’t have been otherwise in some important respects. E.g., if
conjunction could have failed to be a logical constant, then something of the
form “If A and B is true, then B is true” could perhaps have failed to be a
logical truth. So one might want to endorse an essentiality of kind thesis for
the kind logical constant to avoid this possibility. Or, alternatively, suppose
conjunction is an abstract object which is essentially a logical constant, but
such that it could have behaved truth-functionally differently, e.g. conjunc-
tion could have been such that it took two false propositions and mapped
them to the true. If conjunction could have been this way, then “If A is
false and B is false, then A and B is true” could have been a logical truth.
So one might want to endorse an essentialist thesis about the features that
make a logical constant what it is.6 It’s no use giving an account of logi-
cal necessity in terms of logical truth thus characterized, if a certain logical
constant could have failed to be a logical constant, or if a logical constant
could have behaved importantly differently. As the problem is framed in
terms of (logical) objects, the essentialist makes a natural move to provide
a solution in terms of essences of those objects.
It seems to me that this presents a genuine challenge to RM. If claims
about logical truth really are to be understood as claims about certain log-
ical entities, then the crucial properties of those entities had better not be
accidental, otherwise logical necessities and possibilities will not even match
6Many will argue that there is nothing more to conjunction than its truth-functional
character, or its introduction and elimination rules, and hence that this example is im-
possible, or perhaps even incoherent. I am not trying to argue that conjunction really
could have behaved differently in this way. The point is simply to highlight the underlying
assumption that it couldn’t, because of its essential nature.
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the metaphysical necessities and possibilities. If logical truth concerns the
properities of entities such as the logical constant conjunction, then proper-
ties of conjunction such as the property of being someone’s favourite logical
constant, which conjunction could easily have failed to have, will clearly be
irrelevant. By contrast, some properties of conjunction seem crucial, such
as its introduction and elimination rules, or its being a logical constant. It
looks like conjunction couldn’t fail to have these properties and continue to
be what it is. But if that is what is driving the account of logical truth
and logical necessity, then one will need to explain why the entity could not
fail to have those properties. Hence the essentialist gives an explanation in
terms of the essences of things. The essentialist takes the essences of things
to provide the source of metaphysical necessity, so at the heart of their ac-
count of logical truth will be metaphysical necessities and possibilities for
logical entities. So we end up with an account of logical necessity in terms
of what is metaphysically necessary and possible for certain entities. How,
then, can RM maintain that metaphysical modality is mere relative logical
modality?
One strategy that RM can employ is to avoid accounts of logical neces-
sity that are obviously premised on the nature of particular entities, such as
models, propositions or logical constants. In the next chapter I will present
an account of logical necessity based on a notion of logical laws as consti-
tutive norms of thought. This view does not rely upon the nature of an
entity, but it does arguably depend upon the nature of thought. I will dis-
cuss whether this is a serious problem in section 3.5.6. As I said before,
one may also reject the essentialist link between essence and metaphysical
necessity, such that having the essence of some thing at the base of RM does
not lead to any problematic circularity.
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Chapter 3
A Logical Basis for Relative
Modality
3.1 The Search for Fundamental Modality
The relative modality view (RM) claims that at least the non-logical alethic
modalities are mere relative forms of logical modality, i.e.
It is R-necessary that p: ∃ϕ(Ψϕ & (ϕ→ p))
It is R-possible that p: ¬∃ϕ(Ψϕ & (ϕ→ ¬p))
where “” expresses logical necessity.
One requirement of this view is that there be at least one kind of non-
relative necessity, a fundamental necessity of which relative modalities are
mere relative forms. As a view in metaphysics, RM has it that relative
modalities are mere relative forms of some other kind of modality. To claim
that all kinds of modality are relative, would therefore end in a circle or a
regress: if A-necessity is a mere relative form of B-necessity, and B-necessity
is a mere relative form of C-necessity, and C-necessity is a mere relative
form of D-necessity, . . . , then this will either result in a regress which never
bottoms-out in a definitive kind of modality of which other modalities are
mere relative forms, or a circle, where the regress turns back to an earlier
necessity, e.g. where Z-necessity is a mere relative form of A-necessity.
Such a regress or circle would be vicious: if a relative necessity just is a
mere relative form of something else, then with no non-relative necessity
in the chain or loop, there will be nothing at bottom for these necessities
to be. I have restricted my interest, from the claim that all non-logical
modality is relative, to the more modest claim that at least the non-logical
alethic modalities are relative. Within this domain the same point applies.
In giving an account of the non-logical alethic modalities as being (mere
relative) forms of logical modality, it is not open to me to give an account
of logical modality as a relative form of an alethic modality.
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Note: this more modest claim does allow that logical modality might be
given a relative treatment in terms of some non-alethic modality. However,
to take that route from the outset would immediately rule out any hope of
RM extending to cover all non-logical modality (see section 1.2). That said,
one might argue that the view which I will ultimately develop in this chapter
treats logical necessity in terms of normative necessity, in characterizing the
most basic laws of logic as being constitutive norms for thought. A further
question would then arise regarding the nature and source of normative
necessity. One might be attracted to a view which treats alethic modalities
as relative forms of logical necessity, where logical necessity finds its source
in laws of thought, because one finds the idea that there is bare, mind-
independent possiblity and necessity in the world intuitively implausible. It
seems to me that normative necessity is far more amenable to receiving a
mind-dependent or anthropocentric account, explaining norms in terms of
human interests and practices, than alethic necessity. So, if it is after all
correct to deem my account as treating all non-logical alethic modalities as
relative logical modalities, and logical modalities as some kind of normative
modality, then perhaps that is not such a bad outcome.
So far it has been assumed that this fundamental (non-derivative) ne-
cessity underlying relative modality is logical necessity. Note that it will be
good news for RM if there is any such fundamental necessity out there which
is suitable to underwrite the relevant relative modalities. In particular, one
aim of the current project is to give an informative account of what it is to
be metaphysically necessary and possible. So the fundamental necessity had
better be able to underwrite an account of metaphysical necessity as relative.
This immediately rules out taking metaphysical necessity to play the role of
fundamental necessity. In addition, further positive reasons for not taking
metaphysical necessity to be the fundamental necessity will emerge below
(see section 3.5). That said, I will claim that the fundamental necessity is
logical after all.
Earlier (section 2.1) I discussed Hale’s version of McFetridge’s argument
for the absoluteness of logical necessity. McFetridge claimed that the argu-
ment could show that logical necessity is strictly stronger than any other
kind of (non-epistemic) necessity. Hale (1999) has shown that the argument
can only yield the conclusion that logical necessity is at least as strong as
any other kind. This conclusion at least frames logical necessity as a candi-
date for the fundamental necessity, to which the others are relative. Hale’s
conclusion allows that there might be other absolute necessities. However,
the other candidate is understood to be metaphysical necessity. As I have
just mentioned, taking metaphysical necessity as fundamental is not open
to me. So, logical necessity it is!
It is important to distinguish between two different questions:
1. What is logical necessity?
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2. What is the basis or source of logical necessity?
In response to the first question, I will argue that logical necessity is inti-
mately related to the relation between premises and conclusion in a deduc-
tively valid argument. The second question requires us to say something
deeper about where such a status might arise from. What is the most fun-
damental explanation we can offer for something’s being logically necessary,
the “nuts and bolts” of the matter? An answer to the first question need
not determine any particular answer to the second. RM needs to answer
both questions. In particular, in order to ensure that RM is able to yield
an account of metaphysical modality as relative, an account of the basis or
source of logical necessity as fundamental must avoid recourse to metaphys-
ical necessities and possibilities.
The plan is therefore as follows: In section 3.2 I address question (1)
by looking at some thoughts on the matter put forward by Ian McFetridge.
Logical necessity turns out to be intimately connected with logic, deductive
validity and logical consequence. Hence, in looking for an account for the
source of logical necessity, I will be charged with the task of looking at
the sources of such logical notions. In section 3.3 I introduce the view
that the laws of logic are laws of thought, as a candidate account of the
source of logical necessity. I go on to develop and motivate a constitutive-
normative account of laws of logic as unconditionally binding our thought,
and as underlying a notion of logical necessity. Section 3.4 will introduce
and provide evidence for a phenomenon I call a “logocentric predicament”.
In section 3.5 I argue that the best explanation of this phenomenon is that
the laws of logic are constitutive-normative laws of thought, and consider
some challenges for the resulting view.
3.2 What is Logical Necessity?
3.2.1 Logical Necessity and Deductive Validity
One of the most helpful and rich discussions of logical necessity in the liter-
ature is McFetridge’s “Logical Necessity: Some Issues”. I take McFetridge
to have been grappling with two main issues in this paper: (1) If there is
such a thing as logical necessity, what is it?; and (2) What is the purpose
of beliefs about logical necessity? Much of his discussion focuses on what
it takes for someone to count as committed to logical necessity, or what it
takes for someone to have a belief in logical necessity. But much of the
material is still helpful when it comes to the nature of logical necessity.
The first key point highlighted by McFetridge is a connection between
deductive validity in an argument and logical necessity. Deductive validity is
a, perhaps the, central notion in logic. We often take the validity of an argu-
ment to be a modal matter: we say that in a valid deduction the conclusion
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follows of necessity from the premises, or that an argument is valid if it is
impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. McFetridge’s
point is then that, if any notion of necessity deserves to be called logical ne-
cessity, it should be the kind of necessity attaching to deductive validity, if
indeed there is any necessity there.
Deductive validity is the central topic of logic. So if, as Aristotle
and others have thought, to think of an argument as deductively
valid requires us to deploy a notion of necessity, then that notion,
if any, will deserve the label ‘logical’ necessity. There will be a
legitimate notion of ‘logical’ necessity only if there is a notion
of necessity which attaches to the claim, concerning a deduc-
tively valid argument, that if the premises are true then so is the
conclusion. (McFetridge, 1990, p. 136)
I agree with McFetridge. Indeed, I find it hard to imagine how anyone could
argue that, if there is some kind of necessity involved in deductive validity,
then this should not be called logical necessity, in favour of giving the title
to something else. What could count as more logical than the notion of a
deductively valid argument? This is amongst the least controversial of the
claims I will be discussing, so I will take this starting point for granted.
Rumfitt (2010) also endorses a connection between logical necessity and
logical consequence (the latter being a close relative of deductive validity)1
although not directly. He favours an understanding of logical necessity in
terms of logical contradiction—it is logically necessary that p just when it
is logically contradictory that ¬p—and demonstrates a connection to logical
consequence as a meta-theorem, using classical logic.
What does it mean to say that there is a notion of logical ne-
cessity? I mean this: there is a sense of ‘necessary’ for which
pIt is necessary that Aq implies and is implied by pIt is logi-
cally contradictory that not Aq. If we assume a classical logic
. . . we immediately have the following meta-theorem: whenever
B follows logically from A1, . . . , An, the statement pIt is logically
necessary that if A1 and . . . and An then Bq is true (where the
conditional is understood to be material). So logical necessity is
1Deductive validity is a property of an argument. What is an argument? ‘An argument,
in the sense that concerns us here, is what a person produces where he or she makes a
statement and gives reasons for believing the statement. The statement itself is called the
conclusion of the argument. . . ; the stated reasons for believing the conclusion are called
the premises’ (Hodges, 1977, p. 36). An argument is deductively valid just when it is
impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. Logical consequence is a
relation holding between the premises and conclusion of an argument: a conclusion C will
be a logical consequence of some premises A1, . . . , An if and only if there is a deductively
valid argument from A1, . . . , An to C.
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implicated in logical consequence. (Rumfitt, 2010, p. 35)2
Rumfitt is perhaps more precise than McFetridge, but I will use McFetridge’s
characterization as the notion of necessity attaching to deductive validity,
if any, as my working notion of logical necessity. In invoking logical con-
tradiction to characterize logical necessity, and in assuming classical logic,
Rumfitt prejudges some important issues. E.g., if logical necessity is in-
timately connected with logical consequence and validity, and the source
of logical necessity is thereby to be discovered by considering the nature
of logic, of which consequence and validity are central notions, then at that
level of inquiry it will not be appropriate to have certain prior commitments,
either in favour of classical logical systems, or against certain non-classical
logics, e.g. paraconsistent and dialetheic logics.
An immediate question arises from McFetridge’s careful way of putting
things: how can one be assured that there is indeed any necessity attach-
ing to deductive validity? I will therefore consider two arguments which
promise to provide some assurance. First, an argument from McFetridge for
the conclusion that we are constrained to believe in logical necessity (more
exactly, logically necessarily truth-preserving rules of inference). Second, an
argument from Rumfitt against what he calls Russell’s Logical Philonianism,
a view which explicitly rejects any modal aspect as belonging to deductive
validity.
3.2.2 McFetridge on Belief in Logical Necessity
At the relevant point in the paper, McFetridge takes himself to have already
established that logical necessity, if there is such a thing, is the strongest
kind of necessity, i.e. if it is logically necessary that p, then (a) there is no
(non-epistemic) sense of possibility for which it is possible that ¬p, and (b)
for every (non-epistemic) sense of necessity, it is also necessary that p in that
sense. Earlier I discussed a closely-related argument from Hale (1996). Hale
observes that his and McFetridge’s arguments may be successful in estab-
lishing that logical necessity is absolute, in the sense that logical necessity is
at least as strong as every other (non-epistemic) kind of necessity, but that
neither argument establishes that logical necessity is stronger than every
other kind. It is left open that some other kind of necessity may also be
absolute.3
2‘For suppose B follows logically from A1,. . . ,An. Then the statement pIt is logically
contradictory that A1 and . . . and An and not Bq is true. So if ‘if. . . then’ is read as
a material conditional, the statement pIt is logically contradictory that not (if A1 and
. . . and An then B)q is true. So, on the recommended conception of logical necessity, the
statement pIt is logically necessary that if A1 and . . . and An then Bq is true.’ (Rumfitt,
2010, p.34, fn.1)
3Such as metaphysical necessity. See Hale (1996) and section 2.1.
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McFetridge connects this idea about logical necessity and absoluteness
to another concerning reasoning from suppositions. Two steps take us from
deductive validity to suppositions. First, McFetridge emphasises the fact
that the validity of an argument from some premises to a conclusion is
independent of the truth of those premises and conclusion. When we use
logical reasoning with a view to producing a valid argument, we can reason
just as well from mere suppositions as we can from premises that are believed
or known to be true.
Deductive inferences, then, are supposed to remain valid when
they are applied to mere suppositions, and indeed regardless of
what suppositions they are applied to, or are made in the course
of the argument. (1990, p. 151)
Second, McFetridge connects an inquiry into reasoning from suppositions
with the theory of subjunctive or counterfactual conditionals.
I suggest then that we might illuminate some aspects of the role
of deductive principles, and more generally logically necessary
truths, in reasoning from suppositions by drawing on the theory
of conditionals, in particular the theory of subjunctive condition-
als. (1990, p. 151)
A close relationship between reasoning from suppositions and counterfactual
conditionals seems to be prima facie plausible. After all, what might run
through one’s mind in reasoning from a supposition? Something like: if it
were the case that p (let us suppose so), what would also have to be the
case?
Finally, McFetridge introduces the notion of the co-tenability range of a
mode of inference. Hale summarizes nicely:
[C]all the range of suppositions under which the use of a mode of
inference M is not questionable for the sorts of reason touched
upon its co-tenability range. (Hale, 1999, p. 29)
In certain cases of reasoning from a supposition, certain laws will come into
play, e.g., the laws of nature. If I reason from the supposition that I strike
a dry match in the presence of oxygen, to the conclusion that it lights, I am
most likely bringing to bear the laws of nature as auxiliary premises or rules
of inference. This doesn’t follow logically, but it looks like a good argument
on these other terms. But there are circumstances in which it would not
be appropriate to bring to bear laws of nature, e.g., when I reason from
the supposition that some laws of nature are false. In this case, McFetridge
would say that the supposition is not co-tenable with modes of inference
derived from the laws of nature, and hence that the supposition falls outside
of the co-tenability range of the laws of nature.
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Now consider: are there any modes of inference which can be deployed
in reasoning from any supposition whatsoever, with no limit to their co-
tenability range? McFetridge’s suggestion is that belief that a mode of infer-
ence is logically necessarily truth-preserving is to be equated with prepared-
ness to employ that mode of inference in reasoning from any supposition
whatsoever. If we can show that there are indeed some modes of inference
which we are prepared to employ in reasoning from any supposition what-
soever (with an unlimited cotenability range), then we will thereby show
that we are committed to the belief that there are some modes of inference
that will preserve truth no matter what else may be the case, which will in
turn amount to showing that we are committed to the existence of some
logically necessarily truth-preserving modes of inference, and hence that we
are committed to logical necessity.
I therefore wish to suggest that we treat as the manifestation of
the belief that a mode of inference is logically necessarily truth-
preserving, the preparedness to employ that mode of inference
in reasoning from any set of suppositions whatsoever. Such a
preparedness evinces the belief that, no matter what else was the
case, the inferences would preserve truth. And the suggestion is
that it is just this preparedness which is built into the idea that
the validity of an argument is quite independent of questions
about the truth of its premisses. A central point of interest in
having such beliefs about logical necessity is to allow us to deploy
principles of inference across the whole range of suppositions we
might make. (McFetridge, 1990, p. 153)
McFetridge makes the additional point that we can understand why belief
in logical necessity is important to us in terms of the utility of having prin-
ciples of inference that we can deploy no matter what, regardless of other
suppositions we might make.
And so to the argument. McFetridge characterizes abandoning a belief
in logical necessity as follows:
To abandon the belief in logical necessity would be to believe
that for every acceptable mode of inference M there is at least
one proposition r (it might be a very long disjunction) such that
it is illegitimate to employ M in an argument which makes the
supposition that r. (McFetridge, 1990, p. 153)
Thus, I will take McFetridge’s account of the content of a belief in logical
necessity to be LN:
(LN) There is some rule of inference M such that there is no
supposition r such that, if it were the case that r, M would
not preserve truth.
82
And his account of abandoning the belief in logical necessity as a belief in
the negation of LN, i.e.
(¬LN) For every rule of inference M there is some supposition r
such that, if it were the case that r, M would not preserve
truth.
There are then two cases subsumed under a belief in ¬LN. First, where it is
known, for a rule of inference M , which supposition or suppositions r would
prevent M from preserving truth. On this case, the rejection of logical neces-
sity is self-refuting: one can simply amend the rule to specify that it applies
under not-r conditions. Second, where it is not known which suppositions
will prevent a rule M from preserving truth. But then this would cause
irrevocable damage to our practices of reasoning from suppositions at all,
because we could never know, when reasoning from any supposition r, via
rule M , whether r was the supposition under which reasoning in accordance
with M fails to be truth-preserving. Hence we should reject ¬LN and retain
a belief in LN.
I conclude then, that on the present view of what it is to re-
gard a rule of inference as logically necessarily truth-preserving,
we are constrained to believe that there are such rules. For if
we abandoned that belief, we would be unable to reason from
suppositions at all. (McFetridge, 1990, p. 154)
If McFetridge’s argument is successful, it will go some way towards providing
assurance that there is such a thing as logical necessity. If our practices
of reasoning from suppositions require that we believe that some modes
of inferences are truth-preserving no matter what the supposition, true or
false, come what may, then it looks like our practices of reasoning from
suppositions commit us to a belief in logical necessity.4
Is the argument successful? Hale (1999) discusses this argument in detail,
and raises several challenges. In particular, he notes that McFetridge has
assumed that, if one believes ¬LN, one must be assured in any case of
reasoning that a candidate rule to be used is co-tenable with the suppositions
in play. However, why should this be so? Hale’s skeptic retorts:
Why do you assume that if I am to use a rule R in reasoning
under the supposition that p, I must first be able to ascertain
4A simple “proof” of ¬LN goes as follows: Let M be an arbitrary rule of inference.
Let r be the supposition that M does not preserve truth. Trivially, if r were the case,
then r would be the case. Therefore, there is a supposition such that if it were the case,
then M would not preserve truth. QED. However, this argument begs the question. ‘r’
is supposed to be a specification of circumstances under which M fails to preserve truth.
The suggested case where r is “M does not preserve truth” only supposes that there is
such a circumstance without specifying which circumstance that is.
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whether R is, under that supposition, reliable? I don’t have to
do that. It is enough that I have no positive reason to doubt
that R will fail under the supposition that p. (1999, p. 32)
The skeptic adheres to the slogan “a rule is innocent until proven guilty”,
and feels justified in using a rule until such time as it may be falsified by
a particular case of reasoning under a supposition. It isn’t necessary to
determine whether or not the rule is truth-preserving in all cases before
one gets going. Hale accordingly mounts an attack on this “falsificationist
methodology”, in order to show that this kind of skepticism is not an option,
leaving McFetridge’s argument intact.
To go through all of Hale’s arguments pertaining to this matter would
be too great a task for present purposes, so I will only briefly summarize.
Hale’s reasoning goes something like this. Where one believes ¬LN, this
means that for any rule, say rule M , we have to be able to recognise that
circumstances might arise in which M would fail (even if we do not know
the exact circumstances). In order to do so, some reasoning will be involved.
Such reasoning would have to involve rules other than M , call one such rule
R. But once both rules M and R are in play, who is to say that it is rule
M rather than rule R which is the culprit? In coming to recognise that M
might fail to be truth-preserving in some circumstances, it might be that
rule R was defective, and lead us to an unfair opinion about M . At this
point, pragmatic considerations will be brought into play to choose between
the rules, including which rule is more or less recalcitrant in the light of
experience. But in order to calculate these degrees of recalcitrance, one will
need to do some reasoning, which will involve the use of some further rules,
but then, it is again open to lay the blame at the door of the new rule, rather
than the old. And so on and so forth. (See Hale (1999).) This falsificationist
methodology collapses into regress.
In summary, McFetridge’s argument shows that our practices of reason-
ing from suppositions, which we are not likely to give up, commit us to a
belief in logical necessity, i.e. a belief that some rules of inference are truth-
preserving when reasoning under any supposition whatsoever, whatever may
be the case.
3.2.3 Rumfitt on Logical Philonianism
A different challenge to the connection between deductive validity and log-
ical necessity is considered and rebuffed by Rumfitt (2010). The challenge
comes from Russell’s characterization of validity, which demands that for an
argument from 〈p〉 to 〈q〉 to be valid, 〈p〉 and 〈¬p ∨ q〉 need only be true,
i.e. not necessarily true. For inference to take place (for it to be worth-
while) 〈¬p ∨ q〉 must also be known, but not in virtue of knowing that ¬p
or knowing that q.
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Whenever p is false, ‘not-p or q’ is true, but is useless for in-
ference, which requires that p should be true. Whenever q is
already known to be true, ‘not-p or q’ is of course also known
to be true, but is again useless for inference, since q is already
known, and therefore does not need to be inferred. In fact, in-
ference only arises when ‘not-p or q’ can be known without our
knowing already which of the two alternatives it is that makes
the disjunction true. Now, the circumstances under which this
occurs are those in which certain relations of form exist between
p and q. . . But this formal relation is only required in order that
we may be able to know that either the premiss is false or the
conclusion is true. It is the truth of ‘not-p or q’ that is required
for the validity of the inference; what is required further is only
required for the practical feasibility of the inference. [Russell
1919, p. 153, cited Rumfitt (2010, p. 38)]
In thus characterizing deductive validity, Russell threatens to debunk the
antecedent of McFetridge’s conditional claim: if there is any notion of ne-
cessity attaching to deductive validity, then it deserves the title of logical
necessity.
To defend logical necessity against Russell’s “Logical Philonianism”, we
must once again turn to suppositions. The main question to raise in response
to Russell’s view is: How can one know that not-p or q without knowing
that not-p or knowing that q? This is the condition under which, according
to Russell, any actual inferring will take place. Rumfitt argues that this is
something we cannot explain without recourse to our ability to reason from
suppositions.
In general, the answer must be: because the thinker is able to de-
duce Q from the supposition that P (where the deduction tracks
the contextually relevant consequence relation). Only having
made that deduction from a supposition or hypothesis can he
infer, in Russell’s sense, from his knowledge that either not P or
P to attain knowledge that either not P or Q. (Rumfitt, 2010, p.
40)
Another way of looking at the case is that, in order to ascertain that either
¬p or q, without ascertaining either disjunct first, one will need to work out
if both can be false together. If not, at least one will have to be true. So how
might one go about working this out? Consider the logical relations between
〈p〉 and 〈q〉, such as whether 〈p〉’s being true (i.e. ¬¬p) is consistent with
〈¬q〉’s being true. Given that we don’t know whether p or whether q (in order
for this to be a candidate case of inference for Russell), such considerations
could only get started with suppositions or hypotheses regarding 〈p〉 and
〈q〉.
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So Logical Philonianism requires one to reason from suppositions in order
to gain the requisite knowledge (that ¬p or q) to engage in an inference from
〈p〉 to 〈q〉. The fatal point is then that Logical Philonianism is unable to
give an account of reasoning from suppositions, which looks like it should
also be covered by a general account of valid inference.
Now there is nothing alien in the idea that we may exercise our
deductive capacities in reasoning from suppositions just as much
as in reasoning from what we know. . . . But reasoning from a sup-
position plainly demands a stronger condition for validity than
Philonian consequence: the bare fact that either the conclusion
is true or the premiss is untrue is insufficient to underwrite the
soundness of arguments from suppositions, for what is supposed
to be the case may fail to be true. (Rumfitt, 2010, pp. 40–41)
If we merely suppose that p, not requiring 〈p〉 to be true, then the condition
for validity can simply be fulfilled by the truth of the disjunction, ¬p or q, i.e.
whenever 〈p〉 is false or 〈q〉 is true. So any inference from a false supposition
(to whatever conclusion) will count as valid, as will any inference to a true
conclusion (whatever the premises). So the following inferences will count
as valid, although they should not: “Dallas is in California, so violets are
blue”; “Roses are red, so Dallas is in Texas”.
Note, there are two points. The weaker point is that, given that we do
engage in reasoning from suppositions, a theory of valid inference should
be able to account for this. We need to drop Russell’s idea that inference
is based on known premises, and once we do that, the account fails. The
stronger point is that, even if we agreed that a theory of inference should be
concerned only with reasoning from known premises, the view still needs to
account for our knowledge that ¬p or q, and this requires us make appeal
to reasoning from suppositions. At which point a demand for an account of
reasoning from suppositions reasserts itself. In short, a view such as Russell’s
Logical Philonianism, which takes deductive validity to have no necessity
attaching to it, presents a challenge against taking deductive validity as our
guide to logical necessity. However, Russell’s theory is unable to adequately
account for the notion of a valid inference from a mere supposition, whether
we take the practice of reasoning from suppositions as given, or as implicated
in the details of the view.
The main purpose of this section has been to introduce an intimate con-
nection between logical necessity and deductive validity and logical conse-
quence. Indeed, deductive validity and logical consequence allow us to pin-
point logical necessity: logical necessity is just that kind of necessity which
attaches to a deductively valid argument (if the premises are true, the con-
clusion must be true) or to the relation of logical consequence (a relation
that holds between the premises and conclusion in a valid argument). I have
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presented some points in favour of thinking that there is indeed a notion of
necessity in this vicinity, by looking at McFetridge’s argument that we are
required to believe in logical necessity, and by looking at Rumfitt’s defence
of this kind of necessity. The next task is to say something about the source
or basis of logical necessity, which will to amount to saying something about
the source or basis of any necessity attaching to logical consequence and
logical validity.
3.3 Laws of Thought
3.3.1 The Strategy
In the previous chapter I discussed some challenges to RM posed by essen-
tialism. One challenge concerned the consequences of taking a certain view
of logical truth as based on the behaviour of some logical entities, such as
propositions, truth functions or logical constants. In general, the challenge
was that, if logical truth depends upon the features of these logical entities,
then the crucial features had better not be merely accidental features of
those entities. Hence, considerations of the metaphysics of logical objects
was brought in. It was argued that the essences of those entities are what
determine the logical truths. This kind of essentialist challenge needs to be
kept in mind when formulating a suitable account for logical necessity to fit
in with the current project. In general: in giving an account of logical neces-
sity for RM, one had better not rely on an antecedent notion of some entity,
such that the essential nature and thereby the metaphysical possibilities for
that entity underwrite the account of logical necessity, otherwise this will
rule out giving an account of metaphysical necessity as a mere relative form
of logical necessity.
How should one proceed in light of the essentialist challenge? One option
is to turn to developing and motivating an account of logical consequence and
validity which is not immediately premised on the nature of logical entities.
Rather than considering a class of entities as being distinctive of logic, it
may be fruitful to consider an alternative basis for logic: our practices of
reasoning and thinking in accordance with logical principles.
An approach to explaining the nature and source of logic (and thereby
logical consequence and validity) with a rich historical tradition takes the
laws of logic to be laws of thought. Such an approach can be found in
Kant’s work, particularly Kant’s Logic and the Critique of Pure Reason
(Kant, 1800, 1781, 1787), and in the work of Boole and Frege. In the case
of Boole (1854), the clue is in the title of his book: An Investigation of
The Laws of Thought on Which are Founded the Mathematical Theories of
Logic and Probabilities. MacFarlane (2002) presents an interpretation of
Frege’s views on logical laws, whereby they are not straightforwardly laws
of thought, but give rise to such laws. After presenting and motivating this
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view, I will return to consider whether the essentialist challenge remains a
legitimate threat (see section 3.5.6).
3.3.2 Introducing Laws of Thought
The view that the laws of logic are laws of thought is connected to the idea
that logic is somehow general. Logical laws apply regardless of whatever
the subject matter might be. Kant in particular is associated with this
kind of view. He distinguished between two kinds of logic, general logic and
transcendental logic. Transcendental logic comprises rules for the special
employment of the understanding5 to thought and judgment about objects of
possible experience, i.e. objects that conform to the conditions under which
the human mind is able to have objective representational thoughts and
empirical experiences.6 General logic, in contrast, is supposed to abstract
from all content of judgment, and hence comprises rules for the employment
of the understanding tout court, with no restriction as to subject matter.
Logic, again, can be treated in a twofold manner, either as logic
of the general or as logic of the special employment of the under-
standing. The former contains the absolutely necessary rules of
thought without which there can be no employment whatsoever
of the understanding. (Kant, 1781, 1787, A52/B76)
The idea is that general logic (henceforth, logic) is about the rules or laws
to which our employment of the understanding is subject in any circum-
stances. By “employment of the understanding”, I mean the use of concepts
in propositional thought and judgment, and the drawing of logical relations
between judgments. This includes both rules for using concepts and rules
for relating different judgments.
Frege can also be read as being committed to some notion of laws of logic
as laws of thought. Frege primarily takes the laws of logic to be the laws
of truth. These are descriptive laws, general truths, where ‘general’ means
that they apply to everything (rather than the Kantian notion of abstracting
away from content).7 However, he argues that, in addition to these descrip-
tive general truths, arising out of the laws of truth are prescriptive laws of
thought. Because the laws of truth are completely general, in the sense that
they are about absolutely everything, they accordingly give rise to laws for
5The understanding is our capacity for the employment of concepts and conceptual
thought.
6E.g., Kant would deny that we can have full-blown objective thoughts (thoughts about
something that can be true or false) or experiences of things such as genuine vacuums and
uncaused objects, because the conditions of possible experience rule these things out, e.g.
the principle that everything has a cause.
7‘For Kant, the generality of logical laws consists in their abstraction from the content
of judgments, while for Frege, the generality of logical laws consists in their unrestricted
quantification over all objects and all concepts.’ (MacFarlane, 2002, p. 32)
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thinking about anything, about no particular subject matter, hence they are
laws of thought as such.8
From the laws of truth there follow prescriptions about asserting,
thinking, judging, inferring. [“Thoughts”, 1918, p. 58, cited in
MacFarlane (2002, p. 36)]
The [laws of logic] have a special title to the name laws of thought
only if we mean to assert that they are the most general laws,
which prescribe universally the way in which one ought to think if
one is to think at all. [Basic Laws, 1893, xv, cited in MacFarlane
(2002, p. 36)]
Again, the crucial idea is that laws of logic are, or provide, laws of thought
in general, in any circumstances, regardless of particular subject matter.
Note that both Kant and Frege placed themselves in opposition to psy-
chologistic logicians who took logic to be a matter of how we actually think.
Many of us often make logical mistakes in everyday life. A psychologistic
logician would take these into account in his data when trying to work out
the laws of logic. Kant and Frege were interested, not in how we actually
reason, but in how we ought to reason.
In logic we do not want to know how the understanding is and
thinks, and how it hitherto has proceeded in thinking, but how
it ought to proceed in thinking. (Kant, 1800, p. 16)
So the view is that the laws of logic are the laws of thought, where laws of
thought are not drawn from regularities in actual everyday occurrences of
thinking.
There are many different ways one might understand what a law is.
My working notion of a law is something like a general truth or a general
statement in a certain domain. E.g., a law of nature might be the change in
the internal energy of a system is equal to the amount of heat supplied to the
system, minus the amount of work done by the system on its surroundings
(dU = δQ−δW ). It might turn out (indeed, I think it will) that this general
truth about physical systems is a natural necessity, but being naturally
necessary is not the distinctive feature that makes it a law. I discussed this
notion of a law of nature very briefly when looking at Fine’s counterexamples
to RM in section 1.3.5. To mount a comprehensive defence of this kind of
understanding of a law of nature would go beyond the focus of the current
project, but it must be noted that this is an underlying assumption. At least
in the case of something like laws of nature, RM risks vicious circularity if
8The sense in which Frege takes laws of logic to be about everything is explained in
section 3.5.2. See also Textor (2010, Chapter 1) for more on Frege on arithmetic, logic
and logical laws.
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what it is to be a law of nature is to be naturally necessary, but what it
is to be naturally necessary is to follow from the laws of nature. Laws of
nature, then, can be said to be general truths about the natural world.9
Laws of biology might be said to be general truths about biological entities
and processes. Some laws do not require truth, e.g., a particular moral law
may be comprised of general statements concerning behaviour that ought to
be true, such as ‘no person kills another’, or ‘everyone is charitable’. Laws
of logic, then, can be understood, at least initially, as general statements
(or truths) with no restriction to a particular domain. Candidate examples
might include ‘everything is self-identical’ or ‘nothing is true and false’.
There are three crucially different ways one might understand a candi-
date law:constitutive, normative, or constitutive-normative. A constitutive
law tells us about the nature of a thing. Constitutive laws for F s function
to separate the F s from the non-F s. These kinds of laws tell us what is
and is not possible for F s. E.g., consider the view that rules of inference
are constitutive laws in this sense. So the rule modus ponens10 will tell us
something about the nature of inference (or implication). Furthermore, if
someone reasons incorrectly, and does not conform to any rule of inference,
then they will no longer count as inferring. They tried to perform an infer-
ence, but did not succeed. Rules of inference tell us what we can infer, e.g.,
from P and P ⊃ Q, one may infer Q. Of course, if we choose to follow a
different rule, and conclude P & (P ⊃ Q) from the same premises, we are
not violating modus ponens, but following &-introduction. But if no valid
rule of inference is followed, such as if we concluded ¬P , then this can be
construed as not doing any of the things that these rules of inference allow
one to infer. No rule of inference is followed, and hence on the constitutive
understanding, no inference has taken place.
By contrast, normative principles tell us only how things ought to be, or
what we ought to do, even if they actually fail to be so, or we fail to do so.
Normative laws for F s function to separate the good F s from the bad, the
correct from the incorrect. These kinds of laws tell us what is permissible
and not permissible for F s. E.g., if we take rules of inference to be normative
laws, the rule modus ponens will tell us something about correct inference.
On this construal of laws, if someone reasons incorrectly, following no valid
rules of inference, they may still count as inferring, but as inferring badly.
Finally, a constitutive-normative law also functions to separate the F s
from the non-F s, not in terms of whether or not something conforms to or
9It might be argued that laws of nature admit of exceptions, and so the general state-
ments I want to call ‘laws’ will not even be true. I don’t have space to go into this issue.
At least I take it to be plausible that there are some general truths about nature, even if
one can quibble over whether these are what some people count as laws of nature.
10
P, P ⊃ Q
Q
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violates the law, but in terms of whether something is subject to or evaluable
in light of the law. So if rules of inference, such as modus ponens, were
to be understood in this way, in order to count as inferring one’s activity
must count as right or wrong in light of modus ponens (and other rules of
inference). If one were to reason without following any valid rule of inference,
but that didn’t count as getting something wrong, or if one were to reason
in accordance with a valid rule, but that didn’t count as getting something
right, then one wouldn’t count as inferring.
Suppose Pedro believes that p, and believes that p ⊃ q, and then goes
on to infer 〈¬q〉 from 〈p〉 and 〈p ⊃ q〉. A constitutivist about laws of in-
ference would say that this case is misdescribed. Pedro’s activity is not
properly called “inferring”, because he has done something that is against
the very nature of inferring. A normativist about laws of inference would say
that Pedro did infer, but that his inference was incorrect. A constitutive-
normativist would say that Pedro is inferring only if what he is doing is
properly evaluable (as wrong) in light of rules of inference. So, how should
we understand “laws” in the idea of laws of logic as laws of thought: as
constitutive, normative, or constitutive-normative?
3.3.3 Constitutive Laws
If the laws of thought are understood constitutively, and the laws of thought
are the laws of logic, then we should be unable to think illogically. In general,
this kind of view generates the idea of a limit to thought. To go beyond
the laws of logic is literally unthinkable. The idea of a limit to thought
beyond which we cannot think is an interesting topic in its own right.11
Whether or not the notion of such a limit is coherent might be an indirect
way to assess the constitutive view of laws of thought, given that the latter
appears to bear some commitment to such a limit. However, there is a more
straightforward way to show that a constitutive understanding of laws of
thought, as underlying laws of logic, fails.
The problem is that this view is committed to our being utterly unable,
not merely not permitted, to think illogically. This is just false. We think
illogically all the time: we make mistakes in inference and reasoning, we
hold contradictory beliefs, we find fallacies convincing, and so on. Now, the
constitutivist may reply that when we make such mistakes, we in fact do
not count as thinking; there is the mere illusion of thought and reasoning,
but we are in fact engaging in some distinct mental activity. However, this
kind of response cannot be maintained.
First, we are often able to recognise our logical mistakes, either by our-
selves or through the help of others, and go on to correct ourselves in a
reasonable way. E.g., suppose Pedro reasons as follows: If it’s a weekday,
11E.g., see Conant (1991) and Priest (1991).
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the bank will be open; it’s not a weekday; therefore the bank will not be
open. But Maria points out to him that he has fallen into the fallacious trap
of denying the antecedent, in assuming that because P implies Q, ¬P will
imply ¬Q. She points out that, although it is true that the bank is open
on weekdays, there are other conditions under which the bank is open, e.g.
on Saturday mornings. It is plausible to assume that Pedro is capable of
recognising where he went wrong, and adjusting his reasoning accordingly.
However, if what he was doing before Maria intervened wasn’t even thought,
how is it that he is able to rationally reflect on what he was doing, and relate
it in a suitable way to what Maria says such that he can transform it into a
correct inference? I contend that it doesn’t make sense to characterize the
case in terms of two different kinds of mental activity, thought and some-
thing else. Rather, this is simply a case of mistaken thought and inference,
followed by corrected thought and inference.
The point can also be made in relation to one particular candidate law
of thought (logic), the law of non-contradiction. This law is stated in a
variety of different ways: for the purposes of this point I will take it to
be: ∀p¬(p & ¬p). Understood as a constitutive law of thought, this is
supposed to represent how we in fact always think, i.e. that no thought is
contradictory (of the form p & ¬p). Any instance of a thought that p & ¬p
will violate the law, and hence should not count as thinking. By ‘think’ here
I mean to include something as minimal as ‘entertaining a proposition’, as
well as more robust thoughts such as ‘opining that p’, drawing inferences,
and so on. So the implication is that we cannot even entertain propositions
with a contradictory content, i.e. that p & ¬p. But we can. First, one might
appeal to anecdotal or introspective evidence: Graham Priest would surely
testify that he thinks contradictions frequently, and with ease. Furthermore,
if we can’t think a proposition, how can we know that it is a contradictory
proposition? One might reply that we may take not being able to think
the proposition as evidence for it being contradictory, however, it might be
illogical for other reasons, or it might not be a well-formed proposition. So
we are left wondering how we know the proposition is contradictory if we
can’t think it. In addition, it is often claimed that contradictions are false.
But how can we determine that a proposition is false if it cannot be thought?
Another point is that if I can perfectly well think that p, and I can perfectly
well think that ¬p, why should thinking them in sufficiently close proximity
prevent me from being able to think either one? I think we can conclude
that it is hopeless to argue that contradictions are unthinkable, in the sense
that we are literally not able to think them.12
In short, understanding laws of thought as constitutive will not provide
a suitable account of laws of logic in terms of laws of thought, because we
12See Priest (1998b,a) for more detailed arguments against thinking that contradictions
have no thinkable propositional content.
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break the laws of logic all the time when thinking.
3.3.4 Norms for Thought
The broad alternative to a constitutive reading of laws of thought is a nor-
mative one. Normativity has to do with standards, prescriptions and rules.
A “norm” provides a rule, or a standard, or a prescription for behaviour or
action, which may or may not be followed. If a norm is not followed, this is
accompanied by a notion of somehow being incorrect or wrong or liable for
punishment. Likewise, following a norm is deemed as being correct or right
or perhaps liable for praise.
A norm is a rule for behaviour, or a definite pattern of be-
haviour, departure from which renders a person liable to some
kind of censure. In this sense there are grammatical norms, and
norms of etiquette, as well as moral norms. Indeed, almost all as-
pects of human behaviour will be to some extent norm-governed.
. . . (Blackburn, 1994, 1996, p. 265)
Normativity consists in the fact that there is a set of ideals,
standards, guides, recommendations, commands, rules, princi-
ples, laws, and so on (hence “norms”) that govern human beliefs
and intentional actions. . . . As I will construe it, the normativity
of something X is expressed by saying that there is something
humans ought to (or may) believe or do because of X. In other
words, the normativity of X is the role X plays in the giving of
reasons for human belief or intentional action, that is, in the jus-
tification of human belief or intentional action. More precisely,
then, X is normative if and only if X can be directly cited as
a reason for human belief or intentional action, or at least X is
intrinsic to some reason for human belief or intentional action.
(2006, pp. 202–3)
A normative law of thought, then, will provide reasons, obligations, per-
missions and the like to think in certain ways. Suppose something like
∀p¬(p & ¬p) were a normative law of thought. This could be understood
to mean something like: one ought not to think, for any proposition p, that
both it and its negation are true. Note that these laws may come apart from
how we in fact think and reason: we may often fall short of what we ought to
do. This kind of understanding of laws of logic and thought as normative is
demonstrated by the “oughts” in the quotations from Kant and Frege above
(section 3.3.2).
However, the story does not stop there. One can always ask: why does
something provide reasons for something else? And there are different an-
swers to this question. There are a number of different ways something
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might be normative. Hanna (2006, § 7.1) highlights some helpful distinc-
tions. Consider the normativity of something X. First, the normativity of
X might be an intrinsic or extrinsic feature of it.13 If X is extrinsically
normative, X depends for its normativity on something else external to it.
E.g., logical laws might be taken to be intrinsically non-normative, e.g. a
purely descriptive or factual science (perhaps describing the behaviour of
truth-bearers), but to provide norms when considered in relation to some-
thing else, such as certain other interests or practices (such as the need to
preserve truth in when engaged in empirical science). Second, X might have
hypothetical, i.e. conditional or instrumental, normativity, or categorical, i.e.
unconditional or non-instrumental normativity.
Something X is categorically normative if and only if humans
ought to believe or do Y because of X under all sets of circum-
stances and primarily because of X alone, whereas something X
is hypothetically normative if and only if humans ought to be-
lieve or do Y because of X only in certain circumstances and
primarily because of something else Z. (Hanna, 2006, p. 203)
How might it be that a class of certain principles are normative laws of
thought? First, there might be some other norm governing thought, e.g.,
that thought ought to aim at the truth, or that thought and reasoning
ought to be consistent. This, in turn, will bestow normativity on some
further things. Suppose that the laws of logic constitute the most general
truths. Then, if thought ought to aim at the truth, then thought ought
surely to aim to cohere with these most general truths. Or, wherever the
laws of logic find their source, if thought ought to be consistent, then thought
ought surely to strive to conform to the laws of logic, given that these
laws are concerned with relations such as consistency. On these kinds of
views, the laws of logic provide norms for how one ought to think. However,
this is not because the laws of logic are straightforwardly laws of thought.
Rather, there are more fundamental laws of thought (such as the norm
that thought ought to aim at the truth), which furnish the laws of logic
only with second-hand normativity. If the norms directly governing thought
were different, e.g. if thought was to aim at happiness (even at the price
of self-delusion), then the laws of logic might not provide laws for how we
ought to think after all. The laws of logic, by this view, are independent
of thought. They are general truths about the world, or some such. So
if the norms directly governing thought were to change, the laws of logic
would not. They would merely cease to be relevant to our thinking. In
13Hanna expands upon intrinsic features as being necessary features, and extrinsic fea-
tures as being accidental features (2006, p. 203). This is not particularly helpful in the
context of a discussion about modality. I will assume a working notion of an intrinsic
feature as one that a lonely object could have, i.e. even if there were no other entities, the
feature could still be had. (See Lewis (1983))
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exploring the prospects of a laws of thought account of logical laws and
logical necessity, then, this kind of view doesn’t help at all, as it ultimately
sets laws of thought aside. Note, the kind of normativity afforded to laws of
logic here is merely extrinsic (depending on standards for thought external to
logic) and potentially hypothetical (depending on whether those standards
for thought apply in all circumstances).
A more promising approach is to consider the laws of logic as more
directly connected to thought, with no intermediary norm. The laws of
logic, whatever they are, directly constitute norms for how we ought to
think.14 However, note that even if an example of such a (direct) norm
were to be ‘One ought think, for all propositions p, ¬(p & ¬p)’, one could
still question why that is, and give extrinsic or hypothetical reasons. One
ought to think like that, in circumstances where one is engaged in empirical
science, say. Ultimately, I shall argue that there is a certain phenomenon,
the ‘logocentric predicament’, which is best explained if the laws of logic
provide constitutive norms for thought, such that if one is not subject to
these norms, one is not thinking. This should serve to rule out an account
of laws of logic as having hypothetical normativity: they should turn out to
apply in all circumstances of thinking. This should also serve to rule out a
view where logical laws are extrinsically normative: this would require that
there be an external element determining what constitutes thought, beyond
thought itself. Unless one wants to postulate some kind of God decreeing
what it is to be something,15 I do not see what such an external element
could be.
In short, understanding the laws of thought as normative includes dif-
ferent ways that a law might be normative. Some kinds of normativity seem
more appropriate for a laws of thought account of the laws of logic. At
this stage it is too early to say what kind of normativity these laws will be
afforded on such a view. The next task is to argue that the laws of logic are
indeed normative laws of thought. The conclusion of the argument should
tell us what kind of normativity we are dealing with.
3.4 Logic and Rational Indubitability
3.4.1 A Logocentric Predicament?
Why think that the laws of logic are laws of thought? The strategy of the
following will be something like an argument to the best explanation. I will
14There are two ways one might understand “we ought to think in accordance with the
laws of logic”. Either we ought to think in accordance with the laws, whatever they are,
where the laws are described and not specified, or we ought to think in accordance with
law L1, law L2, etc., where the laws themselves appear in the law of thought. In this
present case, I mean the latter.
15Which I don’t
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first introduce a phenomenon I call a “logocentric predicament”, regarding
principles that thinkers are not able to rationally reject or doubt. The
challenge is to then provide an explanation of this phenomenon. I will argue
that one very good explanation is that the laws of logic are constitutive-
normative laws of thought. I will contrast this other views of laws of logic,
which I argue cannot (yet) provide a satisfactory explanation. I will not
have space to explore every possible explanation, hence I can’t quite claim
that my “laws of thought” explanation is the best, but I will conclude that
it is at least very good, and better than the others I discuss.
“Logocentric predicament” is a phrase coined for the circumstance that
we find ourselves in when we try to give a justification of logical laws. This
purported predicament is borne out when we try to justify or give an account
of our logical practices, because we always seem to end up relying on logic
to do so.
[T]he attempt to formulate the foundations of logic is rendered
arduous by a . . . “logocentric” predicament. In order to give an
account of logic, we must presuppose and employ logic. (Sheffer,
1926, p. 228)
Often, when giving a justification of some or other practice or rule, we will
employ logical reasoning. But how then can we justify the validity of logical
rules? It doesn’t seem right to use the very thing to be justified in its
justification. If this is true in general, then it doesn’t seem right to use
logical principles to justify logical principles. But then, what else is there
to be used?
I don’t want to focus on this predicament which is framed in terms of
justification. Rather, there is a similar “predicament” in the vicinity. The
idea is that there are some logical principles which do not admit of rational
doubt or rejection, or if they do, only at a prohibitive cost.16 There is an
important sense in which one cannot properly question these principles. I
take this to be an interesting state of affairs to find oneself in, and that
it demands explanation. Why do certain principles have such a binding
effect on our thought? Note that if one cannot doubt a principle, the task
of justifying it seems rather premature. But the deeper predicament is
the rational indubitability of a principle, not the seeming redundancy of
a justification for the principle. To this end, I will consider a number of
examples of such potentiality indubitable principles.
3.4.2 McFetridge Again
The first example is simply the argument I discussed in section 3.2.2: Mc-
Fetridge’s argument that we are constrained to believe in logical necessity.
16By rational doubt or rejection, I mean to rule out simply stamping one’s foot and
refusing to accept a principle, even in the face of compelling reasons.
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Recall, McFetridge characterized a belief in there being logically (absolutely)
necessarily truth-preserving rules of inference in terms of preparedness to
employ a rule under any supposition whatsoever. He gave an argument to
show that we cannot rationally abandon such a belief, on pain of rendering
ourselves unable to reason from suppositions at all. Of course one cannot
maintain that it is impossible for someone to believe that there is no rule
of inference which is valid in reasoning from any supposition whatsoever.
The point is rather that such a belief cannot be maintained in the face
of reasonable, rational consideration. McFetridge concludes that there is
a constraint on what we are bound to believe (if we think about it hard
enough). It might not show that we are always bound to try to follow
these rules, but at least it shows that we are bound to believe in them.
In terms of introducing a new predicament, it seems we have the following
(meta)logical principle which rational thinkers are bound to believe, given
sufficient reflection.
LN There is some rule of inference M such that there is no
supposition r such that, if it were the case that r, M would
not preserve truth.
One might worry that in order to have this belief, one will need to possess
concepts such as supposition, truth preservation and inference rule. Doesn’t
this mean that such a principle only binds thinkers who have attended logic
classes or read logic books? There are two responses to this worry, one brief,
one rather more important. First, recall that McFetridge characterized the
belief in LN in terms of behaviour: the preparedness to employ a rule of
inference in reasoning from any supposition whatsoever. One can avoid the
conceptual worry by simply framing the constraint in terms of this kind of
behaviour. Our practice of reasoning from suppositions would break down
if it did not allow, and indeed require, reasoners to employ some rules of
inference in any circumstances. However, no amount of inferential behaviour
will be able to show that someone accepts certain rules as valid in any
circumstances, simply because we are finite beings and can only achieve a
finite amount of reasoning in a lifetime, where there will be many more
possible circumstances in which reasoning may take place.
This leads to my second point. McFetridge’s conclusion cannot be that
all thinkers are constrained to explicitly assent to the proposition: There
is some rule of inference M such that there is no supposition r such that,
if it were the case that r, M would not preserve truth. It is indeed likely
that very few thinkers will ever conform to this constraint, even if they have
the requisite concepts.17 Rather, such a constraint provides a standard. If
one should stumble across matters pertaining to LN, one is constrained to
17E.g., all philosophy undergraduates may have the requisite concepts, yet never go on
to read McFetridge or consider the same kinds of questions.
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believe LN rather than ¬LN (one ought to behave one way, rather than
another). The former is correct, the latter incorrect. And if, after suitable
reflection, one nevertheless believes ¬LN then it looks like something has
gone seriously wrong. If someone really understood all the steps in the
argument, and still concluded that ¬LN, one might begin to doubt whether
they were a rational thinker at all. In short, it doesn’t matter if a thinker
does not actually occurently assent to LN, either because the question hasn’t
arisen, or because they do not have the requisite concepts, or for some similar
reason. The principle provides a standard for going right and wrong. Not
considering LN might be taken to be neutral, but once it is considered, one
had better conform to the principle on pain of being open to serious censure.
What arises is not so much a predicament, such as if we wanted to reject
this principle, yet cannot (analogous to wanting to give a certain kind of jus-
tification for deduction, but being unable to). However, I take McFetridge’s
conclusion to introduce a similar phenomenon. It seems that there is at
least one principle that reasoners cannot rationally reject, on pain of losing
any hope of being able to reason at all. The phenomenon to be explained is
therefore: how is it that such principles, which look to be logical in nature,
have such a hold on thinkers?
3.4.3 The Minimal Principle of Contradiction
A further example to be considered is the Minimal Principle of Contradic-
tion.
MPC Not every statement is true.
Thompson (1981), following Putnam (1978), argues that MPC is true and
known a priori in virtue of its being a presupposition of thought and expla-
nation.
Some truths of logic may be “so basic that the notion of expla-
nation collapses when we try to ‘explain’ why they are true.” So
suggests Putnam. As an example of such a truth, he mentions
“the Minimal Principle of Contradiction (Not every statement is
true).” In suggesting that the notion of explanation collapses
when we try to explain why this principle is true, he says he
does not mean “that there is something ‘unexplainable’ here.”
The point is that “there is simply no room for an explanation of
what is presupposed by every explanatory activity.” (Thompson,
1981, pp. 458–459)
Insofar as MPC can be said to be a presupposition of thought and expla-
nation, it is a principle that we are bound to accept if we are to think or
engage in explanatory practices at all.
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Thompson invites us to consider a thought experiment: imagine trying
to make meaningful utterances in a situation where you have to accept
every statement as true. The idea is that such a thought experiment is
self-undermining. In order to even imagine such a scenario, one must be
adhering to the minimal principle of contradiction. So one can hardly use
the thought experiment in a justification of MPC.
[I]n imagining the situation in question, we presuppose the very
principle we are supposed to learn from the thought experiment.
In order to imagine ourselves in a situation in which we reject
the minimal principle of contradiction, we must take it to be true
that in this situation we reject the principle and false that we
accept it. But then we take for granted at the start that not every
statement is true, which is just what the experience is supposed
to show. This predicament is unavoidable. (Thompson, 1981, p.
460)
Thompson’s argument here is difficult to tease out. Moreover, there are
a number of prima facie problems. E.g., imagination is not closed under
logical consequence: just because I imagine myself in a situation where I
reject MPC, it does not follow that I imagine that in that situation it is true
that I reject MPC and false that I accept it. Moreover, it appears that some
kind of assumption against true contradictions is being smuggled in. Even
if in this imagined situation it is true that I reject MPC, why shouldn’t it
also be true that I accept MPC? We are, after all, in the business of looking
for some kind of warrant or justification to believe in MPC, so prejudice
against contradictions surely isn’t allowed.
I would like to offer a simpler route into highlighting the curious nature
of MPC. Let us recap what we are dealing with, namely, the statement:
Not every statement is true.
Ultimately I want to know if it is possible for thinkers like us to rationally
doubt or reject such a principle. So, consider the question: what would it be
to rationally doubt this statement? Well, it would be to seriously entertain,
or to try to assert, something like the following:
It might not be true that not every statement is true.18
In rationally considering how things might be, it will be natural to consider
how things would be if things were indeed that way. So, if it were not true
that not every statement is true, how would things be?
If it were not true that not every statement is true, then it would
be true that some statement is not true.
18The ‘might’ here should be read as epistemic possibility. What is up for discussion is
doubt, not the thought that MPC is contingent.
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From it being true that some statement is not true it follows that
Not every statement is true.
Note, I have not claimed here that anything is false. Simply that, in con-
sidering how things would be were MPC not to be true, it would turn out
that not every statement would be true, and hence that MPC would be true
after all.
This is not intended to be an argument for the truth of MPC. Rather, the
purpose is to highlight the relationship between MPC and rational doubt.
What is it to doubt something? At the very least it will involve entertaining
the thought that it might not be true.19 In entertaining that the object of
doubt might not be true, one is immediately entertaining MPC. So how can
one be expected to doubt MPC, if the very mechanism of doubting brings
in the thought that MPC might be true? Taking a step further, to rational
rejection, again, what is it to reject something? It is to affirm that it is not
true.20 And of course, if something is not true, then MPC is true. So the
very mechanism of rejection brings in the thought that MPC is true.
What should we make of this? I want to take this as further evidence for
the existence of a genuine phenomenon, whereby there are certain logical
principles that we cannot reject in our thinking. It seems that thinkers
cannot rationally reject MPC. In engaging in doubt or rejection, one thereby
entertains or affirms MPC.
Thompson’s main purpose is to argue that the principle can be classed
as a priori, but he also draws some conclusions about thought.
We discover that we presuppose the principle of contradiction
in all our thinking only by discovering our inability to think in
violation of it regardless of what we are thinking about and of
how we express our thought externally. (Thompson, 1981, p.
463)
This highlights an important point. Thompson takes us to be bound to
think in accordance with MPC. In contrast, I want to claim that we are
bound to take our thought to be right or wrong in light of MPC. I argued
above that our ability to think a contradiction shows that we are able to
think in violation of logical laws. Thompson claims otherwise.
When we accuse someone of illogical (and not just irrational)
thought, what we mean is that the person’s efforts at thought
have completely failed. His thoughts cancel each other and he
has failed to think anything at all. (Thompson, 1981, p. 471)
19Even if more is involved, the thought is at least entertained.
20Rejectivists argue that acceptance and rejection are two distinct mental or speech
acts, such that rejection of a proposition p is not the same thing as acceptance of its
negation ¬p. However, rejection of p and acceptance of ¬p are still logically equivalent,
which is all that is presently required. See Smiley (1996).
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This still seems wrong. Even in the arguments I have just considered, one
can certainly think that every statement is true, but on closer inspection, it
will always turn out that that is false. Getting something wrong does not
constitute not thinking. Rather, as I argued above, one has been able to
make progress and learn something on the basis of considering the statement
or thought that every statement is true (i.e. that one cannot rationally
sustain a belief in such a statement).
It should be noted that Thompson and I have slightly different notions
of “thinking” in mind. I have been working with a minimal notion where
merely entertaining a proposition counts as thought. Thompson’s notion
might be richer, requiring something more akin to imagining or picturing
how things would be according to the proposition. The view that we cannot
fully picture a contradictory situation might be easier to defend, however,
what then are we to say about entertaining and understanding a contra-
dictory proposition? If that doesn’t count as thought, albeit rather simple
thought, then the notion of thought in play is too demanding.
Thompson offers a rather obscure argument to the contrary.
It might seem wrong to say that with illogical thought one fails
to think anything at all. One thinks a contradiction. But we
can think a contradiction, think that both p and not-p, only by
conforming to the principle of contradiction. Without this con-
formity, we would have to think not only both p and not-p but
also its negation, neither p nor not-p. With absolute noncon-
formity, with strictly illogical thought, we get endless iteration
of this process. We do not think merely that both, both p and
not-p and neither p nor not-p, but also that neither, neither both
p and not-p nor neither p nor not-p. We thus think nothing at
all. If we could not contradict ourselves we could not think. We
think a contradiction only when we think it as such, as thought
that cancels itself. In thinking a contradiction without think-
ing it as such, we fail to think anything at all—we are illogical.
(Thompson, 1981, p. 471, fn. 8)
One point he might be intending to make here is that, supposing we can take
contradictions to be true in thought, if the minimal principle of contradiction
were not presupposed, we would have to take not only the contradiction to
be true, but its negation, and so on and so forth. But this kind of result
might be taken to follow from a failure of MPC in any case. If everything
is true, and I think that p is true, then I must also think that ¬p is true,
and so on and so forth. But that is not a problem peculiar to thinking
contradictions.
The point specific to contradictions appears to be that in thinking p and
¬p, these contradictory propositions cancel each other out, hence there is no
thought at all. If for every proposition p we think both p and ¬p, this would
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then amount to cancelling all (propositional) thought. This cancellation
view of contradictions is illustrated nicely by Strawson.21
Suppose a man sets out to walk to a certain place; but, when
he gets half-way there, turns round and comes back again. This
may not be pointless. He may, after all, have wanted only exer-
cise. But from the point of view of a change of position, it is as
if he had never set out. And so a man who contradicts himself
may have succeeded in exercising his vocal chords. But from the
point of view of imparting information, of communicating facts
(or falsehoods) it is as if he had never opened his mouth. He
utters words, but does not say anything. Or he might be com-
pared with a man who makes as if to give something away and
then takes it back again. He arouses expectations which he does
not fulfil; and this may have been his purpose. Similarly, it may
have been the purpose of a man who contradicts himself just to
create puzzlement. The point is that the standard purpose of
speech, the intention to communicate something, is frustrated
by self-contradiction. Contradicting oneself is like writing some-
thing down and then erasing it, or putting a line through it. A
contradiction cancels itself and leaves nothing. (Strawson, 1952,
pp. 2–3)
I turn again to my arguments of section 3.3.3. Proponents of this view of
contradictions have to explain how it is that we succeed in thinking and
understanding contradictions to the point that we can (a) recognize that
they are contradictions, (b) claim that they are false, and (c) correct our-
selves when contradictions are pointed out to us in a reasonable and rational
manner.
3.4.4 The Minimal Logical Toolkit
In “Basic Logical Knowledge”, Hale explores the idea of a minimal toolkit
of logical principles and inference rules for reasoning about logic, which are
“rationally indubitable”. Such principles form the backbone of doubting,
questioning and reasoning about logical principles, and so are not properly
subject to the same kinds of doubt themselves.
The target of Hale’s paper is to consider ‘whether there is any basic
logical knowledge and if there is, how this is possible’ (2002a, p. 2). Logical
knowledge is understood as knowledge about logic, not knowledge arising
out of the use of logic.
Logical knowledge is, roughly speaking, knowledge about logic—
such as knowledge that a certain principle of inference necessarily
21Strawson puts things in terms of speech, rather than thought.
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preserves truth, or that every proposition of a certain form must
be true—and so is not the same thing as knowledge that is gained
by using logic, i.e. inferential knowledge. (Hale, 2002a, p. 1)
Logical knowledge is specifically a species of modal knowledge, given that
it concerns knowledge such as that a certain rule of inference necessarily
preserves truth, or that every proposition of a certain form must be true.
Setting aside Quinean worries regarding whether there can be such a thing
as modal knowledge at all, Hale argues that the peculiarly logical brand of
modal knowledge at issue is unlikely to be a posteriori knowledge, but should
be expected to be a priori. Basic logical knowledge won’t make any appeal
to further logical knowledge. E.g., take the case of knowledge that a principle
of inference is sound (necessarily truth-preserving). If this knowledge makes
appeal to the soundness of some other principle of inference, then it will no
longer count as basic knowledge, but only derived logical knowledge, based
on some other logical knowledge (which may or may not be basic itself).
Hale then introduces a dilemma. Knowledge is either inferential (first
horn) or non-inferential (second horn). On the first horn of the dilemma
we face the problem that basic logical knowledge cannot be inferential: it
would no longer be basic, but rather the rule of inference used would be the
candidate for basic logical knowledge. On the second horn, the problem is
that the going kinds of non-inferential knowledge, e.g. perceptual knowl-
edge, don’t seem like they will be up to the job of giving us the kind of
knowledge we’re looking for, i.e. knowledge of generalities and necessities.
The challenge is to try to make one side of the dilemma work.
Minimally, one must either explain how one can use a basic rule
of inference in arriving at the conclusion that that very rule of
inference is necessarily truth-preserving without being involved
in some vicious circularity, or provide an alternative, credible,
model for non-inferential knowledge which avoids the shortcom-
ings of any perceptual or inner-perceptual model. (Hale, 2002a,
p. 6)
The first horn of the dilemma, going inferential, is rejected by Hale. If
inferential knowledge of the soundness of a rule of inference R is to have any
chance of being basic, the inferences we engage in to come to know R cannot
rely upon the soundness of some other rule of inference. So, if basic logical
knowledge of the soundness of R is to be inferential, the inference will have
to make use of the only rule of inference left, R itself. This opens up the
account to the charge of circularity: using a rule of inference R, and relying
upon its being sound, in an argument to the conclusion that R is sound, looks
viciously circular. This might not be straightforward circularity, where the
conclusion of an inference occurs as a premise, but it does look like a case of
rule-circularity, where an inference to the conclusion that a rule of inference
is sound uses that selfsame rule of inference.
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One way to dispel the worry that rule-circularity is vicious is to appeal
to Dummett’s distinction between suasive and explanatory arguments. A
suasive argument is intended to persuade someone, already believing the
premises, of the truth of the conclusion. In contrast, an explanatory argu-
ment seeks to explain why a conclusion is true, by appeal to the premises,
where the conclusion is already known or taken to be true (see Dummett
(1973, 1978)).
Is rule-circularity always vicious? Dummett argues that it need
not be. If an argument is intended to persuade someone who
doubts the soundness of a rule that that rule is sound, and the
argument uses that rule, then it will be just as useless as an argu-
ment that involves premiss-circularity. But if instead the argu-
ment is an ‘explanatory’ (as opposed to ‘suasive’) argument—if
it is aimed at explaining why its conclusion is true, as opposed to
proving that it is true—then rule-circularity, Dummett claims,
may not be harmful, since in giving an explanation, we may
quite properly take for granted the fact we are trying to explain.
(Hale, 2002a, p. 7–8)
Recall, however, that Hale is concerned with knowledge that a rule is neces-
sarily truth-preserving. As such, it is not clear that a (non-problematically
circular) explanatory argument is appropriate. The challenge is precisely to
explain how we might come to know that R is sound. But an explanatory
argument takes for granted that it is already accepted that R is sound, and
merely seeks to give an explanation. Hale agrees that Dummett’s distinction
is not of help here, for this and other reasons.
Although the argument is to be viewed as an explanatory rather
than a suasive one, what we are trying to find is an explana-
tion how we may come to know that modus ponens is truth-
preserving. It seems, in general, that a good explanation of how
we may come to know something ought to indicate a route by
which someone could come to know it—so that, in the present
case, the argument must after all be capable of being used by
someone who is unsure about the rule as a means of gaining as-
surance that it is safe to use it. But it seems that a rule-circular
argument could not serve as such a means. (Hale, 2002a, p. 8)
With the inferential horn looking unpromising, Hale moves to consider
the second horn: to develop some account of non-inferential knowledge suit-
able to account for logical knowledge. Hale starts by considering a view
which draws on, or is ‘grounded in, the conditions for understanding the
logical constants’ (Hale, 2002a, p. 9). If understanding the logical constants
involves grasping or accepting certain rules of inference concerning those
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logical expressions, then it looks like we may have some epistemic access to
those rules which does not involve reasoning from antecedent premises, but
which neither involves something like perception. However, Hale is quick
to point out that acceptance of certain basic patterns of inference involved
in understanding of a logical operator does not equal the truth or validity
of those patterns of inference. Provision must therefore be made for an
important extra step in the account.
Thus Hale introduces the following key distinction:
A Explaining how we can come to know that basic rules such as
modus ponens are sound.
B Explaining why it is not possible intelligently (ie clear-headedly
and coherently) to doubt the soundness of basic rules such as
this one. (Hale, 2002a, p. 10)
The strategy of the rest of Hale’s paper is as follows. Setting aside project
A for the time being, Hale considers whether there are indeed “rationally
indubitable” rules of inference that it does not make intelligent sense to
doubt. He argues that there is a “minimal toolkit” of logical principles
that are involved in the very practices of doubting and reasoning about the
soundness of logical principles. Hence, it makes no good sense to doubt the
soundness of these very principles in the minimal toolkit. If the argument
succeeds, this will contribute to the logocentric predicament I have already
introduced with reference to McFetridge and Thompson. Yet again, we will
have evidence that there are some (logical) principles that are so basic to
reasoning, explaining or doubting that we cannot rationally reject or doubt
them.
The argument hinges on the idea that, if part of what it is to understand
a logical constant is to accept certain principles of inference concerning that
logical constant, then to doubt these principles will amount to misunder-
standing the logical constants. So there is no room for intelligent or rational
doubt of these principles, as opposed to just missing the point.
The fact that acceptance of (at least sufficiently simple instances
of) basic patterns of inference featuring a logical operator is (at
least partly) constitutive of understanding that operator has an
important consequence—it means that one cannot regard any-
thing which is recognisably an instance of the relevant inference
pattern as unsound without convicting oneself of misunderstand-
ing. (Hale, 2002a, p. 11)
First, Hale considers cases which look like genuine doubting of a can-
didate principle by a suitably intelligent person, such as McGee’s attack
against modus ponens.22 It is worth pausing to look at the kind of example
22See McGee (1985). See Sinnott-Armstrong et al. (1986); Lowe (1987); Over (1987) for
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McGee considers. If any logical principle is going to be one we cannot ra-
tionally reject, modus ponens is a likely candidate. It’s a principle accepted
by most, doubted by few, unlike some other logical principles which have a
more contentious literature (such as ex falso quodlibet).
A representative example from McGee is the following:
Opinion polls taken just before the 1980 election showed the
Republican Ronald Reagan decisively ahead of the Democrat
Jimmy Carter, with the other Republican in the race, John An-
derson, a distant third. Those apprised of the poll results be-
lieved, with good reason:
If a Republican wins the election, then if it’s not Reagan who
wins it will be Anderson.
A Republican will win the election.
Yet they did not have reason to believe
If it’s not Reagan who wins, it will be Anderson.
(McGee, 1985, p. 462)
Note, this example, as well as the others put forward by McGee, is of the
following general form (of which McGee himself is aware).
If φ, then if ψ then θ;
φ;
Therefore, if ψ then θ.
McGee does not show that any use of modus ponens risks being unsound.
Rather, the problem is restricted to more complex cases, where the proposi-
tions in the inference are themselves of a certain complexity. Hale suggests
that with this caveat he can continue on with his proposed line of thought.
So one might continue to take the meaning of the conditional
as (partially) constituted by acceptance of modus ponens—but
in a suitably restricted version. The argument I develop in the
remainder of this paper could be straightforwardly recast to suit
such a restricted version of the rule. (Hale, 2002a, p. 11)
It is reasonable to assume such a restriction? Surely modus ponens is a
simple inference form, blind to the content of premises, and hence blind to
the logical complexity of premises? So, e.g., given the form
If A then B;
A;
Therefore, B.
critical responses.
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each letter could stand for any proposition. That may be so, but Hale’s
proposal (to take acceptance of a “suitably restricted” version of the rule as
contributing to our understanding of the conditional) does not require that
one establishes that modus ponens has restricted application. The point
is simply that only (acceptance of) simple instances of the rule need be
taken to contribute to understanding of the conditional. More complicated
examples may confuse someone, and cause them to question an inference
even though it is valid and they understand the constituent parts. Similarly,
one would not accuse someone of misunderstanding the plus sign because
they systematically make mistakes in complex sums. What counts is whether
they can do simpler sums, e.g. ‘2 + 2 = 4’.
Setting worries about modus ponens aside, Hale concludes that on this
view of understanding ‘one cannot rationally entertain the idea of coun-
terexamples’ to inference rules which are constitutive of understanding of
the logical operators (Hale, 2002a, p. 12). A problem is then raised. Why
is it that we cannot raise doubts about the validity of rules of inference,
such as modus ponens, which are constitutive of our understanding of logi-
cal operators, yet we can, and indeed should, raise doubts about the validity
of other rules of inference, such as the tonk -rules, which arguably are also
constitutive of understanding “bad” logical operators, such as “tonk”.23
If one can argue: acceptance of modus ponens is required for
understanding the conditional, so if a thinker supposes she can
envisage a counter-example to it (i.e. a case in which it is true
that A and that if A then B but not true that B), she must be
confused, then one can just as well argue: acceptance of tonk-
elimination is required for understanding ‘tonk’, so if a thinker
supposes she can envisage a case in which it would be true that
A tonk B but not true that B, she (too) must be confused. But
the tonk rules are clearly duff. It must, therefore, be possible
to entertain doubts—indeed, well-founded doubts—about them.
So there has to be something wrong with the argument in their
case. Since the argument for the conditional rules runs entirely
parallel, it must likewise be defective. (Hale, 2002a, p. 13)
What makes the difference? This argument is based on the idea that to
doubt the validity of a rule of inference will involve envisaging a counterex-
ample to it. In order to side-step this worry, one need only show how some
other way to doubt the validity of a rule of inference is appropriate in the
case of tonk-rules, but not in the case of rules such as modus ponens. Hale
considers what might be involved in doubting or questioning the validity of
23
A
A tonk B
A tonk B
B
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a rule of inference. He takes it that this will involve reasoning. After all,
the lack of conservativeness of the ‘tonk’ introduction and elimination rules
is hardly something one can see at a glance: one needs to think about it
and do some reasoning to realize that. Of course, one might just doubt with
brute force, but then the doubt will not be rational or reasonable, but rather
just a mindless attitude. Hale has already eliminated the option that a rule
R be vindicated by reasoning involving itself, on pain of circularity. So, the
reasoning going on in considering and questioning the validity of a rule R
will have to involve rules other than R.
If what I’ve said is right, any vindication of a doubt about the
conservativeness (or, more generally, the soundness) of any rules
of inference must involve reasoning which doesn’t use those rules,
but uses some other rules instead—rules whose reliability is as-
sumed in that reasoning. It does not, of course, follow from this
that there must be some rules whose reliability must, and may
properly, be assumed in any demonstration we can give of the
conservativeness or non-conservativeness (more generally, sound-
ness or unsoundness) of any (other) rules. It does not follow, but
it is—or so I believe—true. (Hale, 2002a, p. 17)
Hale takes the final step of suggesting that, not only will there be, for rea-
soning about any rule of inference R, some other rule R′ which is assumed
to be sound, but that there will be some rules which will be assumed to be
sound when reasoning about any rule R.24
Some more concrete examples of rules we might expect to employ in
reasoning about any rule of inference are suggested. E.g., rules governing
the conditional and the universal quantifier.
Any rule(s) of inference whose soundness we may wish to con-
sider will—or so I think we may assume—be both general and
conditional—general, in the sense that their explicit formulation
tells us that a conclusion of some specified general form may be
drawn from premisses of some specified general form, and con-
ditional, in the sense that they tell us that given premisses of
the specified form, a conclusion of the specified form may be
drawn. Any reasoning about what inferences they permit—as
distinct from reasoning that simply uses those rules—will, at
least if fully articulated, involve reasoning from explicit formu-
lations of the rules. . . If this is right, then there is what might be
called a minimal kit of inference rules—including at least rules
for the conditional and universal quantifier—required for any
24Hale points out that this does not follow logically. To think so would involve the same
mistake as taking it to follow from everyone loving someone, that there is someone that
everyone loves.
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reasoning about the soundness of any rules of inference. (Hale,
2002a, p. 19)
This then gives us the minimal logical toolkit.
Hale concludes
My intermediate conclusion, in sum, is that the minimal rules are
immune to doubt in a very strong sense. Given their meaning-
constitutive character, they are not open to doubt of the first
kind; and given their indispensable roˆle in reasoning about
soundness in general, they cannot be subjected to a genuine
doubt on that score. Thus unless there is some way in which they
might relevantly be questioned, we have—at least in outline—an
explanation why there can be no intelligible doubt about them.
(Hale, 2002a, p. 21)
Hale has answered project B by arguing that an account of our understand-
ing of the logical constants in terms of (tacit) acceptance of certain inference
rules gives rise to the conclusion that, in cases of reasoning about logical
principles, there is a minimal toolkit of certain of these (understanding-
constitutive) rules of inferences which are not open to rational doubt.
Hale has argued that reasoning about logic requires a minimal toolkit
of logical principles which are not themselves open to rational criticism and
doubt. My current aim is to establish that there is a phenomenon, a logo-
centric predicament, where there are certain logical principles that thinkers
cannot rationally reject. Hale’s conclusion is not general enough for my
purposes: presumably one could opt out of any reasoning about logic at all.
The conclusion needs to be extended to any thinking whatsoever, to the
conclusion that there is a minimal toolkit of logical principles which are not
open to rational criticism and doubt, full stop. Hale relies on there being
certain features of reasoning about logic that one would always expect to
find, e.g. generality, hence one will always need to employ the principles
associated with those features, i.e. rules governing universial quantification.
Even if this line of thought can be extended to cover any reasoning whatso-
ever, it does not carry over to any thinking whatsoever. If I am entertaining
some singular proposition about an object, there is no obvious reason to
expect my thinking here to involve generality and universal quantification.
A proposition such as ‘Socrates is a fool’ does not contain any of the inter-
esting logical concepts utilized by Hale such as conjunction, the conditional
and universal generalization.
We can extend Hale’s conclusion by noting that, whenever a logical prin-
ciple is explicitly questioned, the minimal toolkit will enter in. The logocen-
tric predicament I am trying to introduce concerns whether certain logical
principles can be rationally rejected or not. So, as soon as that question
arises, the minimal toolkit enters in, and it turns out that there are some
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logical principles that are not open to the relevant kind of doubt. This is not
to say that in all of our reasoning and thinking we adhere to these logical
principles. I emphasised above that we can make logical mistakes. But these
mistakes cannot be justified as correct after all, by rejecting a certain logical
principle, where the very practice of this kind of doubting relies upon the
validity of that logical principle. And so the minimal toolkit provides fur-
ther evidence of the logocentric predicament; that there are some (logical)
principles that thinkers cannot rationally reject.
Hale connects the rational indubitability of some logical principles with
our understanding of logical constants. The understanding-constitutiveness
of these principles rules out doubt of their soundness based on counterexam-
ples to the rules: these would simply amount to cases of misunderstanding.
The fact that certain principles are involved in any reasoning about logic
rules out another kind of doubt of their soundness, namely that based on
other reasoning about them. So far I have not committed myself to, or even
properly considered, an account of understanding of the logical constants,
let alone Hale’s favoured version.
It might be objected that, without this commitment, I cannot make use
of Hale’s conclusion: the relevant principles will be open to rational doubt
on the basis of purported counterexamples unless the meaning of the logical
constants is constitutively tied to such principles. However, if “doubt by
counterexample” involves some reasoning about the rule of inference under
consideration, then it seems that general considerations to do with reasoning
about logic will apply in any case. So the theory of understanding need not
play as great a role here. If, however, “doubt by counterexample” doesn’t
involve any reasoning, then I fail to see how this can count as rational doubt.
At least the purported counterexample must be recognized as being of a
certain general form, and as having certain unexpected consequences etc. I
do not see how this might be expected not to involve at least some of the
distinctive features of reasoning about logic. So, whilst I am sympathetic
towards Hale’s underlying commitment to an account of understanding of
logical constants, it does not look like such a commitment is required to
get hold of the minimal toolkit. I take it that the element of Hale’s view
concerning the understanding of logical constants, even if it plays no essential
role in arguing that some logical principles are immune to rational doubt,
may provide an explanation as to why these principles are indubitable in
this way. To give them up would be to give up logical concepts, such as
the concept of conjunction, without which we could not conceptualize and
engage in rational argument.
3.4.5 Logic and the Web of Belief
As a final consideration towards showing that we are in a logocentric predica-
ment, I turn now to some arguments presented by Shapiro (2000) against a
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Quinean approach to the status of logic, in particular, the view of Michael
Resnik. I will not go into every detail of Shapiro’s arguments. I want to
focus on the elements which bring out some fresh reasons for thinking that
some logical principles are immune to doubt, in the sense that they are im-
mune to the kind of revision to which the Quinean takes all elements of the
web of belief to be subject.
The Quinean view encompasses a kind of epistemic holism, whereby it is
not single beliefs which are the objects of confirmation or disconfirmation by
observation and experience. Rather, it is one’s entire network of beliefs—the
web of belief—which faces the “tribunal of experience” as a whole. Beliefs
about logic and mathematics are included in this web. If there is some
discrepancy between the web of belief and experiential evidence, then some-
thing in the web of belief will have to be modified. Modifications can in
principle take place at any point in the web, although some areas, such as
beliefs about logic and mathematics, will require exceptionally strong recal-
citrant experience to force their revision. A given recalcitrant experience
might prompt revision of the observation belief (one didn’t see what one
thought one did), revision of some general beliefs about the world (such as
revising a scientific law in the light of new empirical evidence), or, in the
most extreme cases, one may revise a law of logic. This Quinean position
does not allow for the kind of predicament I have been arguing for: given
the right kind of recalcitrant experience, any logical law might be up for
revision and jettison, so no logical law can be immune to rational doubt or
rejection.
In response to the Quinean, Shapiro contends that the process of belief
revision will involve the use of logical principles, and in particular, the pro-
cess of revision of logical beliefs will involve the use of some logical principles.
Of which logic? The same questions regarding possible revision will be faced
by this second logic, which will require the use of logical princoples. And so
on and so forth. So this kind of revision can never get going properly.
Since nothing is outside the web of belief, the Quinean would
have it that the identification of the correct logic is part of the
web. In particular, logic itself is subject to modification the
way anything in the web is. Suppose someone is considering a
change in logic, because less drastic measures are not working.
Presumably the troubled theorist would follow the model for
any change in the web. He would replace the old logic with
the new one and see how it comes out. That is, the theorist
would examine the consequences of the change in logic for the
proposed new web of belief. Consequences? Which logic do we
use to assess the consequences of different logics? Is there a
correct logic for that, and is this super-logic also just a bunch of
nodes in the current web? Regress threatens. Is the super-logic
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analytic, a priori, or incorrigible? (Shapiro, 2000, p. 338)
The thought is that the process of maintanence of the web of belief in the
light of experience will sometimes involve a reasoned, considered reaction
to recalcitrant experience. We must be able to recognise that an experi-
ence is indeed not compatible with extant beliefs, and work out what beliefs
will have to be changed in order to accommodate the recalcitrant experi-
ence with minimal trauma to the web. This, surely, will involve the use of
some logical principles, such as those governing coherence and compatibil-
ity, and those governing the use of the conditional (to be able to properly
consider the consequences of different changes). But if the very activities
of web-maintanence and belief-revision presuppose reliance on some logical
principles, this will cause trouble when it comes to revision of beliefs in those
logical principles. What principles may one rely on when revising the very
principles which underwrite the process of revision?
Resnik is correct that ‘theory development and testing must take
place against a backdrop of principles and rules for generating
consequences and commitments’ and that what ‘we call our logic
is what we take as fixed in testing and developing our theories.’
So what is the ‘logic’ that we hold as fixed during the logician’s
quest? (Shapiro, 2000, p. 346)
Shapiro notes that this kind of argument is similar to one presented by
Crispin Wright against the Quinean position.25
Suppose that a logician has an intuition that a certain argument
A is invalid, and wants to see if this intuition coheres with her
evolving logical theory T . Sadly, she finds out that the invalidity
conflicts with T . Consider the sentence:
(*) The theory T is not in accord with the invalidity
of the Argument A,
presumably accepted by the theorist. We are told that any sen-
tence is up for revision. Can our logician maintain both T and
the invalidity of A by rejecting (*)? That is, can our logician
just reject the inference from T to the validity of A? Regress
threatens. (Shapiro, 2000, p. 346)
Hale (1999) also presents a slightly different version of the argument. It
begins:
Let θ be some theory we are putting to the test and L our un-
derlying logic. We derive from θ, using L, various conditional
25This argument is also considered in Hale (1999), and used to bolster his defence of
McFetridge’s argument, as discussed in section 3.2.2.
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statements whose antecedents describe observationally checkable
initial conditions, and whose consequents specify observable pre-
dicted outcomes. Let I → P be any such. A series of observa-
tions E will be recalcitrant (more fully, recalcitrant with respect
to θ+L) if it provides, or appears to provide, grounds to accept
I but reject P . (1999, p. 37)
Now, in the case where E is recalcitrant, the Quinean allows a number
of revisionary moves. One might change theory θ, such that it no longer
constitutes premises from which I → P is derivable. One might change
logic L, such that it no longer yields a derivation of I → P from θ. Or one
might change one’s view of E, such that it is no longer viewed as recalcitrant.
However, because the Quinean allows that all and any statements are part
of the web of belief and thus should be candidates for revision, an additional
option presents itself, viz. to reject the following statement W:
W θ `L I → P
Regress now threatens for the following reason. Standardly, in choosing an
option for revision, say between revising θ, or revising L, the Quinean will
bring in pragmatic considerations, comparing the options for their relative
degrees of recalcitrance against already accepted beliefs and observations.
However, this pragmatic comparison rests upon acceptance also of W: if W
were not true, then the degree of recalcitrance of changes to, e.g., θ will
come out as different. So the process of comparison of options all occurs
conditional upon W. So different combinations containing acceptance and
rejection of W must now be assessed for their degrees of recalcitrance. But
inevitably there will be some further hypothesis underlying this exercise in
comparison, analogous to statement W. Hale concludes
Since all such hypotheses are in the pragmatic melting pot along
with all other statements, we have no progress—only regress.
Hale (1999, p. 39)
Wright et al have shown that a Quinean view which excludes all state-
ments, including logical statements, from a special status outside of the web
of belief, cannot be sustained, as it will lead to vicious regress. Shapiro
highlights an additional detail of Quine’s view which pulls in this direc-
tion. Quine’s thesis of the indeterminacy of meaning has it that linguistic
data (such as affirmation and denial of sentences in contexts with different
stimuli) systematically underdetermines an interpretation or translation of a
linguistic agent. In Quine’s familiar example, a linguist in the field, working
to develop a translation manual for the language of a tribe, is presented with
a tribe member exclaiming “Gavagai!” in the presence of a running rabbit.
Not only is there insufficient evidence for choosing a translation from “There
goes a rabbit!”, “There goes an instance of rabbitiness!”, “There go some
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undetached rabbit-parts!” and so on, but Quine contends that each of the
different possible translation manuals are equally correct—there is no fact
of the matter in the case of meaning.
This is the general idea, but how are things supposed to go in the case
of logical vocabulary? Shapiro notes:
Quine himself is ambivalent on the semantic status of the logical
connectives. In later work, he suggests that if a radical trans-
lator has a native denying (or refusing to assent to) a logical
truth, then we have strong evidence that we have mistranslated.
The problem is that if we interpret a native as denying or re-
fusing assent to a logical truth, then we have attributed a deep
incoherence to him. Better to think we have made an error in
translating than to attribute deep incoherence. (Shapiro, 2000,
p. 356)
This echoes a point which I will attempt to draw out later, namely an im-
portant distinction between our attitudes towards rejection or denial of log-
ical truths, and those towards rejection or denial of other purported truths
including metaphysical statements. The “Gavagai” example seems to in-
volve the field linguist assigning different folk metaphysical beliefs to the
tribe members. The first translation ostensibly gives us a tribe believing in
medium-sized physical objects and organisms, the second a tribe believing
in property-instances rather than objects, the third a tribe believing in the
existence of parts but not ontologically-robust wholes. We might find some
of these world views (conceptual schemes?) strange, but we do not worry
that we are consigning the tribe to incoherence. Our attitudes towards rejec-
tion of purported metaphysical truths is remarkably accepting and tolerant.
In contrast, even Quine has noticed that our attitudes towards rejection of
logical truths is far less sanguine. We might think that someone who is
best interpreted as denying an important metaphysical truth to be gravely
in error, but it seems that we can’t make any good sense at all of someone
who is best interpreted as denying important logical truths. In the realm of
radical translation, a translation that has a tribe member denying a logical
truth should always be taken as evidence of a mistake in the translation,
not evidence of the deep incoherence of the tribe member.
In sum, a Quinean will not be inclined to accept that there is a logocentric
predicament, whereby there are certain logical principles which are immune
to doubt, because they claim that any belief or statement can be subject to
revision in the face of recalcitrant experience. Wright’s argument, evinced
by Shapiro and Hale, has shown that even the Quinean must admit that
there are some logical principles which lie outside the scope of revision. In
addition, further remarks from Quine highlight a distinction between our
attitudes to rejection or doubt of metaphysical, as opposed to logical, truths
and principles.
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3.5 Constitutive-Normative Laws of Thought
3.5.1 The Explanandum
I have provided a number of examples of principles, which we would normally
deem to be logical, which it seems we cannot rationally reject, on pain of
setting aside certain basic abilities to reason on the basis of a supposition,
to engage in explanations, or to reason about logic itself. Such principles
include
• There is some rule of inference M such that there is no supposition r
such that, if it were the case that r, M would not preserve truth.
• Not every statement is true.
• φ ⊃ ψ;φ |= ψ
In addition, it would seem that even the Quinean has to accept that some
beliefs, certain logical beliefs, are immune to revision, although I have not
explored what those principles would be. I take this all to be evidence for a
phenomenon which I have called a “logocentric predicament”.
One might think that an equally compelling phenomenon arises from
discussions about the justification of deduction. E.g., Haack has attacked
the idea that there can be any justification of deduction, against Dummett’s
contention that there is a sense in which deduction can be justified. Haack
argues: How might we justify deduction? Either inductively or deductively.
Inductive justification would be too weak, as it wouldn’t be able to assure
us of the necessarily truth-preserving nature of a rule of deduction.26 But
deductive justification would be circular. Therefore, deduction has no jus-
tification (see Haack (1976)). She also offers a more complex argument,
claiming that if certain rule-circular justifications of kosher principles such
as modus ponens are to be allowed, so must the same kinds of rule-circular
arguments which serve to justify bad principles, such as modus morons.27 In
contrast, Dummett offers his distinction between suasive and explanatory
arguments (see section 3.4.4, p. 104). Whilst it does seem illegitimate to use
a rule in an argument which is intended to persuade someone that the rule
is valid, nevertheless, Dummett claims that there is no problem for using a
rule in an argument which is intended to explain why the rule is valid to
someone who already accepts its validity (see Dummett (1973, 1978)).
26One might argue that cases of the necessary a posteriori show that inductively-
acquired knowledge can indeed provide knowledge of necessity. I will ignore this com-
plication for now. In any case, I take it that the laws of logic are standardly taken, even
by Kripkeans, to be necessary a priori.
27
A ⊃ B,B
A
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Even if an explanatory argument for the justification of deduction is
acceptable, the question remains: why are suasive arguments for the justi-
fication of deduction so bad? Yes, they are circular in some unacceptable
way. But what is it about deduction that appears to rule out the kind of
suasive justificatory argument that it is possible to give in so many other
circumstances? One might take these considerations to highlight another lo-
gocentric predicament: one of justification, rather than doubt and rejection.
Not everyone will be moved by this. One might just reject the idea that
we require anything like justification of deductive principles. Like Dummett,
one might argue that only explanation is appropriate here, and that we
should not panic if no (suasive) justification is available. One might then
reject the idea that there is any “predicament” here to cause us worry. Surely
we are only in this predicament if we need justification and cannot get it:
but, arguably, we do not need it.
Even taking this more relaxed attitude to the justification of deduction,
I think there is still a peculiarity of logic which is highlighted. Depending
upon one’s particular views, this peculiarity is that there cannot be any jus-
tification of deductive principles, or equally peculiar, that we are absolved
of needing any justification of deductive principles. If one finds this wor-
thy of consideration and explanation, then it can be incorporated into the
discussion of doubt and rejection of logic as a phenomenon arising from a
deeper predicament. I have argued that there are certain principles which
thinkers like us are not able to properly question, doubt or reject. If we
cannot even coherently raise doubts about the validity of certain principles,
how can the task of (suasive) justification of those principles even get going?
So the rational indubitability of logical principles may be able to account
for our inability to properly give a justification of them. And the fact that
we cannot give a justification of those principles is less worrying, given that
we can hardly reject them as a consequence.
It is not uninteresting that logical principles have this strange hold on
how we may think. Such a phenomenon invites consideration and explana-
tion. Why do logical principles, and seemingly no other kinds of principle,
have such a hold on us? The rest of this chapter will be devoted to consid-
ering how to provide an explanation. I will first consider some explanations
which I take to be inadequate. I will then propose my own explanation.
3.5.2 Alternative Explanations
First, McFarlane’s interpretation of Frege on logical laws. Consider cases of
laws less general than logical laws, such as the laws of physics. The laws
of physics describe regularities of the physical world: they are true general
statements about physical objects, properties and processes. Arising from
these are norms or standards for counting as thinking about physical objects.
Suppose I believe that the force exerted on an object is equal to its mass plus
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its acceleration. In order for my belief to really be about physical objects,
it must be appropriate to evaluate it as wrong, given the laws of physics. It
may well be that my belief is neither right nor wrong in light of the laws of
physics, because I am thinking about some other kind of thing, say, alien
schmysical objects in a parallel universe.28
Insofar as one’s activity is to count as making judgments about
the physical world at all, it must be assessable for correctness
in light of the laws of physics. In this sense, the laws of physics
provide constitutive norms for the activity of thinking about the
physical world. (MacFarlane, 2002, p. 36–7)
At some point, there will be completely general standards for thought,
where one considers thought about any subject matter whatsoever, not re-
stricted to a particular domain such as physical objects. Frege took the laws
of logic to be the most general truths there are, about absolutely everything.
If the laws of logic are general truths about everything, then, following the
same line of thought as above, if I want to count as thinking about anything,
what I am doing must count as right or wrong in light of those laws. But
this time, there is no alternative realm I might be thinking of (as with the
alien universe). If I am not thinking about something out of everything,
there is nothing left for my thought to be about.
While physical laws provide constitutive norms for thought about
the physical world, logical laws provide constitutive norms for
thought as such. (MacFarlane, 2002, p. 37)
In order to count as thinking at all, what I am doing must count as right or
wrong in light of the most general laws which cover every possible domain
of thought. If one’s activity is not evaluable in light of these norms, then it
cannot be about anything, hence one must be doing something other than
thinking.
I am sympathetic to the view that laws of logic are constitutive norms
for thought, but I think a different rationale to that offered by (MacFar-
lane’s) Frege is to be preferred. A substantial worry about this strategy is
that it does not seem able to isolate the laws of logic as those laws which
are binding for thought, as opposed to other kinds of laws which are also
28This kind of view does not require that one know what the laws of physics actually
are. It would be inconsistent for me to believe that L is a law of physics, and also to
believe something about the behaviour of a physical object which contradicts L. But
this would be straight logical inconsistency. The point is that, in believing something
about a physical object which goes against what the laws of physics actually are, I should
count as doing something wrong, whether I know it or not, if what I am doing is to count
objectively as thought about physical objects. If what I am doing isn’t counted as (right
or) wrong, then I am doing something else, e.g. thinking about alien objects.
117
about “everything”.29 First, in what sense are the laws of logic about “ev-
erything”? It is perhaps helpful to start with the generality of the laws of
arithmetic.
Here, we have only to try denying any one of them, and complete
confusion ensues. Even to think at all seems no longer possible.
The basis of arithmetic lies deeper, it seems than that of any
of the empirical sciences, and even than that of geometry. The
truths of arithmetic govern all that is numerable. This is the
widest domain of all; for to it belongs not only the actual, not
only the intuitable, but everything thinkable. Should not the
laws of number, then, be connected very intimately with the
laws of thought? (Frege, 1884, § 14)
The laws of arithmetic govern, according to Frege, all that is thinkable.
Do the laws of arithmetic quantify over everything? Presumably not. We
normally think of laws of arithmetic as quantifying over numbers, e.g.
∀n∀m (n+m) = (m+ n)
Even if we don’t express laws of arithmetic using quantifiers, but schematized
sentences or suchlike, e.g.,
(a+ b) = (b+ a)
it is still understood that the letters are place-holders for numerals (i.e.
number-terms).
If the laws of arithmetic quantify over or contain places for numbers,
and govern the behaviour of numbers and arithmetical functions, in what
sense can they be said to govern everything thinkable? In the following
sense: everything which falls under a (non-vague) concept is numerable or
countable.
The only barrier to countability is to be found in the perfection
of concepts. Bald people for example cannot be counted as long
as the concept of baldness is not defined so precisely that for any
individual there can be no doubt whether it falls under it or not.
Thus the domain of the countable is as wide as the domain of
conceptual thought. (Frege, 1980, p. 100)30
(Frege ultimately argues that vague predicates do not correspond to any
concept, so the restriction to falling under a non-vague concept is really
29To put forward a careful interpretation of Frege here would be too great a task for
present purposes. If what I write is not a faithful rendering of what Frege intended, at
least it is a Fregean view under consideration. See MacFarlane (2002) and Textor (2010)
for more detailed interpretations.
30As cited in Textor (2010, p. 16).
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no restriction at all.) We can only think about things which fall under
concepts,31 so everything which we can think about is countable.
By ‘countable’ Frege cannot mean that everything can be mapped one-
one to the natural numbers, because that is arguably false. E.g., not every
point on a line can be counted in this way, let alone everything there is.
Rather, we must take him to mean that each thing is such that it can be
counted—every point on the line is such that we could count it along with
some others—and not that once we “finish” counting everything we will
have no more than ω things. In other words, everything is such that we can
start counting including it, although we may never finish counting. Numbers
apply to everything. So the laws of arithmetic, in governing numbers, also
govern everything which is countable, which is everything.32 One might
worry that this overlooks non-sortal concepts such as “red”. However, Frege
writes
The concept “syllables in the word three” picks out the word as
a whole, and as indivisible in the sense that no part of it falls
any longer under that same concept. Not all concepts possess
this quality. We can, for example, divide up something falling
under the concept “red” into parts in a variety of ways, without
the parts thereby ceasing to fall under the same concept “red”.
To a concept of this kind no finite number will belong. (Frege,
1884, §54, my emphasis)
There may be uncountably many, as in cannot be mapped one-one to the
natural numbers, entities which fall under a concept such as “red”, but this
does not harm Frege’s point. Such concepts may still have a number, but an
infinite number. The alternative understanding here of “countable” stands.
One can understand Fregean generality of the laws of logic in a similar
way. A law such as
∀p∀q (p ⊃ (q ⊃ p))
ostensibly quantifies over propositions. A schematic presentation of the law,
A ⊃ (B ⊃ A)
contains letters which act as place-holders for sentences or propositions.
So, aren’t the laws of logic a specialized science about propositions or sen-
tences? No. Propositions (sentences) can be about anything, in the same
way that numbers can count anything. So the laws of logic govern everything
thinkable, in virtue of governing propositions which can be about anything
thinkable.
31The simplest explanation of this is that everything falls under a concept, understood
in the Fregean sense, i.e. something like a property: to think otherwise would be to
commit oneself to the existence of bare particulars.
32See Textor (2010, p. 17).
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A Fregean explanation of the logocentric predicament may run as fol-
lows. Thought aims at the truth. So there is a prescription to think in
accordance with the truth as far as possible. If you want to think about
physical objects, you should aim to think in accordance with the general
truths about physical objects (laws of physics). If you want to think about
anything at all, you should aim to think in accordance with the most general
truths about absolutely everything (laws of logic). This explains why logic
is so binding for our thought: the aim of thought is truth, and the laws of
logic are truths about everything, so thought about anything will aim to be
in accordance with those laws.
My worry is that there are other laws (general truths) which are “about
everything” which are not rationally indubitable, or immune to rational
rejection, or otherwise binding on our thought. If this explanation works
for logical laws, then any other laws which constitute general truths about
everything should also be rationally indubitable, and yet they are not. One
can already see that the laws of arithmetic, on this view, should be binding
for thought in this way. Are they? A Fregean would say yes. Kant has
argued that mathematics is not analytic, such that one can coherently doubt
whether 7 + 5 = 12 even if one perfectly well understands the constituent
numbers and functions. I do not want to engage in this debate here. But
already this explanatory strategy appears to commit one to the rational
indubitability of arithmetical truths, where one may prefer to leave this
matter open.
More worrying is the possibility of general truths which directly quantify
over everything (i.e. they are not about everything in virtue of an interme-
diary such as numbers or propositions), or which are “about everything”
directly. E.g., Frege may have endorsed something like the following state-
ment:
Everything is either an object or a function.
There are other general statements that some philosophers have endorsed.
Everything is a property or some properties. (Bundle Theory)
Everything is a thinking substance. (Spinoza?)
Everything is perceptible. (Berkeley?)
Everything is an object. (Property Nominalism)
Everything is a part of a whole. (Unconstrained Merelogy)
Surely these are intended to be about all things? The bundle theorist doesn’t
allow for there being some bits and pieces which are genuine substances. The
suggestion is that many general statements in metaphysics are claimed to
be truths governing everything. Moreover, they are more obviously about
everything than the laws of logic and arithmetic, given that they quantify
directly over all things, not over an intermediary which in turn applies to
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all things. But, and here is the rub, surely we do not want to claim that
metaphysical truths are immune from rational doubt or rational rejection.
The very bread and butter of a discipline such as metaphysics is to continu-
ally question these kinds of statements, to consider them, to offer arguments
and justifications in favour of (or against) them.
Note also, any truth can be manipulated into a general truth which
quantifies over all things. E.g., everything is such that, if it is a glass of
water, then it is a glass of H2O. Or, everything is such that, if it is a plate
of chips, then there is a high probably that I will desire to eat it. There
is a sense in which these statements are about everything, but I hope it is
obvious that they are not rationally indubitable.
Recall, the brief was to provide an explanation of a particular phe-
nomenon, namely, the rational indubitability of some logical principles. In
offering the above explanation, one not only accounts for the logical laws,
but one gets any general truths about everything for free, be they laws
of arithmetic, or metaphysical truths, and so on. The explanation fails in
overstepping the brief, and ushering in new commitments to the rational
indubitability of principles that we would rather keep open to debate.
Another alternative explanation of the predicament might run as fol-
lows. Isn’t it because we want our thought to accord with how things are
absolutely necessarily? If thought aims at truth, then thought will aim at
being correct about how things are. In particular, thought will always count
as correct or incorrect according to how things are absolutely necessarily.
Supposing, e.g., that things are absolutely necessarily such that not every-
thing is true, then whatever the circumstances, one will count as thinking
correctly if one believes, or believes consistently with, the proposition that
not everything is true. Perhaps this explains why thinkers are always evalu-
able in light of certain principles—because thought aims at truth, and the
relevant principles are always true, no matter what. However, this fails as
an adequate explanation of the predicament, of why rational rejection of or
doubt about these principles is ruled out. An attempt to raise doubts con-
cerning, e.g., modus ponens does not break down simply because it is always
valid no matter what (or because a propositional rendering of it is always
true), rather, it is because it is an integral part of the very apparatus we
use to raise doubts about logical principles. Simply being true or valid no
matter what doesn’t seem to imply that a proposition or rule is part of this
minimal logical apparatus (although an implication may turn out to run in
the other direction).
One can raise a similar objection here to that directed towards the
Fregean view: it explains too much. An essentialist form of this expla-
nation will take metaphysical necessity to be (richly) absolute necessity (see
section 3.2.2). The problem is that there is even less chance of explaining
the logocentric predicament in terms of trying to accord with how things are
absolutely (metaphysically) necessarily, than there is in terms of trying to
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accord with how things are absolutely (logically) necessarily. The proposal
is to explain why the laws of logic are unconditionally binding for thought
in terms of thought aiming to be in accord with how things are absolutely
necessarily. This might have some sway when how things are absolutely
necessarily covers ground which is intuitively logically necessary. However,
it has no sway when we include (purported) metaphysical necessities, such
as that Socrates is a human, and not a boiled egg; or that Elizabeth II
has George VI for a father; or that water is H2O. There is no comparable
“predicament” which we get into when attempting to doubt the veracity of
these statements. Whether or not one agrees with Kripke’s arguments in
Naming and Necessity,33 he is not usually accused of tying himself in knots,
or attempting to justify something which is fundamentally built into the
apparatus of justification such that it makes no sense to attempt to justify
it. It makes perfect sense to give reasons, and to give arguments for and
against the truth of purported statements of metaphysical necessities. So
one cannot claim both that metaphysical necessity is absolute, and that the
logocentric predicament can be explained in terms of striving to think in
accordance with how things are absolutely necessarily.
3.5.3 Constitutive Norms for Thought
I argued above that we cannot understand the laws of logic as being literally
constitutive of thought, in the sense that it would be impossible to think
illogically, because we plainly do think illogically on frequent occasions. But
simply saying that the laws of logic are normative for thought is not prima
facie strong enough to (a) provide for an account of laws of logic as being
laws of thought, or (b) account for the logocentric predicament. Questions
that emerge out of the foregoing discussion are: why and how is our thought
bound in such a way? One answer is to say that these laws are constitutive of
thought, not in terms of being followed to the letter, but in terms of being
a standard of evaluation. That’s just what thought is: a mental activity
which is subject to rules of a peculiar kind. There are some normative
laws, evaluability in light of which is constitutive of thought. These are the
“laws of thought”. And the kind of principles that arise from considering
the predicament of being unable to step away from these norms look to be
familiar and basic logical principles. So we can take the laws of logic (or at
least the most basic laws of logic) to be the laws of thought: constitutive
norms for thought as such.
My argument for taking the laws of logic to be constitutive-normative
laws of thought is an argument to the best explanation. If we accept that
we are in a logocentric predicament, this means that it is impossible for us
to step out of our thought being evaluable in light of logical principles. A
33Kripke (1980)
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good explanation of this is that for one’s mental activity to be thinking just
is for it to be evaluable in light of certain norms. One can draw a contrast
with other mental activities and states which do not appear to be subject
to the same kinds of norms. E.g., we do not demand logical coherence from
our dreams, but dreaming is arguably some kind of mental activity.
One might still try to ask the following question: why are the laws
of logic unconditionally and intrinsically binding for human thought and
reasoning? This is what the Fregean explanation attempted: to provide a
deeper explanation of why the laws of logic are constitutive norms of thought
in terms of their being general truths and thought aiming at the truth. But
such an explanation allowed for too much. Is it enough to say that this is
just what the laws of logic are? Or does one require an explanation of why
this further fact is so? I am happy to let the buck stop here. The laws
of logic are constitutive norms for thought because that’s what thinking is,
to be evaluable in light of logical principles. If someone can offer a deeper
explanation for this connection between thought and logical laws, which
does not threaten the compatibility of the view with RM, then that would
be nice, if not strictly necessary. Even so, I will briefly sketch two potential
avenues for such an explanation.
One option for further explanation would be to expand upon the role of
the meaning of the logical constants as described in section 3.4.4. Suppose
our understanding of the logical constants consists at least in part in accep-
tance of certain rules of inference concerning those constants. Suppose also
that these logical constants, and our ability to understand and use them,
are a constitutive part of our ability to engage in certain activities such as
reasoning from suppositions. Then, it seems that our understanding of the
logical constants is required for us to be able to do this kind of thing, i.e.
do some reasoning. Given this account of what this understanding consists
in, this means that our ability to engage in the relevant activities depends
upon our acceptance of the relevant principles. So, we cannot rationally re-
ject these principles because to do so would be to lose the ability to engage
in rational argument at all.
A potentially problematic detail of this kind of further explanation con-
cerns the meaning of the logical constants. Suppose one takes their meaning
to be determined by a referent, e.g. the meaning of the word ‘and’ is de-
termined by the behaviour of the logical function conjunction to which the
word refers (in English). The account would therefore bottom out in the
behaviour of logical entities, which I have tried to avoid. The explanation of
the logocentric predicament is no longer that the laws of logic are consitutive
norms for thought. Rather, the laws of logic would concern the behaviour
of these logical entities, and the logocentric predicament would be explained
by our need to employ certain concepts, and those concepts being intimately
connected to these logical entities. Then again, an advocate of a laws-of-
thought account of logic is unlikely to also believe in the existence of logical
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entities such as conjunction. These two views together would threaten to
overdetermine logic—logic is both a matter of laws of thought and the na-
ture and behaviour of logical entities. I shall leave deeper assessment of this
option for elsewhere.
A more general answer plays on the idea that thought is a normative phe-
nomenon. Take the example of representational thought, e.g. thinking that
a is F . It makes sense to describe how this representation succeeds in being
“about” a in terms of norms and correctness: if the thought isn’t correct or
incorrect depending upon how things are with a, then it doesn’t make sense
to think of it as being about a. Through Kant’s work he makes an implicit
distinction between mere thought and cognition. Very briefly, cognitions are
objective representations which succeed in being about the world (through
adhering to certain constraints on possible experience). By contrast, mere
thoughts do not achieve objectivity: they are not properly about the world.
E.g., according to Kant, the thought that there is a vacuum contains a con-
cept, the concept of a vacuum, which, although non-contradictory, could
have no instance in the empirical world, so the thought falls short of objec-
tivity.
To cognize an object I must be able to prove its possibility, either
from its actuality as attested by experience, or a priori by means
of reason. But I can think whatever I please, provided only that
I do not contradict myself, that is, provided my concept is a
possible thought. This suffices for the possibility of the concept,
even though I may not be able to answer for there being, in
the sum of all possibilities, an object corresponding to it. But
something more is required before I can ascribe to such a concept
objective validity, that is, real possibility; the former possibility
is merely logical. (Kant, 1781, 1787, Bxxvi, footnote)
My suggestion is this. In the case of mere thought, we cannot make sense
of it as being a normative phenomenon in terms of norms arising from how
things are with what is represented, because mere thoughts do not succeed in
representing any object. We are left only with bare norms for how thoughts
should be put together and related to one another, i.e. logical principles.
This line of thought needs to be explored more thoroughly elsewhere. How-
ever, the suggestion to be kept in mind is that, allowing for thoughts which
fall short of representating the objective world, and taking a general view of
thought as a normative phenonemon, may give us the tools to give a more
satifying account of why logical laws are constitutive norms for thought.
3.5.4 Necessity, Truth and Opting Out
The alternative explanations, in terms of Frege on laws of truth, and how
things are absolutely necessarily, hint towards a significant challenge for the
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proposed view that logical necessity has its source in laws of logic understood
as constitutive-normative laws of thought. Logical necessity is typically
taken to imply truth, i.e.
p→ p
This is the T-axiom familiar from modal logic. One would expect any ac-
count of the source of logical necessity to be able to accommodate the validity
of this principle (or to have a very good reason why it should be rejected).
The alternative views look like they will be able to easily accommodate
the T-axiom. Consider Frege’s laws of truth: above all, these are them-
selves truths. How things are absolutely necessarily, is also understood to be
how things are. An essentialist account of logical necessity in terms of the
essences of logical objects also appears to include the truth of logical neces-
sities. Being essentially thus-and-so is simply a way of being thus-and-so.34
E.g., if it is necessary that conjunction can join two true propositions into
one, then this necessity purportedly has its source in conjunction essentially
being able to join two true propositions. But if conjunction is essentially
able to join two true propositions, it follows that conjunction is able to join
two true propositions. So if necessarily, conjunction is able to join two true
propositions, then conjunction is able to join two true propositions. Truth
has been implied by necessity.
By contrast, it is not clear how the proposed view, that laws of logic are
constitutive-normative laws of thought, can accommodate an implication
from logical necessity to truth. Just because a principle is an inescapable
standard of correctness for our thought, this does not immedately imply
anything about truth. But it seems that giving up the implication of truth
by logical necessity would be too bitter a pill to swallow.
It is worth emphasising how this issue and the logocentric predicament
pull in two directions. On the one hand, we want to explain why logical laws
are so intimately bound up with thought and our practices of reasoning and
justification. On the other hand, we want to maintain that basic principles
and statements arising from logic are, above all, true. A view which takes
laws of logic to be (constitutive-normative) laws of thought has a ready
answer to the first question, but has no immediate answer to the second.
Likewise, a view which takes laws of logic to be connected to something
external to thought may have it easier with the second question, but will
struggle with the first.
In particular, an essentialist account of logic and logical necessity, where-
by logical necessity has its source in the natures of logical objects, may
easily be able to account for logical truth, but it remains unclear how the
essential properties of a specific class of objects should have such a profound
and binding influence on human thought. The essentialist may reply that
thought aims at the truth, and so thought ought to conform itself to logical
34Whereas, e.g., being a toy X does not imply being an X.
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laws, as violating them is likely to lead one away from the truth. However,
this doesn’t explain why conformity to the principles arising from the nature
of logical entities is binding in a way that the principles arising from the
nature of other kinds of things is not. Take the class of all trees. If thought
aims at the truth, then thought ought to conform itself to the necessities
arising from the nature of all trees, because to violate these necessities would
lead one away from the truth. But necessary truths about trees are not
rationally indubitable. Perhaps it is part of the nature of a tree that it is not
sentient, but we can perfectly well enjoy and understand stories involving
talking, thinking trees. No other kinds of objects have this effect on our
thought (except perhaps mathematical objects) so why should logical objects
be any different? One familiar quibble with essentialist views concerns how
we might be said to have any epistemic access to the relevant essential
natures of things in order to have any knowledge of logic at all. The challenge
of the logocentric predicament is similar to this, but stronger. Not only
does the essentialist need to explain how we can have any knowledge of
the essential properties of logical objects, but he needs to explain how the
essential properties of logical objects provide an inescapable standard of
correctness for thought, and why the essential properties of these objects,
as opposed to other kinds of object, have such an effect.
The essentialist might argue that a proper account of logical necessity is
to be given in terms of the natures of logical concepts, a` la Fine.
The conceptual necessities can be taken to be the propositions
which are true in virtue of the nature of all concepts; the logical
necessities can be taken to be the propositions which are true
in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts. (Fine, 1994, pp.
9–10)
It seems far less mysterious how logic is binding and epistemically acces-
sible if we put things in terms of concepts. After all, we use concepts to
think. This is one way for the essentialist to go, but the view looks more
like a redescription of the proposed view in essentialist language, rather
than a genuine alternative. The most basic laws of thought might be un-
derstood to include rules for relating propositions to each other, and also
rules for use and application of concepts. Someone already working in an
essentialist framework might describe this in terms of laws or rules arising
from the essences of the concepts, especially the logical concepts. Some-
one with a different theoretical background might simply take these rules as
the building-blocks of thought themselves, without going on to reify these
rules as entities—concepts—which have essences. The resulting views are of
course different, with different commitments, but to choose between them it
looks like one will need reasons for choosing between the overall approaches.
E.g., one might favour the essentialist view because one already has reasons
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for believing that certain entities have essential natures, and that concepts
are the right kind of thing to have such a nature.
There seems to be a tension between the logocentric predicament and
necessity implying truth. Tie logical necessity too close to thought, and it
looks to be too far from mind-independent truth; tie logical necessity too
close to truth and mind-independent reality, and it remains obscure how it
can be binding on thought. This tension needs to be addressed by any view
of logical necessity.
A related worry has been introduced for a certain kind of account of
moral normativity. In brief, two issues are under consideration: (a) to what
moral standards are we subject, and (b) what makes moral standards bind-
ing for us, why ought we to conform? The hope is that a constitutive theory
can give us the answers. The idea is that the moral standard that one ought
to φ is binding for an agent because that one ought to φ arises out of consti-
tutive features of what it is to be an agent, or because φ-ing is constitutive
of being an agent. Issue (a) can be addressed by learning more about what
is constitutive of agency, and issue (b) can be addressed by noting the con-
stitutive tie. The moral norms that bind us do so because they are part of
what it is to be an agent.35
The intuitive idea can be put, I think, rather simply: In order to
know what it takes for a car to be a good car, we need to under-
stand what cars are, what their constitutive functions are, and so
on. A good car is just a car that is good as a car, good, that is,
in measuring up to the standards a commitment to which is built
into the very classification of an object as a car. Analogously,
then, perhaps in order to know which actions are good (or right,
or reason supported, or rational, or whatever), all we need is a
better understanding of what actions are, or perhaps of what it
is to be an agent, someone who performs actions. Perhaps the
normative standards relevant for actions will fall out of an under-
standing of what is constitutive of action just as the normative
standards relevant for cars fall out of an understanding of what
is constitutive of cars. (Enoch, 2006, p. 170)
The analogy with my proposed view of logical laws is striking. My question
(b) is: why are logical laws binding for our thought? The proposed answer
is: because that we ought to think that way is part of what it is to think. My
question (a) is: what are the most fundamental laws of logic? The proposed
answer is: those which we cannot rationally doubt, due to their being in
some sense constitutive of thought.
So what is the problem with this kind of view? At the heart of the
moral view is the idea that we want to explain why it is good to do some
35Examples of constitutive views include Korsgaard (1996, 2009); Rosati (2003).
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things, such that we ought to do them, and such that it is not an arbitrary
matter which things we ought to do. However, just because we find out that
performing some actions is in some sense constitutive of being an agent,
why does this take away the worry? Why shouldn’t we simply then worry
that the constitution of our agency is just as arbitrary as our non-essential
desires and actions?
Why does it matter, as far as the question of normative ar-
bitrariness is concerned, that some parts of [an autonomous
agent’s] psychology have this necessary-for-agency status? Why
shouldn’t our agent treat the motives and capacities constitutive
of agency as normatively arbitrary? Why shouldn’t she treat the
very fact that they are constitutive of agency as normatively ar-
bitrary? . . . What is it to her, so to speak, if some of her motives
and capacities enjoy such a status? (Enoch, 2006, p. 178)
A variant of the challenge is to ask: if this is what is constitutive of agency,
why should one be an agent? In response to Korsgaard’s view where self-
constitution is constitutive of agency, Enoch asks why the “agent” cannot
simply respond:
“. . . Perhaps I cannot be classified as an agent without aiming
to constitute myself. But why should I be an agent? Perhaps
I can’t act without aiming at self-constitution, but why should
I act? If your reasoning works, this just shows that I don’t
care about agency and action. I am perfectly happy being a
shmagent—a nonagent who is very similar to agents but who
lacks the aim (constitutive of agency but not of shmagency) of
self-constitution. I am perfectly happy performing shmactions—
nonaction events that are very similar to actions but that lack
the aim (constitutive of actions but not of shmactions) of self-
constitution.” (Enoch, 2006, p. 179)
Not only do these views appear to fail in rendering moral norms non-
arbitrary, but it seems that we are now able to opt out of the norms simply
by saying we are not agents, but rather something similar which lacks the
relevant constitutive nature.
The threat to my proposed view is likewise twofold. First, just as we
want our moral norms to guide us to the good, so we want our logical laws
to guide us to the truth.36 However, just as being constitutive of agency
doesn’t adequately explain how moral norms can be non-arbitrary and aim
at the good, so being constitutive of thinking does not adequately explain
how normative logical laws can be non-arbitrary and aim at the truth. Not
only is there the simple problem sketched above that if we understand logical
36We want them to be true and/or truth-preserving.
128
laws in a normative way we cannot expect the resulting logical necessities
to imply truth, but there is also the worry that the constitutive element of
the view is equally undermining. Second, just as we require a reason to
be an agent rather than a schmagent, so it seems we need to explain why
we should be thinkers—subject to evaluation in light of the laws of logic—
rather than schminkers, non-thinkers who are similar to thinkers but lack
the constitutive feature of being evaluable in light of logical laws.
These are deep problems spanning across a wide range of debates, so I
do not expect to be able to solve everything quickly here. But I will sketch
what I take to be a promising line of defence. First, how should we address
the charge that we can opt out of being thinkers? What reason have we
to be thinkers rather than schminkers? There are two issues here: (1) is it
genuinely possible for us to opt out of thinking in this way, and (2) if so,
what reason do we have for not thus opting out?37
So, can we opt to be schminkers rather than thinkers? A simple answer is
to point back to the arguments for there being rationally indubitable logical
principles in section 3.4. Surely, if these arguments are successful in showing
anything, they show that we are unable to shed these principles as standards
for any rational mental activity in which we engage. So, it looks like we can’t
in fact choose to be schminkers, understood as non-thinkers who are very
similar to thinkers except for not being evaluable in light of logical laws.
Even so, this assumes that we have a reason to engage in rational mental
activity: I have not been concerned with the kind of doubt which refuses to
“see reason”, which is just stubborn foot-stamping.
I think we cannot give up evaluability in light of logical laws, and hence
choose schminking over thinking, on pain of losing out on too much. Under
such conditions, schminking would hardly be similar to thinking insofar as
it would be radically irrational. This is brought out in Hanna’s response to
a radical rejection of logic, which he calls “white-queenism”.
By the notion of white-queenism, then, I mean the radical skep-
tical attempt sincerely and self-consciously to reject logic com-
pletely. I will consider two versions of white-queenism: (1) clas-
sical or Cartesian white-queenism, and (2) postmodern or Niet-
zschean white-queenism. (Hanna, 2006, p. 224)
Cartesian white-queenism is connected to doubt about logical principles and
truths.
The Cartesian skeptic I have in mind is one who goes slightly
beyond Descartes’s own application of his skeptical method and
37Enoch points out that needing a reason to be an agent, rather than a schmagent,
undermines a naturalist project of reducing norms for action down to constitutive facts
about agents. My project does not include such a reductive claim—it bottoms out in
a certain kind of norm for thought—so I am not going to address this worry for the
naturalist.
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proposes explicitly to doubt every logical truth, law, deduction,
notion, and principle whatsoever: a skeptic, in short, who pro-
poses explicitly to doubt whatever logical apparatus is presup-
posed by and implemented in any and every argument or belief,
including the cogito. (Hanna, 2006, p. 225)
This kind of white-queenism is quickly despatched, given that its proponents
rely on an underlying logic.
Any explicit doubt about logic already presupposes and uses the
skeptic’s own logic of thought, at the very least. But every logic
of thought is a logical system of some sort. Therefore all ultra-
Cartesian or Peircean doubts about logic are self-refuting. The
logocentric predicament strikes again. (Hanna, 2006, p. 226)
This kind of skeptical doubt perhaps invites justification of logical princi-
ples in response, but we saw above how this kind of doubt and hence any
justification is inappropriate. One can therefore also dismiss this kind of
skepticism as not fully rejecting logic.
More interesting is the second kind of white-queenism. Hanna likens the
view to Nietzschean skeptism about morality. This skeptic does not simply
claim that things we thought were good are in fact evil, or that evil things
are in fact good. Rather, this skeptic opts out of morality altogether: there
is no good and evil. (Note the similarity here to opting out of being an agent
altogether.)
The Carnapian-Nietzschean or neo-Nietzschean skeptic becomes
a logic skeptic not by explicitly doubting logic, but instead by
simply opting out of the social construct that constitutes the will
to truth: that is, by deciding to liberate herself from logic, and
by undertaking to live a form of human life that expresses a total
lack of concern for logic. (Hanna, 2006, p. 227)
I have argued that being subject to some logical principles is inescapable
for human thought, but these arguments all used reasoning in some way
or another. Why couldn’t we just side-step the issue completely? Rather
than arguing one way or the other about whether certain logical principles
are rationally indubitable or similar, one might set it all to one side and
determine to go on subject to evaluation by no logical principles whatsoever.
Hanna’s response is to try to imagine “a community of fully logic-liber-
ated people”. His conclusion is that, even if this rejection of logic is possible,
it would result in giving up the ability to have beliefs, to give reasons for
action, to act on desires and so on. Humans would act blindly and have
unreflective mental attitudes, with no systematic connection between actions
and mental attitudes, and between different attitudes.
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Inconsistency and fallacy would be endemic, entrenched among
them. Neither truth nor truthfulness would mean anything to
them, or untruth or untruthfulness for that matter. They could
not have beliefs, but instead only unreflective attitudes. They
could not give reasons for anything, hence could not justify any-
thing, hence would be without cognitive or practical norms of any
kind. Without cognitive or practical norms, their emotional and
volitional states would be without internal constraint or struc-
ture and utterly wanton, without any reasons for caring one way
or the other about their direct or “first-order” desires or prefer-
ences. (2006, p. 229)
This seems right. Judgment, inference, reasoning, giving reasons for
beliefs and actions, acting on the basis of beliefs and desires, an interest in
truth, and much more besides requires some logical standards of correctness.
Perhaps one can indeed reject logic wholesale, but all the rest would go
with it. So far I have been understanding thought as simply as possible,
with the most basic kind of thought being just entertaining a proposition.
Perhaps, even if judgment, inference, reasoning and reasons were abandoned,
we could still do this. However, it can be argued that the ability even to
entertain a proposition involves these kinds of abilities. Different broad
lines of thought might be used to come to this conclusion. Some thinkers
have argued that grasp of concepts and the propositions they go to form
requires some inferential abilities. E.g., Baldwin (2002) and Brandom (1998,
2008) offer arguments for the view that concept acquisition and deployment
involves inferential and modalizing abilities. Alternatively, one might hold a
Davidsonian theory of meaning in terms of the truth-conditions of sentences.
A community which rejected any interest in a notion of truth would be
unable to understand propositions the meaning of which was constituted by
the conditions under which they are true. Even a use-theory of meaning
brings in the notion of correct and incorrect use of expressions. So the
logical nihilist would be taken to be rejecting even the most minimal level
of thought—entertaining of a propositional content—from many established
philosophical standpoints.
I think this line of thought goes a long way to showing that we should
be thinkers, not schminkers: we shouldn’t give up logical laws, and mental
activity evaluable in light of those laws is thinking, not schminking. How-
ever, the non-arbitrariness problem remains: even if we can’t opt out of
thinking, how can we be assured that the logical principles evaluability in
light of which is constitutive of thinking will lead us to the truth?
One might attempt to tell a story about the evolution of our reasoning
practices. The idea here would be to point out that, as any other kind of
animal, the particular skills of human beings (and like-minded creatures)
must have evolved. That would mean that they must be useful for survival
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in some way. When it comes to propositions that we can’t help but pre-
suppose, one might presume that these presuppositions would only survive
if they were true. Otherwise, inevitably creatures would run up against
difficulties when they are proven to be false. The creatures with the true
presuppositions might be expected to do better overall. That said, it might
be sufficient for survival if the presuppositions are almost always true. E.g.,
if there were only a very few cases of modus ponens failing, but in the large
it gives creatures an advantage, then it might still be selected for.
A natural move to make, given the Kantian background of this view of
logic, is the move from acknowledging that we can’t help but experience the
world a certain way, to concluding that those features are thereby genuine
features of the world we experience (see sections 4.1 and 5.2). Kant drew
a distinction between real and logical modality (see section 4.4). In order
for a thought to have “objective validity”—to count as saying something
true or false about the world—it must conform to conditions on possible
experience, it must at least be really possible. A proposition might be per-
fectly well thinkable, and hence logically possible, but it may nevertheless
fail to be really possible, in which case it will lack objective validity, and
will not be rightly evaluable for truth. This view is explored in more detail
in sections 4.4 and 5.2.3. However, the point to be highlighted here is that
the conditions on possible experience, with which a thought must be com-
patible in order to be objectively valid, are taken to correspond to genuine
features in the world, and hence to correspond to truths. E.g., if a condi-
tion of possible experience is that every object be spatiotemporal, then it is
thereby true that every object is spatiotemporal. What it is important to
note here is that these conditions on possible experience provide additional
constraints to those on being a bona fide thought in the first place. As well
as meeting certain logical criteria, which make a thought logically possible,
it must meet additional criteria to count as objectively valid. Now, these
logical criteria, in being part of conditions on having an objectively valid
thought, in virtue of being part of conditions on having a thought at all,
will be subject to the same move. It looks like we can be assured that those
logical principles, evaluability in light of which is constitutive of thought,
will thereby be genuine features of the world, and therefore true.38
38If successful, this strategy will ensure that logical necessity implies truth, without
allowing mere logical possibility to have any “metaphysical significance”: objectively valid
thoughts must conform to logical principles as well as conditions on possible experience,
but conformity to logic alone is insufficient for a thought to have an object in the world.
See section 5.2.3.
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3.5.5 Different Logics
There are many well-established logical systems which differ on key princi-
ples and definitions, and on what counts as a deductively valid argument.39
I have argued that logical necessity is the kind of necessity attaching to a
deductively valid inference, and that the source of logical necessity is to be
found in an account of logic, for which the notion of a deductively valid
argument is a, perhaps the, key component. The account of logic, in turn,
is premised on the view that some logical principles are immune to ratio-
nal doubt or rejection. However, an obvious challenge here is to point out
that there are many different logics on the market, all seemingly legitmate,
which agree on hardly any logical principles at all. Doesn’t the conclusion
that some basic laws of logic are rationally indubitable fly in the face of
actual logical practice?
Furthermore, I have argued that the best explanation of this phenomenon
is that the laws of logic are constitutive-normative laws of thought: evalu-
ability in light of these basic logical laws is just what it is to think. But
this threatens to clash with the multiplicity of logics. Do intuitionist and
classical logicians have fundamentally different laws of thought, such that
the intuitionist is thinkingI when the classicist is thinkingC? If Graham
Priest converts me to think that dialetheic logic is the One True Logic, do
I change the constitutive-normative laws of my thought, and hence engage
in a different kind of mental activity, say thoughtD, to what I was doing
before? Presumably not. In which case, a story needs to be told about how
an account of logic in terms of constitutive-normative laws of thought can
accommodate the apparant plurality of different logics.
Hanna (2006) discusses what he calls the e pluribus unum problem, the
“out of many one” problem.
Logic . . . is the science of the necessary relation of consequence.
But there are many different and seemingly incomensurable log-
ical systems. So one outstanding philosophical problem about
the nature of logic is how to preserve the unity of logic while ac-
cepting the manifest multiplicity of logical systems distinct from
classical or elementary logic. This is what I call the e pluribus
unum (“out of many, one”) problem. (Hanna, 2006, p. 29)
39Haack (1974) distinguishes between classical or elementary logics, extensions of el-
ementary logic, and deviant logics. Hanna summarizes: ‘extensions of elementary logic
introduce nontrivial changes . . . that preserve all the logical constants, valid sentences,
theorems, valid inferences, and laws of elementary logic. By contrast, deviants of elemen-
tary logic introduce nontrivial changes that do not preserve all the classical or elementary
logical constants, valid sentences, theorems, valid inferences, and laws’ (2006, p. 40).
Examples of extensions of elementary logic are classical second order logic, and classical
modal logics. Examples of deviant logics include relevant logic, intuitionistic logic, and
paraconsistent and dialetheic logics.
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Hanna is concerned with preserving a certain unity of logic in the face of
many logics. Insofar as he wants to accommodate some kind of unique core
to logic, this is similar to my need to accommodate a class of universal,
privileged logical principles. He lists three standard responses the problem,
and then goes on to defend his own, fourth, option. The standard three
moves are:
1. Diehard classicism: maintain that classical/elementary logic is the
One True Logic, and dismiss other “logics” as not being genuine logics.
2. Diehard nonclassicism: maintain that some nonclassical logic is the
One True Logic, and dismiss other “logics” as not being genuine logics.
3. Unconstrained pluralism: deny that there is any One True Logic and
claim that all logics are equally acceptable.
(See Hanna (2006, p. 41).)
Hanna’s proposed solution is to introduce the notion of a “protologic”.
The idea is to have a universal set of principles, shared by all thinkers,
which provide a schema for building up a logical system. Hanna likens
his protologic to Chomsky’s notion of a universal grammar. The proposed
advantage is that the protological principles can be genuinely binding on
thought, accounting for the unity of logic, whilst the logics produced by
employing these protological principles may vary widely. To discuss Hanna’s
proposal in detail would take a lot of time and space: too much, given that it
is unlikely to solve the particular problems faced by my proposed view here.
In short, Hanna’s strategy seems to be to find a set of underlying principles
which may genuinely be shared by all logics. First, these principles, in
order to be so shared, will have to be extremely weak, so it is not clear that
any useful notion of logical necessity could be yielded from them. Second,
some of the principles I have argued may be rationally indubitable would
be too strong to be included in this protologic, e.g., modus ponens is not
straightforwardly valid in some relevant logics.40 So I will need a different
strategy to defend the rational indubitability of principles such as modus
ponens in any case.
To hold (3) prima facie looks like it would involve abandoning the laws of
thought view of logic. If different logics are equally acceptable, and if logical
laws are constitutive-normative laws of thought, then different logics will be
associated with different kinds of thought. But it does not seem plausible
to suppose that advocates of different logics genuinely have different kinds
of thought.
One alternative response is to reject the false dichotomy in options (1)–
(3) between “diehard” and “unconstrained” responses. One might want to
40Some relevant logics reject the disjunctive syllogism rule: P ∨Q;¬P ` Q, and take it
to be equivalent to modus ponens: P ;¬P ∨Q ` Q
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rule out some logics as genuine logics. One neither endorses only one partic-
ular logic, as many are deemed acceptable, nor is one totally unconstrained,
as some logics may be ruled out if they violate the minimal principles. The
“genuine” logics share a core of rationally indubitable logical principles, but
may differ on less fundamental logical principles. However, the problem
with this strategy concerns what to say about these non-core principles.
Are they logically necessary? Surely we want to say yes. But then they
must either be rationally indubitable—of the most basic logical principles—
or follow logically from the most basic logical principles. We already know
the non-core principles are not basic, so they must follow from the basic
principles. But then, there is going to be a unique set of (non-basic) logical
principles logically determined by the basic principles. If we are to account
for non-basic principles being genuinely logically necessary, we cannot sus-
tain a view whereby there are several genuine logics sharing a core set of
logical principles, but differing in their non-basic principles (such that the
non-basic principles of the different logics are logically incompatible).
After all, we have to hold that there is one privileged logic, and hence we
have to endorse either (1) or (2). Exactly which logic will turn out to be the
One True Logic will depend upon further work, similar to that in sections
3.4.2, 3.4.3 and 3.4.4, to highlight further rationally indubitable principles
and thereby to discover what all the basic logical principles are. That is a
task for another time.
This will be an unwelcome conclusion for advocates of the logical systems
which will ultimately be rejected, but there are various ways to sweeten the
pill. One possibility to is draw a distinction between a logic qua formal
mathematical system, and a logic qua having some possible application as a
system of human reasoning. In many cases the two will overlap. But a formal
system may be designed which loses all touch with reasoning. Mathematical
logical systems may have other interesting properties and applications, but
given that the very idea of logic has come out of the study of reasoning
and valid forms thereof, we might retain the idea that the study of logic
and logical necessity should maintain a link to a logical system being at
least in principle useable as a system of reasoning. Systems falling short
may be mathematically interesting, but are not relevant for the purposes of
philosophical logic.
Another option might be to introduce considerations to do with the
meaning and understanding of logical constants. E.g., consider a logic which
rejects modus ponens, but which claims to still contain a conditional. I
think it is open to argue that, if a logical connective doesn’t behave so
as to validate at least simple instances of modus ponens, then it doesn’t
count as a conditional. After all, what does it even mean to assert that if
p, then q, if this doesn’t mean that whenever you’ve got 〈p〉, you’ve also
got 〈q〉? If your conditional is more complex than this, such that modus
ponens is not sufficient for conditional-elimination, at least it is necessary.
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However, if a logic claimed to contain a conditional which did not conform
to modus ponens at all, then rather than say this is not a “proper logic”,
one could say that the logic is misdescribed: it contains a logical constant or
connective with various properties, but that constant should not be counted
as a conditional.
I noted above that Relevant logic does not straightforwardly validate
modus ponens. Will this cause trouble for treating non-alethic modalities
as relative, as discussed in section 1.2? Hopefully not. Hale avoided having
to deal with McGee’s counterexamples by noting that acceptance of simple
cases of modus ponens would be sufficient to constitute understanding of the
conditional. Likewise, one could argue that acceptance of simple relevant
cases would be sufficient for understanding, i.e. cases where the premises
are relevant to the conclusion, in a way to be specified by a precise Relevant
logic.
3.5.6 The Essence of Thought?
I will consider one final objection that the essentialist might make to this
line of thought. In invoking constitutive-normative laws of thought, which I
claim tell us about what thought is, aren’t I thereby invoking the essence of
thought? Hence, the account rests at bottom on the essence of some thing,
thought, which in turn provides the source of de re metaphysical necessities
about thought, from which, on this account, logical necessities then arise.
So the account of logical necessity is not after all immune to the main es-
sentialist challenge, which was to find an account of logical necessity which
can underwrite an account of metaphysical necessity as merely relative.
How can RM respond? First, it is assumed that essence is an appropriate
notion when extended beyond a certain domain of entities (objects, natural
kinds, etc.). Thought looks like a mental activity, likewise inference and
judgment. Perhaps belief is rather a mental state. Even if one finds the idea
that some entities (including abstract objects) have essential and accidental
properties compelling, it is less clear that the same can be said of activities
and states. The question of the identity of an object is different to the
question of when one counts as doing something. The first might lead us
to posit properties the object has which determine its identity. At most,
the second might lead us to posit certain conditions to be fulfilled (e.g. one
cannot count as buttering bread if one has no butter), but prima facie, it is
not clear if this is the right kind of “thing” to bear essential properties.
In support of this reponse, note that many presentations of essentialism
are biased towards a notion of essence which applies to objects, and not ob-
viously to anything else. An extreme example of this can be found in Paul
(2006). Simplifying a lot, Paul presents an account of essence by which ob-
jects are reduced to sums of properties (a bundle theory of objects), where
those properties include relational properties concerning how the object is
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de re represented. An essential property F of an object O is a part of O
where O does not also have as a part the de re representational property of
being representated as not-F . Paul includes the bundle theory element into
her account in order to avoid making a mistake she views Lewis as having
made, which she believes will lead one to hold the wrong kind of essentialist
view (see in particular Paul (2006, section 4)). Paul’s essentialism is clearly
centred on the idea of an object having essential and accidental properties,
where this is explained in terms of objects being mereological wholes com-
posed of properties and the relations that hold between those properties. In
order to accommodate any notion of essence of anything else, such as activi-
ties or properties, one would need to fill out the metaphysics of these things
within Paul’s account, and see if any similar notion of essence is applicable.
To straightforwardly extend the account, one would need something like
a bundle theory of properties. But then, what are properties bundles of?
More properties? And what are they, if not bundles of further properties?
The account is best limited to objects being the only kinds of things which
have essences.
Other views are not so explicitly committed to a peculiarly object-
centred notion of essence, but their presentation appears to lean in that
direction. E.g., in “Senses of Essence”, Fine introduces the notion of essence
thus:
One may distinguish between the essential and accidental prop-
erties of an object. A property of an object is essential if it must
have the property to be what it is; otherwise the property is
accidental. (Fine, 1995, p. 53, my emphasis)
Likewise, in “Essence and Modality”, when he introduces the idea of essence
as real definition, this is again in terms of objects.
It has been supposed that the notion of definition has application
to both words and objects—that just as we may define a word,
or say what it means, so we may define an object, or say what it
is. The concept of essence has then taken to reside in the “real”
or objectual cases of definition, as opposed to the “nominal” or
verbal cases. (Fine, 1994, p. 2, my emphasis)
One may of course read Fine as using the word “object” with its most per-
missive reading, such that it will cover anything the essentialist might care
to consider. However, the examples used centre on substantial concrete ob-
jects, abstract objects, and kinds. E.g., in Fine (1994) his examples include
Socrates, {Socrates}, the Eiffel Tower, Socrates’s parents, the number 2,
{2}, and objects that are persons, bodies and minds. He also considers the
essences of concepts, understood as a kind of entity. There are no exam-
ples of how to extend the account to activities and practices. E.g., work
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needs to be done to show that there are “objects”, in a permissive sense,
corresponding to activities and practices.
One might find it perfectly plausible that, just as objects have properties,
and some of those properties count as essential, so other entities such as
properties themselves, relations, functions and so on, also have properties,
some of which are essential to the entity. In the case of thought, presumably
the idea would be that thinking, construed as a property of an object (e.g.
Jane is thinking), has some properties itself, some of which are essential.
On this kind of view, the essence of entities such as properties is modelled
on the essence of objects.
Correia (2006) argues that this approach to understanding what he calls
generic essence in terms of objectual essence is misguided. Generic essence is
essence associated with predicate expressions, and questions such as ‘What is
it to F?’. Objectual essence is essence associated with objectual expressions,
and questions such as ‘What is a?’. The formulation targeted by Correia
gives an account of generic essence in terms of the objectual essence of a
property.
(g4) It is true in virtue of what the property of F -ing is that F s
G.
(See Correia (2006, p. 760).) Correia raises three objections to this kind
of treatment: commitment to properties, availability and depen-
dency.
The first objection is that such a view commits one to the existence
of properties: (g4) explicitly draws on the idea that there is a property,
F -ing, to go with every predicate, F . Even if one is happy to admit the
existence of properties, one might still agree that one should be able to
express statements of essence without being forced to make this admission.
Statements of forms such as, ‘An F essentially Gs’, ‘F s essentially G’ and,
‘It is true in virtue of what it is to F that p’ do not prima facie contain any
commitment to the existence of properties, whereas (g4) does.
[F]riends of the property account have to say that despite ap-
pearances, generic essentialist statements do carry commitments
to properties. And this, I think, is a view that should be resisted
as far as possible. (Correia, 2006, p. 761)
Commitment to the existence of properties is not uncontroversially carried
by a statement of generic essence. One must beware giving an account of
these statements which smuggles in extra commitments.
The second objection points out that there will not be a property avail-
able for every predicate.
Another, more radical problem, is that some predicates can-
not possibly express properties, while there are corresponding
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true generic statements. Consider for instance the predicate
‘is a non-self-exemplifying property’. There cannot be such a
thing as the property of being a non-self-exemplifying property.
For if the property in question existed, it would be the case
that it exemplifies itself iff it does not. Now arguably, a non-
self-exemplifying property, as such, is essentially many things:
non-self-exemplifying, a property, an abstract object, a non-self-
exemplifying property, etc. (Correia, 2006, p. 761–2)
This causes problems for an account which seeks to treat all statements of
generic essence in terms of the essences of properties. However, this is not
a direct problem for the “essence of thought” view. Presumably, there is no
comparable problem for assuming the availability of a property of thinking.
The problem only arises if treating some generic essence statements in this
way commits one to treating them this way across the board.41 Note also
that there are other ways out of this problem. E.g., one might introduce
some kind of type-theory, such that predicates and properties are of a certain
level, and may not apply at or above that level. The property of being a non-
self-exemplifying property may be a perfectly good property of level n, such
that it can only apply to entities of level n−1 and below. It would not make
sense to consider whether this property exemplifies itself—it simply doesn’t
apply at level n. So the inconsistency of the property is avoided, but it can
still exist and have essential properties, such as being a property. Again,
there is a way out, but one can see that considerable extra commitments are
involved.
Finally, Correia raises the worry that, on this kind of view, in some
cases objects will turn out to be ontologically dependent upon their essential
properties in a way that we would not expect them to be.
Consider the following thesis:
(M) It is true in virtue of what the property of being
a man is that every man exemplifies it.
It seems that the following general transitivity principle is cor-
rect:
(T) If a is essentially an F , and if an F , as such, es-
sentially Gs, then a essentially Gs.
If we accept that (g4) entails (g) [An F , as such, essentially Gs],
from (M) and (T) we get the conclusion that:
(C) If a is essentially a man, then a essentially exem-
plifies the property of being a man.
41Correia considers, and rejects, a strategy of restricting the account to generic state-
ments which are not analytic. See Correia (2006, p. 762).
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But consider Socrates. He is essentially a man—or so we may
suppose. By (C), it is part of the nature of Socrates that he bears
a certain relation, namely exemplification, to a given entity, to
wit the property of being a man. It then follows that Socrates is
ontologically dependent upon the property, that Socrates’ iden-
tity depends upon the property’s identity. But surely even under
the assumption that both (M) and (T) are true, this may be de-
nied: it is possible to maintain that Socrates is ontologically in-
dependent from the property of being a man, and more generally
from any property whatsoever. Correia (2006, p. 762–3)
Given some plausible principles, (M) and (T), we end up with the metaphys-
ically robust conclusion that Socrates is ontologically dependent upon the
property of being a man. If Socrates is essentially a man, he does plausibly
bear an important relation to the property of being a man: he will bear
the property in all worlds where both he and it exist. However, one might
want to allow that Socrates is still a man in worlds where there are no prop-
erties.42 Correia’s point is that acceding to the generic essence statement
that Socrates is essentially a man, and the principles (M) and (T), should
not thereby commit one to the robust thesis that Socrates is ontologically
dependent upon the property of being a man. That should not simply fall
out of the essence claim, but should require some extra, explicit philosoph-
ical commitments, such as a commitment to the (necessary) existence of
properties.
In short, Correia raises some serious questions for how we are to under-
stand generic essence, i.e. matters concerning the essence of F -ing, being F ,
or being an F . The initial suggestion of simply treating them analogously to
the essence of objects, by reifying entities such as properties and relations,
is not straightforward after all.
Correia’s response is to conclude that we should not reduce generic
essence to a special case of objectual essence. Rather, we should either
carry on with two primitive notions of essence, generic and objectual, or
effect the opposite reduction, of objectual essence to generic essence, via the
introduction of individual properties, i.e. haecceities, for objects.
Some might wish to supplement the [GO-]view with a thesis
which has the effect of simplifying the account of metaphysical
necessity—a thesis I myself find appealing. The thesis is that to
be true in virtue of what some given objects are is to be true
in virtue of “what it is to be these objects”. (Correia, 2006, p.
764)
This seems a reasonable move, but it leaves us with a bare notion of generic
essence. In terms of getting a grip on the notion of essence, it seems rela-
42Perhaps nominalism is contingently true.
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tively plausible that an object has some properties, and that some of those
properties might be more important than others. However, this kind of loose
way in to understanding essence isn’t as straightforward for generic essence,
especially if it is not legitimate to treat it analogously to objectual essence.
In summary, where RM may argue that essence is a notion applicable
only to objects, and not to the activity of thinking, the essentialist can retort
that this is a case of the essence of an entity: the property of thinking.
Correia has raised some challenges for this response, but suggests that we
adopt a notion of generic, as opposed to objectual, essence, which naturally
accommodates properties as having essence. However, this notion of generic
essence is less intuitive, and more needs to be said to flesh-out the notion.
We are left wondering if there is such a thing as the essence of thought.
Another response which is open to RM is leave alone the claim that
thought has an essence, but deny that this is problematic. At its most min-
imal, all that is meant by “essence” is what something is, and the ‘thing’
in ‘something’ is not taken seriously, but can include activities, properties,
and so forth. I have offered an account of what is to think, and so arguably
I have offered an account of the essence of thinking, in this minimal sense.
However, this does not mean that I have to accept an essentialist account of
necessity and possibility. The essentialist claims that what is metaphysically
possible for something x is determined by the essence of x, such that there is
no metaphysical possibility where x loses an essential property. I will argue
in Chapter 5 that what is metaphysically possible for something x is what-
ever is compatible with conditions on experience. Now, it may be that some
essentialist principles turn out to be included in or entailed by conditions
on experience, but this would not be an essentialist account of necessity—
the essentialist principles would be hostage to conditions on experience. In
other words, the identity of things might be relevant to metaphysical modal-
ity, but it is not the be-all and end-all of metaphysical modality, because it
is not all there is to conditions on experience.
To properly consider what is the most viable account of the notion of
essence, and whether it encompasses activities and so on, is a task for an-
other day. What I want to conclude here is that it is not clear how far the
going accounts of essence can be stretched. Some accounts, such as Paul
(2006), appear to rule out even properties from having essences. Others,
such as Fine’s account, just don’t say enough about the intended extent of
the account, although further work may tell us more. Correia (2006) has
been concerned with the best way to formulate claims about the essence
of anything expressed by a predicate, but being able to express a view is
one thing, endorsing it another. There is more work to be done to make
a case for my account of constitutive norms for thought boiling down to
an account of the essence of thought. Furthermore, even if my account of
logical necessity is after all correctly construed as an account of the essence
of thought, there is still scope to reject an essentialist account of the link
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between essence and metaphysical necessity. Hence, the essence of thought
would pose no threat to RM. For now, then, I will leave this worry to one
side.
3.5.7 The Stream of Consciousness
The proposal that logic provides constitutive norms for thought raises the
question of what to say about cases which we might intuitively class as
thought, but which are not properly logically evaluable. E.g., what about
the stream of consciousness, composed of “snatches of thought”? Thus far
I have employed a working notion of thought as minimally entertaining
propositions. A thought can be this minimal, although it can be more.
However, a stream of consciousness may be made up of “thoughts” which
do not even involve something as well-formed as a proposition.
In response, one can claim that the scope of my account only covers
thoughts which fulfil the minimal condition of entertaining of a proposition.
There may be other interesting mental activities and practices in the vicinity,
but these are not taken into account here. Propositional thought is still
something we engage in. As such, an account of this in terms of constitutive-
norms, and an account of logical necessity as having its source in these
constitutive norms, still has a place. To accommodate the worry by making
the notion of thought in play even more minimal would be a step too far.
E.g., it would make no sense to develop an account of logical laws out of
an account of an activity which doesn’t obviously have a relation to logic.
If thought were taken to include streams of consciousness, then the most
minimal cases of thought arguably would not be logically evaluable.
3.6 A Logical Basis for Relative Modality
In this chapter I have attempted to give an account of logical necessity
which can underwrite RM. First, I explored what logical necessity is, and
concluded along with McFetridge and Rumfitt that any kind of necessity
which deserves the title “logical” should be that kind of necessity which is
attached to a deductively valid argument. As such, the source of logical
necessity will amount to the source of the logical laws governing deductively
valid argument. I have gone on to develop and defend a view of the laws of
logic as constitutuve-normative laws of thought. The primary motivation for
taking this view comes from a “logocentric predicament”. Any account of
the nature of logical laws needs to take note of the inescapability or rational
indubitability of logical principles. The view that what it is to think just is
to engage in a mental activity which is evaluable in light of certain principles
explains why we can’t shake off logic, although we can nevertheless make
logical mistakes. Finally, I have considered some objections to and challenges
for the proposed view.
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The resulting picture is that there are norms for thought, evaluability in
light of which is constitutive of a mental activity being thought or reasoning.
These norms are the basic, most fundamental laws of logic. Logical laws, in
turn, provide a foundation for the notion of logical necessity which attaches
to a deductively valid argument or to logical consequence. Other kinds of
necessity can then be defined in terms of logically necessary conditionals,
with variously different antecedents, in line with the relative modality view.
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Chapter 4
Kant and Modality
In this chapter, I examine the work of Immanuel Kant to draw out his views
on modality. I argue that a plausible interpretation is to take him to be
endorsing a kind of relative modality view (RM). I discuss this aspect of his
views on modality, as well as other important features such as his classifica-
tion of modal concepts as mere logical (as opposed to real) predicates, his
rejection of necessary existence, and the distinction between real and logical
possibility. The purpose of this discussion is not merely to show that RM
has a history. Rather, having given an exposition of what I take to be Kant’s
relative view of real modality, I will take this as a guide to developing my
own relative account of metaphysical modality in Chapter 5.
The plan is as follows. To begin, I present an overview of the key ideas
involved in Kant’s views about modality. With that in place, I look at
what he says in the Postulates of Empirical Thought about the possibility,
actuality and necessity of things. I then take a closer look at some of the
particular theses arising and particular features of the view. I then look at
the distinction between real and logical modality. To close, I consider the
implications for abstract and mathematical objects.
4.1 Kant and Modality: An Overview
4.1.1 The Tables of Judgments and Categories
In Kant’s major critical work, The Critique of Pure Reason1, explicit at-
tention to modality occurs chiefly in the context of the Table of Judgments
and the Table of Categories. The modality of a judgment concerns a fea-
ture of the making of a particular judgment, irrespective of content. By
contrast, the modal categories are concepts one of which must be applied in
any cognition of an object, i.e. they feature in the content of a judgment.
1Kant (1781, 1787). In the following, where this work is referenced, I will cite only the
standard A/B paragraph numbers.
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The table of judgments lays out the different forms a judgment may
take. More specifically, it lays out the different functions which act to unify
representations (concepts, intuitions, and other judgments) into judgments.
For Kant a judgment is ‘the mediate cognition2 of an object’ (A68/B93).
A judgment is a cognition, eine Erkenntnis. The contemporary German
word ‘Erkenntnis’ can mean something like an instance of coming to know
and hence, as a term relating to knowledge, is factive. However, the use of
the term in Kant’s time commonly meant something weaker: to represent
or conceive of something.3 Furthermore, Kant himself wrote about false
Erkenntnisse (A58–9/B83–4), showing that he cannot have meant a factive
notion such as ‘knowledge’. So a judgment is a representation of some kind.
It is mediate, meaning that it represents more immediate representations
(concepts and intuitions) as being some way, i.e. as being connected accord-
ing to the forms of judgment. E.g., the judgment that all dogs are animals
represents the concepts of dog and animal as being universally, affirmatively
and categorically related, and thereby mediately represents whatever it is
that those concepts more directly represent (supposedly dogs and animals).
Judgments must also have an object: they must be objective, i.e. about
the world. They are not mere relations amongst concepts in the mind: they
represent things as objectively being a certain way, and are thereby truth-
evaluable.4
One can think of the table of judgments as presenting four determinables
for the form of a judgment—quantity, quality, relation and modality—each
with three determinates.
2I have here changed the translation of ‘erkenntnis’ from the misleading ‘knowledge’
to the more neutral ‘cognition’. I will continue to make this change where appropriate.
3“2. To conceive of a thing, whether we may conceive of it clearly or obscurely, dis-
tinctly or confusedly; in this widest meaning it is commonly used by the recent philoso-
phers. To recognize a thing obscurely, clearly, distinctly. A merely obscurely recognised
truth. To indicate something to someone, to awake an idea in him, either by means of
words or in some other way. The heathens recognized God in a very confused way. In
common language, as well as in the sciences, this is the most common usage.” (Adelung,
1808, vol. 1, p. 1906, passage translated by Mark Textor)
4See Leech (forthcoming) for a more thorough discussion of Kant’s notion of judgment.
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Table of Judgments
I
Quantity of Judgments
Universal
Particular
II Singular III
Quality Relation
Affirmative Categorical
Negative Hypothetical
Infinite Disjunctive
IV
Modality
Problematic
Assertoric
Apodeictic
(A70/B95).
The first three determinables concern how the content of a judgment is
organized. An instance of a judgment that is universal, affirmative and
categorical might be ‘All dogs are animals’, whereas a similar judgment,
that is universal, affirmative and hypothetical might be ‘If something is a
dog, then it is an animal.’
The moments of modality are different. They do not provide a form for
the content of the judgment, but rather concern how the content is judged
on a particular occasion.
The modality of judgments is a quite peculiar function. Its dis-
tinguishing characteristic is that it contributes nothing to the
content of the judgment (for, besides quantity, quality, and re-
lation, there is nothing that constitutes the content of a judg-
ment). . . (A74/B99–100)
The modalities of judgment are best understood as concerning where a par-
ticular token judgment occurs in a course of reasoning or inferential struc-
ture. E.g., a problematic judgment (lacking assertoric force) is typically one
in disjunctive or antecedent position, an assertoric judgment is typically one
in premise position, and an apodeictic judgment is typically judged as the
conclusion to an inference.
Thus, for instance, in a hypothetical syllogism the antecedent
is in the major premise problematic, in the minor assertoric,
and what the syllogism shows is that the consequence follows in
accordance with the laws of the understanding. The apodeictic
proposition thinks the assertoric as determined by these laws of
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the understanding, and therefore as affirming a priori ; and in
this manner it expresses logical necessity. (A75–6/B101)
The claim that every judgment has a modality, combined with the claim that
the modality of a judgment is its location in a course of reasoning, gives rise
to the intriguing thesis that every judgment occurs in a course of reasoning.
This is an interesting view to consider, but it falls outside of the remit of
the current project. Kant’s modalities of judgment do not concern what it
is for a proposition to be necessarily or possibly true, or what it is for an
object to possibly exist, or to have necessary properties. These are claims
that concern the content of a judgment: either by occuring in that content,
or by depending upon the content (in the case of truth). The modality of a
judgment concerns only its position in an inferential structure, and not at
all the content of the judgment.5
Kant goes on to take the table of judgments to provide a “leading thread”
(Leitfaden) towards the table of categories. Where the functions appearing
in the table of judgments are said to apply to the combination of representa-
tions into a judgment, the table of categories presents a priori concepts, one
of which from each of the four groups must be applied in order to produce
a bone fide representation of an object of experience.
In this manner there arise precisely the same number of pure
concepts of the understanding which apply a priori to objects
of intuition in general, as, in the preceding table, there have
been found to be logical functions in all possible judgments.
(A79/B105)
The categories concern groups of concepts of which one of each must be
applied in any represention or experience of an object. Again, one can
understand them on the model of determinables and determinates. Every
object must have a size, shape, causal profile, and so on.
5See Leech (forthcoming). See also Longuenesse (1998, pp. 157–161). E.g.
. . . the modality of judgment is determined by its relation to the forms of
thought involved in deductive reasoning (judgments and syllogisms), not by
its internal components (its “matter”). (Longuenesse, 1998, p. 159)
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Table of Categories
I
Of Quantity
Unity
Plurality
Totality
II III
Of Quality Of Relation
Reality Of Inherence and Subsistence
Negation (substantia et accidens)
Limitation Of Causality and Dependence
(cause and effect)
Of Community (reciprocity
between agent and patient)
IV
Of Modality
Possibility—Impossibility
Existence—Non-existence
Necessity—Contingency
(A80/B106)
Each group of categories is expounded upon in further detail: categories of
quantity in the Axioms of Intuition; categories of quality in the Anticipations
of Perception; categories of relation in the Analogies of Experience; and
categories of modality in the Postulates of Empirical Thought in General.
4.1.2 Modal Categories and the Postulates
Kant argues that there are pure concepts of the understanding or categories.
These are concepts that must be applied in experience in order for us to
experience the world as we do.6 The application of a pure concept is not
justified by experience, but by its being a prerequisite of having any ex-
perience (of the kind we have) at all. One might say that these concepts
are not acquired from any particular experience, but are “in us” prior to
experience.7 There are four sets of three concepts; quality, quantity, relation
and modality. The categories of modality are:
6Here take “we” to stand for, roughly, mentally mature creatures, human or similar,
with experience of an objective world. I will not address concerns regarding the status of
infants and higher animals here.
7This should not be taken to imply that pure concepts are to be understood as innate
concepts. The point is not that we are somehow “born with” these concepts, but that
these concepts play a peculiar role in our capacity for cognition and experience of the
world.
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Possibility—Impossibility
Existence—Non-existence
Necessity—Contingency
Kant does not explicate the categories immediately after their introduction
in the Critique, but concentrates on their deduction, i.e. on establishing
that they are applicable to experience even though they are a priori and not
derived from experience. A fuller discussion of how we are to understand the
modal categories appears soon after in the Postulates of Empirical Thought
in General (A218–235/B265–288). This occurs as part of the Systematic
Representation of all the Synthetic Principles of Pure Understanding. In
other words, in this part of the Critique, Kant tries to systematically lay
out those rules to which our cognitive faculties must conform when forming
experience out of given input. The Postulates of Empirical Thought is the
section in which he discusses those rules pertaining to the modal categories.
These rules are:
1. That which agrees with the formal conditions of experience, that is,
with the conditions of intuition and of concepts, is possible.
2. That which is bound up with (zusammenha¨ngt) the material condi-
tions of experience, that is, with sensation, is actual.
3. That which in its connection with the actual is determined in accor-
dance with universal (allgemeinen) conditions of experience, is (that
is, exists as) necessary.
(A218/B265—6).
They are then explained as follows:
The categories of modality have the peculiarity that, in deter-
mining an object, they do not in the least enlarge the concept
to which they are attached as predicates. They only express
the relation of the concept to the faculty of cognition. Even
when the concept of a thing is quite complete, I can still en-
quire whether this object is merely possible or is also actual, or
if actual, whether it is not also necessary. No additional deter-
minations are thereby thought in the object itself; the question
is only how the object, together with all its determinations, is
related to understanding and its empirical employment, to em-
pirical judgment, and to reason in its application to experience.
Just on this account also the principles of modality are noth-
ing but explanations of the concepts of possibility, actuality, and
necessity, in their empirical employment; at the same time they
restrict all categories to their merely empirical employment, and
do not approve or allow their transcendental employment. For
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if they are not to have a purely logical significance, analytically
expressing the form of thought, but are to refer to the possibility,
actuality, or necessity of things, they must concern possible expe-
rience and its synthetic unity, in which alone objects of cognition
can be given. (A219/B266–7)
These postulates are intended to explicate the rules or principles govern-
ing our modal concepts. The first paragraph of the explanatory passage lays
out the overall view: the modal status of an object (i) does not enrich the
concept of that object, but rather (ii) is determined by a relation between
the concept of that object and “the faculty of cognition” or to “understand-
ing and its empirical employment, to empirical judgment, and to reason in
its application to experience”. Note the two claims: there is the negative
claim that modality is not a first-level property of objects, and the positive
claim that modality of things concerns a relation between the concept of a
thing on the one hand, and something to do with empirical experience and
cognition of the world on the other.
The second paragraph emphasises that this is an account of modality as a
feature of the empirical world, the world we experience. As such, conditions
on the very possibility of this world of experience must be taken into account.
If these concepts are to be about things in the world of experience, then
they will have to respect conditions on the possibility of experience. If these
conditions were not taken into account, we would end up with an account
of another kind of modality. Later I will discuss Kant’s distinction between
real and logical modality. He is alluding to such a distinction here. For
an account of real, rather than merely logical, modality, we must take into
account not only merely logical features of the concept of a thing, but also
how it relates to conditions on experience.
A quick note on universal and formal conditions on experience: The
formal conditions on experience are those conditions pertaining to formal
features of experience, rather than the matter of experience. Regardless
of the particular matter entering into the world of experience, if it is not
of a certain form, it will not be counted as possible. E.g., one of Kant’s
theses is that all objects of experience must be experienced in time, and all
external objects of experience must be experienced in a spatial framework—
non-spatiotemporal external objects will therefore not count as possible.
The universal conditions of experience can be understood as those applying
across the board: if something is to count as possible, it must conform to
these conditions. It looks as though these conditions, formal and universal,
match up insofar as they are both sets of conditions to which all objects of
experience must conform. From this point on, then, I shall take them to be
the same.
Another passage provides a summary of the overall view.
The principles of modality are not, however, objectively syn-
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thetic. For the predicates of possibility, actuality, and necessity
do not in the least enlarge the concept of which they are affirmed,
adding something to the representation of the object. But since
they are none the less synthetic, they are so subjectively only,
that is, they add to the concept of a thing (of something real),
of which otherwise they say nothing, the cognitive faculty from
which it springs and in which it has its seat. Thus if it is in
connection only with the formal conditions of experience, and so
merely in the understanding, its object is called possible. If it
stands in connection with perception, that is, with sensation as
material supplied by the senses, and through perception is de-
termined by means of the understanding, the object is actual. If
it is determined through the connection of perceptions according
to concepts, the object is entitled necessary. The principles of
modality thus predicate of a concept nothing but the action of
the faculty of cognition through which it is generated. (A233–
4/B286–7)
Again we have the negative claim that modal concepts do not add to the
concept of an object, alongside the positive claim that they concern a re-
lation between that concept and our cognitive faculties, i.e. the conditions
they impose upon the world. These principles are not “objectively syn-
thetic”, but are subjective. They do not concern a property an object has
on its own, independently of any subject, but rather they concern the ob-
ject as it relates to some “cognitive faculty”. What is important here is
not so much the particular faculty Kant says is relevant, but the connection
between possible experience and our cognitive faculties. Kant is known for
having rather a mania for system, to the detriment of some of his ideas. The
balance of different modalities being seated in different faculties looks suspi-
ciously tidy. The key point is that conditions of experience are said to stem
from our cognitive faculties. If there are constraints upon experience, then
according to Kant, they have something important to do with our cognitive
constitution. So when he writes about our cognitive constitution here, we
are to understand that the key thought concerns the conditions on experi-
ence. Possibility is mere compatibility with these conditions. Actuality is
straightforward empirical experience. Necessity is what follows from given
experiences and the laws apparent in those conditions. And no object could
be possible, actual or necessary in the absence of some subjective conditions
on experience. In some sense, yet to be explained, modality looks like it
may turn out to be mind-dependent (see section 4.3.4).
4.1.3 The Concept of a Thing
An important preliminary clarification is to highlight the role of the “con-
cept of a thing”. Kant makes it fairly clear that these modal concepts are
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intended to concern things or objects. However, much of their explication
makes use of “the concept of a thing”.
The categories of modality have the peculiarity that, in deter-
mining an object, they do not in the least enlarge the concept
to which they are attached as predicates. They only express
the relation of the concept to the faculty of cognition. Even
when the concept of a thing is quite complete, I can still en-
quire whether this object is merely possible or is also actual, or
if actual, whether it is not also necessary. No additional deter-
minations are thereby thought in the object itself; the question
is only how the object, together with all its determinations, is
related to understanding and its empirical employment, to em-
pirical judgment, and to reason in its application to experience.
(A219/B266–7, my emphasis)
Kant is clearly concerned with the modality of objects/things, however, this
concept of a thing appears to play an intermediary role. One might read
Kant as claiming that it is the concept of an object which is compatible with
or determined by conditions on experience, rather than the object or thing
itself, and hence that an object is possible just when the concept of it is in
agreement with the formal conditions on experience. On this reading, the
modal status of an object will depend upon a relation between the concept
of that object and conditions on experience.
By “modal status” I mean whether the object is possible, actual or
necessary—Kant tends to use modal adjectives in this way. But what does it
mean for an object to be possible, actual or necessary? The most straightfor-
ward sense is to take these modal adjectives to mean possibly exists, actually
exists or necessarily exists. In what other sense could an object be possible?
I suppose an entity might not be an object, and yet be a possible object, in
the same way that an unused hunk of clay might be called a possible statue.
But the notion of a thing which is a potential object but not yet an object
seems too strange.
Why does Kant go via the concept of a thing? A plausible rationale might
go something like this. The modal categories are supposed to concern certain
compatibility and determination relations between conditions on experience
and objects. But what about a possible object? There is no object to
be related to, or assessed against, the relevant conditions. If we want to
ask if there could be a talking donkey, even though there actually isn’t, we
don’t assess a talking donkey against the conditions on experience—there
is no talking donkey available. But what we can do is use our concept of a
talking donkey, and consider how that is related to conditions on experience.
So when considering modal matters, it makes better sense to make use of
our concepts of things to find out about their modal properties.
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What if there were no concepts? Then one relatum of the relation which
determines modality would be missing, and so the object would have no
modal status. It would seem that any modal status for objects will depend
upon the existence of concepts of those objects. But fair enough. If, in the
most general terms, concepts are required for human-like experience, i.e.
some kind of categorizing capacities are required in addition to some kind
of sensory or receptive capacities, then in cases where there is human-like
experience, there will be concepts. What about cases where there is no
human-like experience—will there be concepts? We don’t need to answer
this question, because the other relatum of the relation determining modal
status is conditions on human-like experience. So the absence of this kind
of experience would also appear to rule out any determination of modality,
apart from whether or not there are concepts. Of course, the claim that
the kind of modality which applies to things is restricted to the realm of
experience of creatures similar to us is a substantial thesis, to be considered
in its own right.
Given this important role for concepts in the account, it is important
to get clear on Kant’s notion of the concept of a thing. First, this is not
an individual concept, i.e. a concept which by its nature picks out only one
thing, such as the concept of being identical to Bertrand Russell. For Kant, a
concept is by its nature a general (re)presentation. A particular presentation
is an intuition. Taken alone, a concept cannot be expected to pick out an
individual, because then it would fail to be general, although of course it
may turn out that only one object in fact falls under a concept. In order to
guarantee picking out an individual object, intuitions as well as concepts are
required. Combining concepts with intuitions gives us cognition of objects
and states of affairs.
All cognitions, that is, all presentations consciously referred to
an object, are either intuitions or concepts. Intuition is a singular
presentation (repraesentatio singularis), the concept is a general
(repraesentatio per notas communes) or reflected presentation
(repraesentatio discursiva). Cognition through concepts is called
thinking. (Kant, 1800, p. 96)
Although concepts cannot be expected to be necessarily such that they pick
out one thing, it is perhaps reasonable to suppose that some concepts can
be maximally specified, so that in practice only one thing falls under the
concept.
Indeed, Kant contrasts two different principles of determination. Kant
claims that every concept is subject to the principle of determinability : for
each pair of contradictorily opposed predicates, only one of the pair can
belong to a concept.
Every concept is, in respect of what is not contained in it, un-
determined, and is subject to the principle of determinability.
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According to this principle, of every two contradictorily opposed
predicates only one can belong to a concept. This principle is
based on the law of contradiction, and is therefore a purely log-
ical principle. (A571/B599)
This is taken to be a purely formal or logical constraint on a concept: for
any concept, it should not include both being F and being non-F for some
predicate F .
The second principle is more useful when considering how one might
fully specify an object through a concept. The principle of complete deter-
mination states that, for every pair of contradictorily opposed predicates,
every thing (note, not concept) has one or other of the pair of predicates as
belonging to it. I.e., for every predicate F , and every thing x, either x is F
or x is non-F .
But every thing, as regards its possibility, is . . . subject to
the principle of complete determination, according to which if
all the possible predicates of things be taken together with their
contradictory opposites, then one of each pair of contradictory
opposites must belong to it. (A571–2/B599–600)
This is a principle primarily and ostensibly concerning things, however, Kant
also writes
It is the principle of the synthesis of all predicates which are
intended to constitute the complete concept of a thing, and not
simply a principle of analytic representation in reference merely
to one of two contradictory predicates. (A572/B600)
In contrast to the principle of determinability, which places a constraint
on any pair of contradictory predicates which might be considered, this
principle concerns every such pair, and demands that a complete concept
of a thing determine the thing with respect to every pair of contradictorily
opposed possible predicates. It seems, then, that the closest we can get to a
concept that can pick out an individual object will be the most determinate
kind of concept: the complete concept of a thing.
However, things are not quite so simple. First, Kant’s discussion of the
principle of complete determination occurs in the Transcendental Dialectic,
in his discussion of our idea of God, and problems concerning rational the-
ological arguments for the existence of God. He argues that this principle
presupposes a transcendental idea, namely, “the sum-total of all possibili-
ties”.
This principle does not rest merely on the law of contradiction;
for, besides considering each thing in its relation to the two con-
tradictory predicates, it also considers it in its relation to the sum
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total of all possibilities, that is, to the sum-total of all predicates
of things. (A572/B600)
Kant argues that this sum-total of all predicates of things is a necessary pre-
supposition of reason, but also that it necessarily leads to the transcendental
error of thinking that there exists a necessary being which is the ground of
all reality, i.e. God. To go into detail here would involve too great a digres-
sion.8 The important point for present purposes is whether we need to be
worried that fully determining a concept appears to involve some kind of
transcendental error.
The short answer is, no we don’t. The danger of the transcendental idea
is when we mistake it for something that is applicable to the empirical world,
i.e. we take it to refer to an objectively-real being. Understood properly as
a mere regulative principle of reason, there is no problem. The idea of this
sum-total should not be understood as referring to something real in the
world, but rather as an idea which guides good functioning of reason and
the understanding. Put very simply, in determining a complete concept of
a thing, we should not think of the totality of all possible predicates as a
given, from which we carve out the concept. Rather, it can be thought of
as a goal, i.e. we should strive towards taking into account every possible
predicate, even though we cannot encounter them all together as a totality
in the world. Longuenesse (2005) puts it nicely:9
. . . the representation of a totum realitatis as the complete whole
of . . . determinations of things can only be a goal which reason
sets to the understanding for the improvement of its knowledge,
not an actually given whole. The illusion of rational metaphysics
is precisely to think that such a whole is actually given in pure
intellect alone, rather than having to be generated by the sensibly
conditioned understanding. (2005, p. 220)
In short, there is no reason to think that we cannot form a completely
determinate concept of a thing, although Kant would remind us that doing
so makes a certain presupposition, which may lead us into error if we are
not careful.
Even if we can form the complete concept of a thing, this may not be
sufficient to guarantee picking out an individual object. The complete con-
cept of a thing is a concept composed of, for every possible predicate, either
it or its negation. Such a concept could hardly be more specific, but it is
still a concept given that it is general in form. Conceivably two different
8See Grier (2001) Chapter 7, for a detailed reconstruction and interpretation.
9Grier and Longuenesse disagree vehemently over how Kant’s arguments in the Tran-
scendental Ideal are to be understood. See e.g. Grier (2001, pp. 237–243) for Grier’s
critique of Longuenesse. For present purposes, I do not need to defend one interpretation
over the other (although I am writing under the assumption that Grier wins).
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individual objects could fall under the same complete concept. Indeed, this
is at the heart of Kant’s rejection of the principle of the identity of indis-
cernibles. Even if two objects are indistinguishable as regards the concept
of them, they may still be distinct given that distinct intuitions may be in-
volved. (See A281/B337-8). Two distinct particular presentations may fall
under the same complex complete concept. Note that this is only a problem
if we are concerned with the possible existence of a particular individual.
But such cases are rather rare. E.g., suppose I want to know if Sherlock
Holmes could have existed. Suppose further that I flesh-out my concept of
Holmes to include for every pair of contradictorily opposed predicates one
or other predicate. If this concept is non-contradictory and compatible with
the conditions on possible experience, surely this is enough to ensure that
Sherlock Holmes is possible. It is not as though there is a particular non-
actual individual object, and I care about whether that thing is possible.10
In short, where Kant writes of the concept of a thing, I will not take
this to be an individual concept, but rather a concept sufficiently specified
to happen to pick out, in most cases, individual objects.
4.1.4 Relative Modality
Looking again at the rules for modal concepts, one can quickly see that
they invoke some notion of relative modality. I did not discuss actuality
before, so I will set it aside for the moment. First, read “agrees with”
as “is logically compatible with”, and “determined in accordance with” as
“follows logically from”. Second, read “a is possible” as “possibly, a exists”,
and “a is necessary” as “necessarily, a exists”. Third, given that we have
only concepts of things, not individual concepts, “a exists” should not be
formalized as “∃x(x = a)”, but rather as “∃xAx”, where “A” details the
concept of a. Finally, take “Cϕ” to mean something like “ϕ is a conjunction
of formal/universal conditions of experience”. We then have the following.
The rules
That which agrees with the formal conditions of experience, that
is, with the conditions of intuition and of concepts, is possible.
That which in its connection with the actual is determined in
accordance with universal conditions of experience, is (that is,
exists as) necessary.
10This may invite an objection to the effect that if someone in the actual world happened
to have exactly all the properties specified by the complete concept of Holmes, then that
person would count as being Holmes, although Conan Doyle intended his character to
be completely fictional. I will not consider problems associated with fiction here. For a
sample of the debate see Ryle (1933); Moore (1933); Lewis (1978).
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can be understood as saying something like
♦R∃xAx ≡ ¬∃ϕ(Cϕ & (ϕ→ ¬∃xAx))
R∃xAx ≡ ∃ϕ(Cϕ & (ϕ→ ∃xAx))
I.e. possiblyR a exists (there could be something falling under the concept
A) just when there is no conjunction of formal conditions of experience
which rules out a’s existence; and necessarilyR a exists just when there is a
conjunction of universal conditions of experience which logically entails a’s
existence. Note that “” stands for logical necessity. I have used a subscript
R to distinguish the kind of modality being defined by the categories—real
modality—which will be explained in due course.
I discuss this relative modality feature of Kant’s view in more detail
below. But it should be clear from the start that his explication of the
modal categories immediately suggests some kind of relative modality view.
4.1.5 Possible Experience
The notions of possible experience and conditions on experience play a cru-
cial role in Kant’s views about modality. To clarify, possible experience is
not to be understood as what we could experience if “could” is taken to
mean something like “practically possible” or “physically possible”. Two
examples spring to mind.
First, Parsons (1964) has highlighted a problem for reconciling the notion
of possible experience with Kant’s comments on infinity. On the one hand,
he claims, Kant’s theory of intuitions includes the claim that space and its
contents are infinitely divisible and indefinitely complex.
It follows from the fact that the empirical objects of perception
are in an infinitely divisible space that they are indefinitely com-
plex. For the spatial region which an object occupies can be
divided into subregions, which again can be so divided, and so
on. (Parsons, 1964, p. 185)
The objects of empirical perception are objects of possible experience, given
that they are objects of actual experience. Parsons then raises problems for
the idea that we could perceive this infinite complexity in objects of possible
experience. Given the perceptual powers we in fact have, we would not be
able to perceive complexity beyond certain limits.
[Kant] must hold that we represent objects as being in a space
and time having parts which are beyond the experience of a
thoroughly finite being, and that this arises from the form of
our sensibility. But this cannot be justified phenomenologically.
(Parsons, 1964, p. 196)
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If “practically possible” was the notion of possible experience in play, the
complex features that we are unable to perceive could not count as part of
possible experience as opposed to the claims presented as part of the theory
of intuition. ‘Thus it appears that the “possibility of experience” for Kant
must extend beyond what is practically possible for the sort of being we
have reason to think we are’ (1964, p. 193). The problem is to make sense
of what “could” means in “what we could experience”.
A second example concerns Dummett’s notion of a verification transcen-
dent statement, a statement whose truth or falsity we would never be able
to verify.11 Examples include statements about the past for which no evi-
dence remains, such as “There were 101 hairs on Julius Caesar’s head when
he died”; statements about non-manifested character traits, such as “Jones
was brave” for Jones who is now dead and who never showed any behaviour
pertaining to bravery or cowardice throughout his life; and certain state-
ments about the future such as “There will never be a city built on this
spot”, for which we would need experience infinitely extended forward in
time. We could have no experience to confirm or disconfirm these state-
ments (they transcend verification). But the intuition is that Jones could
have been brave, or that it is possible that Julius Caesar had 101 hairs on
his head when he died, or that it is possible that a city will never be built
on this spot. Indeed, it would be strange to claim that it is impossible that
Julius Caesar could have had 101 hairs on his head when he died, even if you
agree that the statement “Julius Caesar had 101 hairs on his head when he
died” cannot be verified. So although in one sense we could not experience
Jones’s bravery or the number of hairs on Julius Caesar’s head when he died,
if we want to count these statements as possibly true, we need a notion of
possible experience that admits them.
I think the response to these problems is to construe possible experience,
not as dependent on the circumstances in which one could have a particular
experience of some thing, but rather as dependent upon universal rules and
features. Practically speaking, I could not find myself in a circumstance
where I would be able to verify that Jones was brave, but Jones being brave
is compatible with universal rules and features of experience, e.g. the notion
of Jones as a human being with a particular character trait is not logically
contradictory and does not violate certain laws of physics. Jones’s being
brave qualifies as something that could feature in experience given its com-
patibility with certain rules and features; this does not imply that one can
verify (or falsify) that Jones was brave. Possible experience is then experi-
ence which is compatible with certain universal conditions, not experience
which one could have in some practical sense of “could”.
Defining modality whilst leaning heavily on a notion of “possible expe-
rience” might seem circular. However, the shape of the account sketched
11See e.g. Dummett (1959, 1978).
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so far should go some way to alleviating this concern. First, if RM can in
general stand up to its main objections, this reduces the task of explaining
modality to the nature of logical modality and the status of the base class of
propositions from which interesting kinds of relative necessity follow. The
notion of “possible experience” then enters in when giving a Kantian ac-
count of the base class of propositions from which Kant’s “real” necessities
follow. This is not immediately circular, because the conditions on experi-
ence involved in the notion of “possible experience” are not so much defined
in terms of real possibility, but in terms of the categories.
In summary, Kant’s notion of possible experience should not be under-
stood in terms of what we could experience practically speaking, but in
terms of conformity to certain conditions or constraints. The basic notion
is not really, after all, possible experience, but rather certain constraints on
experience, necessary conditions to which experience must conform. Pos-
sible experience is then simply experience which conforms to them. These
constraints, for Kant, are provided by the a priori or “pure” elements of
our cognitive faculties that contribute to the nature of experience, without
which we could not have the kind of experience that we in fact have. (See
section 4.3.3 below for some alternative ways to understand these elements
without having to rely on the transcendental idealist explanation in terms
of cognitive faculties.) This leaves open a huge question concerning how we
might argue for there being such conditions on possible experience, and how
we might discover what they are. The answer to these questions is part of
what Kant tries to achieve in the first Critique. For now I will grant the
resulting view. I will consider why we might want to be in broad agreement
with Kant on this in Chapter 5.
4.2 Possibility, Actuality and Necessity
4.2.1 Possibility
That which agrees with the formal conditions of experience, that
is, with the conditions of intuition and of concepts, is possible.
Possibility is a matter of agreement with the formal conditions of experience.
It is important that this is not merely a constraint on concepts, e.g., that the
concept of an object be merely non-contradictory. Kant would agree that,
e.g., round squares are not possible. There could be no object corresponding
to the concept of a round square in experience. However, for possibility Kant
requires more.
The postulate of the possibility of things requires that the con-
cept of the things should agree with the formal conditions of
an experience in general [. . . ] It is, indeed, a necessary logical
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condition that a concept of the possible must not contain any
contradiction; but this is not by any means sufficient to deter-
mine the objective reality of the concept, that is, the possibility
of such an object as is thought through the concept. Thus there
is no contradiction in the concept of a figure which is enclosed
within two straight lines, since the concepts of two straight lines
and of their coming together contain no negation of a figure. The
impossibility arises not from the concept in itself, but in connec-
tion with its construction in space, that is, from the conditions
of space and of its determination. And since these contain a
priori in themselves the form of experience in general, they have
objective reality, that is, they apply to possible things. (A220-
1/B267-8)
The kind of possibility here is supposed to apply to things, not just concepts.
Whilst it is accepted that a concept of a thing should at least be non-
contradictory to have any hope of referring to something possible, that is
not sufficient. One must also take into account “the formal conditions of
an experience in general”. These include certain concepts that should be
applied, such as causal relations, specified in the table of categories, as well
as the forms of intuition, whereby the data of experience is put into spatio-
temporal form as a consequence of the constitution of our receptive faculties.
The example given is supposed to illustrate how a concept—say, of a figure
which is enclosed within two straight lines—may be non-contradictory, and
yet incompatible with the conditions on experience, because such a concept
could not be exemplified, in this case, in space.
Kant’s geometrical example comes along with a host of problems. First,
one might wish to maintain that space-times with different geometries to
the actual space-time we occupy are really possible, e.g., if you think phys-
ical necessity is distinct from metaphysical necessity, where the behaviour
of space-time is a matter for physics. Second, it is not clear whether the
geometry of space as we experience it is the same as the geometry of space
objectively speaking, in the empirical world. Many of the principles of Eu-
clidean geometry seem natural, and it is difficult to imagine how they could
fail to hold, yet certain scientific theories suggest that space is in fact not
Euclidean. Third, the example relies upon Kant’s claim that geometry is
synthetic, not analytic. However, one might take geometry to be an analytic
discipline concerning the logical consequences of a set of analytic definitions
(such as the definition of a straight line as the shortest distance between two
points). Geometrical statements such as ‘There could be a figure enclosed
by two straight lines’ would consequently come out as either conceptually
necessary (or conceptually contradictory) after all.
Setting aside this difficult example, the key idea is that there must be
more conditions than mere non-contradictoriness to be met by the concept
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of an object for it to count as having a corresponding object in possible
experience. We can describe these conditions loosely as conditions on the
possibility of experience. Some of them may pertain to necessary conditions
on the form of intuitions: in order to have experience or cognition of a
thing, Kant requires that there be an intuition as well as concepts, and
intuitions are supposed to bring with them temporal structure (and spatial
structure for outer things). Some of the conditions may pertain to general
features of the conceptualization of intuitions, i.e. it is the categories, pure
concepts, that are supposed to bring with them causal order. It remains to
be seen how far one should adhere to Kant’s division between intuitions and
concepts, but we can grasp the general idea without having to immediately
commit to a distinction between “spontaneous” and “receptive” sources of
these conditions.
There are two key features so far in Kant’s account of possibility. First,
an object is possible if (the concept of) the object is compatible with con-
ditions on possible experience. More generally, if we take “is possible” to
mean “possibly exists”, and if we take into account that fact that it is propo-
sitions that can be compatible or not strictly speaking, rather than objects
or concepts, we have a view whereby the proposition that the object exists12
is compatible with the conditions on experience. Kant stresses that it is not
the concept of a thing alone which determines the possibility of the thing:
it is only in relation to universal conditions of experience that anything can
be cognized as being possible or not.
If I represent to myself a thing which is permanent, so that ev-
erything in it which changes belongs only to its state, I can never
cognize from such a concept that a thing of this kind is possible.
. . . Only through the fact that these concepts express a priori
the relations of perceptions in every experience, do we cognize
their objective reality, that is, their transcendental truth, and
this, indeed, independently of experience, though not indepen-
dently of all relation to the form of an experience in general, and
to the synthetic unity in which alone objects can be empirically
cognized. (A221–2/B268–9)
Second, we have an account of the status and source of the conditions
on experience. They are a priori concepts or forms of intuition. Kant un-
derstood these to arise from the constitution of our cognitive faculties, but
there are more minimal interpretations. Strawson’s austere interpretation
of a priority can help us to understand the status of such conditions: ‘a
concept or feature (element) could be called a priori if it was an essential
structural element in any conception of experience which we could make
intelligible to ourselves’ (Strawson, 1966, p. 68). If there were indeed any
12I.e. there is something which falls under the concept of the object, ∃xAx.
161
such essential structural elements, then if a concept of an object somehow
violated this essential structure, if the proposition that something falls un-
der the concept was incompatible with it, we would not be able to make
intelligible to ourselves any conception of experience in which that object
might exist. Hence, it could not be said to be an object of possible expe-
rience (assuming that intelligibility of conceptions of experience are either
constitutive of or at least a reliable guide to possible experience).13
Kant stresses the importance of the universal conditions on experience
by discussing how we should treat the modality of “invented” concepts.
Presumably concepts such as that of Sherlock Holmes count as invented; we
do not take them as is from experience, but construct them out of other
concepts. But as long as those other constituent concepts are objectively
real, there should be no prima facie problem in the object described counting
as possible or not. Kant raises concerns regarding invented concepts which
are neither a priori nor verifiable in experience (either directly or through
the laws of experience). He claims that they cannot be cognized as really
possible (or not) at all—there is no criterion of their possibility.
But if we should seek to frame quite new concepts of substances,
forces, reciprocal actions, from the material which perception
presents to us, without experience itself yielding the example of
their connection, we should be occupying ourselves with mere
fancies, of whose possibility there is absolutely no criterion since
we have neither borrowed these concepts [directly] from expe-
rience, nor have taken experience as our instructress in their
formation. Such fictitious concepts, unlike the categories, can
acquire the character of possibility not in a priori fashion, as
conditions upon which all experience depends, but only a pos-
teriori as being concepts which are given through experience
itself. And, consequently, their possibility must either be cog-
nized a posteriori and empirically, or it cannot be cognized at
all. (A222/B269-70)
In order for a concept of something to have a criterion of possibility at
all, it would seem that the concept must either be a standard empirical
concept, derived from experience directly, e.g. I perceive a particular tree
and so acquire the concept of that tree, or formed under the instruction
of experience, i.e. the concept of the thing is constructed by us, perhaps
as with the concept of Sherlock Holmes, but taking experience as a guide.
Presumably this means constructing the concept with the laws of experience
or the laws of nature in mind, as well as our actual experiences (e.g. I can
construct a concept of Sherlock Holmes on the basis of having experienced
other similar human beings).
13I discuss the austere interpretation as contrasted with a transcendental idealist inter-
pretation more in section 5.2.1.
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What would it be to form a concept without taking experience as our
“instructress”? Kant gives examples of the kinds of things he has in mind.
A substance which would be permanently present in space, but
without filling it (like that mode of existence intermediate be-
tween matter and thinking being which some would seek to in-
troduce), or a special ultimate mental power of intuitively antic-
ipating the future (and not merely inferring it), or lastly a power
of standing in community of thought with other men, however
distant they may be—are concepts the possibility of which is
altogether groundless, as they cannot be based on experience
and its known laws; and without such confirmation they are ar-
bitrary combinations of thoughts, which, although indeed free
from contradiction, can make no claim to objective reality, and
none, therefore, as to the possibility of an object such as we here
profess to think. (A222–3/B270)
By not taking experience and its laws into account, we are left with concepts
the instantiation of which can have no confirmation or disconfirmation in
experience. And, given that these are not a priori concepts of the under-
standing, that is the only kind of confirmation they could hope for. Perhaps
the problem could be framed in terms of applicability. The categories are
applicable to the world of experience because their application is a necessary
condition on there being experience of this world at all. Most empirical con-
cepts are applicable because they are acquired from experience, or fabricated
from other concepts according to the laws of experience. It is conceivable,
however, that I could invent a concept of something which contained nothing
either incompatible with or determined by the conditions on possible expe-
rience, leaving no way to test its applicability to experience against these
conditions.14
4.2.2 Actuality
That which is bound up with the material conditions of experi-
ence, that is, with sensation, is actual.
So far I have said very little about actuality. My main concern in this
thesis is with different kinds of possibility and necessity—if actuality is just
plain being the case, then I’m happy to leave it alone for now. However,
actuality is more important for Kant, given the idea of the modal categories
as determinables. An object is supposed to be either merely possible, actual
14Kant can be read as claiming that such concepts, with no empirical consequences,
should be counted as meaningless. In section 4.4.1 I discuss this thesis of concept empiri-
cism.
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or necessary. In understanding Kant’s views on the nature of these modal
concepts, then, actuality is one third of the picture.
That said, there is an important difference between actuality and the
other two modal categories. Where possibility and necessity are concerned
with formal and universal conditions on experience, actuality is given an
account in terms of the material conditions of experience. Whereas possibil-
ity and necessity are concerned with the mere form of possible experience,
actuality differs in being concerned with the matter of experience. A rough
illustration might be: the concept of a talking donkey is, perhaps, compati-
ble with the merely formal conditions on experience (unlike a donkey with
telepathic powers, perhaps), however, if there are no talking donkeys, then
there is nothing in the matter of experience which is a talking donkey, and
so there are no actual talking donkeys, although they are possible. Or, the
cat’s sitting on the mat is compatible with the merely formal conditions
on experience (unlike, say, the cat’s being causally isolated from the mat),
however, if the cat is not on the mat, then there is nothing in the matter
of experience which is the cat’s being on the mat, and so it is not actually
the case, although it is possibly the case. The category of actuality is, then,
quite different from those of possiblity and necessity. I will therefore con-
tinue to focus on possibility and necessity, although I will briefly look at
Kant on actuality first.
For some thing to be actual is for it to be ‘bound up with the material
conditions of experience, that is, with sensation.’ These conditions on ex-
perience pertain to the matter of experience, rather than its form. This,
according to Kant, is sensation. This need not be understood to mean that
all experience is sensory experience, coming from stimulation of one of the
five senses. The notion of experience here importantly involves the combina-
tion of sensibility with the understanding, i.e. given input is conceptualized
and we are left with experience as we know it. This includes inner sense;
our experiences of our own thoughts, feelings and inner life are considered
to be constructed in the same way as our outer experiences, out of given
input (the manifold of intuitions) in sensibility and applied concepts in the
understanding. I cannot sense my inner life via sight, hearing, touch, taste
or smell, so either Kant is restricting his notion of actuality to outer expe-
rience, or we should understand “material conditions” and “sensation” in a
broader sense than “of the five senses”. The latter makes more sense. We
might wish to discuss the actuality of thoughts, dreams, inner dialogues and
so on. Indeed, if my thought that there are five human senses didn’t actually
exist (regardless of the difficulties associated with its identity conditions),
how would I have just been able to experience the thinking of it? Even if
inner experiences are ultimately reducible to electrical patterns and events
in the brain, somehow I still know that this is going on, and not obviously
via the five senses.
In his discussion of actuality, Kant stresses that we do not need direct
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experience of an object for it to be actual or existent, so long as we have some
experience from which the existence of that object can be inferred. This
involves examples such as something which cannot seen by the naked eye
(e.g. magnetic force) whose existence can be inferred from other perceptual
experiences (the attraction of iron filings).
The postulate bearing on the cognition of things as actual does
not, indeed, demand immediate perception (and, therefore, sen-
sation of which we are conscious) of the object whose existence is
to be cognized. What we do, however, require is the connection
of the object with some actual perception, in accordance with
the analogies of experience, which define all real connection in
an experience in general.
In the mere concept of a thing no mark of its existence is to
be found. [. . . ] that the concept precedes the perception signi-
fies the concept’s mere possibility; the perception which supplies
the content to the concept is the sole mark of actuality. We
can also, however, cognize the existence of the thing prior to its
perception and, consequently, comparatively speaking, in an a
priori manner, if only it be bound up with certain perceptions,
in accordance with the principles of their empirical connection
(the analogies) [. . . ] Thus from the perception of the attracted
iron filings we cognize the existence of a magnetic matter per-
vading all bodies, although the constitution of our organs cuts
us off from all immediate perception of this medium [. . . ] Our
cognition of the existence of things reaches, then, only so far
as perception and its advance according to empirical laws can
extend. (A225-6/B272-3)
One important consequence would seem to be that we cannot know the exis-
tence of some thing completely a priori, as is argued for further in relation to
arguments for the existence of God. For a thing to be actual it requires some
connection with the matter of experience, either through being experienced
directly, or via a suitable connection to something else which is experienced.
So to know if a thing exists, one must take into account the matter of ex-
perience, and not simply universal, a priori conditions on experience. One
might not be worried about God, but mathematicians might want to hold
onto the idea that they can learn a priori about the existence of entities
such as numbers. However, recall that these purported mathematical enti-
ties are thought to exist, not only actually, but necessarily. Perhaps there is
room to learn of the existence of a thing a priori in the special case where
it also exists necessarily. I will discuss Kant’s views on necessary existence
and mathematical and abstract objects below.
The demand for some perceptual connection to an object for it to be
actual—be it direct or indirect—might be thought to raise problems. Is it
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realistic to expect there to be enough direct perceptual experience of things
to account for all the actual things there are? And what if there were no
creatures capable of perception? In response to the first worry, recall that, in
cases without direct perceptual experience of the object, actuality is assured
by ‘the connection of the object with some actual perception, in accordance
with the analogies of experience’ (A225/B272). In brief, the analogies of
experience comprise principles which are supposed to capture different nec-
essary connections between perceptions. As expanding on the categories
of relation, these principles will therefore be included in the conditions of
possible experience.
The principle of the analogies is: Experience is possible only
through the representation of a necessary connection of percep-
tions. (B218)15
The principles are:
1. In all change of appearances substance is permanent; its quantum in
nature is neither increased or diminished. (B224)
2. All alterations take place in conformity with the law of the connection
of cause and effect. (B232)
3. All substances, in so far as they can be perceived to coexist in space,
are in thoroughgoing reciprocity. (B256)
These principles can be taken to correspond loosely to more familiar princi-
ples of physics, i.e. laws of conservation, laws regarding sufficient causation,
and action and reaction. One way to frame the worry here is to ask: in the
case of a single actual perception of an object, call it a, is it reasonable to
suppose that there are other “actual” objects which bear no such relations
to a, however remotely? Could there, e.g., exist an isolated causal system
with no causal connection whatsoever to objects outside of that system? I
suspect that physics tends towards answering no. Hence, as long as there
is some direct perpectual experience, this should be connected to all actual
things.
The more pressing worry seems to come from considering how things
would be if there were no actual perceptions of objects. Would nothing
then actually exist? Surely to think so would be to adhere to an unpopular
kind of idealism. However, the worry can be defused by stressing that there
is a difference here between actuality and existence. Actuality is considered
to be a modal category, a concept that comprises part of the conditions
on there being experience at all, the application conditions of which make
15The statement of the principle of the analogies, and the analogies themselves, is dif-
ferent in the A-version, but I only need a brief overview of the analogies here, so I won’t
concern myself with the differences between the two versions.
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clear reference to minded creatures: ‘[the modal categories] only express the
relation of the concept to the faculty of cognition’ (A219/B266). In a world
which contained no minded creatures (of the appropriate kind), one might
think that there would be no possibility, actuality or necessity (see section
4.3.4). But even if this were the case, it does not follow that there would be
nothing at all.
Kant takes the concept of existence to be different to that of actuality.
One cannot hereby equate the concept of actuality with the con-
cept of existence, for the existence of a thing comprehends in
itself the possibility as well as the actuality, as the necessity of
an object, whereby existence is predicated of all three, but actu-
ality of actuality (actualitas) alone. (Kant, 1794–5, 29:987)
Kant’s statement that the two notions are different is clear, even if the
reasons which follow are rather less so. The idea seems to be that the
notion of existence is involved in all three other notions, but that the notion
of actuality is only involved actuality. Put simply, if to be possible, actual
or necessary, is to possibly exist, actually exist or necessarily exist, then one
can see clearly that existence occurs as a “part” of each of the three modal
concepts, but that actuality occurs as a “part” only of one. Hence, they
are different. Kant may have something more complicated in mind by his
obscure phrasing, but I think this way of putting things at least provides a
gloss in the spirit of the point.
One can also see that the accounts Kant gives of each notion differ. In
saying ‘There is a donkey’, or ‘A donkey exists’, the concept of a donkey
is “posited’ as having an object. We have seen that in saying ‘A donkey is
actual’ reference is made to sensation and experience. Compare
If, now, we take the subject (God) with all its predicates . . . and
say ‘God is’, or ‘There is a God’, we attach no new predicate to
the concept of God, but only posit it as being an object in relation
to my concept. (A599/B627, my emphasis)
with
. . . the perception which supplies the content to the concept is
the sole mark of actuality. (A225/B273, my emphasis)
As long as there were still objects in some sense, we might be confident
that things still exist in a mindless world, but they might not count as
actually existing. This might sound strange, but it may be taken to be a
peculiarity of Kant’s view of modal categories. When applied to possiblity
and necessity, it does not seem so strange, i.e. to think that facts about how
things could be or how things must be are not a properly objective feature
of the world, but connected to how creatures like us experience the world
and the interests we might have.
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4.2.3 Necessity
That which in its connection with the actual is determined in
accordance with universal conditions of experience, is (that is,
exists as) necessary.
The third postulate is concerned not with logical or formal necessity, but
with “material necessity in existence”. This is in line with the emerging
trend to distinguish between logical modality, i.e. a matter of lack of con-
tradiction amongst concepts, and the kind of modality that involves, in
addition, a relation to (i.e. determination by) the universal conditions of
experience.
Lastly, as regards the third postulate, it concerns material ne-
cessity in existence, and not merely formal and logical necessity
in the connection of concepts. Since the existence of any object
of the senses cannot be cognized completely a priori, but only
comparatively a priori, relatively to some other previously given
existence; and since, even so, we can then arrive only at such an
existence as must somewhere be contained in the context of the
experience, of which the given perception is a part, the neces-
sity of existence can never be cognized from concepts, but always
only from connection with that which is perceived, in accordance
with universal laws of experience. (A226-7/B279)
There is an important clarification to be made here. One might think,
given the account of possibility, that necessity of an object would be a mere
matter of following from the laws of experience. But this turns out to be
relative to some other previously given experience. So rather than an object
being necessary when its existence (or something’s falling under the concept
of the object) follows from the universal conditions of experience, it is nec-
essary when it follows from a given experience plus the universal conditions
of experience. Note again that this conditional necessity is restricted to the
domain of objects of experience. Again, this guards against being able to
argue for the necessary existence of a transcendent God, but may also cause
problems for an account of mathematical and abstract objects.
An initial problem is how to distinguish these conditional necessities from
those indirectly-experienced actualities inferred from directly-experienced
actualities and the laws of experience, e.g. magnetic force as inferred from
the behaviour of iron filings. Doesn’t this make either magnetic force (qua
indirectly-perceived actuality) conditionally necessary, or conditional neces-
sities merely actual? In response, one might say that certain events or
entities can be conditionally necessary, whilst being ultimately or uncondi-
tionally merely actual. E.g., one might say, given the behaviour of the iron
filings, there must be a magnetic force present. However, to say that does
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not mean the same as saying that there must exist magnetic force, full stop.
The particular instance of magnetic force here actually exists. It might not
have existed, but given the existence of certain other things, it could not
have failed to. Understood this way, a close relationship between actuality
and conditional necessity does not seem so troubling.
Another response would be to take the necessary connection involved in
actuality to be epistemic, as opposed to physical or metaphysical necessity
in the conditioned necessity case. So, e.g., the iron filings constitute evi-
dence of magnetic force, but something else may have caused (i.e. causally
necessitated) there to be a magnetic force. However, this approach would
spell disaster for actuality. Things could only actually exist if there was
actually perceived evidence for their existence. Again, this strikes me as
overly idealist, even for Kant. This reading is suggested by the iron filings
example. After all, no one wants to argue that the movement of the iron
filings in any way necessitates the existence of a magnetic force. A clarifica-
tion may help here: the view is not that the object of actual perception is
always the cause or equivalent of the actual existence of an indirectly per-
ceived thing. Rather, the object of the perception is taken to stand in some
appropriate relation to the other object. E.g., we know the iron filings could
not move without a cause. Science tells us that that cause is a magnetic
force. So we conclude from the movement of the iron filings that there is
an actual magnetic force. So yes, the actual perception is used as evidence
for the conclusion that there is a magnetic force, but the crucial relation
which ensures the actuality of the magnetic force is not that the iron filings
provide evidence for the magnetic force (although they do), but that the
laws of experience state that the filings and the force will be related in a
certain way.
The notion of necessity we are left with is then explicated by Kant in
terms of causal necessity. We know that this material necessity is connected
to the universal laws of experience. In the present passage, this amounts
to what appear to be three laws of physics.16 For Kant, certain physical
principles are a priori, and these are amongst the conditions to which the
concept of an object must conform if it is to refer to a possible object.
An object has (conditional) necessary existence if it follows from a previous
experience according to these laws of physics. But it is a mistake to talk here
of necessarily existing objects. An important point is that Kant does not
think that there could be such a thing as a necessary existent or a necessarily
existing being. He indeed goes on to claim that this kind of conditional,
causal necessity only regards the states of things, not the existence of things.
Now there is no existence that can be cognized as necessary under
the condition of other given appearances, save the existence of
effects from given causes, in accordance with laws of causality. It
16See The Analogies of Experience, as discussed in section 4.2.2
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is not, therefore, the existence of things (substances) that we can
cognize to be necessary, but only the existence of their state; and
this necessity of the existence of their state we can cognize only
from other states, which are given in perception, in accordance
with empirical laws of causality. (A227/B279)
The reason seems to be that we are dealing with causal necessity, a relation
between causes and effects, so we must be dealing with states. This will
depend on a claim about the relata of the causation relation; objects or
states.
A restriction here to causal necessity seems misguided. First, the laws
of mathematics as well as the laws of physics, according to Kant, guide the
behaviour of objects in the world. So it seems reasonable to expect these
conditional necessities to follow from mathematical as well as causal laws.
It seems plausible to claim that nothing exists absolutely necessarily where
this is a case of causal necessity, but once we have a richer notion of necessity
in the picture, this may not be so straightforward. One might argue that the
number 2 exists of mathematical necessity, and unconditionally so. Given
the scope and importance of these issues to do with conditional necessity
and abstract objects, I will discuss them in more depth once the main views
have been outlined.
The relation between necessity and possible experience is brought out in
the following way. Necessity is a matter of causal relations, and the causal
law is an a priori condition on possible experience. So necessity is thereby a
matter of determination by causal laws, which are a condition on experience.
It therefore follows that the criterion of necessity lies solely in
the law of possible experience, the law that everything which
happens is determined a priori through its cause in the [field of]
appearance. We thus cognize the necessity only of those effects
in nature the causes of which are given to us, and the character
of necessity in existence extends no further than the field of pos-
sible experience, and even in this field is not applicable to the
existence of things as substances, since substances can never be
viewed as empirical effects—that is, as happening and coming to
be. Necessity concerns only the relations of appearances in con-
formity with the dynamical law of causality and the possibility
grounded upon it of inferring a priori from a given existence (a
cause) to another existence (the effect). (A227-8/B279-80)
Again, the notion of necessity is restricted to the realm of experience, against
the temptation to posit the existence of transcendent necessary beings such
as God.
In terms of giving a clear exposition of Kant, the third principle of modal-
ity concerning necessity is really intended by Kant to capture a notion of
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conditional, causal necessity. However, below I show how a more general no-
tion of necessity, mirroring the account of possibility (which is not restricted
to causal possibility) can be taken from Kant, which yields a simpler view.
4.3 The Main Theses
From the general outline of the view a number of claims can now be extracted
and examined in greater depth.
1. The Real/Logical Predicate Thesis
Modal concepts/properties are not first-level concepts/properties of
objects. Kant repeatedly makes the negative claim that modal con-
cepts do not add to the determination of an object, do not enrich the
concept of an object. This is closely related to his argument that ex-
istence is not a predicate, and his distinction between real and logical
predicates.
2. The Relative Modality Thesis
The positive claim that Kant makes is that modal concepts pertain to
the relation between the concept of a thing and conditions on possible
experience, namely compatibility with those conditions as possibility,
and determination by those conditions as necessity. This can best be
cashed-out in terms of relativization of logical possibility and necessity
to a set of conditions, i.e. as being a version of RM.
3. The Category Thesis
Modal concepts are categories. They form part of the conceptual
prerequisite for experience. This is the key source which has led to
the development of what are commonly called “Kantian” theories of
modality.
4. The Mind-Dependence Thesis
Modality is mind-dependent. Modal facts, such as that an object
possibly exists, are dependent for their existence upon the existence
of creatures capable of experience similar to ours.
In the following I will work through a number of issues regarding Kant’s
account, clarifying the above theses, and pointing out some potential prob-
lems.
4.3.1 Real and Logical Predicates
Kant is adamant that the modal concepts at issue—possibility, actuality and
necessity of things—do not add to the concept of the thing.
171
The categories of modality have the peculiarity that, in deter-
mining an object, they do not in the least enlarge the concept to
which they are attached as predicates. [. . . ] Even when the con-
cept of a thing is quite complete, I can still enquire whether this
object is merely possible or is also actual, or if actual, whether it
is not also necessary. No additional determinations are thereby
thought in the object itself [. . . ] (A219/B266)
For the predicates of possibility, actuality, and necessity do not in
the least enlarge the concept of which they are affirmed, adding
something to the representation of the object. (A233/B286)
The idea is that although we can use modal predicates, e.g. as in “This
object is possible”, we do not thereby attribute a(n intrinsic) property to
the object.
Kant offers in the quotation above an argument for this negative claim:
The concept of an object may be fully determined, but we can still ask
whether the object be possible, actual or necessary. The idea is that, even
if I could exhaustively determine every property of an object, it would still
make sense to ask whether the object possibly exists, actually exists or
necessarily exists. And the answer to that question would not be a foregone
conclusion.
This line of thought is developed further in Kant’s well-known comments
concerning existence in his argument against the ontological argument for
the existence of God, summed up by the slogan “existence is not a predi-
cate”. Kant does not deny the uncontroversial claim that the verb ‘to exist’
can appear grammatically as a predicate in a statement. In his terminology,
he allows that ‘existence’ can form a logical predicate. But it is quite an-
other thing to allow that something can be what he calls a real predicate. A
real or determining predicate ‘determines a thing’; it is ‘a predicate which
is added to the concept of the subject and enlarges it’ (A598/B626). ‘Exis-
tence’ is not a real predicate because predicating existence of an object does
not add any further determination of the object; it does not determine any
new properties of the object. As Kant says, ‘A hundred real thalers do not
contain the least coin more than a hundred possible thalers’ (A599/B627).
We cannot explain why the concept of existence does not add to the concept
of a hundred thalers by claiming that it is analytic that a hundred thalers
exist, because that is clearly false. So Kant concludes that existence cannot
be a real predicate. The slogan should be “existence is not a real predicate”.
This kind of argument is particularly effective as an attack on Leibniz.
Leibniz thought (i) that God is in possession of complete concepts of all
possible things; (ii) that existence is a real predicate; and (iii) that God has
the power to choose which possible things to make actual. Now, consider:
Take any subject you please, for example, Julius Caesar. Draw
172
up a list of all the predicates which may be thought to belong
to him, not excepting those of space and time. You will quickly
see that he can either exist with all these determinations, or not
exist at all. The Being who gave existence to the world and to
our hero within that world could know every single one of these
predicates without exception, and yet still be able to regard him
as a merely possible thing which, in the absence of that Being’s
decision to create him, would not exist. (Kant, 1763, 1979, p.
57(2:72))
Take Julius Caesar. God must be in possession of his complete concept, i.e.
know all of the determinations of Julius Caesar, all of the real predicates
which belong to him. If existence is a real (determining) predicate, then
the complete concept of Julius Caesar will include whether or not he exists
(suppose the concept includes existence). But God is supposed to be able
to choose whether or not Julius Caesar exists. However, if God elects not to
make Julius Caesar actually exist, this will not be possible. Julius Caesar,
has as a determining property that he exists. Whatever it is that God has
not chosen to make existent, it is not Julius Caesar, but something very
similar. So Leibniz’s position is inconsistent.
Kant is pointing to an inconsistency here between Leibniz’s the-
ory of complete concepts and his views on existence. Leibniz
holds that existence is a perfection, or a positive simple predi-
cate, and that since God contains all perfections he must likewise
contain existence. Kant recognizes that this conception of exis-
tence is inconsistent with the Leibnizian position that God is in
possession of complete concepts of possible things. If the concept
of a possible thing is indeed complete, then whatever it is that is
effected by God’s choice to actualize that thing, it cannot be the
case that any new predicates are added to this concept, since it
is already complete. Thus, to say that a thing, x, exists cannot
be, as Leibniz seems to indicate, to say that the predicate of
existence is included in the concept of x. (Fisher and Watkins,
1998, p. 377)
Fisher and Watkins (1998) also bring out another point. If existence were
part of the complete concept of a thing, we would not be able to use the
same concept when talking about the same object being actual or possible.
Consider, you and I are debating whether Homer existed. We both agree
that such a person could exist, and we have made sure that we have the same
concept of a thing in mind. Only I think such a person actually existed,
whereas you think no such person existed (rather, a group of several people
were responsible for “his” works). It seems we cannot even make sense of
this being a genuine disagreement without allowing that you and I share our
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concept of Homer, but disagree regarding his existence, which must therefore
be something that would not feature in this concept. Moreover, Fisher and
Watkins point out that we standardly take things which exist to be possible
as well as actual. But this couldn’t be done if the concepts were different.
Kant argues that existence is not a predicate. Thus, the complete
concept of a thing is still indeterminate as to whether or not it
applies to an actual or a merely possible thing. If this is the
case, no amount of analysis of the concept will justify the claim
that the object to which this concept refers is an actual object.
If existence were a predicate and the complete concept of an
actual thing contained existence, then we could not refer to a
thing as possible and as actual by means of the same concept.
Such a consequence is of course unacceptable, since we consider
actual things to be possible as well. Thus, existence cannot be
a predicate if the complete concept theory is to be maintained.
(Fisher and Watkins, 1998, pp. 377–8)
In short, although not uncontroversial, Kant’s view that existence is not a
real predicate seems to be standing on fairly plausible ground.
Kant appears to describe two ways that a predicate can fail to be a real
predicate. First, a predicate might still convey some useful information,
e.g. however we treat statements such as “a exists” or “a is possible”,
we seem to be saying something substantial. Second, Kant discusses cases
where a predicate is merely logical in virtue of occuring in a certain way in
an analytic truth—where the predicate attached to the subject is already
contained in the subject, as in “This bachelor is unmarried” or “Socrates is
Socrates”. This second kind of logical predicate is logical only relative to
whether it is part of an analytic sentence. E.g., “is unmarried” can serve as
a real predicate in “Socrates is unmarried”, although it serves as a logical
predicate in “Every bachelor is unmarried”.
Anything we please can be made to serve as a logical predicate;
the subject can even be predicated of itself [. . . ] But a determin-
ing [real] predicate is a predicate which is added to the concept
of the subject and enlarges it. (A598/B626)
The first kind of logical (non-real) predicate (such as “exists”) does not
appear to be relative in this way. They do not fail to determine anything
about the object because the information is already contained in the subject
term, rather they fail to determine anything about the properties of the
object because they convey a different kind of information. We do not want
to claim that “Socrates is possible” or “Kant exists” are analytic. Kant
rather claims that these predicates behave in a special way.
Kant’s distinction between real and logical predicates seems therefore
to be rather piecemeal. What we in fact have is a distinction between
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predicates that do and do not determine properties of an object, relative to
the content of the subject term used, and a third kind of predicate which can
never determine properties of an object because it is not the right kind of
predicate to do that. In other words, there is a logical/real contrast between
predicates as used in analytic or non-analytic contexts, and a distinction
between predicates which are and are not first-level predicates. A first-level
predicate is a predicate which can combine with singular terms to form a
sentence, e.g. “is red”: likewise a first-level property can be instantiated
by individual objects, e.g. redness. The notion of a first-level predicate or
property might help us to capture what Kant wants to say modal concepts
are not when he argues that they are not real predicates.
Frege distinguished between first-level predicates such as “is red” and
second-level predicates such as “exists” or “are three in number”. A second-
level predicate applies to other predicates (a second-level concept17 is a
function which takes other concepts as arguments). E.g. “Socrates exists”
should be understood as being of the form “∃x(x = Socrates)”, or more
roughly, “There is something which is identical with Socrates”, effectively
making “Socrates exists” to be a case of the first-level concept x is identical
with Socrates (note the variable place for an individual) falling under the
second-level concept there is something which is X (note the variable place
for a first-level concept).
This kind of division, between first- and second-level predicates, would
appear to serve Kant well. His account of modal concepts is put in terms
of the concepts of things, e.g. the concept of a thing being compatible with
the formal conditions on experience. So perhaps it is correct to say that he
holds a view whereby modal concepts, including existence, are applied to
other concepts. Note that the precise formulation in terms of an individual
concept such as x = Socrates will not be appropriate, given Kant’s views
on individual concepts (see section 4.1.3). But taking, e.g., the complete
concept of Socrates, represented by the predicate “Sx”, the same treatment
can be given for existence, i.e. “Socrates exists” will be translated as being
of the form “∃xSx”, i.e. “There is is something which falls under the com-
plete concept of Socrates”. I consider whether this is genuinely the correct
characterization, of modal predicates as being second-level, below in section
4.3.2. Although it seems right to say that for Kant modal predicates are not
first-level predicates, it is not clear whether they are therefore second-level
predicates instead.
There is a long history of arguments both for and against existence being
a first-level property of objects. One can take Hume to be in the “against”
camp when he argues that there is no difference between the idea of a thing
and the idea of that thing existing.
To reflect on any thing simply, and to reflect on it as existent,
17i.e. the referent of a predicate or concept-word
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are nothing different from each other. That idea, when conjoin’d
with the idea of any object, makes no addition to it. (Hume,
1739, 1740, 1.2.6)
This seems plausible: if I ask you to imagine a cabbage, and then I ask you
to imagine an existing cabbage, surely you will have the same image of a
cabbage in your mind’s eye in both cases. Hume concludes that every idea
of a thing is an idea of an existing thing; existence is already built into the
idea of any thing, it cannot be attributed as an additional property.
Whatever we conceive, we conceive to be existent. Any idea we
please to form is the idea of a being; and the idea of a being is
any idea we please to form. (Hume, 1739, 1740, 1.2.6)
From here, we can ask: what is the difference between the case where there
is an object corresponding to the idea (an existing object) and the case
where there is none? It can’t be that there are two objects, one with the
property of existence and one without, because all my ideas are of existing
objects—it is only existing objects that correspond to my ideas. So we have
to find another account.
As well as the negative point, Kant’s criticism of the ontological argu-
ment contains a suggestion of how to understand what these (non-analytic)
logical predicates might do if they cannot enrich the subject-concept, i.e. if
they cannot be used to predicate qualities of an object. First, Kant writes:
If, now, we take the subject (God) with all its predicates (among
which is omnipotence), and say ‘God is’, or ‘There is a God’,
we attach no new predicate to the concept of God, but only
posit it as being an object that stands in relation to my concept.
(A599/B627, my emphasis)
Rather than claiming that God has some property or other, enlarging the
concept of God, we can say that we claim that there is an object relating
to the concept, i.e. we claim that there is such a thing as God (in the
case of existence). “God exists” becomes “There is an object falling under
the concept of God”, which looks happily like the Fregean formulation of a
second-level concept, i.e “∃xGod(x)”.
4.3.2 The Relative Modality Thesis
Appended to the negative claim that modal predicates are not real predi-
cates, is the positive claim that they instead indicate some relation between
the concept of the thing in question and conditions on possible experience.
Looking again at the particular explications of each modal concept in the
Postulates, an account of possibility and necessity as relative to a set of
propositions or laws can be seen to be emerging. The account as presented
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by Kant focuses on the modality of objects, in terms of a relation between
the concept of the object and a certain class of propositions. These proposi-
tions express conditions on the possibility of experience arising or deriving
from the pure concepts of the understanding and the pure form of intuitions
(or, with Strawson (1966), those features essential to an intelligible notion
of experience).
Let us call the set of these conditions C. I suggested above that state-
ments involving modal predicates such as “a is possible” should be under-
stood as claims of the form “possibly a exists”, and then in terms of the
concept of a, Ax, i.e. “possibly ∃xAx”. Recall, a thing is supposed to be
possible when it (its concept) is in agreement with C, and necessary when
its actuality (the actual instantiation of its concept) is determined by C. So
we have:
a possibly exists ≡ 〈∃xAx〉 is compatible with C.
and
a necessarily exists ≡ 〈∃xAx〉 is determined by C.
How should we understand the relations of compatibility and determi-
nation here? Surely not causally: the conditions on possible experience do
not cause anything to exist (such as a state of something). The simplest
and most straightforward option would be to understand them as logical
compatibilty and logical determination (i.e. logical consequence). The only
other option, as far as I can see, would be something like “metaphysical
entailment” (“metaphysical compatibility”), the kind of determination re-
lation one might think holds between, e.g., something’s being red all over
and something’s not being green anywhere—a relation which goes beyond
physics, but which is not obviously conceptual or logical. However, this kind
of relation seems to be based precisely on notions such as real possibility and
real necessity, e.g. it might not be a conceptual truth that nothing can be
red and green all over, but perhaps this is ruled out of possible experience
by some other means. Hence, I think the only way to go is to understand
compability and determination in logical terms.
More formally, then, we have:
a possibly exists ≡ ¬(C → ¬∃xAx)
a necessarily exists ≡ (C → ∃xAx)
We saw before that this formulation has certain logical problems. The so-
lution adopted was to include a quantifier in the formulation. The kind of
possibility and necessity Kant is concerned with here is premised on there
being certain conditions on experience of the relevant kind. If this back-
ground claim is included in the formulation, then we can take another step
towards showing that Kant’s modal categories constitute an instance of RM.
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a possibly exists ≡ ¬∃ϕ(Cϕ & (ϕ→ ¬∃xAx))
a necessarily exists ≡ ∃ϕ(Cϕ & (ϕ→ ∃xAx))
where “Cϕ” is to be read as “ϕ is a conjunction of formal conditions on
experience”. It is unfortunate that Kant restricts himself to existence state-
ments. There is no obvious block here to extending the account to different
form propositions to cover different modal claims, i.e.
It is possible that p ≡ ¬∃ϕ(Cϕ & (ϕ→ ¬p))
It is necessary that p ≡ ∃ϕ(Cϕ & (ϕ→ p))
One might worry that this kind of modality is supposed to be modality
of things, so we should retain a restriction at least to singular propositions
containing proper names of things. However, it is not the proposition which
is possible or necessary that distinguishes the modality of things from the
modality of the “form of thought”, but the fact that the former is relative
to possible experience and conditions on it.
For if [the categories of modality] are not to have a purely logi-
cal significance, analytically expressing the form of thought, but
are to refer to the possibility, actuality, or necessity of things,
they must concern possible experience and its synthetic unity, in
which alone objects of knowledge can be given. (A219/B267)
So it seems that anything can relate to the “modality of things”, so long as
it is a matter of a relation to conditions on possible experience.
Kant’s views are more complicated when it comes to necessity. I have
presented a formulation of necessary existence as follows.
a necessarily exists ≡ ∃ϕ(Cϕ & (ϕ→ ∃xAx))
The notion of necessary existence here is not a bad one—it doesn’t seem
to be incoherent or out of keeping with the general postulate for necessity.
It is just that, according to Kant, nothing can ever satisfy that condition.
Why not? Here is one plausible rationale, based on other claims that Kant
makes. The formal conditions on experience are all general in form, e.g.,
some might be:
(C1) ∀x(x is a unity ∨ x is a plurality ∨ x is a totality)
(From the categories of quantity)
(C2) ∀x(x is outer ⊃ x is in space)
(From the forms of intuition)
If all these conditions are general in form, one cannot yield a theorem that
is particular in form, and in particular one will not be able to yield theorems
of the form that there exists something that is thus and so. Only by adding
ancillary particular premises will a particular conclusion be derived. And
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this is what Kant suggests: something can exist necessarily only on a prior
condition of something else existing. One might reply, in classical logic it is
assumed that at least one thing exists, so we are allowed to instantiate from
universally quantified statements. Even so, via such a method we would
only be able to yield the most basic of necessary existence claims, such as
Necessarily, there is an object.
Necessarily, there is something which is either a unity, a plurality
or a totality.
And perhaps even reifications of a priori features such as
Necessarily, space exists.
It seems that Kant has the resources to mount a principled defence of his
insistence that most (if not all) necessary existence is conditional. I dis-
cuss the consequences of this for mathematical and abstract objects below
(section 4.5).
How can Kant’s conditional necessities be clearly formulated? One might
take it to simply be a case of conjoining the relevant extra existence propo-
sition with the conjunction of conditions, i.e.
s2 necessarily exists, conditional upon the existence of s1 ≡
∃ϕ(Cϕ & ((ϕ & ∃xS1x)→ ∃xS2x))
where S1x and S2x are predicates expressing the concepts of the states s1
and s2 respectively. One potential problem with this is it looks like the
existence of the condition state s1 will itself turn out to be necessary, after
all, the following will be trivially true as well.
∃ϕ(Cϕ & ((ϕ & ∃xS1x)→ ∃xS1x))
However, this does not make s1 necessary relative to the conditions of possi-
ble experience taken alone, but relative to those conditions plus the existence
of s1. So s1 only exists necessarily in the sense that it follows from the fact
that s1 exists that s1 exists.
The problem remains that, given that Kant seems to have causal ne-
cessity in mind (A227/B279), this doesn’t capture the difference in causal
status between s1 and s2. s2 may be necessary conditional upon s1 in the
sense that s2 is caused by s1, but the conditional necessity of s1 is not that
it is self-caused. How might the necessary connection between cause and
effect be properly captured? Perhaps there are certain principles allowing
us to discern what can and cannot be a cause or an effect. One such prin-
ciple might be that a cause must occur before its effect, or in other words,
if the existence of a state is the cause of the existence of another state,
then the former must exist before the latter. Finally, suppose that we can
introduce temporal parameters into the state-existence propositions. Now,
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take a state-existence proposition of the form ∃txS1x (there is a state s1
existing at time t), which is going to be our cause. Suppose that the causal
laws included in the set of conditions of possible experience together with
this proposition entail, amongst other things, the following state-existence
proposition: ∃t+nxS2x (there is a state s2 existing at time t + n). Looking
at the temporal parameters, we can see that this second state occurs later
than the other state, and so it may be that the first counts as a cause of the
second.18 Although the set of conditions along with the cause-proposition
entail other necessities, such as the cause-proposition itself, principles of
causality such as the one suggested above will allow us to discern which of
these conditional necessities are causal necessities. In particular, given our
cause-proposition premise, we will be able to pick out our effect-proposition
as being causally necessitated, whereas the cause-proposition is merely triv-
ially conditionally necessitated by itself. This is only a brief sketch, but it
is at least a suggestion of how to reconcile Kant’s comments about causal
necessity here with what is looking to be a fairly coherent view of relative
necessity. (In developing Kant’s ideas further, one might prefer to treat
causal necessity as a kind of physical necessity, and separate it from real
necessity.)
Formulated in these relative terms, this view takes us further away from
thinking about modality in terms of predicates, let alone first-level predi-
cates. We started with a modal concept which applied to objects, and we
seem to have ended up with a condition on a proposition. I started with
something of the form
a is possible
and suggested that this be understood as
a possibly exists
which I have treated as a modal operator applying to an existence proposi-
tion, i.e.
It is possible that a exists.
Considering my interest here is in the modal part, this could be any propo-
sition, i.e.
It is possible that p
The relative modality formulation is indeed a complex condition which con-
cerns a proposition.
18I say, it may be a cause of the second, because I am not assuming that temporal
succession is sufficient for a causal connection, but only taking it to be an example of a
necessary condition.
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¬∃ϕ(Cϕ & (ϕ→ ¬p))
The modal concepts no longer look like predicates at all (see section 4.3.1),
but rather sentence-operators. What looked like a second-level modal pred-
icate has been treated by extracting the modal element, and positing a
relation between the completed predication (the proposition) and some con-
ditions, i.e. the proposition that something falls under the concept F is
logically compatible with formal conditions of experience. This seems to be
the best way to clearly formulate the idea suggested by Kant when he writes
of the concept of a thing being compatible with or determined by conditions
on possible experience.
This conclusion should not be alarming. First, it explains why there
is such a wide gulf between the other categories and the modal categories.
Kant’s modal categories are not determining predicates because they are
not, in their most basic logical form, predicates at all, properly expressed as
sentence-operators rather than predicate letters.
What is perhaps misleading is not only Kant’s presentation in terms of
concepts and predicates, but also his announcement that this is the modality
of things. One might expect, then, that an account of de re modality was
going to be directly presented, the contrast being with modality of judg-
ments (from the Table of Judgments) as an account of de dicto modality. In
fact, this gets things all wrong. Kant’s account of the modality of judgments
has little to do with alethic modality, and is rather an account of properties
that token judgments have in virtue of their position in a course of reason-
ing.19 The contrast of the modality of things is made against merely logical
modality.
For if [the principles of modality] are not to have a purely logical
significance, analytically expressing the form of thought, but are
to refer to the possibility, actuality, or necessity of things, they
must concern possible experience. (A219/B267)
As I noted above, the kind of modality discussed in the Postulates has to
do with conditions on possible experience. This is contrasted with log-
ical modality. In short, logical possibility is only concerned with non-
contradictoriness, however, for a thing to be really possible the concept of
the thing must not only be non-contradictory, but that something falls un-
der that concept must be compatible with extra conditions, i.e. conditions
on possible experience. If it were not, it could not be part of the empirical
world. This does not introduce a de re/de dicto distinction. It introduces a
distinction between logical and real modality. Doesn’t this leave us wanting
for an account of de re metaphysical modality as well as de dicto? I will
consider this issue in section 5.3.2.
19See section 4.1.1 and Leech (forthcoming).
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One might worry that there is some incongruity in the emerging account,
given the arguments for existence being a second-level predicate; the related
arguments that modal concepts, including existence, are not first-level pred-
icates; and the conclusion that modal concepts are properly expressed as
sentence-operators, not predicates at all. First, the negative claim can be
taken as the same for the modal concepts and existence alike, namely, that
they are not first-level predicates. Second, one can avoid an uncomfort-
able incongruity by distinguishing between existence and actuality. I noted
above (section 4.2.2) that Kant himself distinguishes between the two. I also
suggested that we should understand Kant’s modal adjectives, such as “is
possible”, in terms of existence, i.e. “possibly exists”. Recall, Kant claims
that the notion of existence is complicit in the three main modal concepts.
Because the modal concepts possibility, actuality and necessity are cashed
out as possible existence, actual existence and necessary existence, actual-
ity and existence cannot be the same concept: the latter is a proper part
of the former.20 This allows us to retain the second-level predicate view
of “exists”, whilst giving a different treatment of “actually”. “Exists” can
be a second-level predicate, as in “∃xCx”, whilst “actually” can indicate a
condition on these kinds of existence statements, expressed by a sentence-
operator, as in “@(∃xCx)”. (The meaning of the operator “@” would then
be given by something like: actually p if, and only if, p is “bound up with
the material conditions of experience”.)
Finally, further evidence in favour of this relative modality interpretation
of Kant can be taken from the following, written around 1782/3, between
the two editions of the Critique.
Physical possibility is that which does not conflict with the laws
of experience; this one can easily comprehend, e.g., that a large
palace could be built in four weeks is physically impossible.
Morally possible is that which is possible according to the rules
of morals, and does not conflict with the general law of freedom.
(Kant, 1782–3, 29:812)
Here Kant can be seen to be applying a relative modality view to differ-
ent kinds of modality, according to the base class of propositions to which
they are relative. E.g., moral possibility is that which is compatible with
propositions expressing the “rules of morals”. He also gives further exam-
ples of things which are possible or impossible according to taking different
conditions or “hypotheses” into account.
E.g. it is possible that a human being should arrive at vast
riches, but due to laziness, unsuitability, and a lack of wealthy
20Here I am leaning on the containment metaphor. One might otherwise say: if actuality
in fact means actual existence, then actuality analytically entails existence. However, the
argument goes, the reverse entailment does not hold, i.e. from existence to actuality. So
the concepts must be distinct.
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relatives it is impossible. Something can be possible in itself,
while hypothetically, under either its logical or real hypothesis,
it is impossible. (Kant, 1782–3, 29:813)
In this section I have tried to show that Kant’s expansion on the modal
categories in the Postulates can be naturally and plausibly read as a partic-
ular kind of relative modality view. Moreover, there is evidence in Kant’s
Lectures on Metaphysics that he held a relative modality view more gener-
ally. With a relative modality framework in place, the next major step is
to examine what kind of relative modality Kant is describing, and the dis-
tinguishing features of the class of propositions to which it is relative. The
next few sections should begin to cast some light on this issue.
4.3.3 The Categories and “Kantian Modality”
So far I have focused on what Kant has to say about each particular modal
concept, and brought out an account in terms of propositions being compat-
ible with or a consequence of conditions on possible experience. Alternative
approaches to understanding Kant on modality focus on his account of con-
cepts, and in particular pure concepts of the understanding, i.e. categories.
In this section I consider how one might understand Kant’s notion of a cat-
egory, and the kinds of conclusions that have been drawn from the thesis
that modal concepts are categories. Finally, I assess how this understanding
of “Kantian Modality” can be best integrated with the relative account that
has emerged so far.
The categories are concepts that must be applied in experience in order
for us to experience the world as we do. These concepts are not acquired from
experience, but are prerequisites for experience. Kant thus also calls them a
priori concepts, as opposed to empirical concepts. Kant is also famous for
his transcendental idealism. One way to understand transcendental idealism
is as the thesis that humans (and similarly-minded creatures) can only have
experience of appearances, and not of things-in-themselves. Our minds are
such that there are certain a priori constraints on how we experience things.
Appearances are shaped by these constraints, e.g., space and time are forms
imposed upon the world by us. The world we experience, the empirical world
investigated by science, is a world of appearances. Transcendental idealism
is contrasted with transcendental realism, the view that we can experience
things-in-themselves directly.
Philosophers often get nervous when transcendental idealism is men-
tioned. Lots of difficult questions concerning the nature of appearances and
things-in-themselves, and how we are to interpret such a distinction, are in-
evitably raised. But it is wrong to think that in order to profit from some of
Kant’s ideas, we are always required to pay the admission price of defending
transcendental idealism. For a start, that would involve a potentially endless
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digression, and we wouldn’t make any progress on other, potentially more
fruitful, aspects of Kant’s work. What I want to do, as far as possible, is
to set transcendental idealism to one side, and focus on some of the aspects
of Kant’s view that are more obviously related to what he has to say about
modal concepts. The modal concepts are taken by Kant to be categories, so
one such aspect of Kant’s view to be considered is the notion of a category,
and how that can be made sense of independently of an obvious commitment
to transcendental idealism.
One may wish to hold on to the idea that certain concepts or features
are somehow fundamental to human experience, or a priori in some sense,
without having to be a full-blown transcendental idealist. Strawson has
offered an alternative to the “transcendental idealist interpretation” of a
priori concepts, the “austere interpretation”.
In the first, or austere, interpretation a concept or feature (el-
ement) could be called a priori if it was an essential structural
element in any conception of experience which we could make
intelligible to ourselves. In the second, or transcendental ideal-
ist, interpretation to call an element a priori was to claim that
its presence as a feature of experience was attributable entirely
to the nature of our cognitive constitution and not at all to the
nature of those things, as they are in themselves, which affect
that constitution to yield experience. (Strawson, 1966, p. 68)
Concepts can be understood as a priori by making reference to conceptions
of experience. This is in contrast to an interpretation which relies on making
reference to cognitive constitution and to “things-in-themselves”. The for-
mer interpretation thus avoids both having to make specific psychological
claims about our cognitive make-up, and having to engage in speculative
metaphysics concerning these odd “things-in-themselves”, and what role
they might play in determining various aspects of our experience.
To show that a concept or feature was a priori in Strawson’s austere
sense would involve having to show that this concept or feature was in-
deed essential to any intelligible conception of experience. In The Bounds of
Sense, Strawson lists what he thinks are the main theses Kant puts forward
regarding essential features of experience, i.e. ‘what the limiting features
must be of any notion of experience which we can make intelligible to our-
selves’ (1966, p. 24).
1. The temporality thesis: experience essentially exhibits temporal suc-
cession.
2. The thesis of the necessary unity of consciousness: there must be
such unity among the members of some temporally extended series of
experiences as is required for the possibility of self-consciousness, or
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self-ascription of experiences, on the part of a subject of such experi-
ences.
3. The thesis of objectivity : experience must include awareness of objects
which are distinguishable from experiences of them in the sense that
judgments about these objects are judgments about what is the case ir-
respective of the actual occurrence of particular subjective experiences
of them.
4. The spatiality thesis: the objects referred to in (3) are essentially spa-
tial.
5. The thesis of spatio-temporal unity : there must be one unified (spatio-
temporal) framework of empirical reality embracing all experience and
its objects.
6. The theses of the Analogies: certain principles of permanence and
causality must be satisfied in the physical or objective world of things
in space. (See Strawson (1966, p. 24))
Each thesis is clearly a significant issue in its own right. E.g., issues con-
cerning whether experience has to involve temporal succession, or whether
temporal succession and extension in experience is a necessary condition for
self-consciousness, have been widely discussed and form a significant topic
for debate in their own right, with a rich philosophical history. (See Brentano
(1913ff), Russell (1913), Stout (1930), and more recently, Kelly (2005a,b),
Dainton (2000) and many others.) It can be seen that to engage with even
one of these theses is a significant task, let alone all of them.
Strawson goes on to assess which, if any, of these theses can be upheld,
and the kinds of arguments required. Someone wanting to uphold the the-
sis that modal concepts are categories might follow Strawson’s lead. One
version of a Kantian account of modality might claim that any notion of
experience which we can make intelligible to ourselves will include modal
elements and argue accordingly. I will not pursue this in detail here, but
will offer a brief suggestion of ways to argue for this kind of claim.
Keeping closely in line with Kant, one might argue that our application
of modal concepts to experience is required for and embodies that unity of
consciousness which makes any experience possible at all.
In the Deduction we find a repeated insistence that a certain
connectedness and unity among our experiences is necessary to
constitute them experiences of an objective and law-governed
world; that the concepts of the object which we apply in experi-
ence embody the rules of such unity; and that this rule-governed
connexion of experiences under concepts of the objective is pre-
cisely what is required for the necessary unity of consciousness,
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i.e. for the possibility of self-consciousness. (Strawson, 1966, pp.
26–7)
There are two ways one might to try to develop the idea that modal concepts
are categories in this way, i.e. that modal concepts are required to contribute
to the unity of experience. First, one might argue that “things being modal”
or “things being modally related” is a necessary feature of a unified world
of experience, this being achieved by our applying modal concepts to the
world. Take causation: perhaps the idea that events are causally related
is a necessary one for any unity in experience, otherwise we could not link
different experienced events in an orderly manner. Therefore, causation is
an essential feature of experience, without which there would be no unity of
experience, nor unity of consciousness. It is not clear how modal concepts
such as real possibility and necessity could be argued to play this role.
An alternative way to develop this idea is to go deeper and argue that
the rule-like nature of the concepts which embody this necessary unity is a
modal matter, and so modality is built right into the foundations of con-
ceptualized human experience, in the modal nature of concepts themselves.
E.g., perhaps the concept of causation embodies the unity of experience,
but possession of any concept at all, including the concept of causation, re-
quires some ability to think modally. Brandom (2008) and Baldwin (2002)
each have arguments for the view that concept-possession and our reasoning
practices are inescapably modal. The conclusion is that modality is an in-
escapable feature of conceptual thought and inference. Combined with the
assumption that concept-possession and/or reasoning practices are essential
to human experience, these arguments can be used to mount an argument
for modality being an inescapable feature of human experience. At least
they purport to show that the cognitive resources required for the making
of modal judgments, or the possession of modal concepts, are requirements
for any kind of concept possession at all.
The arguments from Brandom and Baldwin are rather similar, and both
take Kant to be their source. Brandom discusses what he calls “the modal
Kant-Sellars thesis”, comprised of two claims:
1. In using ordinary empirical vocabulary, one already knows how to do
everything one needs to know how to do in order to introduce and
deploy modal vocabulary.
2. The expressive role characteristic of alethic modal vocabulary is to
make explicit semantic, conceptual connections and commitments that
are already implicit in the use of ordinary empirical vocabulary. (Bran-
dom, 2008, p. 102)
Brandom argues for the view that the practices and abilities which underlie
the ability to deploy alethic modal vocabulary are practices and abilities
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which are required to underlie the deployment of any empirical vocabulary
at all. This is because the ability to understand the vocabulary (possess the
requisite concepts) requires the ability to assess the robustness of material
inferences in counterfactual situations involving those concepts, which in
turn requires the ability to think counterfactually, i.e. modally. E.g.,
One grasps the claim “the lioness is hungry” only insofar as one
takes it to have various consequences (which would be true if it
were true) and rule out some others (which would not be true if
it were true). And it is not intelligible that one should endorse
as materially good an inference involving it, such as the inference
from “the lioness is hungry” to “nearby prey animals visible to
and accessible by the lioness are in danger of being eaten,” but be
disposed to make no distinction at all between collateral premises
that would, and those that would not, if true infirm the inference.
One must make some distinction such as that the inference would
still go through if the lioness were standing two inches to the
East of her actual position, the day happened to be a Tuesday,
or a small tree ten miles away cast its shadow over a beetle, but
not if she were shot with a tranquilizing dart, the temperature
instantly plummeted 300 degrees, or a plane crashed, crushing
her. The claim is not that one could not fail to assess some
or even all of these particular counterfactuals correctly and still
count as grasping the claim that is their premise, but that one
could not so qualify if one made no such distinctions. (Brandom,
2008, p. 105)
In other words, properly understanding a concept or a piece of vocabulary
involves some grasp of the consequences of difference scenarios for instances
of the concept. That grasp of consequences involves the ability to reason
counterfactually. And the ability to reason counterfactually, or the practice
of reasoning counterfactually, is sufficent to account for the introduction of
modal vocabulary. This accounts for part 1 of the modal Kant-Sellars thesis,
and presents one way to understand modal concepts as being an essential
element of experience: any possession and use of concepts (any use of em-
pirical vocabulary) relies on a prior grasp of modal concepts (vocabulary).
Part 2 of the thesis goes on to claim that modal vocabulary is expressive,
rather than descriptive.
Baldwin makes a similar claim, that possession of a concept requires the
ability to apply it in possible as well as actual situations. This is cashed-out
in terms of an ability to reason from the supposition that a certain concept
applies in a possible situation.
I start from Kant’s thesis that concepts are rules for the un-
derstanding whose application to experience requires that they
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be also applicable by the imagination (A124–6). For this sug-
gests that the ability to apply a concept correctly to observed
actual situations requires the capacity to apply it in the course
of deliberation concerning possible situations as well, and thus
that there is a intrinsically modal aspect to the possession and
use of concepts. But all this needs more elucidation. Concepts,
on this account, are not simply capacities to respond accurately
to types of observed phenomena by registering their presence.
Their role in framing desires and intentions already shows an
ability to apply them to what is thought of as nonactual. . . .
Yet although non-actuality is an ingredient of mere possi-
bility, not everything non-actual is possible and more needs to
be said to fill out the role of modality in characterising concept
possession. We get closer to this, I think, by considering what is
characteristic of the ability to understand what it would be for
something to be both F and G. For the obvious account is that
it involves an ability to reason concerning the implications, both
positive and negative, of the hypothesis that something is both
F and G, where the ability to identify these implications does
not require knowledge of whether or not they actually obtain.
This suggestion connects concept-possession with a capacity for
reasoning, and this is, I think, the fundamental aspect of the
matter. (Baldwin, 2002, pp. 9–10)
Like Brandom, Baldwin claims that modal abilities and practices inherent
in reasoning underlie concept possession. Part of understanding a concept is
being able to reason concerning the consequences for instances of the concept
in different scenarios, and the interaction of the concept with others in such
scenarios. This reasoning is where modality enters in. Insofar as we are
conceptual creatures, these arguments purport to show that modality is an
inescapable feature of our conceptual lives. We have a way to understand
Kant’s notion of a modal category: a practice or ability necessary for any
concept possession at all, which can be expressed in terms of further concepts
(modal concepts).
The conclusion that modal concepts are (or the ability to think modally
is) a prerequisite for conceptual thought and experience is all very well, but
it does not yet say much about the nature of modality. Perhaps there are
genuine, objective, mind-independent modal properties of things, perhaps
even concrete, spatiotemporally and causally-isolated possible worlds, con-
stituting modality in reality, and by happy coincidence our ability to possess
and use concepts is underpinned by an ability to possess and use modal con-
cepts which capture this aspect of reality. The second part of Brandom’s
modal Kant-Sellars thesis claims that the role of modal vocabulary is to
“make explicit” semantic and conceptual commitments and connections in
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our use of ordinary empirical vocabulary, not to describe how things are
modally in the world. Similarly, Baldwin develops his view by arguing that
modal judgments are expressive of our norms of reasoning, which are the
modal notions underlying our use of concepts. He notes that if modal judg-
ments were just reports of modal connections between concepts, this would
hardly be an improvement on an account where modal judgments are taken
to be reports of modal connections between properties and objects.
For on this view,21 concepts come, like atoms, with an intrinsic
modal ‘valency’ that enables them to join up with other concepts
in the molecular patterns that our ordinary modal judgments
capture. This would be a realist account of the matter; and
the objection to it is that it seems not much less mysterious
than the accounts of modality propounded by those who rely
on Aristotelian essences or merely possible worlds. All that the
conceptualist move has achieved is that the grounds for unease
have been shifted by locating primitive modality at the level of
sense (concepts) rather than at the level of reference (properties,
worlds); but this does not remove the unease. (Baldwin, 2002,
p. 12)
The idea is that such modal connections are no less mysterious for being
between concepts rather than objects, but if we take modal judgments (i.e.
judgments with apparent modal content) to be expressions (rather than
descriptions) of our norms of reasoning with concepts, then we have an
explanation of the source of our modal commitments and judgments, with-
out having to explain these mysterious, objective, modal relations between
things.
. . . the anti-realist . . . holds that modal judgment is the expres-
sion of norms inherent in the capacity that we have to reason
from our thoughts which is essential to our capacity to have
thoughts at all. (Baldwin, 2002, p. 13)
E.g., the anti-realist might take a judgment that necessarily, all bachelors are
unmarried, to be an expression of norms inherent in the capacity to reason
using the concepts bachelor and unmarried, norms which are essential to
our capacity to have thoughts using these concepts at all.
To discuss the pros and cons of such a view is too great a task for present
purposes. The pertinent question here is how far this view is an accurate
reflection of Kant’s view of modality, and whether these considerations are
helpful in developing a viable version of Kant’s view. First, if I make a
statement of the form “x possibly exists”, then according to the view I have
21In the course of reasoning we are guided by our grasp of the internal relations between
the concepts involved.
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attributed to Kant, this conveys the information that the proposition that
x exists is compatible with the formal conditions on experience. It does
not appear to be merely expressive of this, but in fact has that content,
with clearly defined truth-conditions, i.e. the compatibility or not of that
proposition with those.22 So an expressivist account does not immediately
seem appropriate. However, any relative account of modality of this kind
faces a challenge to give an account of logical necessity. If a Baldwin-style
account of modality were to have any bite, it is likely that it would have to
be here, at the level of logical necessity. After all, Kant owes us an account
of the notions of compatibility and determination which underlie his account
of the modality of things. If I am right to read these as logical compatibilty
and determination, then an account of these notions will be required.
Another consideration is that relative accounts of modality owe an ex-
planation of the status of the propositions in the base class, from which
relative necessities follow. One can take any set of propositions and find out
what is logically necessary relative to them, but this does not explain why
we take some classes of propositions to be especially important and inter-
esting, e.g. those propositions from which all the natural necessities follow,
or those from which all the metaphysical necessities follow. In a Kantian
framework, one can perhaps use the idea that there are categories to address
this concern. In the case of Kant’s real modality, the modality of things,
the special status of the conditions from which the real necessities follow
is that they are derived from the categories. These conditions describe the
prerequisites for having any experience of an objective world at all. E.g., all
objects must be causally efficacious, of a particular magnitude, and so on.
What makes the base class of propositions to which real necessity is relative
special is that they lay out, in the form of conditions or laws, those features
that are essential to experience.
Recall, the modal categories are different to the other three groups.
Whereas the categories of quantity, quality and relation are supposed to
directly comprise conceptual prerequisites for experience, i.e. universal con-
ditions on experience, the modal categories concern a relation to the univer-
sal conditions on experience. So, if the modal categories are also conceptual
prerequisites for experience, this means, roughly speaking, that an essen-
tial prerequisite for experience is that we have the conceptual resources to
assess concepts of things against the universal conditions on experience.
Not only are there constraints on what we can experience, such as causal
connection and so on, but there is also a requirement that we be able to re-
flect upon those constraints, e.g. consider the concept of a causally-isolated
object against the background of conditions on experience. Strawson has
described the task of the first Critique as being ‘the investigation of that
limiting framework of ideas and principles the use and application of which
22Depending on whether logical modality is given an expressivist treatment.
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are essential to empirical knowledge, and which are implicit in any coher-
ent conception of experience which we can form’ (1966, p. 18). Perhaps
another principle to be added to Strawson’s suggested list (shown above) of
the main theses might be called “the thesis of transcendental reflection”. So
long as one takes there to be essential features of any intellgible conception
of experience, one should think that one such feature is the ability to reflect
on this very fact, that there are such features, and their consequences for
what can, must, and could never be a part of our experience as a result.
Kant’s relative account of real modality has most opportunity to become
“Kantian” when we consider what to make of the propositions to which it is
relative. The particular account of the real modal concepts is a relative one,
where they are logical necessities relative to a set of base propositions. A
peculiarly Kantian flavour is added by the details of the account of the status
and source of these base propositions, in terms of universal conditions on
possible experience. A Kantian account of logical necessity—the necessity
to which real necessity is relative—would further bolster this “Kantian”
flavour. In Chapter 3 I developed and defended a broadly Kantian view
of logical necessity. In Chapter 5 I will develop the idea of a base class of
propositions expressing something like conditions on possible experience as
underlying an account of the contemporary notion of metaphysical modality
as relative.
This may be an apt point to consider an objection to this kind of Kantian
view. This account has to take seriously the idea of a priori concepts, and
has to give an account of these. The standard transcendental idealist account
in terms of the nature of our cognitive faculties is open to an objection made
by Russell.
Our nature is as much a fact of the existing world as anything,
and there can be no certainty that it will remain constant. It
might happen, if Kant is right, that to-morrow our nature would
so change as to make two and two become five. (Russell, 1912,
p. 49)
If the categories depend upon our cognitive make-up, and our cognitive
make-up is an inconstant matter, then any account of possibility and neces-
sity grounded in our cognitive make-up will make possibility and necessity
themselves inconstant. In particular, a worrying case is that, given that
Kant takes mathematics to be synthetic, mathematical propositions may
turn out to be contingent, in the sense that they may change over time.
This would be unacceptable.
The moral to take from Russell’s worry is to take care in giving an
account of the categories and the base class of propositions from which the
metaphysical and mathematical necessities follow. If one chooses to ground
this base class in an account of something like the categories, then this
worry will have to be considered. In giving an account of the conceptual
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prerequisites for having any experience of an objective world one must ensure
that these prerequisites are not tied too closely to contingent human features.
In short, other philosophers have taken Kantian modality to concern
modal prerequisites involved in concept possession, where modal statements
are thereby expressive, rather than descriptive. This is in contrast to the
relative modality view I have attributed to Kant. However, one can drawn
on the same ideas, concerning the idea of categories or essential features of
any intelligible conception of experience, to give a peculiarly Kantian flavour
to a relative modality view.
4.3.4 Mind-Dependence
A so-called “Kantian” account of modality is often billed as treating modal-
ity as mind-dependent in some sense. Mind-dependence is traditionally un-
derstood in modal terms, i.e. a phenomenon, object, property or fact etc.
is said to be mind-dependent just when there is no possible world in which
crucial aspects of our mental lives are different, and the phenomenon, ob-
ject, property or fact still exists (it is not possible for these mental aspects
to be different and the phenomenon etc. still to exist). Similarly, mind-
independence is a case of the phenomenon existing in a world where crucial
aspects of our mental lives are different (it is possible for these mental as-
pects to vary and the phenomenon still to exist).23
Baldwin (2002) introduces his broadly Kantian approach as a middle way
between Aristotelian and Humean approaches (having already dismissed a
Lewisian approach).
As in ethics we can, I think, distinguish three further types of po-
sition: a broadly Aristotelian position that speaks of the essences
of kinds of substance: a position that develops Kant’s view that
modal concepts are categories, a priori concepts of the under-
standing, whose warrant lies in the fact that they enter into the
constitution of any possible conceptual scheme that provides for
objective truth: and a Humean ‘projectivist’ view of necessity,
as an expression of the irresistibility of certain judgments, or of
the fact that we find their denial unimaginable. (2002, p. 7)
Of the alternatives to full-blooded realism, the Kantian position
appears, to me at least, prima facie the most attractive. For it
offers the prospect of an account which does not treat modal-
ity as a primitive feature of reality, in the way that an appeal
to Aristotelian essences appears to, while equally avoiding the
subjectivism of Humean projectivism. (2002, p. 9)
23Jenkins (2005) contrasts this standard modal definition with a notion of essential
dependence.
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The Humean will take modality to be a projection of certain attitudes,
analogous perhaps to the property of being funny. To be funny just is to
make people laugh. Likewise, to be necessary just is to engender certain
responses, e.g. for it to be difficult to imagine the contrary. Although a
Kantian view is not based on subjective responses in this way, it still seems
to rely on the subject insofar as the account relies on notions which appear
to involve minds, such as experience or concepts.
If any kind of modality is going to count as mind-dependent, this is not
part of the structure of RM. Recall the general structure of the view:
It is R-necessary that p: ∃ϕ(Ψϕ & (ϕ→ p))
It is R-possible that p: ¬∃ϕ(Ψϕ & (ϕ→ ¬p))
Looking at this, how might a kind of relative modality be mind-dependent?
First, one might consider the case where the condition Ψϕ picks out a set
of mind-dependent truths. So being R-necessary would be mind-dependent
when the truths to which it is relative are mind-dependent. The absence
of minds would prevent the existential condition from being fulfilled. So
nothing could be R-necessary. However, this would not obviously render
R-possibility mind-dependent. After all, there being no such conjunction of
propositions is one way in which 〈p〉 can turn out to be possible: there is
nothing to rule out 〈p〉.
Another way for relative modalities to be mind-dependent would be
if the modality to which they are relative—logical modality—were mind-
dependent. In Chapter 3 I argued that one can give an account of log-
ical necessity which is compatible with RM in terms of laws of thought.
Surely thought and thinking are mind-dependent phenomena if anything is,
so perhaps one should also take the laws which govern thought to be mind-
dependent, insofar as they govern a mind-dependent phenomenon. In this
case, logical modality would turn out to be mind-dependent. And then, any
kind of modality which is a mere relative form of logical modality would also
be rendered mind-dependent.
However, things are not quite so straightforward. For a start, it is not
clear whether the existence of laws governing a phenomenon depends upon
the existence of that phenomenon. E.g., if no motor vehicles existed, would
the law that one should drive on the left in the UK also not exist, or would
it just be useless? Consider also general statements concerning non-existent
things, e.g., that all unicorns have a horn. Such statements are usually taken
to be trivially true. But then, general statements do not need to rely on
the existence of whatever they describe for their truth. Likewise, if there
were no thinking creatures, there might still be general truths concerning
thinking, which might be called “laws of thought”. Indeed, one might argue
that in order for it to be true that there is no thinking going on, the criterion
by which something counts as thinking or not is required to exist. Otherwise
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there might be no fact of the matter.
Both kinds of strategy for introducing mind-dependence—mind-depend-
ent conditions or a mind-dependent account of logical necessity—turn on
the idea that the existence of relevant constraints, norms or laws will be on-
tologically dependent upon the existence of creatures capable of experience
or conceptual thought. Another way to reject this general move would be to
hold that things such as concepts, norms and laws are abstract, and there-
fore eternally and necessarily existent. The existence of suitably-minded
creatures is presumably not even true throughout actual history, let alone
necessarily.
It looks like the mind-dependence claim is going to be difficult to main-
tain. After all, even if there were no minds like ours, one might think that
from a God’s eye view it is still true that such and such conditions on possi-
ble experience like ours have certain logical consequence and compatibility
relations to other propositions. However, there are reasons to think that
Kant wouldn’t agree: even if a proposition p were logically compatible with
conditions on possible experience, this would mean nothing to a mind dif-
ferent to ours, and especially to a mind like God’s. Kant frequently makes a
distinction between a discursive understanding—an understanding like ours
which requires input from sensible intuition in addition to concepts to be
combined into cognition—and an intuitive understanding, which enjoys the
benefits of “intellectual intuition”. An intuitive intellect would merely need
to think of something for it to exist, whereas our discursive understanding
requires input from sensible intuition.
Now, consider, if to think of something is immediately for it to exist,
what sense would it make for such an understanding to think of a thing as
merely possible? Not a lot. By contrast, a distinction between possibility
and actuality is written in to the fundamental structure of the discursive
intellect, in the gap between the mere concept of a thing, which is possible,
and confirmation of the actual existence of a thing given through sensible
intuition.24 In the Critique of Judgment Kant writes
Human understanding cannot avoid the necessity of drawing a
distinction between the possibility and the actuality of things.
The reason for this lies in our own selves and the nature of our
cognitive faculties. For were it not that two entirely heteroge-
neous factors, the understanding for concepts and sensuous intu-
ition for the corresponding objects, are required for the exercise
of these faculties, there would be no distinction between the pos-
sible and the actual. This means that if our understanding were
intuitive it would have no objects but such as are actual. Con-
cepts, which are merely directly to the possibility of an object,
24Thank you to Bob Stern for drawing my attention to this line of thought across Kant’s
works.
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and sensuous intuitions, which give us something and yet do not
thereby let us cognize it as an object, would both cease to exist.
Now the whole distinction which we draw between the merely
possible and the actual rests upon the fact that possibility signi-
fies the position of the representation of the thing relative to our
concept, and, in general, to our capacity of thinking, whereas ac-
tuality signifies the positing of the thing in its intrinsic existence
apart from this concept. Accordingly the distinction of possible
from actual things is one that is merely valid subjectively for
human understanding. (Kant, 1790, 401–2)
An understanding into whose mode of cognition this distinction
did not enter would express itself by saying: All objects that
I know are, that is, exist; and the possibility of some that did
not exist, in other words, their contingency supposing them to
exist, and, therefore, the necessity that would be placed in con-
tradistinction to this contingency, would never enter into the
imagination of such a being. (Kant, 1790, 403)
Note that Kant takes the cognate notion of necessity to be insignificant to the
intuitive understanding along with any notion of possibility or contingency.
The idea of concepts which are important for our lives as lived through a
discursive understanding and yet irrelevant to the intuitive intellect occurs
across Kant’s work. In the Critique of Pure Reason, he stresses that the
categories would be “meaningless” for the intuitive understanding.
For were I to think an understanding which is itself intuitive
(as, for example, a divine understanding which should not rep-
resent to itself given objects, but through whose representation
the objects should themselves be given or produced), the cate-
gories would have no meaning [Bedeutung ] whatsoever in respect
of such a mode of cognition. (Kant, 1781, 1787, B145)
(See also B308–9). The real modal concepts are themselves categories, so a
fortiori these modal concepts will have no meaning for the intuitive under-
standing. This line of thought also extends to Kant’s practical philosophy, in
his claim that moral obligation and imperatives, as expressed by the moral
‘ought’, have no meaning for a holy will which will always do the right thing
anyway.
A perfectly good will would, therefore, equally stand under ob-
jective laws (of the good), but it could not on this account be rep-
resented as necessitated to actions in conformity with law since
of itself, by its subjective constitution, it can be determined only
through the representation of the good. Hence no imperatives
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hold for the divine will and in general for a holy will: the ‘ought’
is out of place here, because volition is of itself necessarily in
accord with the law. Therefore imperatives are only formulae
expressing the relation of objective laws of volition in general to
the subjective imperfection of the will of this or that rational
being, for example, of the human will. (Kant, 1797, 4:414)
For Kant, it makes no sense for a divine will to be obliged to do something
that it will always do anyway. In contrast, our human will is often confused
by desires which do not accord with the moral law, and so needs a sense of
duty or obligation in order to guide us in making the right choices.
There are two main ways one might choose to read this line of thought.
First, the notions of possibility and necessity are insignificant to the intuitive
intellect in the sense of not mattering to them, even though they make sense.
On this reading, God (with an intuitive understanding) might agree that
it is really possible that p insofar as it is logically compatible with some
other propositions, which relate the conditions on possible experience for a
discurive intellect, even though he (or she) himself (herself) does not have
any use for these notions, and even though they have no application to his
(her) own experience. So a proposition could count as really possible, say,
even if there existed no minds of the appropriate kind.
In contrast, the second reading takes these notions to be insignificant in
the sense that they are meaningless, such that God wouldn’t even under-
stand what it would be to be possible or necessary. On this reading, from
the perspective of an intuitive understanding, it wouldn’t even make sense
to classify something as possible—propositions containing modal concepts
would be meaningless, not even false. In this case, it seems that possibility
and necessity will be heavily dependent, not only on the existence of the
appropriate kind of minds—those with a discursive understanding—but on
the perspective from which a judgment is made, i.e. the modal concepts will
only be meaningful at all as applied from the perspective of the discursive
intellect. From the perspective of an intuitive intellect, there would be no
(real) modality at all.
In brief, these aspects of Kant’s views suggest something more than mere
mind-dependence for modal facts, in the form of some stronger, perspectival
or relativist account. To explore the prospects of such a view would go
beyond present purposes. At least, it is open in the interpretation of these
passages to take ‘bedeutung ’ to mean ‘significance’ in the weaker sense, rather
than ‘meaning’ in a stronger sense, and so to make room for a less mysterious
account of modality, meaningful across the board.
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4.4 Real Modality and Logical Modality
Throughout Kant’s work, a distinction between real and logical is made,
including a distinction between real and logical possibility. The importance
of this distinction is borne out in the strikingly different roles played by real
modality and logical modality: the former is a mere relative form of the lat-
ter. This distinction is also interesting because it appears to be similar to the
distinction made by many contemporary philosophers between logical and
metaphysical modality. Although widely used, it is not always clear what
these different kinds of modality are supposed to be. Kant’s distinction,
as we shall see, rests on the difference between considering interrelations
between concepts, and the demands of applying and using concepts in an
objective world. The distinction relates to the differences between thinking
and cognizing.
4.4.1 Real and Logical Possibility
A first statement of this distinction is that a concept is logically possible
just when it is non-contradictory, and a concept is really possible just when
it is non-contradictory and consistent with the a priori constraints on expe-
rience. Another way to put things is that to be logically possible a concept
(or a proposition) need only be non-contradictory, but in order to count as
really possible it must also fulfil certain conditions such that it might be
instantiated in experience.
Logical possibility, actuality, and necessity are cognized accord-
ing to the principle of contradiction [. . . ] Real possibility is the
agreement with the conditions of a possible experience. (Kant,
1790–1?, 28:557)
So, e.g., whilst the concept of an uncaused event might not be strictly self-
contradictory, there is a question whether such a thing could appear in the
empirical world.
The distinction is brought out in this passage from the first Critique.
A concept is always possible if it is not self-contradictory. This
is the logical criterion of possibility, and by it the object of the
concept is distinguishable from the nihil negativum. But it may
none the less be an empty concept, unless the objective reality
of the synthesis through which the concept is generated has been
specifically proved; and such proof, as we have shown above, rests
on principles of possible experience, and not on the principle of
analysis (the law of contradiction). This is a warning against
arguing directly from the logical possibility of concepts to the
real possibility of things. (A596/B624, footnote)
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The nihil negativum is the kind of nothingness that is due to contradiction
in a concept (as opposed, e.g., to nothingness due to a non-contradictory
concept that has no corresponding object for other reasons) (A290–2/B346–
9). So, logical possibility of a concept ensures that the concept will not
be empty due to the contradictoriness of that concept. In order for the
concept to be able to have a corresponding object in experience, and so
to count as really possible, “the objective reality of the synthesis through
which the concept is generated” must be proved. What does this mean? The
concept must be applicable in experience (objectively real). The criterion
of logical possibility arises from the principle of analysis, i.e. the principle
of non-contradiction. In contrast, the synthesis of intuitions and concepts
into a cognition, or an empirical experience, is subject to further conditions.
This synthesis is the activity that is subject to the pure concepts of the
understanding, i.e. the cognition must conform to universal conditions on
possible experience. For real possibility we need to find out if the concept
under consideration is compatible with the principles of possible experience
as well as the law of non-contradiction, whether it is applicable in experience
as well as non-contradictory.
Kant sees a connection between his distinction between analytic and
synthetic judgment, and logical and real modality.
Possibility is nothing other than the agreement of a thing with
conditions of thought. The conditions are analytic or synthetic;
should it not agree with the former, then it is impossible on ac-
count of the principle of contradiction. But it must also agree
with synthesis. The principle which contains the synthetic con-
ditions of thought is provisionally this: all synthesis must con-
tain the conditions under which the manifold is brought into a
unity—or: to no thing can a synthetic predicate be attributed
unless it is a possible experience. (Kant, 1782–3, 29:821–2)
Both logical and real possibility require compatibility with conditions of
“thought”. However, logical possibility is concerned only with analytic
principles. Real possibility must be compatible in addition with synthetic
principles—conditions of cognition.
Kant also frames the distinction in terms of a distinction between the
conditions for being able to think (denken) something, and the conditions
for being able to cognize (erkennen) something.
To cognize an object I must be able to prove its possibility, either
from its actuality as attested by experience, or a priori by means
of reason. But I can think whatever I please, provided only that
I do not contradict myself, that is, provided my concept is a
possible thought. This suffices for the possibility of the concept,
even though I may not be able to answer for there being, in
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the sum of all possibilities, an object corresponding to it. But
something more is required before I can ascribe to such a concept
objective validity, that is, real possibility; the former possibility
is merely logical. This something more need not, however, be
sought in the theoretical sources of cognition; it may lie in those
that are practical. (Bxxvi, footnote)
Note that Kant makes a reference to the fact that real possibility may have
something to do with practical considerations. One way we might work
out that an object is really possible is to take obligations as our guide, i.e.
because ought implies can, the commitments of our obligations concerning
what we ought to do will show us something about what is really possible.
Here logical possibility of the concept requires only a lack of contradic-
tion. If we connect this to what we can think, one might worry that the
implication here is that we cannot think thoughts about objects the concepts
of which are self-contradictory. However, it seems plausible that I am able to
think thoughts such as that there are no round squares. I understand what it
would take for something to be a round square—it would be both round and
square—and I understand that roundness and squareness are contradictory
properties, so I conclude that there are none, and even that there could not
be any. Given that we can perfectly well think about logically impossible
things in this kind of way, one might take Kant to mean something more like
cannot be imagined. Indeed, I can’t summon a mental picture of a round
square, but then again I don’t usually require myself to be able to summon
mental pictures of things to consider them logically possible. E.g., I am
prepared to accept that the truth of string theory is a logical possibility, but
I am utterly incapable of summoning up any mental picture adequate to
represent string theory. Another way to make sense of the view is to read “I
can think whatever I please” as normative, i.e. thinking non-contradictory
thoughts is permissible, but thinking contradictory content is in some sense
bad. I discussed this approach in more detail in Chapter 3.
More depth can be added to the distinction by considering the following.
So long as the definition of possibility, existence, and necessity
is sought solely in pure understanding, they cannot be explained
save through an obvious tautology. For to substitute the log-
ical possibility of the concept (namely, that the concept does
not contradict itself) for the transcendental possibility of things
(namely, that an object corresponds to the concept) can deceive
and leave satisfied only the simple-minded.α
αIn a word, if all sensible intuition, the only kind of intuition
which we possess, is removed, not one of these concepts can
in any fashion verify itself, so as to show its real possibility.
Only logical possibility then remains, that is, that the concept or
thought is possible. That, however, is not what we are discussing,
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but whether the concept relates to an object and so signifies
something. (A244/B302 & footnote)
The passage from the main text just reiterates the distinction with which we
are already becoming familiar, and warns against conflating logical with real
possibility. This is explicated in the footnote, which makes two illuminating
points. First, the role of intuition in real possibility is highlighted. Intuition
is required for a concept to “verify” itself, to show its real possibility. Second,
it is implied that possibly having a corresponding object allows the concept
to “signify something”; if a concept could never be exemplified in experience,
it would therefore lack significance.
The role of intuition in the significance of concepts brings to mind one
of Kant’s best known statements:
Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts
are blind. (A51/B75)
The relevant point here is that in order for our thoughts (concepts) to have a
genuine object, to count as thoughts about (concepts of ) things rather than
just thoughts (empty concepts), they must be supplemented with sensible
intuition. Kant seems to have a very particular and strict notion of the con-
ditions for a concept or a thought having intentional content—really being
about something—as opposed to being somehow well-formed but empty or
idle. So we can begin to understand the distinction at hand in different
terms: logical possibility is a matter of the conditions a concept must fulfil
in order to count as a well-formed concept; real possibility is a matter of the
conditions a concept must fulfil in order to be “significant”, a matter of the
application of concepts to an objective world.
In Kant’s Dialectic, Bennett draws out this feature of Kant’s view. In
order to be meaningful, a concept must be able to (be used to) draw dis-
tinctions that are discernible in experience. If it did not, it is not clear what
the purpose or significance of such a concept could be. This is then tied to
intuitions: given that empirical experience requires a combination of con-
cepts and intuitions, whether a concept draws any line through experience
will require taking into account intuitions.
The thesis that concepts need intuitions is a form of concept-
empiricism or meaning-empiricism. Kant holds that a state-
ment’s meaning is a function of what it implies for actual and
possible experience, and that a statement which has no such im-
plications, no empirical cash value, means nothing. (Bennett,
1974, p. 27)
So, for a concept to be significant its use in a judgment must have empirical
implications. Strawson has also noted this aspect of Kant’s view.
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The employment of concepts in judgments involves essentially
the thought of their possible application to objects—ultimately
to objects not themselves concepts. The general conditions of
the applicability of concepts to objects essentially involve the
general conditions of our becoming aware of objects, i.e. involve
our modes of intuition. Our mode of intuition is sensible and
spatio-temporal. We are aware of objects, in experience, under
the conditions of space and time. We cannot detach our concepts
from these conditions of their application to objects and hope at
the same time to preserve any significant employment for them
in recording, or advancing, knowledge of objects. It is only in
application to objects of possible experience that concepts have
any such use. (Strawson, 1966, p. 263)
In Kant’s view, then, the significance of a concept, conditions of its very
applicability, its implications for possible experience and intuitions are all
bound together. If a concept has no consequences for experience, if there
is no difference between conditions under which the concept is or is not
applicable, it lacks empirical application conditions, and hence has no sig-
nificance. We may be assured of the applicability of a concept if we check
it against “the general conditions of our becoming aware of objects”, i.e.
the pure forms of intuition and ultimately, also, the pure concepts of the
understanding. The link with real possibility is clear: the same criteria of
compatibility with a priori constraints on experience are required both for
the real possibility, and for the significance, of a concept. It is one thing to
dream up concepts of things and avoid bare logical or analytic contradiction
in the concept. It is quite another to dream up a concept that could really
do work in application to the world, and in making judgments about the
world.
Once we are assured that the concept is compatible with possible experi-
ence, then, it is presumed, it must have implications for possible experience.
E.g., the concept red is empirically significant because we can use it to draw
a line through experience, i.e. between the red and non-red things. The
concept electron is meaningful because it appears in empirically testable
theories. The concepts Elizabeth II and Sherlock Holmes are significant
because we should be able to discern corresponding objects in possible ex-
perience; although we can only actually discern the former, we would be
able to recognize the latter if he were real (actual) rather than only merely
possible. The concept cause is significant because we can, indeed must,
discern causal relations between different objects and events. In contrast,
the concept uncaused event may be empirically empty insofar as nothing
in possible experience could count as a corresponding object. If Euclidean
geometry is true of the empirical world, figure bounded by two straight lines
will also be meaningless in this sense. Other, non-empty mathematical con-
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cepts, although they rely only on pure intuition, should still be significant
as the form of pure intuition is supposed to contribute to the conditions on
possible experience.
What has become clear is that Kant’s distinction between ‘logical’ and
‘real’ is a distinction between matters concerning thought and concepts taken
in isolation, and matters concerning cognition, experience, and the applica-
tion of concepts to the world. This distinction between the logical and the
real extends to many other domains.
Aside from making a distinction between a logical and a real sub-
ject, between logical and real simplicity, logical and real identity,
and logical and real possibility, he also distinguishes between log-
ical and real essence, logical and real negation, a logical and a
real reason (Grund), as well as logical and real necessity. The
best known of these distinctions is that made between a logical
and a real predicate in Kant’s refutation of the ontological proof
for the existence of God. (Rosefeldt, 2003, p. 146)
Sometimes Kant is interested in mere conceptual truths, or links between
concepts. Sometimes, however, he is interested in features of objects, which
for him involves taking much more into account, i.e. conditions on possible
experience and intuitions as well as concepts.
4.4.2 Logical Necessity
The real modalities can be understood in terms of the modality of things, as
discussed above. Much trickier is the notion of logical necessity. One might
expect logical necessity to be something like the following. Recall, a concept
F is said to be logically possible just when F is not self-contradictory, where
contradiction is to be understood in a broadly logically sense (logical contra-
dictions such as married and not married as well as analytic falsehoods such
as married bachelor). How do we get (broad) logical necessity from this?
If we accept that necessity is the dual of possibility, then we can define it
in terms of not possibly not. So a concept F would be logically necessary
just when it is not the case that it is not self-contradictory that not-F , i.e.
the concept F is logically necessary when ¬F is self-contradictory. This is
nicely in accord with some other formulations of logical necessity, e.g.,
What does it mean to say that there is a notion of logical ne-
cessity? I mean this: there is a sense of ‘necessary’ for which
pIt is necessary that Aq implies and is implied by pIt is logically
contradictory that not Aq. (Rumfitt, 2010, p. 35)
pIt is logically contradictory that Aq is taken to mean that some overt
contradiction follows logically from the supposition that A.25
25One might take Kant to have something similar in mind when he writes: ‘The reverse
of that which as concept is contained and is thought in the knowledge of the object, is
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The formulation of logical necessity here is promising, but faces the prob-
lem that Kant writes in terms of concepts, rather than in terms of some-
thing like propositions, which would be necessary for application of sentence-
operators and relation via implication. We might borrow the strategy used
above, and simply substitute the concept for a proposition to the effect that
something falls under the concept, i.e. “∃xFx”, then see whether this is
contradictory or not. We will end up with a concept F being logically nec-
essary just when the proposition that it is not the case that something falls
under the concept F entails a contradiction.
F is logically necessary ≡ 〈¬∃xFx〉  ⊥
The accompanying formulation of logical possibility as lack of contradiction
would accordingly be:
F is logically possible ≡ 〈∃xFx〉 2 ⊥
Drawing on the notion of existence here might seem inappropriate, given
that we are concerned with logical necessity. However, one can see that
this is just a special case of Rumfitt’s formulation, where “A” has been
replaced by a more specific kind of proposition. As above, the account can
be generalized to any proposition, i.e.
It is logically necessary that p ≡ 〈¬p〉  ⊥
It is logically possible that p ≡ 〈p〉 2 ⊥
This is all very well, but we cannot rely on this to give a satisfactory ac-
count of logical necessity. Logical necessities will conform to these rules—the
negation of a logical necessity will always logically entail a contradiction—
but these formulations themselves rely on a prior notion of logical necessity
governing the notions of entailment, contradiction, and so on. A deeper
explanation of these elements must be given if a proper account of logical
modality is to be provided. Furthermore, the account of other kinds of
modality as being relative to logical necessity also relies upon having an ac-
count of logical modality. In chapter 3 I discussed a broadly Kantian account
of logical necessity. Kant adheres to a notion of logic which is concerned
with the rules of thought.
The sphere of logic is quite precisely delimited; its sole concern is
to give an exhaustive exposition and a strict proof of the formal
rules of all thought. (Bix)
The account I explore takes logical necessity to find its source in logical laws,
and the laws of logic to be constitutive norms for thought.
always rightly denied. But since the opposite of the concept would contradict the object,
the concept itself must necessarily be affirmed of it’ (A151/B190–1).
203
4.5 Abstract Objects and Mathematics
Kant’s account of cognition appears to leave little room for the existence
and cognition of abstract objects. Cognition of objects is supposed to be
the result of the application of concepts to the input from the senses, sensi-
ble intuition. But if abstract objects are not objects of the empirical world,
capable of impinging on our senses in this way, how can we fit them into
Kant’s view? A number of problems arise. For one, how can we account
for the existence of mathematical (and other abstract) objects, let alone
their necessary existence,26 and a priori knowledge of their existence? Also,
given Kant’s doctrine of concept empiricism,27 how can we accommodate
the meaningfulness of mathematical concepts and their applicability to the
world? These questions are pressing because a view of modality which ex-
cludes the existence of abstract and mathematical objects and the mean-
ingfulness of mathematical concepts as a matter of course would appear to
require the biting of some hefty bullets.
Kant did not neglect the philosophy of mathematics. Indeed, the ad-
vertised goal of the first Critique is to show how synthetic a priori knowl-
edge is possible, of which there are two branches; philosophical knowledge
and mathematical knowledge. Kant is known for a view of “construction”
whereby our mathematical knowledge rests on the pure forms of intuition.
Without spending too much time on details here, I will sketch some more
or less Kantian suggestions of how one can address these issues.
First, existence and necessary existence: The former, according to Kant,
requires something like “intuitability”, the latter is rejected. There are sev-
eral ways one could accommodate the necessary existence of mathematical
and abstract objects into Kant’s account, some more faithful to the original
view than others.
First, one might keep the idea of abstract objects as genuinely existing
in the world, and try to stretch the notion of the “intuitability” of existent
objects. Such objects cannot be known via sensible intuition, but perhaps
there is another kind of intuition by which we can know these kinds of
objects. Kant claims that we gain mathematical knowledge from the pure
form of intuition, i.e. the form we impose on sensible intuition. Perhaps
introspection on this could give us access to knowledge of an abstract realm,
but it is not clear how one could justify such a connection. This would also
be to give up on Kant’s stricture against necessary existents.
Second, I argued above that one can understand Kant’s rejection of nec-
essary existence as the idea that only general conclusions could follow from
general principles of experience. One could therefore introduce necessarily
26I am assuming that abstract objects, if they exist, exist necessarily. I am ignoring for
the time being peculiar species of abstract object, such as Thomasson’s abstract artifacts
(Thomasson (1999)), which might count as contingent.
27See section 4.4.1.
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existing (abstract) objects by claiming that conditions on experience can
contain existential (particular) propositions as well. For current purposes,
such principles would presumably be something like “There are numbers”.
One would then have to do some work to show that the existence of, say,
numbers, is an essential feature of any conception of experience (or similar).
Kant does seem to include the concept of number in the categories: ‘. . . the
concept of a number (which belongs to the category of totality). . . ’ (B111).
One might therefore take Kant to think that the concept of number is es-
sential to experience. But it would require further argument to show that
the existence of objects falling under this concept is essential to experience.
Kantian philosophers of mathematics are often occupied in trying to give
an account of Kant’s notion of construction. The rough idea is that math-
ematical concepts are supposed to be constructible in intuition. This has
been understood in many different ways. Hintikka (1967) takes the lesson
to be that we deal with general mathematical concepts through particular
instances. We conduct proofs by taking particular representatives, such as
particular triangles in geometry, or particular sequences of objects in arith-
metic.
Kant’s characterization of mathematics as based on the use of
constructions has to be taken to mean merely that, in mathe-
matics, one is all the time introducing particular representatives
of general concepts and carrying out arguments in terms of such
particular representatives, arguments which cannot be carried
out by the sole means of general concepts. (Hintikka, 1967, p.
24)
Can we always be assured that there will be particular things in the world to
act as instances of mathematical concepts? At least in the case of arithmetic,
Parsons answers:
The general point behind the observations on symbolic construc-
tion can be put in the following way: In general, a mathematical
proposition can be verified only on the basis of a proof or cal-
culation, which is itself, a construction in intuition. But in view
of the remarks about ‘7 + 5 = 12’, a more special fact may have
influenced Kant. Certain “symbolic constructions” associated
with propositions about number actually involve constructions
isomorphic to the numbers themselves and their relations, or at
least to an aspect of them. (Parsons, 1969, p. 66)
Mathematical symbols can act as particular representatives of mathematical
concepts, ensuring that there will be instances of these concepts as long as
we have a symbolic notation for them.
The key idea here appears to be that there exist representatives or in-
stances of mathematical concepts and structures, without there having to
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directly exist numbers and other mathematical objects. Indeed, Parsons
writes
Kant never talks explicitly of the existence of mathematical ob-
jects; existence for him seems to be concrete existence; this is
quite explicit in its schematization as actuality. He seems to de-
cline to attribute existence to mathematical objects at all. [. . . ]
If we are not to import into Kant the “mathematical-objects pic-
ture”, then it seems we have to take the range of these variables
to be empirical objects. Then a mathematical argument can-
not, strictly speaking, establish existence. What plays the role
of mathematical existence in Kant is constructibility. The most
plausible reconstruction of Kant would be, in my view, to take
constructibility of a concept to be a kind of possible existence
of a (nonabstract) object falling under the concept. (Parsons,
1969, pp. 73–4)
This all looks rather like some kind of structuralism. However, this should
not be understood as a view whereby there exists an abstract object which
is the number structure, but rather as a view whereby mathematics relies
upon the possibility of the existence of concrete objects exemplifying some-
thing like the concept of the number structure. Perhaps one might say that
certain mathematical structure is an essential feature of any intelligible con-
ception of experience. A similar story would have to be told for other,
non-mathematical, abstract objects. When it comes to existential proposi-
tions about abstract objects, such as “The number 2 exists”, these might
have to be given a paraphrase treatment to say something more like “It
is possible for an object corresponding to the node of the number 2 in the
number structure to exist.” This route does not give us full-blooded math-
ematical and abstract objects existing independently in some special realm,
but it does at least show the way to accommodating mathematics in the
view.
These considerations also contribute to answering the question whether
mathematical and abstract objects can be considered as really possible. A
concept is really possible if the existence of an empirical object falling under
the concept is consistent with universal conditions on experience. But if an
object were to fall under the concept of an abstract object, surely that would
entail the existence of a necessary existent, going against Kant? Again, one
must think in terms of instances of a structure. Rather than an abstract
object which is the number 2 falling under the concept 2, one must think
of concrete representatives falling under the concept, e.g., pairs of empirical
objects, or numerals such as ‘2’ or ‘II’.
Next: the significance of mathematical concepts. Above I discussed
Kant’s view that in order to be significant a concept must have empiri-
cal implications, or empirical “cash value” (see section 4.4.1). How, then,
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can purported concepts of non-empirical objects be significant? First, the
applicability of mathematical concepts to experience is supposed to be jus-
tified in virtue of their a prioricity. Recall, the applicability of empirical
concepts is supposed to be justified in terms of either their acquisition from
or possible recognition in experience, whereas the applicability of a priori
concepts is supposed to be justified by reflection on the necessary conditions
on and features of possible experience. As mathematical concepts are sup-
posed to lie in the latter camp, we do not need to be able to intuit instances
of them for them to be significant; we need only to show that they are a pri-
ori in the relevant sense. Second, one can also bring to bear considerations
regarding Kant’s theory of construction. The idea was that mathemati-
cal concepts are closely related to construction in intuition, which can be
understood as meaning that instances of mathematical structures must be
intuitable in experience. By this, mathematical concepts can have empirical
implications, e.g., one might intuit certain number sequences exemplified
in buttons, beads, or mathematical symbols. Again, this involves taking
a particular view of mathematics, but nevertheless concept empiricism can
accommodate meaningful mathematical concepts.
In short, Kant’s theory of construction in mathematics allows us to ac-
count for the significance of mathematical concepts, and the existence of
mathematical objects in the sense of there being exemplars of mathemat-
ical structure. Independent reasons for rejecting a Kantian philosophy of
mathematics might drive one to make more radical changes to the view,
such as including existential propositions in the conditions on possible ex-
perience, or having a less sense-dependent notion of intuition. Either way,
there are prospects for avoiding the potential consequences for a Kantian
relative modality view, that there are no mathematical objects in any sense,
and that mathematical concepts are empty.
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Chapter 5
Metaphysical Necessity:
A Relative and Kantian
Account
In Chapter 1 I argued that the non-logical alethic modalities should be
treated as mere relative logical modality, and should be expressed in terms
of the following schemata:
It is R-necessary that p: ∃ϕ(Ψϕ & (ϕ→ p))
It is R-possible that p: ¬∃ϕ(Ψϕ & (ϕ→ ¬p))
where “Ψϕ” states something like “〈ϕ〉 is a conjunction satisfying condition
Ψ”. Metaphysical modality is one of the alethic modalities to be treated in
this way. To give an account of metaphysical necessity and possibility, the
schemata need to be fleshed-out as follows:
It is metaphysically necessary that p: ∃ϕ(Mϕ & (ϕ→ p))
It is metaphysically possible that p: ¬∃ϕ(Mϕ & (ϕ→ ¬p))
This is not immediately illuminating (beyond making the claim that meta-
physical necessity is relative). The main task at hand is not simply to present
this formula, but to expand upon the condition “Mϕ”: to say to which kind
of propositions metaphysical modality is relative.
First, what is metaphysical necessity supposed to be? It would be helpful
to know what we are aiming at when considering different relative accounts.
The same question was asked of logical necessity before an account of its
source was offered: logical necessity was taken to be whatever necessity
‘attaches to the claim, concerning a deductively valid argument, that if the
premises are true then so is the conclusion’ (McFetridge, 1990, p. 136).
Granting that there is such a kind of necessity, this is fairly uncontroversial
as a way to pick out logical necessity; the controversy arises when we try to
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give an account of its source. But what about metaphysical necessity?
Metaphysical necessity is often introduced informally in one of two ways:
by giving examples of typical (purported) cases, or by describing metaphys-
ical necessity as falling between two other more easily delineated kinds.
Typical cases that are used in the first method tend to include Kripkean a
posteriori necessities—identity statements involving rigid designators, e.g.
‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’; statements concerning the chemical composition
of natural kinds, e.g. ‘Water is H2O’; statements of the essentiality of ori-
gin, e.g. ‘Elizabeth II is essentially the daughter of George VII’; and state-
ments of the essentiality of composition, e.g. ‘Table T is essentially made of
wood’1—as well as other claims about essence (e.g., ‘Socrates is essentially
human’), mathematical truths and some metaphysical claims.2 Having been
presented with these cases, one is supposed to be able to get a rough idea of
the terrain of metaphysical necessity. This method of introducing the idea
of metaphysical necessity may be appropriate in some circumstances (e.g.,
at the beginning of a lecture course on the topic), but it will not be suit-
able for present purposes. Typical cases might be an important benchmark
when it comes to assessing an account of metaphysical necessity—one might
think that an account of metaphysical necessity will run into trouble if no
typical cases end up counting as metaphysically necessary. However, taking
metaphysical necessity to be characterized by an antecedently selected class
of cases will prejudge certain issues. If we assume from the outset what will
count as metaphysically necessary or not this will place unreasonably strin-
gent constraints on an account of metaphysical necessity. Moreover, suppose
that two different accounts of metaphysical necessity both yield the same
class of cases—the typical cases—as metaphysically necessary. How are we
to choose between them? We still require some more general principles to
decide which account properly characterizes metaphysical necessity.
Another informal introduction is to describe metaphysical modality as
falling between, e.g., logical modality and physical modality. E.g., starting
with physical possibility, one might point out that it is physically impossible
to travel from the Earth to the sun and back in 10 minutes, but that it seems
possible in some other sense. If the laws of physics had been slightly different,
then one could travel faster than light and get there and back in 10 minutes.3
1See Kripke (1980).
2E.g., the Principle of Unrestricted Composition in mereology—that any things can
combine to form a whole—might be thought to be metaphysically necessary if true (and
metaphysically impossible if false). However, not all philosophers claim metaphysical ne-
cessity for their metaphysical views. A die-hard physicalist may still admit the possibility
of dualism, if not the actuality.
3One would have to travel faster than the speed of light, but physics tells us that
nothing can do so. Of course, it might have been that light travelled at a slower speed,
such that it was possible to travel from the Earth to the sun and back in 10 minutes
without overtaking light. What I have in mind is a possibility where the speed of light
is the same as the actual world (i.e. 299792458 m/s), but one contravenes the laws of
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But perhaps there is still a limit to this kind of modality. One might think
that, even allowing for different laws of nature, there are some things that
couldn’t happen, even though they aren’t a contradiction in terms. Perhaps
intuitions pull us to think that the man Socrates could have been a woman,
but that he couldn’t have been a worm or an oak tree, even though there is
nothing in the meaning of the name “Socrates” to explain this. So, we have
the beginnings of a sketch of a space filled by truths which are physically
impossible, but possible in some other sense, and that some truths are not
possible in this other sense, whilst still being logically possible. This middle
ground is taken to be the realm of metaphysical necessity. Again, this might
be an appropriate way to get an initial sense of metaphysical necessity, but
it prejudges certain issues that I wish to leave open. E.g., it is not clear that
the relationship between different relative necessities, such as metaphysical
and physical necessity, will be monotonic in this way. This will depend
upon the relation between the kind of propositions to which metaphysical
necessity is relative, and the kind of propositions to which other kinds of
necessity, such as physical necessary, are relative. This neat monotonic
relationship between logical, metaphysical and physical necessity will only
occur (within the framework of RM) if the propositions to which physical
necessity is relative include or entail the propositions to which metaphysical
necessity is relative.4 This is as yet an open question.
An “informal elucidation” of metaphysical necessity as the “strictest real
necessity” is offered by Rosen (2006). This elucidation starts from generally
agreed principles about metaphysical necessity. First, metaphysical neces-
sity is alethic or factive: if it is metaphysically necessary that p, then it is
true that p. But there are other alethic kinds of necessity, such as concep-
tual necessity. Second, then, metaphysical necessity sometimes applies to
substantive truths.
Unlike the various logical and semantic species of necessity, meta-
physically necessary propositions are sometimes synthetic and a
posteriori. . . . So if substantive truths of these sorts can be nec-
essary in the metaphysical sense, metaphysical necessity differs
from logical or conceptual necessity. (Rosen, 2006, p. 15)
This gives us a notion of real modality.
Let’s call any modality that is alethic, non-epistemic, and some-
times substantive or synthetic a real modality. (Rosen, 2006, p.
16)
physics by nevertheless travelling faster than that.
4Monotonicity requires that metaphysical necessity be strictly stronger than physical
necessity, as well as strictly weaker than logical necessity. If all the physical necessity
base propositions include or entail the metaphysical necessity base propositions, but not
vice versa then any metaphysical necessity will also be a physical necessity, but not every
physical necessity will be a metaphysical necessity.
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Metaphysical modality is a real modality. But there are other kinds of real
modality such as physical modality. So Rosen suggests that metaphysical is
the strongest or “most absolute” real modality.
. . . the natural thing to say is that among the real modalities,
the metaphysical modalities are absolute or unrestricted. Meta-
physical necessity is the strictest real necessity and metaphysical
possibility is the least restrictive sort of real possibility in the fol-
lowing sense: If P is metaphysically necessary, it is necessary in
every real sense: If P is really possible in any sense, then its
possible in the metaphysical sense. (Rosen, 2006, p. 16)
As a working notion of metaphysical necessity, ‘the strictest real necessity’
seems rather promising. This provides a good guide for what we expect
from an account of metaphysical necessity—that it respect these key fea-
tures. Note also that it is left open for metaphysical necessity to also be
the strictest kind of necessity tout court, i.e. it might turn out that there is
no stricter necessity than the strictest real necessity. This characterization
therefore does not prejudge the disagreement between essentialists who take
metaphysical necessity to be (richly) absolute, and others who take logical
necessity to be (richly) absolute and metaphysical necessity to be merely
relative and not (richly) absolute.
My proposed view takes logical necessity to be (richly) absolute, i.e. the
strongest genuine necessity, and metaphysical necessity to be merely relative.
I have not claimed that logical modality is “metaphysically significant”, in
the sense that it tells us how the world can and must be. But I have tried
to show that mere logical possibilities are not therefore to be dismissed as
possibilities “in name only”. I have suggested that logical possibility and
necessity are importantly connected to thinking and reasoning. As such,
it does not seem right to dismiss mere logical possibilities as non-genuine:
they are genuine possibilities, concerning the most basic laws of thought,
even if they do not tell us about how the world can be. My view also
takes metaphysical modality to be relative: it is based on Kant’s notion
of real modality, which is a relative form of logical modality. Not only
is metaphysical (real) modality relative, on this view it is merely relative,
meaning that there are some metaphysical necessities the negation of which
is possible in a genuine sense of “possible”. Specifically, the negation of
some metaphysical necessities will be logically possible. E.g., it might be
metaphysically necessity that there be causal relations (see section 5.2.1),
but it is not against the laws of logic for there to be no causal relations.
The gap between conditions for thought and cognition (see section 5.2.2)
translates into a gap between logical and metaphysical modality, such that
logical necessity is strictly stronger than metaphysical necessity. It follows
that metaphysical necessity is not richly absolute, i.e. it is not at least as
strong as any other genuine necessity. It is this result—that metaphysical
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necessity is not richly absolute—which is most at odds with the essentialist
view.
5.1 Different Options
The relative modality schema for metaphysical necessity is supposed to tell
us about what it is to be metaphysically necessary: to be metaphysically
necessary is to follow logically from a certain class of propositions. Let us
call this class of propositions the relative base for a kind of necessity. The
account we give of the relative base propositions for metaphysical necessity
should make it clear why what follows is metaphysical necessity.
In principle, we could try to take any going account of metaphysical ne-
cessity and shoehorn it into this relative schema. However, if an account says
that to be metaphysical necessary is to be F , and we then give an account of
the relative base propositions in terms of being F , then this risks making the
“relative” part of the account trivial. Merely relative modalities are charac-
terized as following from a certain class of propositions.5 If the relative base
for Ψ-necessity is simply the class of propositions which are necessary in the
relevant relative sense, i.e. the Ψ-necessities, then the account will be trivial.
Arguably, the interesting feature distinctive of this kind of necessity will not
be that every proposition follows from itself, but the feature which isolates
that particular relative base. To avoid this problem, the relative base class
of propositions needs to be a subset of the eventual class of necessities, a
smaller privileged class of propositions sharing a particular feature (e.g. M
for metaphysical necessity), which is not shared by all the resulting necessi-
ties. The relative base propositions will also be trivially relatively necessary
in the relevant sense, but they will be singled out by this special feature.
One challenge in modifying extant accounts of metaphysical necessity will
be to avoid this kind of triviality.
So, what are the potential options for fleshing-out “Mϕ”? A represen-
tative (if not exhaustive) list of accounts to be modified might be:
1. Possible Worlds/Possibilities: it is metaphysically necessary that p if
and only if 〈p〉 is true in all (possible) worlds/possibilities. (Lewis,
1986; Humberstone, 1981a)
2. Principles of Possibility : it it metaphysically necessary that p if and
only if it is true that p according to all admissible assigments. (Pea-
cocke, 1997)
5Note, a proposition p is understood to be relatively necessary in some sense just when
there is a certain class of propositions X of which 〈p〉 is a logical consequence. On this
basis, even absolute necessities will be relative, insofar as the class of absolute necessities
follows logically from itself. The present project is interested in merely relative necessity,
i.e. necessities which are not also absolute.
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3. Essentialism: it is metaphysically necessary that p if and only if it is
true in virtue of the nature of all things that p. (Fine, 1994)
4. Deflationism: it is metaphysically necessary that p if and only if 〈p〉 is
a kind of truth which convention treats as metaphysically necessary.
(Cameron, 2009, 2010)
5. Kantianism: it is metaphysically necessary that p if and only if it
follows logically from the formal universal conditions on possible ex-
perience that p.
The purpose of this chapter is to explore and develop option (5). I will
first look briefly at options (1)–(4). To properly assess each alternative
would take too much space. Having already argued for RM, I will not be
considering these views in their own right. I will focus on a brief sketch of
how each account might be fitted into the relative modality framework, and
the challenges to be faced.
5.1.1 Possible worlds
The most obvious way to modify a possible worlds view is to specify a relative
base class of propositions which are true in all worlds (or possibilities).6
It is metaphysically necessary that p:
∃ϕ(ϕ is a conjunction of propositions which are true in all worlds
& (ϕ→ p))
However, this is a non-starter. The view falls foul of the triviality worry
raised above. The defining condition is equivalent to “p is true at all worlds”.
For suppose that p is true at all worlds. Then there is a conjunction of
propositions q, namely p itself, which is true at all worlds and such that
(q → p). Conversely, suppose there is a conjunction of propositions q
which is true at all worlds and such that (q → p). Since q is true at all
worlds and (q → p), p must also be true at all worlds. It seems natural to
say that, on this view, what makes for metaphysical necessity is truth at all
worlds. Complicating matters by putting this in terms of RM does not add
anything.
One might try an alternative strategy. Rather than expand “Mϕ” in
terms of truth in all worlds, one might use underlying principles concerning
worlds as the condition. Divers and Melia (2002) present a number of prin-
ciples or axioms they take to comprise a theory of Genuine Modal Realism
(GMR): the kind of possible worlds theory which takes possible worlds to
6If you think there are impossible worlds (see, e.g., Nolan (1997)) then metaphysical
necessities will not be true in all worlds (on pain of being true in impossible worlds) but
rather true in all possible worlds.
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be concrete worlds, just like ours, which are causally and spatiotemporally
disconnected from our world.7 Some of the axioms are:
(O8) Some individuals are worlds.
(O9) An individual x is a world iff any two parts of x are spa-
tiotemporally related to each other, and anything spatiotem-
porally related to any part of x is itself a part of x.
(O10) Every individual that is a part of a world is a part of exactly
one world.
(O11) α is the world of which we are parts.
(O12) For any individuals x1, x2, . . . xn there is a world containing
any number of duplicates of each, if there is a spacetime big
enough to hold them all, and such that for any spatiotempo-
ral relation the duplicates in question stand in that relation.
(2002, p. 16)
The alternative strategy is thus to read “Mϕ” as “ϕ is a conjunction of
axioms of GMR”. To be possible is thus to be compatible with these axioms,
and to be necessary is to follow from them. One might think that these
axioms will entail what worlds there are, and from thence what is true in all
worlds. But there are two mistakes here.
First, worlds are defined in terms of individuals, and the axioms do not
tell us what individuals there are, just that there are individuals (see Divers
and Melia (2002, p. 15)). So in addition to the GMR axioms, truths about
individuals will be required. Such truths appear to be beyond the remit
of the theory GMR. If this is so, then we cannot give an account of meta-
physical necessity as whatever follows logically from the axioms of GMR. If
metaphysical necessity is truth in all worlds, and the GMR axioms do not
entail what worlds there are, then they won’t entail what is metaphysically
necessary. Note also that to include all such truths about what individuals
exist would make their existence metaphysically necessary, which is unac-
ceptable.
Second, suppose that the axioms could somehow state or determine what
worlds there are. This is not enough to yield metaphysical necessity. One
would also need to include in the axioms a principle taking us from what
worlds there are, to propositions which are true in all of them. One candidate
axiom might be principle (P).
(P) It is possible that P iff there is a world according to which
it is the case that P .
(2002, p. 17) or its sibling (P*)
7In contrast to other accounts of the nature of possible worlds, such as ersatz accounts
whereby worlds are propositions or other abstract objects.
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(P*) It is necessary that P iff it is the case that P according to
all worlds.
However, if (P) and/or (P*) are included as axioms of GMR, this would be
to include an extant definition of metaphysical possibility and/or necessity
in the relative base, being a logical consequence of which (being logically
compatible with which) is supposed to be constitutive of metaphysical ne-
cessity (possibility). This hardly seems right. But it is not clear what other
axioms would be able to do the job here. This is at best a serious challenge
for someone who wants to defend a possible worlds version of RM.
What if we were to take the metaphysical necessities to simply be the
axioms and theorems of GMR, minus principle (P)? This would result in the
view being that the theory GMR is metaphysically necessary. But we were
not interested in the modal status of the theory, we wanted to use the theory
to tell us about the modal status of other propositions (as well). Using the
axioms of GMR as the relative base in a relative account of metaphysical
necessity only succeeds in confusing metaphysical necessity and possibility
as defined by the theory with the modal status of the theory itself.
5.1.2 The Principles of Possibility
The principle-based conception of metaphysical modality is a view pro-
pounded by Christopher Peacocke (see Peacocke (1997, 1999)). His aim
is to integrate our understanding of modal concepts, knowledge of modal
facts, and the truth conditions of modal statements together in one the-
ory. The way the theory treats truth conditions for modal statements can
be understood as a kind of ersatz theory of possible worlds. Rather than
speaking of worlds, Peacocke puts things in terms of assignments. To give a
concept or thought (made up from concepts) an assignment is to assign the
concept or thought a semantic value (a thought is assigned a semantic value
in virtue of the semantic values assigned to the concepts which make up
the thought). Semantic values are understood primarily in Fregean terms—
objects, Fregean concepts, functions etc.—although Peacocke does also make
provision for properties as well. A specification is a set of thoughts or propo-
sitions which purport to describe a state of affairs. Assignments provide the
ersatz worlds. Peacocke then gives an account of when a specification is
genuinely possible in terms of admissible assignments.
A specification is a genuine possibility iff there is some admissible
assignment which counts all its members as true. (Peacocke,
1997, p. 526)
The “principles of possibility” are intended to specify the conditions for an
assignment to be admissible.
The first principle of possibility, the Modal Extension Principle, is pre-
sented in two parts.
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Modal Extension Principle, Main Part:
An assignment s is admissible only if for any concept C which is
not de jure rigid, the semantic value of C with respect to s is the
result of applying the same rule as is applied in the determination
of the actual semantic value of C. (Peacocke, 1997, p. 533)
Modal Extension Principle, Second Part:
For any concept C which is de jure rigid, and whose semantic
value is in fact A, then for any admissible assignments, the se-
mantic value of C according to s is A. (Peacocke, 1997, p. 534)
This principle is concerned with the constitutive rule of a concept. An
assignment for a concept is admissible if it does not violate the constitutive
rule for the concept. E.g., if it is constitutive of the concept vixen that
it be the intersection of the concepts female and fox, then any assignment
which resulted in the concept vixen being assigned a semantic value which
included a male fox, or a female gorilla, would violate the rule, and hence
be inadmissible by this principle.8
Peacocke also includes constitutive principles. For example:
If P is a property which is an object x’s fundamental kind, then
an assignment is inadmissible if it counts the proposition x is P
as false. (Peacocke, 1997, p. 540)
An assignment is inadmissible if it both counts as true the propo-
sition x exists and counts the proposition x bears R to y as false.
(Peacocke, 1997, p. 541)
These principles are not concerned with the concepts involved and their
constitutive rules, but with objects, properties and relations, and what is
constitutive of them. Note that both kinds of principle boil down to be-
ing based on constitutive principles; in the former case, what is constitutive
of concepts, in the latter, what is constitutive of objects, properties and
relations (which may in turn be represented by concepts). These princi-
ples provide necessary conditions for an assignment to be admissible: an
assignment cannot be admissible without satisfying these principles.
One further principle of possibility is presented, this time providing a
sufficient condition for admissibility: “the principle of constrained recombi-
nation”.
An assignment is admissible if it respects the set of conditions
on admissibility given hitherto. (Peacocke, 1997, p. 543)
8Examples of such an inadmissible assignment might be where the concept vixen is
assigned as a semantic value a Fregean-concept under which male foxes fall, or where the
concept vixen is assigned as a semantic value a set of individuals (an extension) which has
female gorillas as members.
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One can read this final principle as saying, in effect, of the other princi-
ples presented “and that’s all the principles there are”. So an assignment
is admissible if it satisfies all of the principles of possibility, and the only
such principles there are are the modal extension principle and constitutive
principles. With all of this in place, Peacocke is then in a position to say
when something is necessary or possible.
A Thought or proposition is possible iff it is true according to
some admissible assignment.
A Thought or proposition is necessary iff it is true according to
all admissible assignments. (Peacocke, 1997, p. 544)
In summary: a specification is a set of thoughts or propositions describ-
ing a state of affairs.9 The specification can be given different assignments.
Assignments are admissible if they conform to the principles of possibility.
Propositions are metaphysically possible if they are true according to some
admissible assignment; propositions are metaphysically necessary if they are
true according to all admissible assignments.
Can Peacocke’s view be used in conjunction with RM? Most natural
would be to put the principles of possibility in as the relative base proposi-
tions.
It is metaphysically necessary that p:
∃ϕ(ϕ is a conjunction of principles of possibility & (ϕ→ p)).
It is metaphysically possible that p:
¬∃ϕ(ϕ is a conjunction of principles of possibility &
(ϕ→ ¬p)).
However, these principles are not supposed to yield metaphysically neces-
sary and possible propositions, but rather admissible assignments. It is
assignments of semantic value to propositions, not propositions, which are
assessed with respect to the principles of possibility. The problem is an in-
stance of that faced by a combination of RM with any possible-worlds-based
account, ersatz or not, as discussed above (section 5.1.1). On such views,
metaphysical modality is to be understood quantificationally, in terms of
truth in all or some possible worlds. Principles are then given in order to
determine which worlds are possible. But these principles cannot be used
directly to determine what propositions are possible or necessary. In the
case of Peacocke’s view, the “worlds” are assignments of semantic values to
sets of propositions; they are “possible” just when they satisfy the principles
of possibility.
9If the description of the state of affairs is maximally specific, we can think of the set
of propositions as describing a possible world.
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Perhaps one can combine these kinds of possible world accounts with
RM in two steps. The kind of possibility which is relative is the kind of
possibility which applies to worlds; the kind of possibility and necessity
which applies to propositions is then defined in terms of quantification over
worlds. However, RM explains the relative necessity of a proposition in
terms of the proposition following logically from a class of propositions. The
proposed account would lose this feature, and so not count as a version of
RM. The necessity of a proposition would be explained in terms of truth in
all possible worlds, regardless of how what worlds are possible is determined.
Another way to try to combine Peacocke’s view with RM would be to use
the principles of possibility to pick out the relative base propositions. Rather
than being relative to the principles of possibility, metaphysical necessity
could be understood as being relative to those constitutive rules etc. which
the principles of possibility pick out as being important.
It is metaphysically necessary that p:
∃ϕ(ϕ is a conjunction of statements of constitution &
(ϕ→ p)).
E.g., the proposition that all bachelors are unmarried is supposed to be
metaphysically necessary because it is true according to all admissible as-
signments, which means that any assignment according to which it is not
true violates the constitutive rules of the concepts all, bachelor and unmar-
ried (and perhaps the is of predication). Perhaps another way to put this is
simply to say that it follows from these constitutive rules that all bachelors
are unmarried. One might also say that a proposition such as some bache-
lors are bald is metaphysically possible because it is compatible with these
constitutive rules.10 Note, however, that this strategy does away with talk
of admissible assignments, and quantification over such assignments. We are
just taking the constitutive rules and principles exploited by the “principles
of possibility”, and assessing propositions directly in terms of their logical
relations to these rules and principles. This is no longer really a Peacockean
view of modality. Rather, we have drifted into essentialist waters.
5.1.3 Essentialism
Essentialists claim a direct link between the essences of objects and necessary
truths about those objects. Having argued that essence cannot be defined
in terms of necessity, Fine writes:
Certainly, there is a connection between the two concepts. For
any essentialist attribution will give rise to a necessary truth; if
10In order for this strategy to work, the “constitutive rules” I have been mentioning have
to be the kinds of things that can be related by logical consequence and compatibility. So
“rules” has to be construed in terms of indicative statements of rules (e.g. All cars drive
on the left), rather than imperatives (e.g. Drive on the left!).
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certain objects are essentially related then it is necessarily true
that the objects are so related (or necessarily true given that
the objects exist). However, the resulting necessary truth is not
necessary simpliciter. For it is true in virtue of the identity of the
objects in question; the necessity has its source in those objects
which are the subject of the underlying essentialist claim. (Fine,
1994, pp. 8–9)
Furthermore, having noted that metaphysical necessity is “insensitive to
source”, Fine suggests that metaphysical necessity be understood as truth
in virtue of the nature of all objects.
. . . far from viewing essence as a special case of metaphysical ne-
cessity, we should view metaphysical necessity as a special case of
essence. For each class of objects, be they concepts or individu-
als or entities of some other kind, will give rise to its own domain
of necessary truths, the truths which flow from the nature of the
objects in question. The metaphysically necessary truths can
then be identified with the propositions which are true in virtue
of the nature of all objects whatever. (Fine, 1994, p. 9)
One could try to give a relative account of metaphysical necessity by
specifying that the relative base be truths about the essence, nature or
identity of all objects.
It is metaphysically necessary that p:
∃ϕ(ϕ is a conjunction of propositions which are true in virtue of
the nature of all things & (ϕ→ p))11
The problem is that the essentialist takes being true in virtue of the nature
of all things to immediately constitute being metaphysically necessary, but
RM requires distance to be put between these two features. Being true in
virtue of the nature of all things has a certain important status, making
it relevant for metaphysical necessity. But metaphysical necessity must be
a matter of following from these truths. However, there are some serious
problems for such a view.
One worry is that it seems that all the relevant propositions that we
want to count as metaphysically necessary will already count as being true in
11One might include an additional quantifier explicitly.
It is metaphysically necessary that p:
∃ϕ∃xx(ϕ is a conjunction of propositions which are true in virtue of the nature
of xx & (ϕ→ p))
Note that I have used a plural quantifier, “∃xx” (there are some things), to allow for cases
where something is true in virtue of the nature of some things, and that is not reducible to
it being true in virtue of the nature of each of the things. E.g., that Socrates is numerically
distinct from Plato is true in virtue of the natures of Socrates and Plato, together, but
not true in virtue of the nature of Socrates alone (mutatis mutandis for Plato).
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virtue of the nature of all objects. So what purpose could there be in taking
an extra step to seeing what follows from them? One response might be to
argue that particular essential truths, such as that Socrates is human, are
true in virtue of the natures only of the relevant things, in this case Socrates,
whereas what is true in virtue of the natures of all things are rather general
essentialist principles, such as the essentiality of kind. Then, these general
principles will form a relative base, which along with additional premises,
such as the fact that Socrates is human, will yield additional metaphysical
necessities, such as it being metaphysically necessary that Socrates is human.
However, there is an ambiguity in how to understand “truth in virtue of
the nature of all objects”. One might take this to mean that every object
must contribute to each such truth, such that the relevant essence here is
whatever is shared by all things. However, such a restriction would result
in an extremely restricted set of features, and an impoverished account of
metaphysical necessity. Indeed, (Shalkowski, 2004) takes this to provide an
account of mere logical possibility, rather than anything metaphysical.
Essentialist claims to the effect that something is logically pos-
sible but not metaphysically possible amount to the following:
the features common to the nature of all things—familiarly ex-
pressed by logically consistent propositions—are insufficient to
rule out a given possibility, for example, that Kripke’s lectern
might have been made of ice. When the full nature of that
lectern is considered, however, this possibility is excluded. If
the logically possible is simply that which contravenes no uni-
versal essentialist facts, then it is not at all surprising that not
all logical possibilities are genuine possibilities. (2004, p. 80)
Essentialist metaphysical necessity is properly understood as all those truths
which are true in virtue of the nature of an object (or objects), rather than
truth in virtue of the nature common to all objects. In other words, the
relative version should be understood as
It is metaphysically necessary that p:
∃ϕ∃xx(ϕ is a conjunction of propositions which are true in virtue
of the nature of xx & (ϕ→ p))
and not
It is metaphysically necessary that p:
∃ϕ∀x(ϕ is a conjunction of propositions which are true in virtue
of the nature of x & (ϕ→ p))
So the triviality objection still stands.
There is an additional point to consider: even if there is a way to start
with essentialist principles and give an account of metaphysical necessities
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as being non-trivially relative, the aim of this chapter is to explore a view
in the metaphysics of modality whereby metaphysical necessity just is a
relative form of logical necessity. It is not enough to show that metaphysical
necessity and logical necessity bear certain logical relations to each other:
we need to be able to make sense of the metaphysical view. The problem
is that the standard essentialist view takes logical necessity to be a special
case of metaphysical necessity. So logical necessity would be explained as
what follows logically from the natures of logical entities. But then what
is the necessary connection implicit in this implication? What is logical
necessity relative to? Logical necessity? We end up in a circle. To avoid
this problem, one could retain a straightforward, non-relativist, essentialist
account of logical necessity at the heart of the view. But then this would
undermine the move to relativize the essentialist account of metaphysical
necessity: why not also go for the straightforward essentialist account here?
Alternatively, one might opt for a different account of logical necessity, e.g.,
that logical necessity has its source in constitutive norms for thought. I think
this kind of view might appeal to someone who agrees with the essentialist
that there is a kind of necessity which has its source in the natures of things,
but who shares my concern that essentialist accounts of logical necessity
cannot account for the bindingness of logic on our thinking (or who has other
concerns regarding essentialism for logical necessity). The debate between
a Kantian and an essentialist account of metaphysical necessity will then
come down to other matters, beyond the mere suitability of the account for
fleshing-out RM.
5.1.4 Deflationism
Deflationism is the view that there is no special feature shared by all the
so-called metaphysically necessary truths. Rather, there are certain kinds
of truths, such as mathematical truths, analytical truths, natural kind iden-
tities, and so on, which we take to be particularly important, and thereby
give them a special status in the way we describe them.
What is it that distinguishes the truths that are necessary from
those that are contingent? The thought that the distinction is
drawn by us rather than the world is best unpacked, I think,
as the thought that there is nothing special about the necessary
truths as opposed to the contingent ones: there is no deep meta-
physical division to be drawn between those truths that could
have been otherwise and those that couldn’t. (Cameron, 2010,
pp. 354–5)
Cameron connects this deflationist strategy with Sider’s take on convention-
alism.12 Metaphysical necessities are not truths which are true by conven-
12See Sider (2003).
221
tion; rather, they are true in the normal way, but it is convention that we
treat them as metaphysically necessary.
Sider offers us a variant on conventionalism that abandons the
useless notion of truth in virtue of convention. Sider’s thought is
this: that it is not true by convention that 2+2 = 4, but rather a
matter of convention that this truth is a necessary truth. . . This
is a deflationist view of modality. There is nothing special about
the truths of maths, or analytic truths, or natural kind identi-
ties, etc., that we are latching on to when we single them out
as necessary truths, it’s just that we consider such propositions
important, and so we use our modal language to accord them
special status. (Cameron, 2009, p. 14)
Two questions immediately arise: First, how should we understand the
status that is conferred upon certain truths—such as mathematical truths—
when convention treats them as “necessary”? It doesn’t look like mere con-
vention can guarantee that they cannot be false. E.g., couldn’t convention
have been such that the status of necessity was not conferred upon mathe-
matical truths, but upon truths about the weather instead? So what does
convention add to these truths? This leads us onto the second question.
This kind of deflationist view leads in turn to a new project, to determine
the purpose and importance of using modal language in order to understand
why certain kinds of truths, and not others, are conventionally treated as
metaphysically necessary. In other words, why do we have this convention,
and does this explain why some kinds of truths rather than others are con-
ventionally necessary?
So what are our reasons for drawing this latter division where
we do? That’s a good question; and to answer it we should also
ask: why is it that we modalise in the first place? To help answer
why we draw the division where we do we should first enquire
as to why we draw such a division at all. Why engage in modal
talk? What would we be missing if we didn’t? (Cameron, 2010,
pp. 356)
A deflationist reading of “Mϕ” would go something like “ϕ is a con-
junction of mathematical truths or true natural kind identities or analytic
truths. . . ”. An independent (non-modal) account can be given of when a
proposition counts as mathematical etc., and then metaphysical necessity
is simply what follows from this resulting class of propositions. However,
there are a number of problems facing both this relative version, and the
deflationist view in general.
The first problem is that a fully worked-out version of deflationism might
be expected to be able to tell us all of the kinds of propositions which
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count as (entailing those propositions which are) metaphysically necessary,
i.e. to complete the disjunction “ϕ is a conjunction of mathematical truths
or true natural kind identities or analytic truths. . . ”. If this was done by
isolating some key feature which all of these kinds of truths have in common,
then the view is in trouble. It would arguably be this feature which is
distinctive of metaphysical necessity. The only role left for convention to
play would be something like it being conventional to recognise this feature.
The deflationist will reply that the only feature these kinds of truths have
in common is being conventionally taken to be necessary. By studying these
conventions—our practices of making modal judgments etc.—we should be
able to isolate those kinds of truths which fall under this convention and
accordingly complete the disjunction. Again, the view will fall back on an
account of why we consider some kinds of propositions to be particularly
“important”, and what “importance” here really means. It is difficult to see
how such an account could be given without making some general claims
about what is considered to be important. And so the same problem arises:
if there is a general account to be given of the propositions considered to
be important, in order to account for our practice of considering them as
important, then this general account would appear to undercut the role of
convention and give a direct account of necessary truths.
Second, a problem particular to the relative version of deflationism is
what to say about logical necessity. Sider’s conventionalism, from which
Cameron’s deflationism takes its lead, is designed to cover logical necessity
as well. There are logical truths, and these are a kind of truth which is con-
ventionally considered to be necessary. But if logical necessity is given the
same treatment as metaphysical necessity, this threatens to undermine RM
entirely. RM says something like: metaphysical necessity is logical necessity
relative to a certain class of propositions, and logical necessity is something
else. The deflationist version will say something like: metaphysical necessity
is logical necessity relative to a class of propositions conventionally consid-
ered to be “necessary”, and logical necessity is a matter of certain proposi-
tions being conventionally considered to be “necessary”. One might as well
not bother with the relative part at all, and just say there are certain propo-
sitions conventionally considered to be important in a certain way, such that
we call them necessary. Different kinds of necessity, one might expect, will
match up with different kinds of propositions, i.e. logical necessity with
logical truth, metaphysical necessity with logical, analytical and essential
truth. It is not clear what the machinery of RM can add. Recall, one argu-
ment in favour of RM was to account for the similarities between different
kinds of necessity. In effect, deflationism can answer this question without
going relative: different kinds of necessity have in common that they are
classes of truths treated a certain way in light of convention. Of course, one
might choose to give a different account of logical necessity. But then the
deflationism project risks being undermined. If there is genuine necessity in
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the form of logical necessity, and metaphysical necessity is a relative form of
that, this seems to be incompatible with the reductive, deflationist project.
In brief, deflationism has some big questions to answer before it can be
properly considered, such as the nature of the status conferred on proposi-
tions, if it can’t be understood as truth come what may, and the purpose
served by having such conventions at all. The view faces the challenge of
giving an account of our considering of some kinds of proposition as “im-
portant” without relying on a general feature of those propositions, but it
looks as though this challenge will be difficult, if not impossible, to meet.
In terms of its compatibility with RM, deflationism faces difficulties when
it comes to an account of logical necessity.
5.2 A Kantian Relative Modality View
Another way to expand upon RM for metaphysical necessity is to take in-
spiration from Kant’s account of real modality, as examined in Chapter 4.
Recall, Kant’s notions of real necessity and possibility were easily captured
by the relative modality schema.
It is really possible that p: ¬∃ϕ(Cϕ & (ϕ→ ¬p))
It is really necessary that p: ∃ϕ(Cϕ & (ϕ→ p))
where the predicate “Cϕ” is to be read as “ϕ is a conjunction of formal
conditions on experience”. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to
motivating and developing this as an account of metaphysical necessity and
possibility, i.e.
It is metaphysically necessary that p:
∃ϕ(ϕ is a conjunction of formal conditions on experience &
(ϕ→ p))
It is metaphysically possible that p:
¬∃ϕ(ϕ is a conjunction of formal conditions on experience &
(ϕ→ ¬p))
There are undoubtably a number of important questions to be consid-
ered. I will address the following issues in turn:
• How should we understand the idea of a formal condition on experi-
ence?
• Why does this count as metaphysical necessity?
• What is the relationship, on this account, between metaphysical neces-
sity and logical necessity? Is one of these kinds of necessity absolute?
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• Where does mathematical necessity fit into the account?
• This account tells us when a proposition is metaphysically necessary.
Do purported cases of de re metaphysical necessity raise a problem?
• What the account say about purported standard cases of metaphysical
necessity, specifically cases of the necessary a posteriori?
5.2.1 Conditions on Experience
Transcendental Arguments and Transcendental Idealism
The core Kantian idea is that there are certain conditions on our having
any experience of the world at all. One might call them presuppositions of
experience: if there is to be experience, then these features must be in place,
or these concepts must be deployed. The Kantian method for discovering
these conditions on experience is the transcendental argument.
The first premise of a transcendental argument concerns a phenomenon
that we can agree on, e.g. we have experience as of an external world. The
second premise draws out the conditions under which the first premise can
be true, e.g. if we have experience as of an external world, then such and
such must be the case. The conclusion is a simple modus ponens move:
therefore, such and such is the case.
We have experience (or, knowledge).
If there is experience (or, knowledge), p must be true.
Therefore, p.
(Walker, 1978, p. 10). The simplest way to think of a transcendental argu-
ment is on the model of an argument from presupposition. E.g.,
Adam met his mother-in-law.
If Adam met his mother-in-law, Adam must be married.
Therefore, Adam is married.
The argument draws out what is presupposed in taking the premise to be
true. Similarly: Jim put his children to bed; therefore Jim has children. In
these simple cases, there is no great mystery in how the arguments work. In
particular, the reasoning in the “Adam” example might be called analytic.
We are required to know that the meaning of mother-in-law is something like
mother of one’s spouse, and the meaning of spouse is something like person
to whom one is married, so we can work out that Adam is married from
his having a mother-in-law to meet simply by virtue of understanding the
words in the premises. With a full-blown Kantian transcendental argument,
is it not so clear that the reasoning is analytic. E.g., do we simply need to
understand the premise “We have experience” in order to conclude that all
objects are spatiotemporal? More seems to be going on here.
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At this point, it may be helpful in understanding conditions on expe-
rience to look at two rival interpretations of the fruits of a transcendental
argument from a premise concerning our experience or knowledge. On the
face of it, all that a transcendental argument can tell us is what must be
the case if our experience is to be as it is, e.g., that everything is causally
connected, or that all external objects are in space and time. The argument
does not prima facie explain why these things are the case.
The idea that transcendental arguments always show something
to be constitutive of reality, or reality as we know it, needs to be
treated with some caution. What they establish is that unless
certain things were the case experience, or knowledge, would
not be possible, but this does not by itself guarantee that such
conditions are constitutive in any sense stronger than that. In
particular, it is not necessary that the conditions be imposed
by the mind itself in constructing our experience. Kant thought
that they must be: on his view transcendental arguments show us
what it is that the mind contributes to the world of appearances,
and they guarantee its objectivity. (Walker, 1978, p. 11)
This insight leads to two primary interpretations. The austere interpretation
takes it to be sufficient that we have charted-out the necessary structure of
the world of experience. The transcendental idealist interpretation demands
that we explain the source of this necessary structure of experience in terms
of the contribution of the cognitive faculties of the experiencing subject.
The analytic interpretation regards statements about the con-
ceptual presuppositions of experience as self-sufficient, and the
Critical problem as solved once the structure of experience has
been specified. It grounds all claims about the structure of expe-
rience on an appeal to the impossibility of our forming any other
conception of experience. The structure of experience, it holds,
is nothing more than the necessary window onto the world, and
cannot be said to give shape to it: that experience has a struc-
ture is ultimately just a matter of our having such and such
concepts and being unable to conceive any alternative to them,
and the attempt to invest it with metaphysical significance over
and above the completely minimal sense of being necessary for
experience it regards as gratuitous and erroneous.
The idealist interpretation, by contrast, sees the need for fur-
ther explanation of the structure of experience, and it refers this
structure to the operations of our mind. (Gardner, 1999, p. 33)
This raises a question: whether a Kantian account of metaphysical necessity
should be austere, or go the full hog and commit to transcendental idealism?
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Recall, Strawson’s austere interpretation understands an a priori condi-
tion on experience to be ‘an essential structural element in any conception of
experience which we could make intelligible to ourselves’ (Strawson, 1966, p.
68). We can discover what these essential structural elements of experience
are via transcendental arguments. By the proposed account, metaphysical
necessity would be whatever follows from this structure of experience, and
metaphysical possibility would be whatever is not ruled out by it. However,
there are problems with taking the austere route.
First, part of this kind of interpretation is that one is not supposed to
invest the view with any metaphysical significance. This is what is neces-
sary for experience; there is nothing more to be said, and no metaphysical
conclusion to be drawn. We learn something about how we experience the
world, indeed, we learn what we cannot help but experience, if we are to have
any experience at all. But it is not clear how, if at all, this connects with
reality. Metaphysical necessity is at least supposed to be factive—to imply
truth—and furthermore to tell us something substantive about reality. This
is precisely what the austere interpretation appears to deny that we can
take from our discovery of the necessary structure of experience. So an aus-
tere interpretation of conditions on experience looks to be an inappropriate
fleshing-out of a relative account of metaphysical necessity.
In response, one might water down the claim that there is nothing more
to be said beyond charting-out this essential structure of experience. One
might rather allow that the austere interpretation leaves it entirely open
as to what the source of this structure might be, thereby allowing that
it is legitimate to go further and ask the question. The transcendental
idealist offers one particular answer to this question: the necessary structure
of experience is imposed upon the world by the subject. But there are
surely other candidate answers, e.g., that things instantiate this structure
independently of how we experience them, and we experience them correctly.
An account of metaphysical necessity which drew upon this weaker austere
interpretation could still maintain that metaphysical necessity is relative
to these structure features of experience. This says something more about
what metaphysical necessity is. All that is left open is the source of that
necessity. But perhaps that is an advantage of the account. It can be
agreed what metaphysical necessity is, but the view can accommodate rival
accounts of its source.
However, this still leaves us in need of an account of the source of meta-
physical necessity, and not just any account of the source of the structure of
experience will result in something resembling metaphysical necessity. Sup-
pose we are all brains in vats, with a scientist determining parameters for
the form of our experience, but leaving the particular details of our experi-
ence subject to a random computer program. In this kind of case, we would
not take the kind of necessity relative to the structure of our experience to
tell us anything substantive or true about the world. Rather, it only tells us
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about the scientist’s program of parameters for the experience of his envat-
ted brains, if anything. It looks like the austere interpretation alone is not
fit for present purposes.
Are we then to commit ourselves to a transcendental idealist interpreta-
tion? Gardner (1999) explains how such an interpretation makes good sense
in light of what he calls ‘The Problem of Reality’.
Now in order for reality or any part of it to become known to
us, some sort of condition must obtain whereby it becomes an
object for us. As it may also be put, something must bring it
about that the objects composing reality appear to us. But the
question is: what makes reality into an object for us? Its being
an object for us is not established by its simple existence. And
whatever allows reality to be an object for us cannot be merely
postulated or taken for granted as a primitive fact—it stands in
need of philosophical explanation, if anything does.
Whatever it is that allows reality to become an object for
us is naturally and perhaps inevitably conceived as some sort of
fundamental connecting relation between reality and ourselves.
The question is then what this relation consists in. (Gardner,
1999, p. 34)
So what might connect reality and our representations? The first option is
that reality simply impresses itself upon our minds. However, this requires
our minds to be ‘appropriately receptive’ to reality, which raises the original
question again: what is it about our minds that makes them appropriately
receptive to reality, such that reality can be an object for us? The reverse
would be to say that reality can be an object for us, not because it imposes
itself on the mind, but due to our own activities. However, again, it must be
explained how our minds can succeed in reaching out to reality. The worry
is that skepticism, dogmatism or solipsism threatens. If we can’t make sense
of how our experience and knowledge is genuinely of reality, either we have
to give up on the idea that we have knowledge and experience of reality; or
we can only dogmatically assert that we do; or we restrict reality to our own
experience.
In light of this kind of problem, transcendental idealism seems to provide
a fairly plausible answer. The idea that we can have knowledge or experience
of things are they are in themselves, apart from how we experience them,
is rejected. Rather, focus is placed on the notion of an object-for-us or a
knowable object.13 The idea is that, given the problems faced by trying
to explain how our representations can conform to reality, we should turn
things around and consider if the problem of reality can be addressed by the
idea that reality must conform to how we represent reality.
13See Gardner (1999, p. 39).
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To suppose that objects must conform to us is to reverse the
customary direction of explanation of knowledge. In the realist
scheme, the arrow of explanation runs from the object to the
subject: if a subject S knows an object O, then the explanation
for S’s representing O lies ultimately in O’s being the way it is;
had O not existed or been otherwise, S would not have repre-
sented O or would have represented O differently. Kant reverses
the arrow: the deepest, most abstract and encompassing expla-
nation of representation lies in how S is. The constitution of
objects is thus determined at the most fundamental level by the
subject. (Gardner, 1999, p. 41)
How does this help with the problem of reality?
[This approach] maintains. . . that these subject-constituted ob-
jects compose the only kind of reality to which we have ac-
cess. . . On this approach, skepticism is refuted by showing that,
although claims to knowledge of real things in the strong sense
must, as the skeptic says, be rejected as dogmatic and ground-
less, reality in the weaker sense is something that we can know
precisely because we constitute it. Knowledge claims are thus
defended on the basis that reason can have insight into ‘that
which it produces after a plan of its own’ (Bxiii). (Gardner,
1999, p. 41)
Reality is a possible object of experience and knowledge for us because our
activity in part constitutes reality, and whatever we contribute to in this
way is a possible object of experience and knowledge.
At this point, some readers will be alarmed. Surely we don’t partly
constitute the external world of which we have experience in this way? The
following remarks should go some way to allaying the worst fears. First, it
is not my intention here to endorse and defend transcendental idealism.14
But it is worth mentioning as one interpretation of conditions on experience
that has been discussed and worked out in detail. I argued above that
some account has to be given of the source of this ‘essential structure of
experience’, to ensure that any kind of necessity relative to it can properly be
called metaphysical. One such account is transcendental idealism. However,
there may be other, better, accounts. In what follows, many of the details of
the Kantian relative view of metaphysical necessity will depend only on the
idea of conditions on experience, and not on the account of their ultimate
source. So if a good alternative to transcendental idealism were to arise,
these points would not be affected.
That said, a background commitment to transcendental idealism need
not be seen as such a bad thing. The second point to note is that, if one
14This would presumably at least take an additional thesis.
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takes the problem of reality seriously, this kind of view helps us to avoid
skepticism, dogmatism and solipsism, each of which looks like far a worse
prospect than transcendental idealism to me.
Third, transcendental idealism is not the kind of idealism which has it
that the existence of objects depends upon the mind. It is the structural
features without which we would have no experience that are supposed to
be provided by the subject, not the material which is thereby structured
into a format suitable for experience.
Since, for Kant, the philosophical motivation for regarding ob-
jects as subject-dependent derives from the problem of reality,
and not from the kind of considerations that move Berkeley, there
is reason for regarding objects as subject-dependent only to the
extent that they are conceived in terms of the conditions under
which objects for us are possible at all, i.e. only with respect to
those of their features by virtue of which they conform to the
structure of experience; we are justified in regarding as subject-
dependent only whatever in objects pertains to the possibility of
their being objects for us at all. The writ of idealism runs no
further. (Gardner, 1999, p. 42)
What is intuitively implausible about idealism in general is the common
sense idea that our experience of external objects, such as of a red car,
depends upon those external things and not on our minds. But the tran-
scendental idealist does not claim that, e.g., the existence of the red car,
or the colour of the red car, depends upon or is constituted by my mind.
Rather, that external object can only be an object of my experience insofar
as I impose certain structural features on it, such as it being a spatiotempo-
ral object subject to some causal laws. Once it is a possible object for me,
then its own features, such as colour, can wear the trousers.
The a priori element in cognition as a whole is the object-
enabling structure of experience, the set of conditions that makes
objects possible for us, and the a priori features of objects are
those by virtue of which objects conform to that structure. Once
this a priori structure is in place, knowledge becomes an a pos-
teriori affair. . . the empirically real features of objects are those
which they have over and above (and conditionally upon) their
a priori features, and on the basis of which the realist form of
explanation has legitimate application. (Gardner, 1999, p. 43)
The idea that the mind cannot create objects, but may still impose some
general features on objects, does not seem so outlandish.
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Intuitions and Categories
What kind of features, then, are supposed to be included in these condi-
tions of experience? For Kant, those conditions arise from a priori features
of our particular capacity for receiving information—our faculty of sensible
intuition—as well as our particular capacity for processing that given infor-
mation by applying concepts—our faculty of understanding. The conditions
of experience thus consist in the pure forms of intuition, space and time,
and the pure concepts of the understanding (categories), concepts such as
substance and causation. Recall, the modal concepts are also included in
the categories, but they are different to the others. They do not directly
contribute to conditions on experience, but concern those conditions of ex-
perience themselves.
I discussed before (section 4.3.3) how considering any one candidate fea-
ture involves engaging in an extensive debate in its own right. To assess
each potential feature here, then, in order to list the conditions on experi-
ence to which metaphysical necessity is (claimed to be) relative, would be
over-ambitious. Indeed, it was never part of the brief that metaphysical ne-
cessity is going to be easy to specify. I will, however, give a sketch of some
of the kinds of conditions that might be included.
A good example of plausible Kantian necessities can, I think, be taken
from the Analogies in the first Critique. Here Kant deals with substance
and causality. Consider, e.g., the second analogy.
Principle of Succession in Time, in accordance with the Law of
Causality
All alterations take place in conformity with the law of the con-
nection of cause and effect. (Kant, 1781, 1787, B232)
The arguments for the principles of the analogies are premised on the claim
that we need the idea of an objective time-order in order to account for our
experience as of an objective world.
If a realm of objects is to be represented, then it must be possible
to draw a distinction between the subjective and the objective
aspects of our representations, i.e. between the aspect of our
representations which refers to us their subjects, and the aspect
which can be taken to refer to a world of objects. Now the
very first thing that is needed here, Kant argues, is a distinction
between the temporal order of our representations, and the tem-
poral order of objects: if we are to think of objects as distinct
from our representations, then we need to be able to think of
them as existing in time, as a matter over and above the inner
flow of our representations. In other words, we need to be able
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to form the idea of an objective time-order, in which objects exist
with determinate temporal locations, as distinct from the merely
subjective time-order in which our representations succeed one
another. (Gardner, 1999, pp. 171–2)
The second analogy takes our requirement for experience of an objective
time-order, and works back from that to a need for an experience of objective
change, and from there to causal laws.
The argument, briefly stated, is that experience of objective
change, i.e. of the world as changing, as opposed to merely
oneself or one’s representations changing, is necessary for experi-
ence of an objective time-order, and that the distinction between
change occurring in our representations, and change occurring in
an objective world, can be made only by employing the concept
of causality. (Gardner, 1999, p. 175)
Kant argues that the distinction between objective and subjective change
rests upon the relation of succession governing the former being necessary
and irreversible. He uses the examples of walking around a house, and
watching a ship sail downstream. In the first case, our representations of
the house—the front, the left side, the back etc.—change in a particular
order, but due to the fact that we have chosen to walk one way rather than
another. We could just as well have walked in a different direction, and
seen the parts of the house in a different order. So the change we see in the
house is merely subjective change. In contrast, there is nothing we could
do to change the order of representations comprising our experience of the
ship sailing downstream, to make it such that it was sailing upstream. In
this case, our representations change because the object is changing, not
because we, the subject, are changing. The succession in representations is
necessary and irreversible—we can do nothing to change it—and so this is
distinguished as a case of objective succession or change.
. . . what makes the difference, according to Kant, is that in the
case of the ship I organise my experience according to a rule
which makes the order in which I experience things necessary
and irreversible. And the concept of a necessary and irreversible
succession is, Kant says, the concept of a causal relation: the
relation of cause and effect is both necessary and irreversible.
The principle of causality is justified, therefore, on the grounds
that only an a priori rule, by virtue of which one appearance can
be regarded as necessitating another, allows us to refer change to
objects, as required for an objective time-order. (Gardner, 1999,
p. 176)
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The rule which gives rise to the necessary and irreversible relation of suc-
cession, which is distinctive of objective change, is the relation of cause and
effect.
This provides an example of the kind of transcendental argument that is
employed by Kant. Our experience as of an objective world, it is argued, is
possible only if we have experience of an objective time-order, and thence, if
we organise the world according to a concept of causality. Looking just at the
conclusion, rather than the argument, it does seem fairly plausible. What
would experience be like if we were able to alter the changes in things at
will? Would we genuinely have a sense that the world was objective, and that
things could change independently of us, if we never experienced resistance
to changing them ourselves? It is unclear whether it would make sense to
attribute change to an object if we could always affect that change by altering
something about ourselves. So it looks like some kind of necessary and
irreversible relation of succession is required as a condition on experience.
Even if one argued that this was not causality, we still have an example of
a condition on experience, regardless of what we call it.
Furthermore, the resulting principle is suitably general. It does not say
that the actual laws of cause and effect that govern our world are necessary,
just that some necessary connection of cause and effect is a condition on
experience. The conclusion is that the relation of succession in the case
of objective change is necessary and irreversible, and that the concept of a
necessary and irreversible relation of succession is just the concept of the
relation of cause and effect. But this says nothing about requiring that our
particular laws of nature inform this causal relation. Thus, I would suggest
that the second analogy also gives us a good example of how we can separate
natural from metaphysical necessity on this Kantian view. In short, the
idea is that the laws of nature could (metaphysically) have been different,
although, whatever they were, they would have to (metaphysically)include
some relation of cause and effect.
5.2.2 Metaphysical Necessity?
Even if we can make good the notion of a kind of necessity which is relative
to conditions on experience, why is this a good candidate for filling the
shoes of metaphysical necessity? Recall, metaphysical necessity is supposed
to be something like the strictest real necessity: of all the factive kinds of
necessity which tell us something substantive about the world, metaphysical
necessity is the “narrowest”: if something is metaphysically necessary, then
it is necessary in any other real sense.
If we understand conditions on experience as contributing to a solution
to the problem of reality, i.e. as explaining how reality can become an ob-
ject of experience or knowledge for us, then one can provide the following
rationale for taking the necessity which is relative to these conditions to be
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metaphysical necessity.15 Any reality that can be experienced or known will
be subject to these conditions on experience. If anything is not compatible
with these conditions, then it will not be part of any reality that can be
experienced or known; and anything that follows logically from these condi-
tions will have to be part of this reality. In terms of the domain of “reality
that can be made an object of experience or knowledge”, these conditions
on experience provide a relative base for a kind of necessity which covers
all of that domain. Other kinds of necessity, e.g. biological necessity, might
focus on a smaller area of reality, e.g. the biological organisms, but given
that these things are still part of the wider domain of reality, they will still
be subject to conditions on experience, and the associated necessities will
still apply to the smaller domain. So it looks like the necessity which is
relative to conditions on experience is the strictest necessity for the domain
of “reality that can be an object for us”.
The obvious challenge to be made here is: this kind of necessity isn’t the
strictest kind of real necessity, because it does not cover all of reality; it cov-
ers only reality “which can be made an object for us”. There is surely then a
kind of necessity which concerns all of reality, regardless of what we can ex-
perience, which is stricter. To be fair, a Kantian framework doesn’t allow for
any cognition or experience of “things are they are in themselves”, although
the existence of these things is posited as grounding the existence of the
things we can and do experience.16 One might be forgiven for thinking that
the proper subject of metaphysics ought to be things-in-themselves, and not
things as they appear to us. However, part of the Kantian movement has
been precisely to move away from this kind of “speculative metaphysics”.
If we have reasons for thinking that we cannot have experience or knowl-
edge of things-in-themselves, then the project of trying to do metaphysics
for these things is a non-starter. One risks being thrown into skepticism
or dogmatism. The Kantian way out is to favour the reality that we can
know and experience. This is the world of empirical science; it is hardly
uninteresting or illegitimate. Metaphysics should be concerned with how
things are in the world we inhabit, not a realm of things that cannot even
be “an object” for us. Note that even discussing these things is difficult
to make sense of: if they cannot be objects for us, it is not clear what we
are talking about when we purport to talk about them. If one nevertheless
maintains that metaphysical necessity should concern things-in-themselves,
not things as they appear to us, then the Kantian can simply say: so much
15This does not require a commitment to transcendental idealism, rather just any decent
account of the source of these conditions on experience which addresses the problem of
reality.
16Kant does allow that we have other kinds (other than knowledge and experience) of
access to the ‘noumenal realm’, such as the access that practical reason has to the laws
governing the noumenal self, in order to be guided in action. But this is not the kind of
access that can lead to judging or cognizing, or to truth and knowledge.
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the worse for metaphysical necessity. What is presented here is a kind of
necessity which governs everything one might ever know or experience, the
world which is studied by the natural sciences, the world we live in. That
is a pretty interesting kind of necessity.
Stang (forthcoming) has argued that Kant is committed to a kind of
modality, noumenal possibility and necessity, governing the behaviour of
things-in-themselves. Even if he is right, there is still no good reason to
treat this, rather than Kant’s real necessity (what Stang calls formal neces-
sity), as metaphysical necessity. The same points stand. In addition, Stang
argues that, given that we cannot have knowledge of noumena, a fortiori
we cannot have a priori knowledge of noumena. This is intended to show
that Kant does not conflate necessity with a prioricity, because we could not
have any knowledge, let alone a priori knowledge, of noumenal possibilities
and necessities. There is a presupposition in the majority of the litera-
ture on metaphysical necessity that we can have knowledge of metaphysical
necessity—the debate is often over whether that knowledge is empirical or a
priori. So this gives us another reason to associate metaphysical with real,
not noumenal, necessity.
Another way to think of “conditions on experience” focuses on the dis-
tinction between cognition and mere thought. A cognition (Erkenntnis) is an
objectively valid representation. One should think of a cognition as being a
thought, with propositional form, which is objective. A thought is objective
if it succeeds in being “about the world” if it has “an object” that it says
something about. Kant defines truth for a cognition in terms of agreement
with the object (A58/B82) suggesting that truth-evaluability depends upon
a cognition having an object at all, which may or may not agree with how
it is represented by the cognition. Conditions on experience can also be un-
derstood as the conditions under which a thought may be objectively valid,
i.e. the conditions for a thought to have an object and hence count as a
cognition. As a consequence, any object of a cognition—anything we can
have cognitions about—will be subject to these conditions. Anything which
is not compatible with these conditions cannot be an object of cognition. So
the necessity which is relative to these conditions covers all possible objects
of cognition. What else might there be beyond this domain, which might
make us think that this doesn’t count as the strictest real necessity? There
are no other objects; to say that there are objects beyond what we can
cognize would be to try to say something objective where objectivity is not
possible.
By contrast, mere thought does not succeed in having an object (being
objectively valid, being “about” anything). In a number of places Kant
alludes to the distinction between thought and cognition. We may well be
able to think all sorts of things, but to cognize them requires something
more.
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To cognize an object I must be able to prove its possibility, either
from its actuality as attested by experience, or a priori by means
of reason. But I can think whatever I please, provided only that
I do not contradict myself, that is, provided my concept is a
possible thought. (Kant, 1781, 1787, Bxxvi, footnote)
But this idea of the supersensible, which no doubt we cannot
further determine—so that we cannot cognize nature as its pre-
sentation, but only think it as such—is awakened in us by an
object the aesthetic judging of which strains the imagination to
its utmost. . . (Kant, 1790, 268)
I discussed the first quotation earlier with respect to Kant’s distinction be-
tween real and logical possibility. Real modality, which is also what is at
issue with metaphysical modality, was subject to conditions on experience.
Mere logical possibility can go beyond real possibility. There are things we
can think, that are logically possible, but such that these thoughts do not
conform to the conditions on experience and so are denied an object. Exam-
ples of what might count as merely logically possible include thoughts such
as all vacuums are yawning (the concept of a vacuum is empirically empty,
so cannot feature in cognitions, but only mere thoughts); Jim has telepathic
powers (likewise, the property of having telepathic powers could never be
given in experience); all toves are slithy (the constituent concepts tove and
slithy do not have empirical significance). One can understand a thought
as being a suitable arrangement of concepts which has the same form as a
cognition, but which lacks the possibility of having any intuition to give it
an object. So we can think thoughts, and understand them, but they fail to
gain traction on the world.
The second quotation makes reference to Kant’s aesthetic theory, but the
main point is that we can think of the “supersensible” in nature—something
beyond what could be given in sensible intuition—although we clearly can-
not cognize it—cognition requires intuitions as well as concepts. In Kant’s
aesthetics, he argues that a judgment of the sublime occurs when we try to
take something in, e.g. the starry night sky, which is too great for us to
properly cognize, to subsume under a concept. But we are still capable of
being aware that there is something too great for us to take in. So, in a way,
we can think of something that we cannot cognize.
In short, one can contrast metaphysical necessity as concerned with con-
ditions on cognition, as opposed to conditions on thought in general. Cog-
nitions are thoughts that succeed in being objective, about objects. The
strictest real necessity should tell us about the widest possible domain of
objects. There is no wider domain of objects, in the Kantian framework,
than that of the possible objects of cognition. So any conditions on what
can be cognized carry over to conditions on all objects.
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5.2.3 Metaphysical Necessity and Logical Necessity
In Chapter 3 I argued for a Kantian account of logical necessity, whereby
logical necessity is that necessity which attaches to a deductive argument,
and the source of logical necessity is to be found in an account of laws of
logic as constitutive norms for thought. Logical necessity has its source in
norms, evaluability in light of which is constitutive of what it is to think
at all. Note, now, the contrast between thought and cognition. A minimal
notion of thinking is entertaining something of propositional form. Cog-
nizing is something richer: one entertains a proposition that is objective,
that says something right or wrong about the world. The idea is then that,
whereas logical necessity has its source in constitutive norms for thought,
metaphysical necessity has its source in conditions for cognition. Note that
the laws of thought are normative, in order to account for the fact that
we occasionally think illogically. By contrast, conditions for cognition can
be counted as “constitutive”: if a thought violates one of these conditions,
it cannot have an object, and therefore fails to count as a cognition (see
sections 3.3.3–3.3.4).
It should come as no surprise that on this view metaphysical necessity is
a mere relative form of logical necessity, relative to conditions on experience:
metaphysical necessity is whatever follows logically from these conditions on
experience. Any question regarding where the “oomph” of necessity comes
from in metaphysical necessity is thereby reduced to a question regarding the
“oomph” of logical necessity. Both kinds of necessity have their “oomph”
in common; what makes metaphysical necessity distinctive is the kind of
propositions to which it is relative. Again, it shouldn’t be surprising that on
this view logical necessity is (richly) absolute. As metaphysical necessity is
distinct from and relative to logical necessity, this means that metaphysical
necessity is not absolute. However, there are those who think that meta-
physical necessity is absolute, and that this should count against the present
view. I contend, however, that my proposed account does a good job of re-
specting the intuitions that might lead one to maintain that metaphysical
necessity is absolute.
Why might you think that metaphysical necessity is absolute? You might
not think that mere logical possibilities are genuine ways that things might
be. You might think that metaphysical necessity concerns how things must
be, and that metaphysical possibility concerns how things can be, but that
logical necessity concerns only concepts and logical connectives. Surely log-
ical possibility, in going beyond metaphysical possibility, purports to de-
scribe a kind of possibility that goes beyond how things can be, and thus
doesn’t make sense as a genuine way for things to be. Why should the non-
contradictoriness of the sentence ‘Socrates could have been the son of George
VI’—the fact that the sentence is not of the form of a logical falsehood, and
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that the concepts do not clash—17 have any bearing on what is possible or
not for the thing Socrates? Shalkowski’s peculiar form of essentialism illus-
trates this kind of worry quite well. In his example (cf. p.220) the thought
is that Kripke’s lectern could not have been made from ice (rather than
wood), full stop, even though there is a weaker sense of possibility in which
one might say it could. But this weaker possibility is not genuine, because for
Kripke’s lectern to have been made of wood would be to violate the essence
of the lectern, resulting in a distinct object merely resembling the lectern.
We have to take into account the nature of the object, the lectern, and
not whether propositions purporting to be about the lectern are logically or
conceptually consistent. The resulting view is that metaphysical necessity
is (richly) absolute: metaphysical necessity is the strongest necessity and
metaphysical possibility is the weakest possibility. Logical necessity is still
strictly absolute—McFetridge’s proof is respected—but logical possibility is
dismissed as not genuine.
In fact, the Kantian views of metaphysical and logical necessity fully
accommodate the intuition that mere logical possibility is not a way things
genuinely could be, and that metaphysical necessity is in some sense abso-
lute. Recall, all of reality that can be an object for us, all objects of cognition,
is (are) subject to the conditions on experience. Metaphysical possibility is a
matter of compatibility with these conditions. Hence, there can be no meta-
physically impossible object or real thing. Indeed, the categories, which
contribute to these conditions on experience, are often understood as com-
bining to provide the ‘concept of an object in general’. Just as an essentialist
is concerned with the identity of objects, which leads them to favour meta-
physical necessity and possibility, so the Kantian is concerned with what it is
to be an object, which leads to a special role for metaphysical necessity and
possibility. The primary difference is that the Kantian view maintains that
logical necessity is nevertheless solely absolute, and that logical necessity
and possibility, whilst not having the same kinds of consequences for real
objects as metaphysical modality, still have a vital role to play. Even though
on this view metaphysical necessity is not absolute, it is still the strictest
real necessity. And it is this feature which allows the view to account for the
intuition that metaphysical necessity is the strongest kind of necessity. It is
not the strongest necessity tout court, but the strongest real necessity, the
strongest kind of necessity which yields the widest kind of possibility for the
real world. This is clearly an important status for metaphysical necessity
to have. This should satisfy those who think that metaphysical necessity is
absolute because mere logical possibilities do not seem to be a good guide
to how reality could be. The Kantian does not claim that they are.
If logical necessity is understood as having its source in constitutive-
17It is not part of the meaning of the name Socrates that its bearer have any particular
parents.
238
norms for thought, then, roughly speaking, of course one wouldn’t expect
logical possibility to give a guide to how real things might be: the possibili-
ties for what we can think shouldn’t be taken to determine what can be. It
seems prima facie plausible that we should be able to fly into wild fancies of
thought without being constrained by whether those thoughts could become
real in any substantive sense. There are further constraints to be taken into
account if we want to consider what could really be the case. However,
the essentialist’s mistake is to think that this demotes the status of logical
necessity and possibility such that logical possibility is not genuine, and log-
ical necessity absolute only insofar as it is a kind of metaphysical necessity.
The Kantian view, in contrast, places logical necessity at the beating heart
of alethic modality. If all (non-logical) alethic modality is a mere relative
form of logical modality, this not only explains what all these diverse kinds
of modality (and their various modal “oomphs”) have in common, but the
task of explaining where (alethic) possibility and necessity come from at all
is reduced to the project of explaining the source of logical modality. It is
not a problem that logical possibility itself does not tell us how the world
of real objects can be—possibility and necessity are restricted to the real
world by an appropriate relative base.
I mentioned above (section 5.2.2) the close relationship between meta-
physical necessity, cognition and truth. It looks as though the Kantian
picture sets the limits of truth and truth-evaluability at the limits of the
empirical world, the world we can cognize. But then what is the relation-
ship between logical modality, mere thoughts and truth(-evaluability)? I
argued before (section 3.5.4) that on a Kantian view logical necessities are
included in constraints on objectively valid thoughts, cognitions. So logical
necessity will imply truth for the same reasons that metaphysical necessity
implies truth. However, in the case of mere logical possibility, it is not so
straightforward to say that if it is logically possible that p, then it is pos-
sible for p to be true. A mere logical possibility is not cognizable—it is
non-contradictory, but incompatible with conditions on experience—so it
can only be expressed by a mere thought. But mere thoughts cannot have
an object, and so they cannot be true, i.e. there is no object to agree with.18
If truth is defined as agreement of a representation with its object, then
cognitions can be true because they are objective, but mere thoughts cannot
be true because they cannot have an object, and so a fortiori cannot agree
with their object. A question remains: are mere thoughts therefore false,
or do they fail to have a truth-value at all? If truth is agreement of a
18If one understands thoughts as something that can be true or false, then this worry is
not going to make sense. In a Kantian framework, a better candidate for something that
can be true or false is a cognition. The notion of thought in play here is something that
is well-formed but which does not succeed in being objectively about the world, perhaps
because a constituent concept has no empirical content, perhaps because the combination
of concepts expresses a way the world couldn’t be, and so on.
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representation with its object, then there are two ways to define falsity on
the basis of this: (a) a representation is false just when it disagrees with
its object; (b) a representation is false just when it is not the case that it
agrees with its object. Definition (a) requires that the representation have
an object with which to disagree, hence a mere thought cannot be false, and
so lacks a truth-value. (b), however, can be trivially satisfied in the case
where the representation lacks an object: it is not the case that it agrees
with the object because there is no object with which it might agree.
For present purposes, I do not need to decide which definition is to be
preferred. However, it is interesting to note how this issue concerning the
truth-value of mere thoughts can be compared to a more familiar matter
from the philosophy of language, concerning the truth-value of sentences
containing non-referring singular terms. This comparison should also illu-
minate some of the Kantian ideas surrounding mere or “empty” thoughts.
Recall, Kant claims that
Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts
are blind. (Kant, 1781, 1787, A51/B75)
A mental representation which lacks empirical content—which could not
be confirmed or disconfirmed in experience in even a very weak sense of
‘could’—is “empty”.19 This can be understood as analogous to the case of
an empty singular term as in the sentence ‘Santa has a booming laugh’. Some
philosophers argue that a sentence which contains a non-referring term, such
as ‘Santa’, has no truth-value. E.g., Frege took predicates to “refer” to
functions (concepts) which take an object and map it to a truth-value. So
if a predicate is applied to a singular term to form a sentence, that sentence
is true just when the function picked out by the predicate maps the object
referred to by the singular term to The True. But if there is no object
referred to by the singular term, as in ‘Santa’, there is no object to be
mapped to any value, so the function remains undefined, and the sentence
lacks a truth-value.
I propose that we can fruitfully understand what Kant means by an
“empty thought” on this kind of model. The key difference is that, whereas
in the case of an empty name the reference failure may be purely contingent,
the empty thought cannot have an object. If we think that Santa Claus
is metaphysically possible—that his existence would be compatible with
conditions on experience—then even though the name ‘Santa’ is actually
empty, it could have had its intended referent. The thought that Santa has
a booming laugh has empirical content, because we could encounter such an
intuition in experience, even though we actually won’t.20 Metaphysically
19Recall, Kant thinks that non-empirical truths have empirical content, e.g., in his
account of mathematical construction.
20I don’t know what Kant would say about contingently empty names. I don’t want to
complicate matters further by considering this.
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possible reference is enough to secure content for a representation, rather
than full-blooded actual reference. By contrast, a thought such as ‘Jim has
telepathic powers’—a thought which is metaphysically impossible—can be
thought of as necessarily lacking reference. There (metaphysically speaking)
could be no instance of telepathic powers, so there is not even a possible
referent (no concept or function, has telepathic powers) to determine a truth-
value.
5.3 Further Issues
5.3.1 Mathematical Necessity and Mathematical Truth
There are two key issues to be considered when it comes to the relation
between the present view and mathematics. First, given Kant’s concept-
empiricism, and the view that propositions with no empirical content may
lack a truth-value, what is to be said about the truth of mathematical
claims? Second, what is the relationship between mathematical necessity
and metaphysical and logical necessity?
First, Kant did not think that mathematical propostions lack a truth-
value—part of the impetus for his project was to show how we can have a
priori knowledge of mathematical truths, even though (according to Kant)
they are not analytic truths. I discussed Kant’s view in more detail in section
4.5. The question is not so much whether Kant can say that mathematical
propositions are true. Rather, it is whether we are constrained to accept a
Kantian philosophy of mathematics along with a Kantian view of modality.
The short answer is: no we aren’t. I will briefly sketch how some of the
different views in philosophy of mathematics could be accommodated in
this relative Kantian framework.
I discussed earlier how structuralism might naturally be incorporated
into the view. It seems plausible to think that some kind of mathemat-
ical structure might turn out to be one of the necessary features of our
experience. If mathematical structure were included in conditions on ex-
perience, this would render mathematics trivially metaphysically necessary.
Mathematical necessity is often thought to be a kind of metaphysical ne-
cessity, given that it concerns a certain class of objects, i.e. mathematical
objects such as numbers, sets and functions. However, one may argue that
mathematical structure is not sufficient, that the view should allow for the
existence of mathematical objects.
What about fictionalism about mathematical entities? One might think
that mathematical entities such as numbers do not exist, but that they can
still be a useful fiction. The best known brand of mathematical fictionalism
is the view put forward by Harty Field.21 He argues that mathematical state-
21Field (1980).
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ments are not true, and that mathematical entities do not exist, however,
mathematics nevertheless provides a conservative extension to our scientific
theories. A conservative extension to a theory does not allow one to deduce
any theorem which could not have been deduced from the theory alone,
however, this conservative extension may often make it quicker and easier
to work with the theory and yield its consequences. This, Field argues, is
the role of mathematics: it provides a conservative extension to the physical
sciences. The problem for incorporating a view such as fictionalism into
the Kantian view is that even Kant maintains that there are mathematical
truths—it is just that they are not “made true” by existing mathematical
objects. So going fictionalist would actually seem to take us further away
from our intuitions about mathematics. Instead, one could endorse a re-
stricted fictionalism concerning only the existence of mathematical entities.
One might argue that the truth of mathematics is to be properly accounted
for in terms of a Kantian account, but that mathematical entities are a use-
ful fiction when it comes to thinking about and doing mathematics. It is
perhaps easier to investigate the properties of a certain number if we think
about it as being an existing object with features, rather than an aspect of
the necessary structure of our experience of the world.
Although Platonism about mathematical entities—that they genuinely
exist in an abstract realm—is not compatible with the letter of the Kantian
view, there are various modifications that could be made towards a more
accommodating view. One option might be to include existence statements
in the conditions on possible experience. I argued before that Kant’s dis-
taste for necessary existence could be motivated by considering that the
conditions on possible experience, from which necessities are supposed to
follow, are general in form, and so cannot be expected to yield particular
existence statements. To follow through with this proposal, one would re-
quire arguments to the effect that certain existents are a prerequisite for our
experience, e.g., one could try to argue that we could not have the kind of
experience we in fact do if there were no numbers. If one at least agrees
that some mathematical structure and mathematical truths are essential to
experience (as Kant seems to), then one way to pursue this line of argument
would be to argue that the only way to account for these truths, or this
structure, is to appeal to the existence of mathematical entities.
The alternatives so far considered—structuralism, fictionalism, platon-
ism—were concerned with how to incorporate mathematical entities into the
world, into the conditions on experience. If such a strategy were successful,
it looks like mathematical necessity would count as a kind of metaphysi-
cal necessity. The mathematical necessities (possibilities) would be those
propositions which follow logically from (are compatible with) those condi-
tions on possible experience which pertain to mathematics. However, not all
philosophers agree that mathematics belongs with the metaphysical; rather,
it should be understood as part of logic. The logicist movement of the be-
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ginning of the twentieth century, including figures such as Frege, Russell and
Whitehead, was concerned to show that mathematics could be reduced to
logic.
Logicism, the theory that mathematics is in some important
sense reducible to logic, consists of two main theses. The first is
that all mathematical truths can be translated into logical truths
or, in other words, that the vocabulary of mathematics consti-
tutes a proper subset of the vocabulary of logic. The second is
that all mathematical proofs can be recast as logical proofs or,
in other words, that the theorems of mathematics constitute a
proper subset of the theorems of logic. (Irvine, 2010)
This movement was partly a reaction to Kant’s view that mathematical
truths are synthetic, rather than analytic, and so not part of logic. However,
if this part of Kant’s view were set aside, one could incorporate a logicist
view. If mathematics is a part of logic, then it need not be treated in
the account of metaphysical necessity, i.e. as being part of the conditions
of experience. Instead, it would need to be included in the account of logic
and logical necessity discussed earlier. One downside is that it is not obvious
how the account could accommodate the existence of mathematical entities.
5.3.2 De Re Necessity
RM tells us what it takes for it to be R-necessary that p. Prima facie, it
looks like these relative accounts only cover what is generally called “de
dicto” necessity. Can RM accommodate de re necessity as well? Does it
need to?
First, what is the distinction between de re and de dicto necessity? In-
formally speaking, de re features pertain to things, whereas de dicto features
pertain to “dicta” or “sayables”. De dicto is associated with things such as
propositions, sentences and statements. De re is associated with the things
that propositions, sentences and statements are about.22 More formally, de
re modality is standardly understood as the case where a constant or free
variable occurs within the scope of a modal operator. E.g., “Fa” is de re
whereas “∃xFx” is de dicto. The idea is that, if it is necessary that Jane
is human, then this is understood as being a de re necessity applying to
Jane. By contrast, if it is necessary that there is something which is human,
then there is no thing this possibility attaches to, it is simply a necessary
proposition.
What to say about RM? Let us adopt for the time being the formal dis-
tinction. First, take the case of a constant in the scope of a modal operator,
22By this, I do not wish to imply that it is possible for all things to be represented in a
proposition.
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i.e.
MFa
where “M” is the operator “It is metaphysically necessary that”. This is
quite easily accommodated by RM. The statement is of the form of an op-
erator applying to a proposition, albeit a proposition containing a constant.
Therefore, we can apply the RM schema.
∃ϕ(Mϕ & (ϕ→ Fa))
The de re reading of this would go something like: a is such that there is a
conjunction of conditions on experience ϕ such that it follows logically from
ϕ that a is F . In such cases, therefore, RM can accommodate de re necessity
by employing a formal definition of de re, and by taking note accordingly of
the structure of the propositions it deems necessary.
The difference between de re and de dicto can be demonstrated by the
relative positioning of a quantifier and a modal operator. E.g.
M∃xFx
and
∃xMFx
show the difference between it being metaphysically necessary that there
is something which is F (de dicto) and there being something which is
metaphysically necessarily F (de re). This kind of de re statement is not of
the form modal operator + sentence, but in the spirit of RM we can render
it as follows:
∃x∃ϕ(Mϕ & (ϕ→ Fx))
This reads as saying that there is something which is such that it follows
from a conjunction of conditions on experience that it is F .
Note that we can infer the more particular instances from the more
general. E.g., take the following general de re necessity, that everything is
metaphysically necessarily G.
∀x∃ϕ(Mϕ & (ϕ→ Gx))
Suppose we already know that object b exists. Then we can infer that b is
metaphysically necessarily G (given that all things are).
∃ϕ(Mϕ & (ϕ→ Gb))
This takes us back to the first formulation, i.e. in terms of containing a
constant, rather than the scope of an operator.
One problem with relying on this formal definition of the distinction is
that is it not clear how to apply it to some typical arguably de re cases of
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metaphysical necessity. E.g., perhaps it is de re necessary that water is H2O,
however, it is not clear how to treat this formally as including a constant or
free variable. One might try to treat this as a case of necessary coextension,
i.e.
∀x(water(x) ≡ H2O(x)).
—everything is such that necessarily, it is water if and only if it is H2O.
However, this is strictly speaking a de re necessity about every thing, not
about water. One might try instead to go second-order, using predicate
constants (names of properties) to formalize the claim as a necessary identity
statement, i.e.
(W = H2O)
However, this second-order formulation assumes that it is correct to think
of this case as one of identity (rather than, say, constitution), which some
philosophers contest. The general lesson here is that, in relying on a formal
definition of the de re, what RM has to say about purported cases of de re
necessity will depend upon what the best formal definition turns out to be.
It has been suggested that there is a particularly intimate link between
de re necessity and metaphysical necessity.
All forms of de re necessity (and of essence) will be fundamen-
tally metaphysical, even though some forms of de dicto necessity
may not be. (Fine, 2005, p. 243)
It is not surprising that Fine would make such a claim, given that he takes
metaphysical necessity to have its source in the natures of things. He claims
that all forms of de re necessity are fundamentally metaphysical, because he
takes any kind of necessity which has its source in the natures of some things
to be a restricted form of metaphysical necessity. Given the very different
approach of the proposed Kantian relative view, one would not expect it
to produce a similar link. Indeed, all of the examples of potential condi-
tions on experience have been general in form. Even if the resulting general
necessities have particular instances, ushering in some de re metaphysical
necessity, at heart metaphysical necessity would seem to be largely de dicto.
A more pressing worry for RM comes from what I will call asymmetrical
de re necessities. In general, these are cases where two or more things
are taken to be necessarily related to each other in some way, but where
the relevant relation is only necessary in one direction. E.g., Elizabeth II
necessarily has George VI as a father, but George VI does not necessarily
have Elizabeth II as a daughter; or table T is necessarily made from hunk of
wood W , but hunk of wood W does not necessarily compose table T ; and
so on. In such cases, the formulation which applies a necessity operator to
a sentence is true—i.e. necessarily, Elizabeth II is the daughter of George
VI, and necessarily, table T is made from hunk of wood W . However, this
kind of formulation does not capture the intuitive asymmetry in the cases,
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e.g., that Elizabeth II’s identity depends upon the sperm and egg cells from
which she was generated, but that there was nothing to stop George VI
having no children, or different children. Normally, one can address this
problem by introducing additional formal machinery. E.g., Wiggins (1976)
modifies a λ-calculus to introduce a modal predicate-modifier. However,
RM is committed to a formulation involving a sentence operator, whereby
modality is applied to a proposition: it cashes-out it is R-ly necessary that
p. Even if a formal definition of de re allows RM to count ‘Necessarily,
Elizabeth II is the daughter of George VI’ as de re, insofar as the proposition
contains something like constants (names), this still does not capture the
purported asymmetry.
These kinds of asymmetrical necessity claims are examples of essence
claims. The idea is that there is nothing in what it is to be George VI which
requires him to have any particular child, or indeed any child at all, whereas
it is part of what it is to be Elizabeth II that she have the parents she in
fact has, including George VI. When it comes to an account of necessity, as
opposed to essence, I agree with Fine insofar as he indicates that essence
and necessity are different things.
My point. . . is that the notion of essence which is of central im-
portance to the metaphysics of identity is not to be understood
in modal terms or even to be regarded as extensionally equiva-
lent to a modal notion. The one notion is, if I am right, a highly
refined version of the other; it is like a sieve which performs a
similar function but with a much finer mesh. (Fine, 1994, p. 3)
Essence and modality are similar notions, but they are nevertheless different.
Where I disagree with Fine is of course in his claim that the relationship
between essence and (metaphysical) modality is that the former provides
the source of the latter. My view is that it is conditions on experience
which define metaphysical modality, although this leaves open whether cer-
tain general essentialist-type principles might turn out to be amongst our
prerequisites for experience of the world.
My suggested response is thus that, whilst claims about essentialist prop-
erties may be asymmetrical, claims of necessary are not. It may be no part
of being George VI to have Elizabeth II as a daughter, but nevertheless, any
world containing them both will be a world in which George is the father
of Elizabeth.23 Fine takes the asymmetrical essential relationship to be the
source of a symmetrical necessary truth. That necessity cannot reflect this
asymmetry is precisely part of Fine’s argument to show that necessity and
essence are distinct. RM is supposed to be an account of necessity, and
so there is no prima facie problem if it cannot capture the asymmetry of
23Granting for the sake of argument that there is indeed this asymmetric relationship,
and allowing for useful possible worlds talk.
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essence. The next question is whether there is indeed some kind of essential
asymmetry, and if there is, whether RM can account for that. I discuss this
further below in section 5.4.
5.3.3 The Necessary A Posteriori
Another common view is that there is an important class of metaphysical
necessities that are knowable only a posteriori.24 25 This severing of the
traditionally accepted relationship between necessity and a prioricity began
with examples presented by Kripke (1980), including Hesperus is Phospho-
rus; Gold is the element with atomic number 79 ; Cats are animals; and
Water is H2O. These are facts that can only be discovered through empir-
ical methods. These are facts that science has told us. However, Kripke
presented good reasons for thinking that they are nevertheless necessary.
E.g., in the case of ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’, they both refer to the
same thing, and one thing could not have been two things, so it is necessary
that Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus. It might have been that when
the names were first coined, they were used differently, such that they re-
ferred instead to two different objects. However, this would not be a case of
Hesperus no longer being Phosphorus—of one thing being two things—but
rather a case of the name ‘Hesperus’ and the name ‘Phosphorus’ being used
differently. So, once it happened that, in the actual world, ‘Hesperus’ and
‘Phosphorus’ were coined to refer to one and the same thing, it could not
have been that Hesperus was not identical to Phosphorus. That said, it took
some empirical work to discover that the names did indeed pick out the same
thing: that the star shining in the morning sky and the star shining in the
evening sky, which were thusly named, are in fact both the planet Venus.
I have put this in terms of names, because we tend to use names to refer
to things, but the more general point is that we might pick out one thing
in two different ways, and mistakenly believe that we have two things when
we have one, such that although the “two” things picked out are necessarily
identical, that they are identical will be a matter of an empirical discovery
that these two different ways of picking things out pick out one and the same
24The view cannot be that metaphysically necessities are distinctively a posteriori, un-
less one is willing to exclude mathematical truth from the realm of metaphysical necessity.
Advocates of the necessary a posteriori presumably agree that (pure) mathematics is a
priori.
25Note that the view under consideration is that 〈p〉 is necessary and 〈p〉 is knowable
only a posteriori. This is in contrast to considering, in the case where it is necessary
that p, how we can know that it is necessary that p. We are here considering knowledge,
e.g., that Hesperus is Phosphorus, not knowledge that necessarily, Hesperus is Phospho-
rus. Although, it should be noted that if it is knowable only a posteriori that p, it won’t
be knowable a priori that necessarily p (assuming that one knows that necessity implies
truth). So considerations regarding the epistemological status of 〈p〉, where 〈p〉 is nec-
essary, will have some bearing on the epistemological states of the proposition that it is
necessary that p.
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thing.
The Kantian relative view of metaphysical necessity implies an account of
metaphysical necessities as being knowable a priori. If metaphysical neces-
sities are those propositions which follow logically from conditions on expe-
rience, and if logical consequence and conditions on experience are knowable
a priori, then the metaphysical necessities should be knowable a priori. I
take it to be uncontroversial that, if anything is knowable a priori, then
logic is. The question is whether the conditions on experience are. They are
supposed to be knowable via methods such as transcendental arguments,
which are supposed to be a priori. It is, however, unclear what is to be
said about the first premise of these transcendental arguments, i.e., that we
have experience or knowledge, or something similar. This doesn’t look a
priori if we take a priori to mean something like knowable independent of
any experience. But, this is a strong reading. Many philosophers take it
to be reasonable to expect that we need some experience for any kind of
knowledge, if only to acquire concepts, or otherwise to be in a position to
be a knower.
A more plausible way to understand a priori is as meaning knowable
independent of any particular experience. We might need some experience
to get into a position to be a knower, but no experience in particular to
come to know that 2 + 2 = 4. By contrast, we need a particular experience
to come to know, e.g., that grass is green. By these lights, we do need some
experience to come to know that we have experience, but quite clearly we
need no particular experience. So perhaps it is a priori after all. A slightly
stronger way to understand a priori is as meaning knowable independent
of any experience beyond that which is required to acquire the relevant con-
cepts. So not just any experience will do—we need experience suitable for
us to acquire certain concepts—but beyond that no particular experience is
required. So, e.g., we might need some experience suitable for acquisition of
the concepts 2, 4, addition and identity, but no further particular experience
to come to know that 2 + 2 = 4. By constrast, as well as requiring experi-
ence to acquire the concepts green and grass, we need a further particular
experience to come to know that grass is green. By this kind of view, we
will need some experience to acquire the concept of experience. But beyond
that, no particular experience will be required to come to know that we have
experience, any experience will do.26 Again, the first premise counts as a
priori. If this is correct, metaphysical necessities would seem to be knowable
a priori.
I am not going to dwell too long here on the epistemological status of
26Indeed, arguably, any experience might be suitable for acquisition of the concept
experience. Also, we should be able to reflect upon that experience (where we acquired
the concept experience) and note that it was an experience. So all that was required was
any experience at all. In the case of this Kantian premise, one can therefore argue that
these two ways to understand the a priori collapse to the same.
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conditions on experience because, even if they are a priori, there is a simple
way to accommodate Kripkean a posteriori necessities. A common strategy
is to split the cases into an a priori general principle and an a posteriori
instance. Take the Hesperus-Phosphorus example. There is an a priori and
necessary general metaphysical (even logical) principle, so the story goes,
that everything is self-identical. It is a matter of empirical discovery that an
instance of this principle can be expressed by the statement that Hesperus
is Phosphorus. Likewise, in other cases, one can posit a general principle
which is a priori and necessary. What is empirical or a posteriori is the
discovery of what the instances of this principle are.
A posteriori necessity is closely associated with de re necessity. The
standard Kripkean examples are generally taken to be de re and a posteriori.
Take the case of Elizabeth II and George VI. It is supposed to be de re
necessary that Elizabeth II is the daughter of George VI, technically because
names are involved, and intuitively because it is a relation holding necessarily
between those two things. It is also thought to be knowable only a posteriori :
we might understand the names very well, and be able to recognize the
people, without being able to work out any familial relations from this. We
can only come to know that Elizabeth is the daughter of George empirically.
That said, it should not be assumed that de re necessity and a posteriority
always go hand-in-hand. E.g., one might take it to be a de re necessity,
concerning a mathematical object, that 7 is prime. But presumably this kind
of mathematical truth is knowable a priori, despite intuitively concerning
the thing which is the number 7. It is not so easy, however, to think of
an example of an a posteriori necessity which is not de re. Indeed, given
the split treatment I sketched above, where a posteriori necessities involve
particular instances of general principles, one would expect these to be de
re: the general principles are applied to particular things.27
Note also that allowing that metaphysically necessary particular in-
stances follow from metaphysically necessary general principles helps the
view to avoid the triviality problem that threatened some of the other op-
tions discussed in section 5.1. The worry was that a view that made all
metaphysical necessities fall into the class of base propositions would render
the relative part of the view redundant. A particular instance of a general
principle is a good example of a metaphysical necessity which follows from,
but is not one of, the conditions on experience.
27Perhaps the following would count as an a posteriori de dicto necessity (on the con-
troversial assumption that it contains no names): Necessarily, for all x, if x is a quantity
of water, then there is a y which is a hydrogen atom and which is part of x.
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5.4 Typical Cases
On the proposed account, what turns out to be metaphysically necessary?
Not only is this of interest in terms of presenting the details of the account,
but there is also a question of extensional adequacy. There are certain typ-
ical cases of metaphysical necessity which philosophers use as a guide when
considering this kind of modality. I specified at the beginning of this chapter
that the strategy would not be to settle on a class of cases and design an
account with the goal of covering all those cases. But also, neither does it
seem reasonable if an account of metaphysical necessity does not confirm
at least some of those cases. In addition, given that those cases were not
simply pulled out of a hat, but come along with plausible motivations, it
should be possible to give a principled reason why any cases which are not
covered by the proposed account are thus excluded.
I should clarify that it would go beyond the scope of this thesis to defini-
tively say what is, or is not, metaphysically necessary. In the proposed
account, this would amount to being able to show that certain principles
are conditions on experience. This is another significant task to be taken on
elsewhere. What I can do here, though, is to sketch the kind of principles
one would expect to uncover, and which moves would be required to confirm
certain typical cases.
The cases I will be considering are the standard Kantian conditions, the
standard Kripkean examples and mathematical truths. I have discussed
these to some extent already, but I will briefly recap in order to address the
question posed here.
5.4.1 Kantian Cases and Mathematical Truths
Conditions on experience arising from the pure forms of intuition and pure
concepts of the understanding, their logical consequences, and their in-
stances, are what you would expect to come out as metaphysically necessary
on the proposed view. Those arising from the forms of intuition are the more
controversial cases: it is unclear how far one can defend the view that, as a
matter of metaphysical necessity, all objects are spatio-temporal. This is the
kind of view which presents prima facie problems for mathematics, i.e. the
existence of abstract mathematical entities, and indeed any other abstract
objects that one might want to admit (such as propositions, properties etc.).
Setting aside issues to do with sensibility, the kinds of necessities arising from
the idea of conceptual prerequisites for experience are more plausible, e.g.,
the analogies of experience (see section 5.2.1).
I have already discussed mathematical truth at length. Kant himself
took mathematical truths to be what I am calling metaphysically necessary,
given that he took their source to be in the pure forms of intuiton, what I
am calling more generally conditions on experience. If one doesn’t want to
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take Kant’s particular view of mathematics, there are still good prospects
for incorporating alternative views, rendering mathematical truths either as
metaphysically necessary (structuralism, platonism), or as logically neces-
sary (logicism) which will also imply their metaphysical necessity.
5.4.2 Identity
Most of Kripke’s arguments for taking statements of identity between ob-
jects to be necessary are based around understanding these statements in
terms of the self-identity of the thing referred to, rather than a statement of
identity between names. It could have been that the names ‘Hesperus’ and
‘Phosphorus’ were given different meanings, and hence the sentence ‘Hespe-
rus is Phosphorus’, with a different meaning, could have been false. But,
given that the meaning of the sentence is actually something like Venus is
Venus, then, unless one is prepared to allow that something could have failed
to be identical with itself, one must agree that the sentence is necessarily
true. One question, then, is whether the proposed Kantian account confirms
the metaphysical necessity of self-identity for all things.
Nowadays, the necessity of self-identity—∀x(x = x)—is taken to be
a logical truth. As such, one would indeed expect it to be metaphysically
necessary on the Kantian account, in virtue of being logically necessary.
However, it is worth noting that self-identity was not uncontroversial in
the time that Kant was writing. Most notably, Hume raised doubts about
identity and self-identity.
His worry concerns our entitlement to the very idea of a relation
of identity in the first place. Every legitimate idea, after all, must
trace its pedigree to original impressions, and that is precisely
what Hume is here suggesting the supposed idea of a relation
of identity cannot do. His principle of separability—what is dis-
tinguishable is separable; what is separable is separate—makes
the problem particularly acute. Since, as the principle implies,
an impression of a relation must be a relation of impressions, no
single impression could give rise to the idea of any relation, and
no multiplicity of distinct relata could give rise to the idea of one
single item’s self-identity. Accordingly, Hume concludes that the
idea of identity results from a “fiction of the imagination” and
embodies a “mistake”. (Rosenberg, 2000, p. 137)
(See also Hume (1739, 1740, I.IV.ii; pp. 250–1).) In this climate, Kant could
not take self-identity for granted. Kant agreed with Hume that a concept
of identity could not be acquired by abstraction from empirical experience,
but instead of rejecting the concept, he argued how it was rather an a
priori concept, necessary for us to have experience at all. Rosenberg (2000)
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describes in detail how the relevant aspects of Kant’s view, in particular the
Analogies, combine to provide a response to Hume.
What the Transcendental Deduction thus establishes, in short,
is that time is “thought into” our experience precisely in and
by our subsuming our sensible intuitions under object-concepts.
Each of the three Analogies specifies a characteristic or feature
of these object-concepts corresponding to one of the “modes”
of time. We think a unitary durational time into experience by
mobilizing concepts of persisting items (permanent substances);
we think determinate successions of before and after into expe-
rience by mobilizing concepts of causally related items; and we
think contemporaneousness (“this while that”) into experience
by mobilizing concepts of reciprocally causally interactive items.
Here, then, is where Kant locates the notion of a persist-
ing substance. The a priori concept of an object qua unitary,
permanent, self-identical substance is precisely the temporally-
restricted (“schematized”) form of the most-general concept of
an object qua logical-subject-of-judgments, i.e., an object-of-
reference, the single subsistent subject of a multiplicity of in-
hering predicables. The generic (“unschematized”) concept is
“inherence and subsistence”; the persisting substance of the First
Analogy is its temporally-restricted (“schematized”) form.
(Rosenberg, 2000, p. 142)
I will not dwell on the particular arguments here. I just want to highlight
that, in accommodating the necessity of self-identity in this historical con-
text, Kant can be understood to have made significant progress, where to
us now this might appear to be a simple case of accommodating a logical
truth.
So, self-identity should count as metaphysically necessary on the Kantian
view, either in virtue of being a logical truth, or arising from considerations
to do with substance in the Analogies. We can then move from the general
case to particular instances, e.g. (Socrates = Socrates).
The next question concerns cases of identity where different names are
involved, e.g. “Hesperus is Phosphorus”. These can’t be understood as
instances of x = x given the different names, but rather as instances of
x = y. One step towards accommodating such cases is to draw attention to
Barcan’s logical proof of the necessity of identity. Barcan (1947) famously
proved the following theorem:
∀x∀y(x = y ⊃ x = y)
Given that we have a proof in logic, we can conclude that it is logically
necessary that, whenever identity holds, it holds necessarily. As we have
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a logical proof, the relative Kantian account is able to accommodate this
general necessity in virtue of its being logically necessary. (Note also that
Barcan’s proof begins with the premise ∀x(x = x), so this builds upon the
former case of the necessity of self -identity.)
However, this does not yet give us particular instances, e.g. that neces-
sarily, Hesperus is Phosphorus. Normally, one could simply employ the rule
of ∀-elimination, replacing a universal quantifier and the variables it binds
with a constant, i.e.
a = b ⊃ a = b.
However, Barcan’s proof relies upon using a free logic.28 This means that
we can only infer instances of the principle for constants already in use, i.e.
for things whose existence has already been proven.
Suppose that a = b. How far can we get within the confines of Barcan’s
free logic?
(1) ∀x∀y(x = y ⊃ x = y) Barcan’s theorem
2 (2) a = b assumption
2 (3) a = b ⊃ a = b ∀E (twice),1,2
2 (4) a = b MPP,2,3
Crucially, we can only conclude that necessarily, a = b on the assumption
that a = b. However, this is not obviously a problem. We don’t want it to
be a matter of logical necessity that Hesperus is Phosphorus, because Venus
might have failed to exist. All that we had in mind was the claim that,
should Hesperus and Phosphorus exist, they could not fail to be identical.
So it seems fair to say that, on the assumption that Hesperus is Phosphorus,
we can conclude that necessarily, Hesperus is Phosphorus.
However, all is not well. A problem arises when we try to make sense of
the resulting principle—that on the assumption that a = b, it is metaphysi-
cally necessary that a = b—in terms of RM. What we will have is something
like principle (ID)
(ID) On the assumption that a = b: ∃ϕ(Cϕ & (ϕ→ a = b))
This says, roughly, that assuming that a = b, there is a conjunction of con-
ditions on experience which entails that a = b. But recall, conditions on
experience are general: “a = b” (e.g. “Hesperus is Phosphorus”) is partic-
ular, containing as it does constants (names). This would be fine if there
was a plausible general condition on experience, an instance of which would
be “a = b”. But consider the universal generalizations of this statement.
28Very briefly, Barcan’s proof starts with the premise ∀x(x = x). In a non-free,
classical logic one could infer from this that (a = a), and from there that a exists. But
we do not want it to turn out that it is a logical truth that a exists. So a free logic is
employed, which blocks that particular inference.
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“∀x∀y(x = y)” is false, and the others—“∀x(a = x)” and “∀x(x = b)”—are
not only false, but not sufficiently general.
One response to the problem is to argue that, if we have shown that (ID)
is true, but that there are no general conditions on experience to logically
entail “a = b”, given that “a = b” is indeed true, then there must be partic-
ular conditions on experience which logically entail “a = b”, i.e. conditions
on how a and b must be, not just general conditions on how all things must
be. But such conditions do not look to be plausible candidates for prereq-
uisites for any experience at all. Apart from anything, many of the relevant
entities, such as Hesperus, are contingent. It would be odd if features of
contingent entities were built into the conditions on any experience at all,
which might easily fail to include the existence of those entities.
I think we have to reject principle (ID), and the steps which took us
there. A plausible diagnosis of the problem may highlight the difference
between considerations to do with entities and their self-identity, which is
accommodated by the Kantian view, and issues arising from complicating
matters by introducing different ways of referring to entities. Insofar as
the sentence “Hesperus is Phosphorus” picks out the state of affairs that
Venus is self-identical, the Kantian view can perfectly well accommodate the
necessity of this self-identity. It appears that the Kantian view has serious
difficulties accommodating this necessity when it is expressed using different
names. Perhaps this is a consequence of the view focusing on the necessity of
things, without having taken into account ways of referring to things. I will
have to leave further discussion of this issue for elsewhere, but the points to
bear in mind are (1) that the Kantian account can still accommodate some
necessities to do with identity; (2) that even accommodating self-identity
should be viewed as an achievement as set against a Humean background;
and (3) that further investigation into the different ways we refer to objects,
and how that is best incorporated into this view, may ultimately show how
these Kripkean identities could be accommodated in my prosposed account
of metaphysical necessity.
What about statements of identity between natural kinds? The Kripkean
claims that there are kinds of stuff, such as water, gold, cats and tigers, and
that there are necessary and sufficient conditions for being of a kind. But
our ordinary (non-scientific) ways of identifying kinds do not tend to use
those necessary conditions. E.g., we ordinarily define a tiger as a kind of
quadruped, but a three-legged tiger is still a tiger. Implicit in the way we
think and talk about kinds is the idea that there is an underlying feature
which makes for a natural kind, and that these features are discoverable by
science. E.g., science has revealed to us that gold is the element with atomic
number 79, and that water is the compound H2O. Now, the word ‘water’,
taken by Kripke to be a common name for a natural kind, might have been
given a different meaning. However, as things actually are, its meaning has
been fixed to refer to that natural kind which is the compound H2O. The
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stuff which is water just is H2O. Kripke construes statements such as ‘Water
is H2O’ as identity statements between names of natural kinds, analogous
to identity statements between proper names. For analogous reasons, he
argues that they are also metaphysically necessary. So long as the words in
the statement do not change their meaning, then it has to be true, on pain
of a kind no longer being identical with itself.
Taking the Kripkean story at face value, these cases should be covered by
the same considerations as for any other identity statements: the necessity
of self-identity for natural kinds will be accommodated, but statements of
identity involving different names for the same natural kind will be problem-
atic. One might worry whether it is correct to understand these statements
as genuinely of the form of an identity statement—K1 = K2—or whether
they have some other fundamental logical form, such as a statement of con-
stitution, e.g. K1 is constituted by K2. If they are not identity statements,
then the discussion above does not apply. Furthermore, this is all premised
on agreeing that there are natural kinds as something real in the world,
rather than their merely being a way that humans tend to classify things.
These, however, are not problems internal to the question of whether these
cases are accommodated by the proposed account. Taking the cases at face
value, there are reasons to think they can only be accommodated in a limited
sense. Insofar as general questions might be raised concerning clarification
of the nature of these cases, this is not something that the proposed view
needs to take care of at this stage.29
5.4.3 Essentiality Theses
Here are some examples of the kinds of cases up for consideration:
• If Socrates is human, then necessarily, Socrates is human.
• If Socrates originated from zygotes X and Y , then necessarily, Socrates
originated from zygotes X and Y .
• If table T is constituted by hunk of wood W , then necessarily, table
T is constituted by hunk of wood W .
These illustrate (necessities arising from) the essentiality of kind, origin and
constitution, respectively.
In accordance with the proposed view of metaphysical necessity, and
understanding the necessity in these principles to be metaphysical, they
should be cashed-out as follows:
• If Socrates is human, then ∃ϕ(Cϕ & (ϕ→ Socrates is human)).
29See also Hanna (1998) for a Kantian argument against these kinds of cases.
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• If Socrates originated from zygotes X and Y , then
∃ϕ(Cϕ & (ϕ→ Socrates originated from zygotes X and Y )).
• If table T is constituted by hunk of wood W , then
∃ϕ(Cϕ & (ϕ→ T is constituted by W )).
It can be seen that these cases, when cashed-out, will fall foul of the same
problem as principle (ID) above (section 5.4.2). What general principles,
following from general conditions on experience, could underwrite instances
such as “Socrates is human”? Again, the candidate universal generalizations
of these instances do not do the job. E.g. “∀x(x is human)” is false, as are
“∀X(Socrates is X)” and “∀x∀X(x is X)”.
One way to cover these cases might be to include explicit essentialist
principles as, or following from, conditions on experience. So, e.g., it might
be a general metaphysical necessity that if x is of kind K, then x is essen-
tially of kind K. The idea would be to incorporate such principles without
including an implication from essence to metaphysical necessity. I.e. trouble
would ensue if this implied that if x is of kind K, then it is metaphysically
necessary that x is of kind K, and hence that conditions on experience entail
x is of kind K. Not only would this implication undermine the proposed
account of metaphysical necessity, in letting essentialism in the back door,
but this would lead us back to the original problem. Perhaps there is room
for some sui generis notion of essence here, but work needs to be done to
show how these bad consequences can be avoided, as well as showing that
plausible general essentialist principles are (or arise from) prerequisites for
experience.
These kinds of essentiality theses all come down to the issue of what the
identity of something consists in. To properly address whether a Kantian
view can accommodate these kinds of cases, we need to go back and con-
sider what the identity of an object consists in in that Kantian framework.
However, Kant doesn’t say very much explicitly about identity. We saw
that what he says about substance can be viewed as a response to Hume’s
rejection of identity. We can also look at his response to Leibniz’s principle
of the identity of indiscernibles. Leibniz held that there couldn’t be two
qualitatively identical objects, and hence that if x and y are qualitatively
identical, then they are numerically identical. Kant argues that this prin-
ciple is false for appearances, i.e. objects in the world of experience. For
we have to take into account intuitions as well as concepts of objects. So
it is enough for two qualitatively identical objects to be distinct if they are
given in different intuitions. Given the spatio-temporal form of intuition,
this boils down the view that a difference in spatial location at the same
time is sufficient for numerical difference, even if all the (other) properties
of objects are exactly the same.
But if it is appearance, we are not concerned to compare con-
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cepts; even if there is no difference whatever as regards the con-
cepts, difference of spatial position at one and the same time is
still an adequate ground for the numerical difference of the ob-
ject, that is, of the object of the senses. Thus in the case of two
drops of water we can abstract altogether from all internal differ-
ence (of quality and quantity), and the mere fact that they have
been intuited simultaneously in different spatial positions is suf-
ficient justification for holding them to be numerically different.
(Kant, 1781, 1787, A263–4/B319–20)
Admittedly, this gives us a sufficient condition for difference, not identity.
It implies that identity must therefore involve spatio-temporal overlap, but
this may only be a necessary condition. It may be insufficient for identity
without, e.g., sameness of kind or sameness of origin. At least this shows
that identity and difference in a Kantian framework importantly involve
spatio-temporal relations, or more generally, conditions to do with intuitions,
particular presentations, of objects. Perhaps we can build extra conditions
into this, such that some kind of essentiality theses were included, but these
certainly do not appear to be required by a Kantian framework.
In the end, it looks as though it will be tricky to incorporate these kinds
of cases into the proposed account of metaphysical necessity. But that is
not necessarily a bad thing. First, lots of cases can be accommodated,
such as mathematical truths, consequences of Kant’s categories, and self-
identity. So we should not be worried about extensional adequacy. Second,
I have attempted to provide a well-motivated account of what it is to be
metaphysically necessary. If a consequence of the account is that it is not
metaphysically necessary that, e.g., Socrates is human, then we can simply
take this to be a lesson about what is metaphysically necessary. Not everyone
finds all of these essentiality theses intuitively plausible, so such people will
be happy to take the lesson. Finally, such cases have not been definitively
ruled out. Someone who is strongly committed to these cases may still be
able to find a way to accommodate them in my proposed account.
5.5 The Case for Kantian Metaphysical Necessity
In this chapter I have introduced an account of metaphysical necessity as
an instance of RM, supplemented by Kant’s views on real modality. In
summary, the merits of this view are as follows. First, the view is set in
the background of general arguments in favour of RM. If these arguments
are successful, then some relative account of metaphysical necessity will be
required. I have argued that this is a good one. The view is also set against
a Kantian background. If one finds considerations such as the Problem of
Reality to be a genuine and significant worry, then this account will stand
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a better chance of avoiding this problem, given that it has been developed
out of what can be construed as Kant’s response.
Second, given the requirement for some relative account of metaphysical
necessity, the Kantian account fairs better than some of the most obvious
alternatives. A possible worlds account either rendered the relative aspect
of the account redundant, or confused the modal status of propositions as-
sessed using the theory with the modal status of the theory itself. Peacocke’s
principles of possibility reduced to an account similar in key respects either
to a possible worlds or an essentialist account. Thus, this approach stands
or falls with one of those two. An essentialist account again threatened to
render the relative aspect of the account redundant. Moreover, combining
essentialism with RM failed to capture the spirit of essentialism. A defla-
tionary account faced some serious challenges in its own right, and did not
seem to be compatible with RM.
In contrast, a kind of relative necessity based on Kant’s real necessity
was seen to fill the boots of metaphysical necessity well, i.e. there are good
reasons for taking this kind of necessity to be the strictest real necessity. Not
only does the account accord with this general idea of what metaphysical
necessity is, but it also turned out to confirm some (albeit not all) typical
cases of metaphysical necessity. The account is also able to accommodate
mathematical necessity, but is flexible enough to be adapted to suit different
views in the philosophy of mathematics. It would not do if this account
prejudged to too great an extent the nature of mathematics, and indeed
there is scope to alter parts of the account depending upon the results of
further investigation into mathematics.
The proposed view is also able to account for the association made be-
tween metaphysical necessity, de re necessity and the a posteriori. Not all
metaphysical necessity is deemed to be de re necessity, and neither is all
de re necessity deemed to be metaphysical. However, the view can account
for some de re metaphysical necessity, dependent upon what turns out to
be the best formal definition of the distinction. That some metaphysical
necessities are knowable only a posteriori was accounted for by drawing on
an existing strategy of separating a priori general necessities and their a
posteriori instances.
Another advantage of using a Kantian framework is epistemological. To
defend a Kantian view of the a priori is beyond the remit of the present
project, but the line of thought goes something like this. We like to think
that, not only do we have knowledge of many propositions that are meta-
physically necessary, i.e. knowledge that p where it is metaphysically neces-
sary that p; but also knowledge that certain propositions are metaphysically
necessary, i.e. knowledge that it is metaphysically necessary that p. Our
knowledge of propositions that are metaphysically necessary may often be
uncontentiously a posteriori, e.g. few would argue that we can know that
Socrates is human a priori, even if they claim that it is necessary. More gen-
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eral metaphysical necessities, such as all objects are causally related, may be
said to be known a priori.
In the case of knowledge that something is metaphysically necessary, it
is unclear how this kind of knowledge could ever be, at bottom, empirical.30
Indeed, Kant asserts that
Experience teaches us that a thing is so and so, but not that it
cannot be otherwise. (Kant, 1781, 1787, B3)
The thought is that, much as empirical experience of the world can tell us
how things are, there is nothing extra in experience which could account for
our knowing how things must be. This is the same line of thought that lead
Hume to deny that we can have knowledge of necessary causal connections
(Hume, 1777, VI–V). Hume thought that the only a priori knowledge was to
do with “relations of ideas”—logical and conceptual matters—as opposed to
matters of fact. We cannot logically or analytically infer an effect from the
cause, so Hume concluded that any knowledge of the necessary connection
of cause and effect would have to be empirical knowledge. But then there
is nothing in our experience of the cause which is the power to produce the
effect. Hume thus concluded that we acquire our idea of causal connection
via a non-rational custom of the mind to expect an effect to occur after its
cause as a result of having repeatedly seen the two in regular conjunction.
All belief of matter of fact or real existence [cause and effect]
is derived merely from some object, present to the memory or
senses, and a customary conjunction between that and some
other object.. . . All these operations are a species of natural in-
stincts, which no reasoning or process of the thought and under-
standing is able either to produce or to prevent. (Hume, 1777,
V.I.38)
Hume saw that we could not have empirical knowledge of necessary connec-
tions, but also thought we could not have a priori knowledge of non-logical
necessary connections. Kant agreed with the first point, but expanded the
notion of a priori knowledge to also cover substantive, synthetic truths.
Kant’s idea is that the synthetic a priori finds its source in the conditions
on experience. Real necessity also has its source here. So, one way to come
to know that something is really (metaphysically) necessary is to come to
know that it one of, or follows from, the conditions on experience. The
thought is then that, in principle, this account makes it easier to see how
we could have substantive knowledge of the world without requiring any
particular experience of the world. The source of the necessity is in the
subject, and it seems plausible to expect that it will be easier to find out
30We might learn that it is metaphysically necessary that p on some empirical basis,
such as from reliable testimony. But how did the testifier come to know it?
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things about ourselves without engaging in a particular experience with the
world, than to find out things about the external world. This is not to
say that the project will be easy. The point is that there is a principled
link between the subject and necessary truth which may help to account for
our a priori knowledge of necessity. By contrast, a full-blooded realist who
takes metaphysical necessity to have its source in utterly mind-independent
things, such as essences or other worlds, needs to explain how we can have
knowledge of that necessity without requiring particular experience which
we arguably cannot have.
Finally, it has also been shown that the proposed account is able to
honour intuitions that metaphysical necessity is absolute as well as intuitions
that only logical necessity is absolute. Logical necessity is absolute, in the
sense of being the strongest alethic necessity, but we are drawn to think that
metaphysical necessity is absolute because it is the strongest real necessity.
The main weakness with this approach might be that it rests on a Kan-
tian framework which requires exploration and defence in its own right.
However, I have indicated where the primary Kantian commitments lie, and
sketched the kinds of arguments and considerations that will bear on their
ultimate success or failure. The purpose of this chapter has been to consider
how a Kantian relative modality view of metaphysical necessity would func-
tion, and what its primary advantages would be. It has turned out to be
one of the betters ways to flesh-out RM to give an account of metaphysical
necessity.
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